A Defence of Informed Preference Satisfaction Theories of WelfareRoberto Fumagalli
27 June 2024
CANCELLED Roberto Fumagalli (King's College London), 17:15 - 18:45, presents his project in the Interdisciplinary Research Seminar of the GRK "Collective Decision-Making”.
Location: Room 0079, Von-Melle-Park 5
Abstract
This paper defends informed preference satisfaction theories of welfare against the most influential objections put forward in the philosophical and economic literatures. The paper explicates and addresses in turn: the objection from inner rational agents; the objection from unfeasible preference reconstruction; the objection from dubious normative commitments; the objection from conceptual ambiguity; and the objection from conceptual replacement. My defence does not exclude that preference satisfaction theories of welfare face significant conceptual and practical challenges. Still, if correct, it demonstrates that philosophers/welfare economists are justified in relying on specific versions of such theories, namely informed preference satisfaction theories of welfare.
Find the abstract as PDF here.