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DFG Graduate Program Collective Decision-Making

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Research

P1: Consensus, compromise, and deliberation

Recent scholarship has criticized the orientation of deliberative theorists toward consensus as chimerical, overly ambitious or counterproductive. Especially under current conditions of “democratic regression” in polarized societies, consensus-oriented procedures may empirically backfire and not result in correct or problem-solving outcomes or an increase in acceptance and/or legitimacy. Faced with these objections, deliberative theory has turned to the notion of compromise, and discussed the epistemic merits of presumptively more widespread, more frequently feasible agreement. In this, it has found an ally in the methodology of ‘political realism’.

This research area will focus on the success conditions of consensus and compromise, e.g. in reducing affective and ideological polarization as well as in reaching optimal epistemic problem-solving. One question is whether polarization in itself (as opposed to deep conflict) could undermine compromise. Since strategic behavior can influence the epistemic value of the decision as well as the degree of compliance it is crucial to understand whether there is any difference between procedures aiming at consensus or compromise with respect to their susceptibility to strategic manipulation.

Objectives

  • To evaluate the respective merits of consensus and compromise from the perspective of political realism.
  • To investigate how strategic behaviour can influence the epistemic value of consensus and compromise.
  • To address the implications of compliance requirements for consensus and compromise.

Suggested Readings

Barberà, S. (2001): “An Introduction to Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions”. Social Choice and Welfare 18, No. 4, 619-653.

Barberà, S. and A. Gerber (2017): “Sequential Voting and Agenda Manipulation”. Theoretical Economics 12, 211–247.

Braham, M. and F. Steffen (2003): “Voting Rules in Insolvency Law: A Simple-Game Theoretic Approach,” International Review of Law and Economics, 22, 421-442.

Carl, C. and P. Bech-Pedersen (2025): “Compromise and Consensus: Toward a Two-Track Model of Deliberation”, Political Studies, OnlineFirst https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217241297.

Cozzaglio, I. (2021): “Legitimacy between Acceptance and Acceptability: A Subjects-first View”. Social Theory and Practice 48(1), 61-88.

Cozzaglio, I. and G. Favara (2022): “Political Realism and the Quest for Political Progress”. Constellations 29(1), 93-106.

Niesen, P. (ed.) (2023): Zur Diagnose demokratischer Regression. Leviathan 51, Sonderband 40.

Rossi, E. and M. Sleat (2014): “Realism in Normative Political Theory”, Philosophy Compass  9/10: 689–701.

Voigt, S. (2023): "Nichtmajoritäre Institutionen – eine Gefahr für die konstitutionelle Demokratie?“ Leviathan 51, Sonderband 40, 282-302.