Implementation in Undominated Strategies: Dictatorship and CompromiseSaptarshi Mukherjee

6 June 2024

Saptarshi Mukherjee (Indian Institute of Technology Delhi), 17:15 - 18:45, presents his project in the Interdisciplinary Research Seminar of the GRK "Collective Decision-Making”.

Location: Room 0079, Von-Melle-Park 5

Abstract

In this paper we consider implementation of a social choice correspondence (SCC) in undominated strategies by a finite mechanism, and address an open question in the literature. An outcome is called a “compromise” if it is Pareto efficient but not most-preferred by any agent. We show that it is impossible to implement an efficient SCC that enforces only compromises at a preference profile when the SCC satisfies a condition called reverse strategy-resistance. To prove this result, we introduce a new monotonicity condition which is necessary for implementation. As a corollary, when the SCC satisfies anonymity and neutrality in addition, any implementable SCC is shown to be tops-inclusive.

Find the abstract as PDF here.