Research Seminar Environmental & Development Economics“Do Regulators Strategically Avoid Pollution Hotspots when Siting Monitors? Evidence from Remote Sensing of Air Pollution“Corbett Grainger (University of Wisconsin)
23. Januar 2019
The Research Seminar Environmental & Development Economics welcomes Corbett Grainger (University of Wisconsin), who will present his work on
“Do Regulators Strategically Avoid Pollution Hotspots when Siting Monitors? Evidence from Remote Sensing of Air Pollution”.
Place: Zentralbibliothek Recht, Rothenbaumchaussee 33 (Google Maps), Room Ro 33 BG 3/4
We are looking forward to seeing you there!
In the United States, the design of ambient air pollution monitoring networks is delegated to local regulatory agencies. Monitoring data determine compliance with federal standards, creating a principal-agent problem. We employ monitoring data and satellite-derived pollution estimates to characterize pollution at unmonitored locations. We then test for strategic siting behavior by local regulators. Leveraging diff erences in federal oversight between attainment and nonattainment counties, we find evidence that local regulators avoid pollution hotspots when siting new monitors. Monitoring data in attainment counties systematically understates pollution compared to nonattainment counties, suggesting that nonattainment designation, used widely in the economics literature, is endogenous.