P7: Interactive compliance: The acceptance of collective decision rules and outcomes
Legal rules that have been established as the outcome of collective decision-making procedures are often incompletely complied with: the behavior of political and state actors (politicians, civil servants, judges) and citizens may diverge considerably from the letter of the law. It is clearly important to account for this potential non-compliance when trying to understand the implications of constitutional rules for society.
This project investigates the factors that determine the non-compliance of state representatives with their constitutions, as well as interactions with non-compliance at the level of the citizen with derived decisions. The different dimensions of the project are to be tackled using a variety of methods including traditional empirical studies of (large n) cross-country studies, (small n) case studies as well as experimental studies on the legitimacy–compliance link.
- To study the determinants of non-compliance.
- To explore the interactions between compliance at different levels of society.
- To investigate the dynamics that result from externally changing conditions.
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