P4: Electoral competition
In politics collective outcomes arise from the interaction of individual voters and parties under various institutional arrangements. Core determinants of collective outcomes are the decisions of parties to enter and exit the political arena, their changes of location within this arena, as well as voters’ responses to these changes in the political market.
This project is rooted in public choice theory. It will focus on building economic models of electoral competition based on empirical knowledge from party and voter research, while at the same time providing additional theoretical foundation to the empirical work done in political science.
- To explore how the distribution of voter bliss points affect collective outcomes.
- To study the effect of preference externalities.
- To investigate a two-dimensional model of electoral competition.
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