Research
Our primary research interests are:
Design of Health Insurance Contracts
Health insurance contracts insure financial risks associated with illness and make expensive therapies accessible. At the same time, they affect preventive health behavior and the incentives to use medical services efficiently. We analyze the impact of the different health insurance contracts and examine the implications for the optimal design of health insurance.
Finance and Design of Social Health Insurance Systems
Social health insurance systems can be financed by income-related contributions, flat premiums or tax-financed subsidies. We analyze the impact of the different ways of financing health care and examine the implications for the optimal design of social health insurance.
Paying Hospitals and Physicians
Payment systems for hospital and physicians affect how patients are treated. Prospective systems give incentives to treat patient cost-efficiently. However, they can have adverse effects on the quality of treatment. Patients may also receive unnecessary treatment or may be denied treatment. We analyze the impact of the different ways of paying providers and examine the implications for the optimal design of payment systems.