The Governance Architecture of Climate Agreements in the Light of Solar Radiation ManagementMichael Finus
13. April 2023
Michael Finus (Universität Ganz) presents his project "The Governance Architecture of Climate Agreements in the Light of Solar Radiation" in the Microeconomics Research Seminar at VMP 5, room 0079 17:15-18:45.
Abstract: We analyse how geoengineering in the form of solar radiation management (SRM), associated
with the potential of high collateral damages, affects the governance architecture of climate
agreements. We clarify under which conditions signatories to a climate agreement can avoid
that non-signatories use SRM. We correct and qualify results of Millard-Ball (2012) who claims
that if countries perceive the potential collateral damages of SRM to be sufficiently high (lower
threshold), a climate change agreement on greenhouse gas emission reductions preventing the
deployment of SRM technologies is stable. We show that an additional though a similar
condition is necessary to make the avoidance of SRM rational in the first place. Moreover, we
also show that such an agreement can only be stable if the threat to deploy SRM is credible
which requires that collateral damages are perceived to be sufficiently low (upper threshold).
Hence, Millard-Ball is far too optimistic about the prospects of using SRM as a threat in order
to stabilize a large climate agreement. We show that our results are robust in two analytical
frameworks frequently used in the game-theoretic analysis of international environmental
agreements.