Incentives, Framing, and Trust in Algorithmic Advice: An Experimental StudyBen Greiner
19. Januar 2023
Ben Greiner (Wien University) presents his project "Incentives, Framing, and Trust in Algorithmic Advice: An Experimental Study" in our Microeconomics Research Seminar @VMP5, Room 0079, on Thursday, January 19, 5:15-6:45 PM.
Abstract: Managerial decision-makers are increasingly supported by advanced data analytics and other AI-based technologies, but are often found to be hesitant to follow the algorithmic advice. We examine how
compensation contract design and framing of an AI algorithm influence decision-makers' reliance on algorithmic advice and performance in a price estimation task. Based on a large sample of almost 1,500participants, we find that compared to a fixed compensation, both compensation contracts based on individual performance and tournament contracts lead to an increase in invested effort and to more reliance on algorithmic advice. We further find that using an AI algorithm that is framed as incorporating also human expertise has positive effects on advice utilization, especially for decision-makers with fixed pay contracts. By showing how widely used control practices such as incentives and task framing influence the interaction of human decision-makers with AI algorithms, our findings have direct implications for managerial practice.