Mechanism Design meets Priority Design: Redesigning the US Army’s Branching ProcessTayfun Sönmez
25. November 2021
Tayfun Sönmez (Boston College) presents his project "Mechanism Design meets Priority Design: Redesigning the US Army’s Branching Process" (joint with Kyle Greenberg and Parag A. Pathak) in the Microeconomics Research Seminar via Zoom on Thursday, November 25, 17:15-18:45. To register for the seminar, you may write to huyen.nguyen-1"AT"uni-hamburg.de or gero.henseler"AT"uni-hamburg.de.
Abstract: Army cadets obtain occupations through a centralized process. Three objectives – increasing retention, aligning talent, and enhancing trust – have guided reforms to this process since 2006. West Point’s mechanism for the Class of 2020 exacerbated challenges implementing Army policy aims. We formulate these desiderata as axioms and study their implications theoretically and with administrative data. We show that the Army’s objectives not only determine an allocation mechanism, but also a specific priority policy, a uniqueness result that integrates mechanism and priority design. These results led to a re-design of the mechanism, now adopted at both West Point and ROTC.