Microeconomics and Industrial Organization
Research Seminar MicroeconomicsOn the credibility of threats in finitely repeated social-dilemma gamesRalph Bayer (University of Adelaide)
28 November 2019
The Microeconomics Research Seminar welcomes Ralph Bayer (University of Adelaide), who will present his project
"On the credibility of threats in finitely repeated social-dilemma games".
Place: VMP 9, S28
Hour: 17:15 - 18:45
We are looking forward to seeing you there!
Abstract
Various experimental studies have shown that the availability of a punishment option can increase the prevalence of cooperative behaviour in repeated social dilemmas. Such a threat is only effective if it is perceived as credible. We investigate if the credibility of threats stems from standard strategic equilibrium considerations (Nash Equilibrium or Subgame Perfect NE). We find that threats are credible due to non-strategic motivations (such as negative reciprocity) and that subgame perfection does not further improve credibility.