Research Seminar MicroeconomicsSequential Primary ElectionMatthias Dahm (U Nottingham)

13 December 2018

The Microeconomics Research Seminar welcomes Matthias Dahm (University of Nottingham), who will present his work on

"Sequential Primary Election".

Place: Room 250, Allende-Platz 1
Hour: 17:15 - 18:45
We are looking forward to seeing you there!

Abstract:

We examine the incentives of party leaders to establish a sequential or a simultaneous presidential primary process. In our model voting in the primary takes place under the `shadow' of the general election which creates an important unity-concern in the primary election. We show that the optimal primary arrangement is the result of a trade-o ff between information aggregation and the ability of the primary to create unity. Unlike in previous work, informative voting is not always an equilibrium of the sequential game and the existence of a sincere voting equilibrium can therefore be seen as the mayor advantage of the simultaneous primary arrangement. However, due to the unity-concern, voters do herd in the sequential game allowing to create unity and to turn out voters in the national election. This ability to `hide' a `divided' party and to generate a voting outcome in which the party is `uni ed' behind the nominee can be seen as the mayor advantage of the sequential primary process.