Research Seminar Microeconomics“Price versus Quantity Competition in a Mixed Duopoly: A General Analysis”Hong Hwang (National Taiwan University)
12 July 2018
The Microeconomics Research Seminar welcomes Hong Hwang (National Taiwan Univerity), who will present his work on
“Price versus Quantity Competition in a Mixed Duopoly: A General Analysis”.
Place: Room 0029, Von-Melle-Park 5
Hour: 17:15 - 18:45
We are looking forward to seeing you there!
Abstract
This paper investigates social welfare in a mixed duopoly with partial privatization. It is found that the welfare ranking between Cournot and Bertrand competition is ambiguous, depending on the degree of privatization of the public firm. Specifically, social welfare is higher under Bertrand than Cournot competition if the degree of privatization is low or high. The ranking is reversed if the degree of the privatization falls in the middle range. Furthermore, if the two firms are allowed to take asymmetric competition strategies, social welfare is the highest if the public firm with partial privatization chooses price whereas the private firm chooses quantity as their competition strategies. These results are sharply different from those appeared in the mixed duopoly literature.