

# Deliberative structures and their impact on voting behavior under social conflict\*

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## Abstract

Inequalities in democracies are multi-faceted. They not only incorporate differences in economic opportunities, but also differences in access to information and social influence. In a lab experiment, we study the interaction of these inequalities to provide a better understanding of socio-political tensions in modern societies. We identify the *tragedy of the elite*, the dilemma that privileged access to information about a fundamental state that mediates political conflict creates lying incentives for the better informed. In our experiment, an electorate consists of two groups, one informed and one uninformed about an uncertain state of the world. Incentives depend on this state. Before voting the two groups can communicate. We study four different communication protocols which vary the access to communication channels of the two groups and are meant to represent societies with different degrees of openness. We hypothesize that the deliberative structures affect group identities, preferences, and voting. Our observed outcomes largely coincide with those predicted by our theoretical analysis.

*Keywords:* Communication, Social Conflict, Inequality

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# 1 Introduction

Inequality in democracies does not only involve differences in economic opportunities, but also differences in access to information about the workings of society, as well as different levels of social influence through different access to communication channels. A sound analysis of how these inequalities interact and potentially even reinforce each other is essential for a better understanding of some of the current socio-political tensions in modern societies. In this paper we present the results from a lab experiment based on a voting game that sheds light on these interactions.

We study an environment which represents a society split into two distinct groups that differ along various dimensions. The state of the world is uncertain and while the members of one of the groups have some information about the state of the world, the members of the other group are uninformed. In both states of the world the same set of policies can be implemented, which lead to different distributions of material payoffs between the groups. In one state of the world the two groups have conflicting material interests, whereas in the other state their material interests are aligned. Hence, there is a state in which a consensus should be easy to reach and another state which leads to potential political conflict. The collective choice of policy is determined through a vote in which all individuals from both groups can participate. Before the vote takes place the individuals of both groups can communicate with each other under protocols or *deliberative structures* that differ in hierarchy between the informed and the uninformed. Our focus is on how such different deliberative structures affect preferences, information aggregation and transmission, voting behavior and outcomes.

Our motivation stems primarily from political situations in democracies in which the information about prevailing economic conditions is often unequally distributed between social groups (Borgonovi et al. (2010), Pande (2011) and Sapienza and Zingales (2013)). In particular, in cases where the informed and the uninformed parts of the society have different interests, efficient outcomes may be hard to reach, because the problems of information aggregation and transmission interact with the conflict between social groups. Information about the state of the world transmitted by the informed to the uninformed may not be truthful or may be suspected not to be. All this may lead to society's inefficient use of information and to social conflict.

We propose that different deliberative structures trigger distinct preferences of the members of the two groups in the spirit of the notion of state-dependent preferences introduced by Bowles and Polanía-Reyes (2012). State-dependence arises because actions are motivated by a heterogeneous repertoire of preferences the salience of which depends on the nature of the decision situation (p. 373). The general idea is that preferences often depend on some specific features surrounding the act of choice which are salient to the

decision-makers involved.<sup>1</sup> In our case we propose that different deliberative structures affect group identities and hence players' preferences.

In our experiments the two groups have different payoffs and receive different information, so that there are two fundamental asymmetries between them. We use different colors to refer to the two groups, white for the informed and blue for the uninformed.<sup>2</sup> Given these differences we study how group identity is affected by the different deliberative structures. We vary the audience that players of each color can address at the communication stage. Our hypothesis is that these variations lead to two different group identities of the two groups, being either color-group identity or voting-group identity, i.e. the group that includes both color groups.

We study four deliberative structures in four distinct experimental treatments. In our baseline treatment, *NoChat*, there is no communication between participants. The other three deliberative structures model different degrees of openness of a society. In the first of the deliberative structures we study, called *Deliberation*, the two groups are on equal foot and communication is unrestricted. All members of both groups can freely chat with each other. Specifically, each individual can write messages that are seen by all other participants and read the messages written by all other participants. With this structure we want to represent the ideal situation of an open society where all members of a society participate under equal conditions in the exchange of ideas that takes place before voting.

In the two other structures we incorporate into the modeling the unequal access of different social groups to the public communication process in actual democracies. In the deliberative structure called *TopDown* only the informed group has access to public communication channels. In this case all members of the informed group can write messages that are seen by all other participants, whereas all the members of the uninformed group can read all the messages written by all participants in the informed group, but can themselves not write any messages. Those who are better informed are also those who dominate the communication process. Nevertheless in *TopDown* the content of whites' communication is transparent. The society is integrated and all its members know what is being said at all times. By contrast, in *TopDownClosed*, there is an additional element of segregation in the communication process which gives the informed group an additional advantage. In this structure, there are two stages. First, all members of the informed group can freely communicate with each other without the uninformed being able to read these messages. The second stage is like *TopDown* above, i.e. all members of the informed group can write messages that are seen by all other participants, whereas all the members of the uninformed group can read all the messages written by all participants

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<sup>1</sup>Bowles and Polanía-Reyes (2012) focus on how the presence of monetary incentives triggers different preferences.

<sup>2</sup>The experiment was conducted in Germany, where "white" and "blue" (collar) do not have the same social connotation as in the English-speaking world.

in the informed group, but can themselves not write any messages.

Democracy at its best involves more than just decision making through voting. It also requires a process of interaction between all members of a society, without exclusion, in which different societal options are discussed. When this process takes place under ideal conditions it is often referred to as deliberation. Through a pure deliberation process people can become more willing to come to adopt the identity of the group as a whole (Dawes et al. (1990), Orbell et al. (1988), Dryzek and List (2003)).

However, if communication before voting takes place under restrictive conditions then the outcome may be that the members of one or more of the social groups involved in the process simply stick to the identity of their own group in which all individuals have the same interest. The first circumstance that may matter for what identity is adopted is whether a group has access to addressing the other group or is prevented from doing so and, hence, has a mere passive role. If a group is subordinated to others in such a way it may be less inclined to take the interests of the society as a whole into account. Second, it may also be of consequence whether members of a group have to directly address those of the other group or can first communicate among each other in a private secluded way. Separate communication between groups has been hypothesized to lead to polarization in opinions (Sunstein (2009), Benoît and Dubra (2014)). We formalize these ideas in the Theoretical Appendix B. Equilibrium analysis of the resulting game provides us with predictions guiding the empirical analysis of our experimental data.

The implications of these ideas are as follows: In *NoChat*, the treatment without any communication, both groups simply have their default identity, which is the identity of their own group (color-group identity). In *Deliberation* both groups have the identity of the society as a whole (voting-group identity), since in the communication process they both address the society, i.e. the voting group as a whole. In *TopDown* the uninformed group has a color-group identity again, since it has merely a passive role in communication. By contrast the informed group has a voting-group identity, since its members are still in a position in which they directly address the society as a whole and, hence, take the interests of all members of society into account. Finally, in *TopDownClosed* both groups have a color-group identity for the following reasons: For the uninformed the situation is the same as in *TopDown*: they are fully passive and hence have their default identity. For the informed we conjecture that they also adopt the identity of their own group, since they communicate privately among themselves before addressing the society as a whole, a circumstance that makes them focus exclusively on the interests of their own group.

We predict that communication and voting behavior is based on the adopted group identity. In a group with voting-group identity, individuals have efficiency preferences and maximize the expected material payoffs of the entire society. In a group with color-group identity, individuals only maximize the expected material payoffs of their own group.

Therefore, according to our prediction efficiency is highest in *Deliberation*, second-highest in *TopDown* and lowest in *TopDownClosed* and *NoChat*.

Researchers in political science have devoted much attention to issues of deliberation, see in particular Cohen (1989), Gutmann and Thompson (1996), Habermas (2015) and Landwehr (2010). Myers and Mendelberg (2013) give an overview of work on political deliberation and Karpowitz and Mendelberg (2011) survey the experimental literature in political science on the topic.

Previous experimental work has found evidence in favor of communication affecting group identity. Chen and Li (2009) report on an experiment in which they study the effects of induced group identity in an environment with an ingroup and an outgroup. They find that participants are more altruistic towards members of an ingroup and that chat communication within the ingroup leads to stronger ingroup favoritism. In the related experiment of Chen and Chen (2011) participants play a coordination game with either an ingroup or an outgroup. In one of the treatments the coordination game is preceded by a problem-solving task designed to enhance group identity in which participants can chat with each other. They find that stronger communication – more words, more content – has a positive effect on the ingroup and a negative effect on the outgroup. Robalo et al. (2017) also induce ingroup bias in an experiment related to political issues without using communication. They group people according to the results of a personality questionnaire and find that political participation is higher when ingroup bias is stronger. In our case, groups are distinguished by asymmetric payoffs and access to information.

Without the focus on group identities, pre-vote communication has already been studied in the extensive literature on voting, recently surveyed in Palfrey (2016). For instance, the results in Guarnaschelli et al. (2000) and Goeree and Yariv (2011) document that pre-play communication of either a straw-vote or unrestricted chat communication lead to an increase in the efficiency of the voting outcome. By contrast, Buechel and Mechtenberg (2017) show that pre-vote communication in social networks can lower efficiency even in a common-interest setting.

Palfrey and Pogorelskiy (forthcoming) study the effects of two different communication protocols on voter turnout in an experiment with individuals belonging to two competing parties and costly voting. The issue of voter turnout is quite different from our focus, but the distinction between public communication (all voters exchange messages through a computer chat) and party communication (messages are only exchanged within each party) is related to our distinction between different deliberative structures. Their result is that both types of communication favor the majority party.

Pronin and Woon (2017) study how the social benefits of deliberation are robust to the existence of private communication between parts of the society, prior to a public discussion. In a setting in which a group of players has to allocate a fixed budget between

themselves and a public good they find that allowing for private messages before the public discussion leads to the under-provision of the public good. Again, the particular issue they study is very different from ours, but the communication protocol they study is related to our *TopDownClosed* treatment.

Although our main motivation stems from the political realm, our analysis can also be related to the effects of *institutionalized communication protocols* in organizational economics (Ambrus et al., 2013). For example, Brandts and Cooper (2007) compare the effects on coordination of various communication protocols between a manager and workers. Brandts and Cooper (2015) study how different communication protocols between a central manager and two branches of an organization affect its efficiency.

Our novel contribution to the literature reviewed above is that we simultaneously study (1) how two groups solve a state-dependent conflict of interest, (2) how efficiently they aggregate information on that state held by one of the groups, and (3) how both conflict solution and information aggregation are affected by communication protocols that shape group identity.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design and procedures. Section 3 contains our hypotheses. Sections 4 and 5 contain our results; and in section 6 we summarize and relate the phenomena we observe in the laboratory to some naturally occurring social issues.

## 2 Experimental design

**The game** Consider the following voting game: Six players form a voting group, consisting of three white players and three blue players. These players vote on a policy from a set of three alternatives ( $A$ ,  $B$ , and  $C$ ). The implemented policy determines state-dependent payoffs that may differ by color. At the beginning of the game, nature draws the state of the world, which is either  $X$  or  $Y$  with equal probability. Then, nature randomly draws an informative private signal on the state of the world for each white player. These signals are conditionally independent and true with probability  $p = 0.7$ . Blue players do not receive any signal.

Subsequently, a communication stage starts. We consider three alternative deliberative structures (communication protocols): (i) Whites and blues can publicly communicate with each other; (ii) the whites but not the blues can send (public) messages; and (iii) the whites can first communicate with each other unobserved by the blues and then send public messages that are also received by the blues. Hence, moving from (i) to (ii), the whites get gradually more control over the communication process. In the first step (moving from (i) to (ii)), the additional, protocol-based asymmetry between the colors is purely behavioral; in the second step (moving to (iii)), it becomes strategic since (iii),

other than the other two protocols, allows the whites to send different messages to their own and the other color. On all communication stages, messages are sent simultaneously, and sending an empty message is possible for all senders.

Table 1: Payoffs for blue and white players, conditional of the state of the world and implemented policies

	State X			State Y	
Policy	Whites	Blues	Policy	Whites	Blues
A	20	20	A	10	0
B	0	0	B	20	10
C	0	10	C	0	20

Finally, the voting stage starts. Each individual chooses whether to vote for one of the three policies  $A$ ,  $B$ , and  $C$ , or to abstain. Voting is costless. The final policy is implemented according to the plurality rule (i.e., the final policy is the one that got most votes); and ties are resolved randomly.

The state of the world interacts with the implemented policy in generating final payoffs, as displayed in Table 1. Given the chosen payoffs, state  $X$  can be considered the good state of the world,  $Y$  the bad state: On the one hand, the efficient policy in  $X$ , policy  $A$ , yields a larger total payoff than the efficient policy  $B$  in  $Y$  ( $3 \times 20 + 3 \times 20 = 120$  vs.  $3 \times 20 + 3 \times 10 = 90$ ); on the other hand, the efficient policy in  $X$  leads to a fair allocation of payoffs (both white and blue players earn 20), while the efficient policy in  $Y$  generates a payoff inequity (20 for white players, 10 for blue players).

In the good state  $X$ , whites and blues would agree on the most preferred policy: Both would like to implement policy  $A$ . This is, however, not true in the bad state  $Y$ : While the whites would prefer  $B$  to be chosen, the blues would prefer  $C$  instead. Hence, the two color types have a state-dependent conflict. This conflict in state  $Y$  is particularly sharp since, in the eyes of the whites,  $C$  is the worst of all options. The efficient policy choice would be  $A$  in state  $X$  and  $B$  in state  $Y$  and is hence both state-dependent and in line with the preferences of the whites.

We chose this design for two reasons. First, we want to model an understudied informational asymmetry that is often observed in reality: Only one group (the whites) has information on whether or not their material interests conflict with those of the other group (the blues). Second, we wanted to rule out a trade-off between efficient information aggregation and efficient policy-choice. Though interesting in itself, such a trade-off is not what we want to study in this paper. Our game is designed to study a combined information-transmission and collective-choice problem if only one part of the collective

has information about whether the choice is to be made in a common-interest situation or in the presence of group conflict.

The state-dependent conflict gives the white players an incentive to lie about the state of the world, if, given the majority of signals, they expect the bad state of the world  $Y$ . In this case, truthfully reporting the majority signal (i.e., the signal received by the majority of whites) would lead selfish blue players to vote for  $C$ . The whites would vote for  $B$ , which ultimately generates a tie between policies  $B$  and  $C$  yielding each white player an expected payoff of  $\frac{1}{2} \times 20 + \frac{1}{2} \times 0 = 10$ . If, however, the whites successfully lied about the state of the world such that the blues expected the good state  $X$  and hence vote for  $A$ , the whites would expect to earn  $\frac{1}{2} \times 10 + \frac{1}{2} \times 20 = 15$  if they themselves chose their optimal policy  $B$ . Obviously, and as shown in Appendix B, successful lies cannot be part of an equilibrium here – instead, communication would become meaningless (“babbling”). Stretching the political interpretation of the game a bit, this dilemma could be called the *tragedy of the elite*: If those who do not belong to it do not internalize its interests but only care for their own, the elite has an incentive to use its informational advantage to manipulate the less-well informed away from the conflict. But if the elite does so, trust and hence information aggregation break down and the conflict sharpens.

**Experimental treatments** We conducted four experimental treatments as depicted in Table 2.<sup>3</sup> The treatments *Deliberation*, *TopDown*, and *TopDownClosed* implement the above game with communication stage (i), (ii), and (iii), respectively. Communication is implemented as computerized free-style chat. In *Deliberation* and *TopDown*, the chat lasted for two minutes. In *TopDownClosed*, both the first (private) chat among the whites and the second (public) chat lasted for one minute each.<sup>4</sup> We decided to exogenously restrict the duration of the chat stage in order to keep the total duration of the experimental sessions comparable within and across treatments.

Treatment *NoChat* implements the above game without the communication stage. However, directly after the information stage, our subjects in *NoChat* have the opportunity to take private notes in a computer window that looks exactly like the chat window in the other treatments. We thus tightly control the task- and time-structure of all treatments.

We asked our subjects to focus their communication (in *NoChat* their notes) on the voting decision at hand. Apart from that we did not impose any restrictions on their

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<sup>3</sup>Translated instructions to all treatments are included in Supplementary online material C

<sup>4</sup>From the post-experimental feedback that we received from the subjects and the analysis of the chat contents, we are confident that our time constraint on the chat is not binding. Moreover, in a comparable experimental setup, Goeree and Yariv (2011) observe that an unconstrained pre-vote chat between privately informed voters lasted only for 26 +/- 11 seconds on average. We hence conjecture that a chat duration of two minutes gives our subjects sufficient time to share the whites’ information (or lies) as well as to deliberate on the policy to be chosen.



Table 2: Implemented deliberative structures across treatments

	White players		Blue players	
	write	read	write	read
<i>NoChat</i>	–	–	–	–
<i>Deliberation</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>TopDown</i>	✓	✓	–	✓
<i>TopDownClosed</i>	✓/✓	✓/✓	–	–/✓

In *TopDownClosed* the first entry refers to the private chat among the whites, the second entry relates to the subsequent public chat.

writing. All subjects received IDs that indicated their color type (white or blue) and a number between 1 and 3 (for instance, "Blue 2"). These IDs were randomly assigned in the beginning of every round such that subjects were not able to recognize and track individuals throughout the different rounds.

**Procedures** Overall, we conducted 20 sessions with 468 subjects in total, half of them assumed the roles of white, the other half the roles of blue players. In *NoChat* and *Deliberation* we ran five sessions each, all of them comprising 24 subjects. In *TopDown* and *TopDownClosed* we ran four sessions with 24 subjects and one session with 18 subjects, each. Sessions lasted for 20 rounds. Subjects were randomly assigned their color (white or blue) at the beginning of the session and kept it throughout the 20 rounds of the experiment. The groups, however, were randomly re-matched at the beginning of each round (stranger matching).

We used z-tree developed by Fischbacher (2007) to computerize our treatments and the recruiting software hroot developed by Bock et al. (2014) to randomly assign subjects to treatments. The experiment was run with student subjects from various study backgrounds at the WISO-laboratory of Hamburg University. During the sessions payments were expressed in experimental currency points which were exchanged to Euros at a rate of 1 Euro = 3 Points at the end of the experiment. Average earnings for the 120 minutes sessions amounted to 23.28 Euro (s.d. 4.73), including a 10 Euro show-up fee (minimum earnings = 10 Euro, maximum earnings = 30 Euro).

For the three communication treatments we analyzed the chat content following the procedures of Brandts and Cooper (2007).

### 3 Hypotheses

We analyze the games of our four treatments in Appendix B. There, we characterize the (plausible) equilibria and formally derive our theoretical predictions. The intuition, however, is quite simple: Our hypotheses are based on the idea that the deliberative

structure affects players' social preferences, as argued by various empirical and theoretical studies in the recent literature in the political science. As presented in the introduction, we adopt the idea from normative deliberation theories that individuals internalize the interests of those whom they have to convince in the course of deliberation. In our setting, this means that any player maximizes the sum of expected payoffs of himself and all players whom he can address during the chat. Put differently, we assume that players have efficiency preferences that are restricted to their respective audiences on the communication stage. In addition, we assume that when there is more than one communication stage (as in *TopDownClosed*), it is the audience of the *first* communication stage that determines players' preferences.

In our equilibrium analysis in Appendix B, we argue that the following type of voting strategy of the two colors is (1) efficient and (2) part of an equilibrium if both colors have a *voting-group identity*, i.e., efficiency preferences that concern the entire voting group: The whites truthfully communicate their signals to all other players, regardless of their color; and players vote in such a way that a plurality of votes is for A if the majority of signals indicate that the state is X and for B if the majority of signals indicate that the state is Y. Note that such a type of strategy implements a compromise: If state Y, the state of color-conflicting interests, is more likely than X, the blues refrain from voting for their best choice C and vote for their second-best choice B instead, which is efficient. Note that given this behavior of the blues, the whites have no incentive to lie to them about the state.

However, if the blues have a *color-group identity*, i.e., if preferences of the blues are not efficiency-oriented towards the total voting group but restricted to the material interests of their own color, then the efficient strategies break down and other types of voting strategies become equilibria. In particular, blues who only care for their own color prefer C over B if the conflict state Y is more likely than X. Hence, since C is the worst choice for the whites and inefficient under any signal distribution, the whites have the incentive to lie to the blues if they can, making them believe that the state is X rather than Y and that therefore, A is the blues' best choice, rather than C. But if the whites lie, their messages will not be believed in equilibrium, and the blues will be even more motivated to vote for C, which is the policy that benefits them most in expectation if information about the true state is absent.

In the face of this dilemma, we argue that the communication structure matters since it affects both the preferences of the colors and the incentive of the whites to lie about the true state. Based on our equilibrium analysis in Appendix B, Table 3 summarizes how our four different treatments (i.e., communication structures) affect (1) the preferences of the blues, (2) the possibility of information aggregation, and (3) the incentive of the whites to lie to the blues. For better understanding, note that the whites, even if they

want to lie to the blues, also always want to truthfully inform the other whites about which signal they got. In Appendix B, we argue that the second motive dominates the first so that the whites will not lie to the blues if this implies lying to the other whites.

Table 3: Preferences for efficiency and their impact on information aggregation

	Efficiency preferences of the...		Information aggregation is possible	Equilibrium incentives of the whites to lie to the blues
	Whites	Blues		
NoChat	✓	no	no	–
Deliberation	✓	✓	✓	no
TopDown	✓	no	✓	no
TopDownClosed	✓	no	(✓)	✓

✓ indicates for each of the treatments if, in equilibrium, (i) the whites and blues assume a voting-group identity and hence have efficiency preferences, (ii) whether information aggregation is possible and (iii) if the whites have an incentive to lie to the blues. Note that in TopDownClosed, in equilibrium information aggregation is only possible in the private chat, but not in the public chat.

Based on our equilibrium analysis in Appendix B, our hypotheses below consider the following possible voting outcomes:  $A/A$  (all votes placed by whites/blues are for policy A),  $A/C$  (the whites vote for A and the blues for C),  $B/B$  (all votes placed by whites/blues are for policy B), and  $B/C$  (the whites vote for B and the blues for C). We call the voting outcomes in which the blues vote for C a *conflict outcome*.<sup>5</sup>

Based on Propositions 1, 2, 3, and 4 (see Appendix B) that pertain to behavior in *NoChat*, *Deliberation*, *TopDown* and *TopDownClosed*, we predict to observe the following voting outcomes: Voting strategies per treatment are as presented in Table 4<sup>6</sup>; and the comparative statics across treatments are as summarized in hypotheses 1-4. The latter are tested in Section refsec:testinghypotheses.

**Hypothesis 1a (Voting outcomes given majority signal X)** *Given majority signal X, the efficient outcome A/A is realized more often in Deliberation and TopDown than in TopDownClosed and NoChat. Conversely, conflict outcome A/C is realized more often in TopDownClosed and NoChat than in Deliberation and TopDown.*

<sup>5</sup>Other voting outcomes that are not part of any equilibrium might empirically occur, too. One salient example would be B/A under majority signal Y: The whites, though informed that Y is likely to pertain, successfully convince the blues that X pertains, so that, while they themselves vote for B, the blues vote for A, which is better than C for the whites. This is no equilibrium (since in equilibrium, lies would not be believed), but though not predicting such outcomes, we do not exclude them from the empirical analysis.

<sup>6</sup>In our predictions we consider only equilibria without abstentions. This has been corroborated by the data. In Appendix B, we also derive equilibria with abstention.

Table 4: Whites' and blues' predicted voting decisions, by treatment and majority signal

	State of the world: X		State of the world: Y	
	Whites	Blues	Whites	Blues
NoChat	$A$	$C$	$A$ or $B$	$C$
Deliberation	$A$	$A$	$B$	$B$
TopDown	$A$	$A$	$B$	$C$
TopDownClosed	$A$	$C$	$B$	$C$

**Hypothesis 1b (Voting outcomes given majority signal Y)** *Given majority signal Y, the efficient outcome B/B is realized more often in Deliberation than in any other treatment. Conflict outcome B/C, conversely, is realized more often in TopDown and TopDownClosed than in Deliberation.*

**Hypothesis 2a (Whites' voting decisions)** *Given majority signal X, the whites' propensity to vote for the efficient policy A does not differ across the four treatments. Given majority signal Y, the whites' propensity to vote for the efficient policy B is lowest in NoChat and does not differ across the communication treatments.*

**Hypothesis 2b (Blues' voting decisions)** *Given majority signal X, the blues' propensity to vote for the efficient policy A is higher in Deliberation and TopDown than in TopDownClosed and NoChat. Given majority signal Y, the blues' propensity to vote for the efficient policy B is higher in Deliberation than in any of the other treatments.*

**Hypothesis 3a (Whites' lying)** *In Deliberation and TopDown the whites are more often truthful than in TopDownClosed.*

**Hypothesis 3b (Blues' trustfulness)** *In TopDownClosed the blues condition their votes less on the majority message sent by the whites than in any of the other communication treatments.*

**Hypothesis 4 (Efficiency ranking)** *The sum of all players' payoffs is largest in Deliberation, second-largest in TopDown, third-largest in TopDownClosed and lowest in NoChat.*

Our hypotheses summarize predictions on the equilibria and their efficiency in our one-shot voting game under the assumption borrowed from political science that deliberative structures affect group identities and hence preferences. Note that Appendix B also contains standard economic predictions (which predict no treatment differences between *NoChat*, *Deliberation* and *TopDown* and only one minor difference between these treatments and *TopDownClosed*).

We test our hypotheses 1 – 4 in experimental treatments with stranger matching, as usual when implementing one-shot games in the lab. However, stranger matching still allows for dynamics, in particular learning, not only of the game itself, but also, and maybe most importantly, about typical types of behavior of other players. Hence, we empirically analyze these dynamics, too.

## 4 Hypotheses testing

### 4.1 Voting outcomes at the group level

We start by testing our hypotheses on realized voting outcomes conditional on the majority signal, that is, the signal received by the majority of whites (Hypotheses 1a and 1b). In Table 5 we present the incidences of the following voting outcomes that we introduced in Section 3 above: *A/A*, *B/B*, *A/C* and *B/C*. Here, *A/A* and *B/B* refer to voting outcomes in which all six voting group members either vote for A or B, depending on the majority signal. *A/C* and *B/C* describe voting outcomes in which the three blues vote for C and the three whites either for A or B, respectively. We expect *A/C* to only occur if the majority signal is X and *B/C* only if the majority signal is Y. Besides these voting outcomes, we also consider the so called “Split-whites” outcome in which all blues vote for C and all whites follow their individual signal (vote for A if the own signal is X, vote for B if it is Y).<sup>7</sup>

Table 5 displays the distribution of the voting outcomes of interest across treatments and majority signals. Grey cells indicate the predicted equilibrium outcomes as derived in Appendix B, figures printed in bold highlight observed modal voting outcomes. Besides the precise equilibrium outcomes, we also present information about voting outcomes in which at most one of the blue and/or one of the white players deviated from the equilibrium strategy. We call these realizations “almost” realizations.

Consider, first, the left part of the table. At first glance, Hypothesis 1a is mostly confirmed. This observation is corroborated by the logit regressions presented in Table 6, in which we regress the respective voting outcomes on treatment dummies and additionally

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<sup>7</sup>See Appendix B for a more detailed description of the voting outcomes that we expect to result from equilibrium play.

Table 5: Voting outcomes at the group level – Conditional on the received majority signal

	Majority signal: X				Majority signal: Y			
	NoChat	Deliberation	TopDown	TopDownClosed	NoChat	Deliberation	TopDown	TopDownClosed
A/A	0	<b>0.386</b>	<b>0.201</b>	0.143	0	0.059	0	0.021
Almost A/A	0.038	0.284	0.358	0.328	0.018	0.059	0.055	0.105
(Almost) A/A	0.038	0.670	0.559	0.471	0.018	0.119	0.055	0.126
A/C outcome	<b>0.338</b>	0.121	0.106	<b>0.159</b>	<b>0.295</b>	0.103	0.114	0.052
of this: Split-whites	0.184	0.023	0.011	0.037	-	-	-	-
Almost A/C outcome	0.513	0.181	0.307	0.339	0.476	0.086	0.095	0.126
(Almost) A/C outcome	0.850	0.302	0.413	0.497	0.771	0.189	0.209	0.178
B/B	0	0	0	0	0	<b>0.086</b>	0.005	0.005
Almost B/B	0	0.005	0	0.005	0	0.124	0.065	0.058
(Almost) B/B	0	0.005	0	0.005	0	0.211	0.070	0.063
B/C outcome	0	0	0	0	<b>0.012</b>	<b>0.216</b>	<b>0.313</b>	<b>0.283</b>
of this: Split-whites	-	-	-	-	0.006	0.092	0.164	0.152
Almost B/C outcome	0.013	0	0.006	0	0.090	0.238	0.328	0.257
(Almost) B/C outcome	0.013	0	0.006	0	0.102	0.454	0.642	0.539
Split-whites	0.269	0.023	0.017	0.037	0.030	0.108	0.174	0.168
Other	0.098	0.023	0.022	0.026	0.108	0.027	0.025	0.094
Observations	234	215	179	189	166	185	201	191

In “Almost” outcomes at most one player per color group deviates from the respective outcome. Grey cells indicate equilibrium outcomes, figures printed in bold highlight the observed modal voting outcomes for the respective treatment and signal combination. Split-whites is also an equilibrium outcome, see Appendix B; however, since it includes abstention, it does not belong to the predicted outcomes.

control for period effects. In all regressions, *NoChat* serves as baseline treatment. Additional results from Wald tests on treatment differences are presented in the bottom part of the table. Model (1) reveals that given majority signal X, *A/A* is significantly more frequently realized in *Deliberation* and *TopDown* than in the other two treatments, as predicted. Analogously, Model (2) indicates that the “conflict outcome” *A/C* is realized significantly more often in *NoChat* than in *Deliberation* and *TopDown*, again as predicted. However, different from what Hypothesis 1a predicts, we do not find a significant difference in *A/C* realizations between *TopDownClosed* and *Deliberation* as well as *TopDown*, respectively (see the insignificant Wald tests presented in the lower part of the table).

Next, we turn to our test of Hypothesis 1b. The descriptive statistics presented in the right part of Table 5 and the regression analysis in Model (3) from Table 6 reveal that, given majority signal Y, *B/B* is more frequently realized in *Deliberation* than in any other treatment, just as predicted. However, in contrast to what we expected, *B/C* is not significantly less often realized in *Deliberation* than in *TopDown* or *TopDownClosed* (see Model (4)). On the contrary, *B/C* is the modal outcome in *Deliberation*. Overall, Hypothesis 1b is hence only partly confirmed.

We will provide explanations for the deviations from our Hypotheses 1a and 1b, that is, the relatively large number of conflict outcomes in all communication treatments, in Section 4.4 and Section 4.5 below, when we discuss the blues’ voting and the whites’ lying behavior.

Finally, we turn to Figure 1, which presents the evolution of voting outcomes over the

Table 6: Voting outcomes

	Majority signal: X		Majority signal: Y	
	(1) A/A	(2) A/C	(3) B/B	(4) B/C
Deliberation (D)	18.966*** (0.539)	-1.417*** (0.448)	16.835*** (0.726)	3.182*** (0.944)
TopDown (TD)	17.791*** (0.453)	-1.554*** (0.489)	13.909*** (1.036)	3.678*** (0.924)
TopDownClosed (TDC)	17.262*** (0.623)	-1.048*** (0.300)	14.029*** (1.043)	3.512*** (0.904)
Period	-0.178*** (0.033)	0.076*** (0.020)	-0.480*** (0.083)	0.044** (0.018)
Constant	-17.606*** (0.493)	-1.460*** (0.324)	-16.519*** (0.566)	-4.930*** (0.949)
Wald test results for comparison of treatment coefficients ( $p$ values):				
D vs. TD	0.024	0.797	0.002	0.142
TD vs. TDC	0.010	0.231	0.921	0.403
D vs. TDC	0.000	0.326	0.005	0.248
Pseudo $R^2$	0.305	0.086	0.454	0.112
Number of clusters	20	20	20	20
Observations	817	817	743	743

Pooled logit regressions. Dependent variable: Realization of the respective voting outcome. Standard errors are clustered at the session level and given in parentheses: \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . NoChat serves as baseline treatment in all regressions.

20 periods. As evident, the incidences of conflict outcomes ( $A/C$  and  $B/C$ ) increases in all 4 treatments. This observation is corroborated by the significant *Period* coefficients in the regressions from Table 6 as well as summary statistics presented in Table C.1 and Table C.2 (see Supplementary online material C). In particular in the communication treatments, after an initial phase of high cooperation and low conflict, the opportunity to chat does not lead to *sustainable* coordination on the efficient  $A/A$  ( $B/B$ ) outcome in case the received majority signal is X (Y). Instead, if the majority signal indicates state X, more and more often  $A/C$  is realized in later rounds. If the majority signal indicates Y, we increasingly often observe the  $B/C$  outcome. The effectiveness of deliberative democracy hence seems to deteriorate over time. We will come back to this phenomenon in Section 4.4.

## 4.2 Whites' voting decisions

The logit regression results presented in Table 7 reveal that the whites' propensity to vote for the efficient policy A does not differ significantly between *Deliberation*, *TopDown*, and *TopDownClosed* (see Model (1) and the respective Wald test results). This is in line with our Hypothesis 2a. However, contrary to our prediction, the whites' propensity to vote for A after majority signal X is significantly higher in the communication treatments than in *NoChat*.




Figure 1: Voting outcomes depending on the majority signal that the whites receive



A similar picture emerges when we consider the whites' voting behavior given majority signal Y. As predicted by Hypothesis 2a, the whites' propensity to vote for the efficient policy B is not significantly different across the communication treatments. It is, however, significantly higher in these treatments compared to *NoChat* (see Model (5) and the respective Wald test results), again as predicted.

Table 7: Individual voting decisions of the whites

	Majority signal: X		Majority message: X		Majority signal: Y		Majority message: Y	
	(1) A vote	(2) B vote	(3) A vote	(4) B vote	(5) A vote	(6) B vote	(7) A vote	(8) B vote
Deliberation (D)	2.050*** (0.541)	-2.030*** (0.546)	0.813 (0.860)	-0.655 (0.905)	-1.853*** (0.256)	1.840*** (0.259)	-0.371 (0.339)	0.315 (0.339)
TopDown (TD)	1.391* (0.737)	-1.544* (0.809)			-2.090*** (0.297)	2.102*** (0.303)		
TopDownClosed (TDC)	2.440*** (0.554)	-2.424*** (0.557)	-1.720** (0.832)	1.850** (0.893)	-1.986*** (0.328)	1.974*** (0.328)	-0.491 (0.611)	0.465 (0.596)
Period	0.062** (0.025)	-0.066*** (0.023)	-0.039** (0.015)	0.037** (0.016)	0.050*** (0.012)	-0.051*** (0.013)	0.021 (0.013)	-0.024* (0.014)
Constant	1.711*** (0.258)	-1.695*** (0.252)	4.198*** (0.672)	-4.323*** (0.761)	0.620*** (0.190)	-0.616*** (0.200)	-1.626*** (0.315)	1.663*** (0.322)
Wald test results for comparison of treatment coefficients ( <i>p</i> values):								
D vs. TDC	0.595	0.593	0.001	0.001	0.669	0.660	0.845	0.801
D vs. TD	0.459	0.609			0.397	0.344		
TD vs. TDC	0.237	0.353			0.764	0.707		
Pseudo <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.115	0.119	0.121	0.123	0.124	0.124	0.009	0.009
Number of clusters	20	20	15	15	20	20	15	15
Observations	2451	2451	2112	2112	2229	2229	1278	1278

Pooled logit regressions. Dependent variable: Decision to vote for the respective policy. Standard errors are clustered at the session level and given in parentheses: \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . *NoChat* serves as baseline treatment in regressions (1), (2), (5) and (6). *TopDown* is the baseline in the other regressions.

### 4.3 Blues' voting decisions

In Table 8 we study the blue players' voting decisions in more detail in logit regressions that are analogous to the ones that we considered in Table 7. Model (1) reveals that given majority signal X, the blues vote more often for the efficient policy A in *Deliberation* and *TopDown* than in *TopDownClosed* and *NoChat*, as predicted in Hypothesis 2b. All observed treatment differences in the blues' propensity to vote for A are significant. The only exception is the difference between *TopDown* and *TopDownClosed*, which goes into the right direction, but is just not significant.

If we focus on those rounds in which the majority signal is Y (Model (5)), we observe that the blues' propensity to vote for the efficient policy B, along with the whites, is significantly higher in *Deliberation* than in *TopDown*, *TopDownClosed* and *NoChat*. This confirms our statement made in Hypothesis 2b. The same is true if we restrict our attention to those rounds in which the whites (truthfully) report majority message Y (see the regression results and corresponding Wald tests from Model (7)).

Table 8: Individual voting decisions of the blues

	Majority signal: X		Majority message: X		Majority signal: Y		Majority message: Y	
	(1) A vote	(2) C vote	(3) A vote	(4) C vote	(5) B vote	(6) C vote	(7) B vote	(8) C vote
Deliberation (D)	2.688*** (0.260)	-2.016*** (0.398)	0.418 (0.280)	-0.429 (0.298)	2.227*** (0.406)	-0.780* (0.468)	0.717*** (0.247)	-0.646** (0.272)
TopDown (TD)	2.237*** (0.279)	-1.533*** (0.400)			1.726*** (0.327)	-0.096 (0.422)		
TopDownClosed (TDC)	1.892*** (0.223)	-1.273*** (0.355)	-0.297 (0.219)	0.238 (0.221)	1.174*** (0.399)	-0.559 (0.404)	0.002 (0.179)	-0.081 (0.188)
Period	-0.085*** (0.013)	0.086*** (0.013)	-0.097*** (0.013)	0.104*** (0.011)	-0.109*** (0.023)	0.067*** (0.014)	-0.105*** (0.025)	0.094*** (0.023)
Constant	-1.144*** (0.218)	0.366 (0.335)	1.189*** (0.246)	-1.330*** (0.245)	-2.430*** (0.328)	0.664* (0.356)	-0.640*** (0.196)	0.503*** (0.190)
Wald test results for comparison of treatment coefficients ( $p$ values):								
D vs. TDC	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.005	0.002	0.414	0.014	0.053
D vs. TD	0.081	0.075			0.048	0.024		
TD vs. TDC	0.106	0.208			0.023	0.010		
Pseudo $R^2$	0.169	0.120	0.065	0.069	0.115	0.041	0.072	0.059
Number of clusters	20	20	15	15	20	20	15	15
Observations	2451	2451	2112	2112	2229	2229	1278	1278

Pooled Logit regressions. Dependent variable: Decision to vote for the respective policy. Standard errors are clustered at the session level and given in parentheses: \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . NoChat serves as baseline treatment in regressions (1), (2), (5) and (6). TopDown is the baseline in the other regressions.

#### 4.4 Which factors can explain the blues' voting decisions?

Next, we analyze the reasons for which the blues vote for C, in conflict with the whites. For this, we consider the content and tone of the chat messages that were sent in the communication treatments and study how these affect the blues' propensity (not) to vote in accordance with the whites' wishes.<sup>8</sup> These and the remaining test results are presented in Table 9.

Consider, first, the left part of the table in which we focus on those rounds in which the whites report majority message X. These are the rounds in which the whites either truthfully reveal their majority signal or lie to make the blues believe that situation X prevails. In logit regressions Model (1) and (2) we regress the blues' propensity to vote for A and C, respectively, on treatment dummies for *Deliberation* and *TopDownClosed* (*TopDown* serves as baseline treatment in these regressions), a dummy variable that indicates if the reported majority message in the previous round was inconsistent with the actual state of the world ("Potential lie"), and two further dummies that capture the tone of the whites' messages (respectful and disrespectful language). Moreover, we

<sup>8</sup>In our analysis we focus on frequently observed chat classifications. A full list of the dimensions in which the chat messages were coded can be found in the Supplementary online material C. Two research assistants coded the chat messages independently from each other (we refer to them as Coder #1 and Coder #2). In the regressions presented in this paper, we rely on the work done by Coder #1. The results remain largely unchanged when we use the codings of Coder #2 instead. The results are available from the authors upon request.

include four additional dummy variables that capture whether the whites mention the experimental environment as justification of their behavior (“our signals are not 100% correct” and similar statements) and attempt to appeal to the blues’ public spirit. Lastly, we add a control variable for the round of play. As evident from the significant period coefficient, voting for A (voting for C) is on average more likely in earlier rounds (in later rounds). Moreover, voting for A (voting for C) is significantly less likely (more likely) if the reported majority message in the previous round was inconsistent with the actual state of the world (“Potential lie”) and if the whites treated the blues disrespectfully. Whites referring to the experimental environment in order to justify their behavior, like the inbuilt probability of wrong signals, or whites mentioning the group’s “joint welfare” have no significant effects on the blues’ voting decisions.

Table 9: Communication treatments: Individual voting decisions of the blues

	Majority message: X		Majority message: Y	
	(1) A vote	(2) C vote	(3) B vote	(4) C vote
Deliberation (D)	0.528* (0.277)	-0.555* (0.290)	0.971*** (0.313)	-0.823*** (0.305)
TopDownClosed (TDC)	-0.298 (0.205)	0.213 (0.213)	-0.037 (0.209)	-0.044 (0.203)
Potential lie in previous period	-0.224** (0.102)	0.289*** (0.100)	-0.089 (0.255)	0.146 (0.189)
Respectful whites	0.079 (0.134)	-0.085 (0.136)	0.554*** (0.201)	-0.587*** (0.179)
Disrespectful whites	-0.583*** (0.143)	0.596*** (0.143)	-1.149*** (0.326)	0.914*** (0.338)
Whites mention experimental environment as information	0.037 (0.079)	-0.033 (0.080)	-0.156 (0.261)	0.269 (0.196)
Whites mention experimental environment to justify their behavior	0.102 (0.194)	-0.117 (0.191)	-0.241 (0.275)	0.002 (0.268)
Whites mention the public spirit	0.081 (0.157)	-0.080 (0.146)	0.059 (0.181)	-0.042 (0.177)
Whites mention whites’ and blues’ joint payoffs	0.071 (0.157)	-0.083 (0.143)	0.229 (0.216)	-0.022 (0.272)
Period	-0.088*** (0.014)	0.092*** (0.013)	-0.089*** (0.026)	0.079*** (0.022)
Constant	1.110*** (0.261)	-1.227*** (0.267)	-0.754*** (0.235)	0.564*** (0.208)
Wald test results for comparison of treatment coefficients ( $p$ values):				
D vs. TDC	0.001	0.001	0.008	0.018
Pseudo $R^2$	0.061	0.065	0.082	0.068
Number of clusters	15	15	15	15
Observations	2001	2001	1230	1230

Pooled Logit regressions. Dependent variable: Decision to vote for the respective policy. Standard errors are clustered at the session level and given in parentheses: \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . TopDown serves as baseline treatment in all regressions. All chat content categories that were recorded in at least 15% of the whites’ chat messages (except specific voting recommendations) are included as explanatory variables.

Next we turn to those rounds in which the whites report majority message Y. It is

common knowledge that this majority message is not a lie, since, given the monetary payoffs, the whites have no incentive to make the blues believe that situation Y prevails if in fact they believe that it is situation X. For this analysis we regress the blues’ propensity to vote for B (Model (3)) and C (Model (4)) on the same explanatory variables as in Models (1) and (2). As evident, if the reported majority message is Y, voting for B (voting for C) does not depend on the perceived correctness of the previous state of the world (see the insignificant coefficient of “Potential lie”). Voting for B (voting for C) is on average less likely (more likely) if the whites treat the blues disrespectfully. Treating the blues respectfully has the opposite effect, potentially reinforcing the general positive effect of telling the truth to the blues. Whites referring to the experimental environment in order to justify their behavior or mentioning the joint welfare have no significant effects on the blues’ voting decisions. Lastly, also in case the majority message is Y, voting for B (voting for C) is on average more likely in earlier rounds (in later rounds).

To summarize our findings: If the reported majority message is X, the blues vote for C more often when they suspect having been lied to in the previous round and when being treated disrespectfully. This behavior could be considered both an indication for the blue players’ general distrust in the reported message or a desire for revenge or spitefulness. Suspecting having been lied to in the previous round has less of an effect on the blues’ voting decisions if the reported majority message is Y. The impact of disrespectful language is, however, still sizable.

## 4.5 The whites’ lying behavior

In Table 10, we present summary statistics on the white players’ decision to lie about their signals. Since the whites only have an incentive to lie conditional on the majority signal indicating state Y (to make the blues rather vote for policy A instead of C), we focus our analysis on decision rounds in which the majority signal is Y. We hence define lying as the group of white players reporting majority message X (that is, at least two of the whites report an X) if, in fact, their majority signal was Y. This means that we consider only pivotal lies.

Table 10: Lying behavior

	NoChat	Deliberation	TopDown	TopDownClosed
<u>Lying and not reporting if majority signal is Y (% of white groups)</u>				
Majority message $\neq$ majority signal	–	22.16	11.44	35.08
Silent whites	–	0	0	12.04
Total number of voting groups	–	185	201	191

Considering the mere descriptive statistics, the figures in Table 10 suggest that the whites are least truthful in *TopDownClosed*, as predicted by Hypothesis 3a (frequency of

lies in *Deliberation*: 22.16%, in *TopDown*: 11.44% and in *TopDownClosed*: 35.08%). We corroborate the significance of the treatment differences in an additional OLS regression.

In the specification presented in Table 11 we regress the dummy variable for a white sub-group reporting majority message Y on a dummy that takes value 1 if the whites’ majority signal is Y (and 0 otherwise), dummies for treatments *Deliberation* and *TopDown* and interaction terms between the majority signal and treatment dummies. As evident from the coefficient “Majority signal: Y”, the correlation between observed majority signal and reported majority message is relatively large and highly significant in *TopDownClosed*, which serves as baseline treatment in the regression. This observation could, for instance, be explained by a general lying aversion in the sense of Gneezy et al. (forthcoming). However, more importantly, the correlations between observed majority signal and reported majority message are even stronger in *Deliberation* and *TopDown*, as indicated by the respective positive and significant interaction terms. We can hence confirm our respective Hypothesis 3a.

Table 11: Received and reported states of the world

	Majority message: Y
Majority signal: Y	0.596*** (0.089)
Deliberation	-0.001 (0.007)
Deliberation × Majority signal: Y	0.178* (0.099)
TopDown	0.000 (0.007)
TopDown × Majority signal: Y	0.284** (0.097)
Constant	0.005 (0.005)
$R^2$	0.640
Number of clusters	15
Observations	1130

Pooled OLS regressions. Dependent variable: Reported majority signal: Y. Standard errors are clustered at the session level and given in parentheses: \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Note that the *TopDownClosed* treatment serves as baseline treatment.

Moreover, Model (3) from Table 7 reveals that the whites lie and subsequently vote strategically more often in in *TopDownClosed* than in the other communication treatments. More precisely, we find that if the whites report majority message X, they choose policy B more often in *TopDownClosed* than in the other communication treatments. This suggests that they use the initial private chat phase to aggregate their signals and to coordinate on lying to the blues in the subsequent public chat phase. If the whites do not lie about the state of the world, that is, if they report majority message Y, voting does not differ significantly across the communication treatments (see Model (7)).

Next, we study how the whites’ propensity to lie and the blue players’ trustfulness

evolve over time. Figure 2 shows the respective graphs separately for the three communication treatments. In all three graphs, the solid blue line indicates the fraction of groups in which the reported majority message X turns out to be wrong. This outcome can either obtain if the whites report a majority message which does not coincide with their majority signal – we label these incidences “pivotal lies” and graphically present them as dashed lines – or it can obtain as a result of the noisy signal structure – remember, each of the three signals per group is only true with 70% probability. These latter cases are labeled as “wrongly informed whites” and are graphically presented as dotted lines. In *Deliberation* we are able to directly record the blues’ trustfulness from the content of their chat messages. Whenever at least one of the blues voices suspicion that the whites do not report the state of the world truthfully, we count this as an incidence of distrust, represented as a solid yellow line.<sup>9</sup> In *TopDownClosed*, finally, there is quite a substantial fraction of white sub-groups who do not report any signal to their fellow blues in the public chat at all (12.04% on average). We represent these incidences as a solid red line in the respective graph.<sup>10</sup>

Consider, first, *Deliberation*. Observationally, there seems to be a positive correlation between “Potential lie” – that is, instances in which the reported majority signal proves to be wrong – and blue players’ mentioning of distrust in the public chat. In fact, a large part of these potential lies only result from majority signals that turn out to be wrong. Nevertheless, over time, the blues’ trust seems to deteriorate.

Next, we turn to *TopDown*. Interestingly, we do not record any pivotal lies in any of the first 9 rounds in this treatment. Also in later rounds we observe on average more instances of unintentionally falsely reported majority messages than true lies. As already discussed above, in this treatment, the whites lie only very rarely: on average only 11.44% of the groups that receive majority signal Y lie about the state of the world.

Finally, in *TopDownClosed*, in all rounds except in rounds 6 and 9, we observe that at least one of the white sub-groups that received majority message Y lies to their fellow blues. Moreover, in all rounds, except in 5, 9, 10 and 13, at least one of the white sub-groups does not report any signals to the blues at all. As discussed above, this is the treatment in which the whites report their signals least truthfully, on average. This is in line with our predictions, although the treatment difference is much smaller than predicted.

The question remains why the whites lie to the blues and – considering that they do so also in the public chat in *Deliberation* and *TopDown* – why they do it even at the expense

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<sup>9</sup>As before, we rely on Coder #1’s codings of distrust in the figures that are presented in the paper. Similar results apply if we rely on Coder #2’s codings. These are available from the authors upon request.

<sup>10</sup>Note that to create the blue lines in Figure 2, we consider all groups in which the majority message is either “X” or empty. The yellow line is based on all groups, irrespective of the group’s individual reported majority message and the red line, finally, is based on all groups in which the whites received majority signal Y.




Figure 2: Lies and suspected lies in the public chats over rounds

of lying to their fellow whites. The regression specifications in Table 12 attempt to shed light on this question. In the reported logit regressions we regress the individual white players' decisions to lie on all chat content categories that were recorded in at least 15% of the blues' chat messages in *Deliberation*<sup>11</sup> as well as a dummy that takes the value 1 if all blue players that a white player was matched to in the previous round voted for C then, a variable capturing the number of convinced blues (that is, the number of blue players who voted for A following a lie) in the previous round and a variable capturing the rounds.

Model (1) considers only the *Deliberation* treatment. As evident, the whites' propensity to report a wrong majority message (report X instead of Y) increases if they encountered at least one blue player who recommended voting for C and if all blue players voted for C in the previous round. If, however, a blue recommended voting for B in the previous round, the whites' propensity to lie decreases on average. Also, the more successful a lie was in the previous round (measured as number of convinced blues), the higher is a white's propensity to lie again.

When considering all communication treatments (see Model (2)), we can only condition on blue players' voting decisions in previous rounds since they have no opportunity to raise their voice in *TopDown* and *TopDownClosed*. Nevertheless, we observe similar behavioral patterns: The whites' propensity to lie increases in the number of blue players who voted for A following a lie in the previous round and it increases if all blue players voted for C in the previous round.

## 4.6 The blues' trustfulness

Lastly, we set out to test our Hypothesis 3b, stating that the blues condition their votes less on the majority message sent by the whites in *TopDownClosed* than in any of the other communication treatments. For this we consider the regression results presented in Table 8.

Models (3) and (4) in Table 8 reveal that – when considering those rounds in which the whites report majority message X – the blues choose policy A (instead of C) significantly more often in *Deliberation* than in *TopDownClosed*. The treatment difference between *TopDown* and *TopDownClosed* goes into the same direction, too. It is, however, not statistically significant.

We can hence only partly validate Hypothesis 3b: The blue players are more trusting in *Deliberation* than in *TopDownClosed*, but they do not trust more in *TopDown* than in *TopDownClosed*. We call this phenomenon *flat (dis-)trust*. Considering the regression outcomes from Model (4), we find that flat (dis-)trust translates into non-significant treat-

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<sup>11</sup>As recorded by Coder #1. Similar results apply if we consider Coder #2's codings and are available from the authors upon request.



Table 12: Communication treatments: Lying decisions of the whites, conditional on receiving signal Y

	Only Deliberation treatment	All communication treatments
	(1)	(2)
Suspicious blue in previous period	-0.322 (0.288)	
Blue recommended voting for A in previous period	0.376 (0.266)	
Blue recommended voting for B in previous period	-0.489* (0.264)	
Blue recommended voting for C in previous period	0.633** (0.291)	
Disrespectful blue in previous period	-0.097 (0.313)	
All blues voted for C in previous period	0.394*** (0.054)	0.275* (0.166)
# convinced blues in previous lie	0.359*** (0.115)	0.458*** (0.094)
Period	0.035** (0.016)	0.077*** (0.014)
Constant	-2.232*** (0.438)	-2.679*** (0.287)
Pseudo $R^2$	0.052	0.039
Number of clusters	5	15
Observations	545	1555

Pooled Logit regressions. Dependent variable: Decision to lie. Standard errors are clustered at the session level and given in parentheses: \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . In Model (1) all chat content categories that were recorded in at least 15% of the blues' chat messages are included as explanatory variables. The variable # *convinced blues in previous lie* only takes into account falsely stated majority messages (=lies) that happened in the preceding period.

ment differences in the blues’ average propensity to vote for  $C$  in *Deliberation*, *TopDown* and *TopDownClosed* and hence the lack of treatment differences in conflict outcome B/C across the three communication treatments.

## 4.7 Earnings and efficiency

Table A.1 in Appendix A summarizes the predicted and actual (expected) joint earnings that are realized by the voting and color groups, respectively. Comparing average joint earnings – our measure of efficiency – between the communication treatments we find that they are highest in *Deliberation* (80.98) and lowest in *TopDownClosed* (78.28), with *TopDown* (79.21) in between. However, the Wald test results from Model (1) presented in the bottom part of Table A.2 in Appendix A reveal that none of the communication-treatment comparisons in (individual) earnings is statistically significant.

The earnings of the whites in the different treatments exhibit a similar pattern as the joint earnings. That is, the whites’ earnings in the communication treatments are ordered just as the joint earnings. Moreover, all communication treatments yield significantly higher earnings to the whites than *NoChat*, a finding that is corroborated by the significant coefficients of Model (2) from Table A.2, in which *NoChat* serves as baseline treatment.

By contrast, the pattern of the blues’ earnings is quite different from that of joint earnings. As indicated by the negative and partly significant coefficients in Model (3) from Table A.2, the blues do not profit from communication compared to *NoChat* and even do worse in *TopDown* and *TopDownClosed*. Blues’ earnings in the three communication treatments are ordered just as the joint earnings. The only significant difference is, however, only observed between *Deliberation* and *TopDownClosed*.

In summary, the efficiency gains from communication go entirely to the whites. Blues’ earnings are unaffected or even decrease. Nevertheless, *Deliberation* is still the socially most desirable treatment since in it the whites gain significantly and the blues are not hurt.

## 5 Summary and conclusion

We use a lab experiment to shed light on what we consider an important socio-economic issue: The difficulty of reaching an efficient outcome in a democratic environment in which two social groups with different material interests have also different information and different access to communication channels.

We study a setting without communication, *NoChat*, as well as three ‘*deliberative structures*’: (1) *Deliberation*, meant to represent an open society where both groups – the informed whites and the uninformed blues – have equal access to communication channels, (2) *Top Down*, a setting in which the whites dominate the communication channels and (3)

*TopDownClosed*, an environment in which the members of the white group can coordinate on how to communicate.

The modal outcomes we observe largely coincide with those predicted by our theoretical analysis that incorporates ideas from political science on how deliberative structures affect group identities and hence preferences. First, without any communication possibilities, the uninformed vote for their preferred policy given their ignorance and the members of the informed group vote according to their individual information, given that they have no way of aggregating it. Second, in the three communication treatments, voting outcomes at the group level are largely as predicted.

There are, however, important deviations. In *Deliberation* and *TopDown*, blues' deviations from their predicted voting patterns are sizeable. The largest discrepancy with our predictions is that, when in *Deliberation* the conflict state of the world occurs, the blues go much more frequently for the conflict than predicted. Also, in *TopDownClosed* whites lie considerably less than predicted.

Compared with the setting without any communication between groups, we find that communication leads to efficiency gains. *Deliberation* yields most efficient outcomes and *TopDownClosed* yields least efficient outcomes, as predicted. However, for all three deliberative structures most efficiency gains go to the whites, not only, as predicted, for *Deliberation*. Hence, our findings suggest that all types of societal communication ultimately serve the elite, not only those that explicitly give voice to – and hence appease – the less-well informed.

Studying dynamics to explain these deviations from our predictions, we find that the interaction between deliberative structures and identity is not the only relevant factor. Interestingly, potential lies interact with the dynamics of our experimental setting in a way that affects outcomes. Given the information structure of our environment, it is both possible that the whites lie to the blues and also that whites seem to lie, although they do not. Blues detect a potential lie when at the end of a period they find out that there is a discrepancy between what the whites told them about the state of the world and the true state of the world. A potential lie naturally increases political conflict between whites and blues. The dynamics of the chat and voting behavior in *Deliberation* reveal the existence of a vicious circle: A blue recommends an egoistic vote to the other blues. In reaction, more whites tend to lie to the blues in the next round. This tends to increase the discrepancy between announced and ex-post observed state of the world. In reaction, more blues recommend the egoistic vote to the other blues. The good news is that unrestricted communication also allows for a virtuous circle that, although less prevalent than the vicious circle, also occurred in *Deliberation*: A blue recommends the efficient, not the egoistic vote, to the other blues; the whites tend to lie less in the next round, and the blues are less likely to observe a potential lie. Hence, they tend to be more

trustful and recommend the efficient vote again.

However, the emotional connotation of communication content is also relevant. In particular, whites' use of disrespectful language increases conflict. Our results here point to a phenomenon that we may call 'the curse of unrestricted communication'. In an adversarial situation, the unrestricted back and forth communication that is possible in the *Deliberation* treatment may lead to an escalation in animosity.

We believe that the phenomena we observe are relevant beyond our simple laboratory experiment. First, in unequal societies free communication between social groups increases efficiency but can deteriorate due to the use of adversarial language. If, on top, the informed group controls the communication process things can be even worse, because a group with a purely passive role in public communication loses sight of society's general interests and becomes particularistic. Second, in modern democracies the advice pertaining to policy options given by experts and the more educated to the society at large is often ignored by the less informed members of society. This occurs out of a combination of (flat) distrust vis-à-vis those who are seen as privileged and the experience that expert knowledge is often less than perfect, so that expert advice that is ex post incorrect is not infrequent. Third, the fluency of communication that is made possible through digital media has of course many virtues. However, the immediacy and anonymity of communication that is now possible often leads to aggressiveness and disrespect between social groups, which can make it difficult to reach a large societal consensus on important issues.

# A Appendix

Table A.1: Rankings over predicted and realized earnings

Efficiency		White players' earnings		Blue players' earnings	
Predicted mean total payoffs	Empirical outcome	Predicted mean payoffs	Empirical outcome	Predicted mean payoffs	Empirical outcome
D (85.56)	D (80.98, 28.53)	D (50.28)	D (42.16, 15.65)	TD (42.78)	NC (39.33, 12.52)
TD (81.30)	TD (79.21, 27.06)	TD (38.52)	TD (41.42, 15.36)	TDC (40.14)	D (38.83, 12.53)]
TDC (65.28)	TDC (78.28, 27.41)	TDC (25.14)	TDC (41.04, 14.67)	NC (37.5)	TD (37.79, 11.13)
NC (60)	NC (70.77, 33.26)	NC (22.5)	NC (31.44, 19.11)	D (35.28)	TDC (37.25, 12.39)

Note that the numbers in columns labeled “empirical outcomes” are average expected round earnings and their respective standard deviations. They are calculated based on the players’ types (white or blue), the signals that the computer reported to the whites, the conditional probabilities of the states of the world (each signal is true with 70% probability) and the actual votes in a given period. In case of a voting tie, the expected earnings are based on the probabilities with which the policies are implemented ( $\frac{1}{3}$  in case there is a tie between three policies,  $\frac{1}{2}$  in case there is a tie between two policies).

Table A.2: Expected round earnings – across treatments

	(1) All Players	(2) Whites	(3) Blues	(4) All Players
Deliberation	1.702*** (0.448)	3.572*** (1.024)	-0.168 (0.283)	-0.168 (0.283)
TopDown	1.407*** (0.408)	3.327*** (0.953)	-0.512** (0.226)	-0.512** (0.226)
TopDownClosed	1.252** (0.442)	3.199*** (0.938)	-0.694** (0.285)	-0.694** (0.285)
White player				-2.629** (1.034)
Deliberation × White player				3.740*** (1.207)
TopDown × White player				3.839*** (1.118)
TopDownClosed × White player				3.893*** (1.068)
Constant	11.795*** (0.370)	10.481*** (0.877)	13.110*** (0.197)	13.110*** (0.197)
Wald-test results for comparison of treatment coefficients ( $p$ values):				
Deliberation vs. TopDown	0.347	0.709	0.154	
TopDown vs. TopDownClosed	0.607	0.800	0.446	
Deliberation vs. TopDownClosed	0.213	0.557	0.085	
$R^2$	0.018	0.069	0.005	0.047
Number of clusters	20	20	20	20
Observations	9360	4680	4680	9360

Pooled OLS regressions. Dependent variable: Expected earnings (in points), conditional on received signals. Standard errors are clustered at the session level and given in parentheses:  
\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . NoChat serves as baseline treatment in all regressions.

## B Theoretical appendix

### B.1 The game

There are two states of the world,  $X$  and  $Y$ , and six players that form a group  $G$ , with three yellow and three blue players forming two respective subgroups,  $G_y$  and  $G_b$ . A player's color is publicly observable. The players have to choose a policy  $P$  from three alternative policies,  $A$ ,  $B$ , and  $C$ , by a vote. Policies generate state-dependent payoffs that may differ across colors. These payoffs are depicted in Table 1. Nature draws the state of the world  $\omega$ , which is either  $X$  or  $Y$  with equal probability, at the beginning of the game. Afterwards, nature randomly draws an informative private signal  $s_i \in \{x, y\}$  on the state of the world for each yellow player  $i$  and sends an empty signal  $s_i = \emptyset$  to the blue players. Informative signals are conditionally independent and true with probability  $p := \{s_i = x \mid \omega = X\} = 0.7$ . The subsequent collective policy choice has two stages, the communication stage and the voting stage, in treatments *Deliberation*, *TopDown* and *TopDownClosed*. Treatment *NoChat* has no communication stage.

The voting stage is identical across treatments and is structured as follows: All six players simultaneously and individually place a vote for  $A$ ,  $B$ , or  $C$ , or abstain. The winning alternative is determined by the plurality rule, i.e., the alternative with the most votes is implemented. If there is a tie, the winning alternative is chosen randomly, with equal probability of both alternatives. In the end, payoffs from the winning alternative are realized, given the true state of the word.

In all treatments with communication stage, this stage is structured as follows: There is a set of senders  $S \supseteq G_w$  and a set of receivers  $R(G_\tau)$  to which players in the subgroup  $G_\tau$ ,  $\tau \in \{w, b\}$ , can send messages. Let  $M$  denote the set of all messages that can be constructed in the common language spoken by the six players, including the empty set. Then, any player  $i \in G_\tau \subseteq S$  sends a message  $m_i \in M$  to  $R(G_\tau)$ . In *Deliberation*,  $S = G = R(G_w) = R(G_b)$ , i.e., communication is public and involves everyone as both sender and receiver. In particular, the whites may reveal their signal to the entire group of six (or lie or be silent about it), and both the whites and the blues may recommend a specific voting profile for the group. *TopDown* differs from *Deliberation* in that  $S = G_w$ ,  $R(G_w) = G$ , and  $R(G_b) = \emptyset$ . Thus, blues are no longer senders, but messages are still received by everyone. In *TopDownClosed*, by contrast,  $S = G_w = R$  on the first communication stage, i.e., the blues are entirely excluded from the communication on that stage, and the whites send messages to the subgroup of white players only. On the second communication stage in *TopDownClosed*, the whites can talk to the entire group; hence,  $R = G$ .

## B.2 Preferences

According to our main hypothesis *MH*, a player's expected utility is the expected sum of his own payoff and the payoffs of his receivers on the - first - communication stage. Hence, players have treatment-dependent preferences that can be described as follows. Let  $R^1(G_\tau)$  denote the set of receivers of individuals in  $G_\tau$  on the first communication stage in the game (which is also the final communication stage in all treatments except *TopDownClosed*). Let  $\pi_i(\omega, P)$  denote the final payoff of player  $i$ , given the state of the world  $\omega$  and the chosen policy  $P$ . Moreover, let  $q_i(\omega | m, s_i)$  denote player  $i$ 's posterior belief about how likely state of the world  $\omega$  is, given the sent messages  $m$  and his own signal  $s_i$ ; let  $\sigma_P(v) \in \{0, \frac{1}{2}, 1\}$  denote the probability of  $P$  being the winning policy, given the voting profile  $v$ ; and let  $z(P) \in \{1, 2, 3\}$  be an index of the policy and  $z(\omega) \in \{1, 2\}$  an index of the state of the world. Hence, we can define the utility function as follows:

$$u_i(v) = \sum_{z(\omega)=1}^2 q_i(\omega | m, s_i) \sum_{z(P)=1}^3 \sigma_{P_{z(P)}}(v | \omega) \left( \pi_i(\omega, P_{z(P)}) + \sum_{\substack{j \in R^1(G_\tau) \\ i \in G_\tau}} \pi_j(\omega, P_{z(P)}) \right).$$

## B.3 Equilibrium concept

We are solving the game for all Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria in pure strategies that fulfill the following selection criteria.

**Definition 1 (WU)** Any equilibrium is in **weakly undominated** strategies.

**Definition 2 (DT)** Players exhibit **dominant truthtelling**: If there exists a truthtelling equilibrium, no babbling equilibrium is played; i.e., if there exists an equilibrium in which all whites reveal their signal on the / a communication stage, no equilibrium is played in which not all whites reveal their signal on that stage.

**Definition 3 (SCT)** Players exhibit **same-color trust**: If the message of a player  $i$  to the entire group contradicts a message he has sent to players of his own color only, players of the same color as  $i$  believe the message that  $i$  has sent to them and disbelieve the message he has sent to the entire group.

**Definition 4 (MC)** Players exhibit **minimal coordination** in the following sense: For any  $\tau \in \{w, b\}$ , players  $i \in G_\tau$  who move at the same information set  $I$  and hence know that they have identical beliefs  $q_i(\omega | I) = q$  coordinate on sending the same message and / or voting for the same policy such that they maximize their (joint and individual) expected utility, given the strategies of the other voters.



**Definition 5 (LS)** Whites exhibit *literal speaking*: They send the message "x" if they want to indicate that their signal was "x", and they send the message "y" if they want to indicate that their signal was "y".

**Definition 6 (CORS)** All players exhibit *conditioning on revealed signals*: They may condition their strategies on the signals that are revealed by the messages but do not use messages as coordination devices otherwise.

Criterion **WU** excludes equilibria in which *selfish* whites vote for policy *C*. Criterion **DT** is typical for the cheap-talk literature and selects the equilibrium with the highest degree of information transmission. Criterion **SCT** excludes equilibria in *TopDownClosed* in which the whites cannot lie to the blues without changing the beliefs of the other whites, too. (Note that such equilibria would be extremely implausible since in *TopDownClosed*, the whites can even tell each other that they intend to lie to the blues.) Criterion **MC** restricts attention to equilibria in which the blues coordinate on the same voting strategy (since the blues always have the same information). Moreover, **MC** guarantees that in any truthtelling equilibrium (in which the whites, too, have the same information) the whites also coordinate on the same voting strategy. Criterion **LS** reduces the syntax of the language in which signals are communicated to a binary set and hence simplifies (the proofs in) equilibrium description. **CORS** restricts the function of communication as a coordination device to what is implied by **MC** and allows us to focus on information aggregation rather than pure (uninformed) coordination. The resulting effect of **CORS** is to restrict the number of outcome equivalent equilibria that differ in strategy profiles.

## B.4 Equilibria in *Deliberation*

Since in *Deliberation* both the whites and the blues send messages to the entire group, they fully internalize group utility, i.e., they have efficiency preferences. Hence, their (joint) utility is

$$\begin{aligned}
u_i^D(v) &= \sum_{z(\omega)=1}^2 q_i(\omega | m, s_i) \sum_{z(P)=1}^3 \sigma_{P_{z(P)}}(v | \omega) \left( \pi_i(\omega, P_{z(P)}) + \sum_{j \in G} \pi_j(\omega, P_{z(P)}) \right) \\
&= q_i(X | m, s_i) (\sigma_A(v | X) 120 + \sigma_C(v | X) 30) + \\
&\quad + q_i(Y | m, s_i) (\sigma_A(v | Y) 30 + \sigma_B(v | Y) 90 + \sigma_C(v | Y) 60).
\end{aligned}$$

Consider a candidate equilibrium in which the whites truthfully reveal their signals to the public. In such an equilibrium, all players have the same information and hence then same belief about  $\omega$ :  $q_i(\omega | m, s_i) = q(\omega | m) \forall i, \omega$ . Hence, *MC* applies to both whites

and blues: Whites coordinate on the same vote and blues coordinate on the same vote, maximizing the expected group payoff, given the strategy of the other color. Strategies of the whites may condition on the private signal or on the messages. Note that under truthtelling, the state of the world that is more likely than the other is indicated both by the signal that is received most often (i.e., twice or even three times) and by the message that is sent most often. Hereafter, we will call this signal and message the *majority signal* and the *majority message*.

**Definition 7** *An equilibrium is **efficient** if and only if  $A$  is the winning policy whenever the majority signal is  $X$  and  $B$  is the winning policy otherwise.*

**Proposition 1** *(i) There is a set of truthtelling equilibria in Deliberation that fulfill the selection criteria. They have the following properties: (a) The whites reveal their signals. The whites vote for  $A$  if the majority message indicates  $X$  and for  $B$  otherwise, and the blues abstain (LTED: "let the experts decide"). If (off equilibrium) there is no majority message, then arbitrary off-equilibrium beliefs about the unrevealed signal and voting profiles consistent with these beliefs can be assumed. (b) The whites reveal their signals. Everyone votes for  $A$  if the majority message indicates  $X$  and votes for  $B$  otherwise ( $A/B$ ). If (off equilibrium) there is no majority message, then arbitrary off-equilibrium beliefs about the unrevealed signal and voting profiles consistent with these beliefs can be assumed. (ii) These equilibria are outcome equivalent in the sense that  $A$  is the winning policy if the majority signal indicates  $X$ , and  $B$  is the winning policy otherwise. (iii) Hence, both types of truthtelling equilibria are efficient. (iv) These equilibria are the unique pure-strategy equilibria in Deliberation that fulfill all selection criteria.*

**Proof.** We first show that the voting profiles described in (a) and (b) are efficient equilibria of the continuation game on the voting stage, given truthtelling. We then show that truthtelling is an equilibrium strategy of the whites, given the voting profiles in (a) and (b). Finally, we prove (i), i.e., that the two equilibria are the only truthtelling equilibria that fulfill our selection criteria. Consider (a) and (b). Due to truthtelling, the majority message always equals the majority signal. Hence, LTED and AB are efficient. Efficiency preferences imply that no-one has a deviation incentive. Thus, the voting profiles in (a) and (b) are equilibria of the continuation game on the voting stage. Consider now the communication stage preceding the voting stage with LTED. If a white deviates from telling the truth in that he lies about his signal, then he either does not change the majority message, hence leaving the voting outcome unchanged, too, or he changes the majority message and hence moves the voting outcome away from efficiency. Thus, no white wants to deviate to lying. Now consider a deviation to silence. Again, this

either changes nothing or moves the voting outcome away from efficiency, depending on the off-equilibrium voting strategies. Hence, again, the whites do not want to deviate. The same kind of argument holds true for the communication stage that precedes a voting profile described in (b). Thus, in *Deliberation* there exist truthtelling equilibria with voting profiles as described in (a) and (b). Parts (ii) and (iii) follow directly.

It now remains to show that these two sets of equilibria defined above contain the only truthtelling equilibria in *Deliberation* that fulfill our selection criteria. Note first that *CORS* excludes equilibria in which strategies condition on messages without conditioning on beliefs. Furthermore, note that under truthtelling, *MC* applies both to the whites and the blues. If the whites have revealed their signals and the blues abstain, then *MC* and efficiency preferences imply that the whites coordinate on voting for A or B, depending on the majority message. If the whites do this, and if they have revealed their signals, then *MC* and efficiency preferences imply that the blues coordinate on a strategy that never distorts the voting outcome away from efficiency. Hence, in this case the only two voting profiles of the blues that fulfill *MC* are abstention and voting along with the whites. Finally, note that *DT* excludes equilibria with partial truthtelling. Hence, *CORS*, *MC*, *DT*, and efficiency preferences pin down all truthtelling equilibria in *Deliberation* to the ones that are characterized in (a) and (b). Part (iv) follows directly from this and *DT*. ■

From Proposition 1, the following outcome-related result can be derived:

**Result 1:** *In Deliberation, (a) the whites truthfully reveal their signal; and (b) if the majority signal indicates X, all votes that are placed are for A (A/A); whereas (c) if the majority signal indicates Y, all votes that are placed are for B (B/B).*

## B.5 Equilibria in *TopDown*

In *TopDown*, the whites can still address the entire group on the communication stage, but the blues are no longer senders. Hence, the whites still have efficiency preferences, but the blues become self-interested. Still, the blues have the same information, so *MC* still applies to them:  $q_i(\omega | m) = q(\omega | m) \forall i \in G_b$ . Moreover, note that payoffs are perfectly aligned across players of the same color; thus we can define  $\pi_i(\omega, P_{z(P)}) := \pi_b(\omega, P_{z(P)}) \forall i \in G_b$ . Hence, in *TopDown* a player  $i$  has utility  $u_i^{TD}$  as follows:

$$u_i^{TD} = u_i^D(v) \text{ if } i \in G_w,$$

$$u_i^{TD} = \sum_{z(\omega)=1}^2 q(\omega | m) \sum_{z(P)=1}^3 \sigma_{P_{z(P)}}(v | \omega) \pi_b(\omega, P_{z(P)}) \text{ if } i \in G_b.$$

Consider truthtelling equilibria.

**Proposition 2** (i) *There is a set of truthtelling equilibria in TopDown that fulfill the selection criteria. They have the following properties: The whites reveal their signals. If the majority message indicates  $X$ , then (a) all vote for  $A$ , (b) all whites vote for  $A$  and all blues abstain, or (c) all whites abstain and all blues vote for  $A$ . If the majority message indicates  $Y$ , then the whites vote for  $A$  and the blues for  $C$  ( $A/BC$ ). If (off equilibrium) there is no majority message, we restrict off-equilibrium beliefs as follows: If there is a one-shot deviation of one white player to being silent and the remaining revealed signals contradict each other (i.e., there is no majority message), then the blues have a belief  $q(X | m) < \frac{2}{3}$ . Then in all voting profiles consistent with off-equilibrium beliefs after such a deviation, the blues vote for  $C$ . (ii) These equilibria are outcome equivalent: They generate winning policy  $A$  if the majority signal is  $X$  and a tie between  $B$  and  $C$  if the majority signal is  $Y$ . (iii) These equilibria are inefficient. (iv) These equilibria are the unique pure-strategy equilibria that fulfill all selection criteria.*

**Proof.** We first show that with truthtelling of the whites on the communication stage, voting profiles with the properties described in (i) are equilibria of the continuation game. Second, we show that then, truthtelling must be part of the equilibrium. Part (ii) directly follows from part (i); and (iii) directly follows from (ii) and the definition of efficient equilibrium.

Assume now truthtelling of the whites, and consider the blues first. For  $q(\omega | m) < \frac{2}{3}$ , policy  $C$  is strictly better for a blue player than the other policies, otherwise, policy  $A$  is better than the other policies. If  $x$  is the majority message, we have  $q(\omega | m) \geq 0.7 > \frac{2}{3}$ , and if  $y$  is the majority message, we have  $q(\omega | m) \leq 0.3 < \frac{1}{3}$ . Thus, if  $x$  is the majority message, then  $A$  is better for any blue player than (a tie with) any other policy; and if  $y$  is the majority message, then (a tie with)  $C$  is better for any blue player than (a tie with) any other policy. Then, MC implies that all blues vote for  $A$  or abstain if  $x$  is the majority message and vote for  $C$  otherwise. If there is no majority message (i.e., there are only two messages that contradict each other), then the off-equilibrium belief of the blues,  $q(\omega | m) < \frac{2}{3}$ , and MC imply that all blues vote for  $C$ .

Consider now the whites on the voting stage. Remember that they have efficiency preferences. If the majority message is  $x$ , then any white prefers  $A$  over all other policies. MC then implies that all whites coordinate on an action that makes  $A$  the winning policy; i.e., voting for  $A$ , or, (only) if the blues vote for  $A$ , abstention. If the majority message is  $y$ , then any white anticipates the three blue votes for  $C$  but prefers  $B$  over all other policies himself. Hence, he also prefers a tie between  $B$  and  $C$  over  $C$  or any other tie with  $C$ . Thus, MC implies that all whites vote for  $B$ . If there is no majority message, i.e., if there are only two messages that contradict each other, then any off-

equilibrium belief about the unrevealed signal and any consistent voting strategy of the whites can be assumed. Note that regardless of the voting strategy of the whites after such a deviation, the resulting efficiency level (group payoff) cannot exceed the level implied by the equilibrium strategies (because strategies cannot improve upon conditioning on the full information about all signals). Thus far, we have shown that under truth-telling, voting profiles with the properties described in (a), (b), and (c) are equilibria of the continuation game on the voting stage.

Consider now the communication stage. We check the incentive of an arbitrary white player  $i$  to deviate to a lie or to being silent about his signal. Consider now a white who has received a signal  $s_i$ . If he lies or is silent about  $s_i$ , then he is either not pivotal, the other two messages being  $m_{-i} = (y, y)$  or  $m_{-i} = (x, x)$ , in which case the deviation does not change anything. Or  $i$  is pivotal, in which case the other two whites have contradicting signals and  $s_i$  is the majority signal. Then,  $i$ 's efficiency preferences imply that he cannot do better than revealing his signal. Thus, there is no deviation incentive on the communication stage.

We now proceed to proving (i) by showing that *all* truth-telling equilibria in *TopDown* have the properties that are described in (a), (b), and (c). Note first that *CORS* excludes equilibria in which strategies condition on messages without conditioning on beliefs. Second, under truth-telling, *MC* applies to both colors. Hence, under truth-telling each color will coordinate on an action that maximizes the probability of the policy preferred by this color, given the strategy of the other color and the common beliefs about the state of the world. But then, (a), (b), and (c) describe all voting profiles under truth-telling. Moreover, *DT* excludes partial truth-telling and babbling equilibria. Thus, *MC*, *CORS*, and *DT* restrict all pure-strategy equilibria in *TopDown* to the set described in Proposition 2, which proves part (iv). ■

From Proposition 2, the following outcome-related result can be derived:

**Result 2:** *In TopDown, (a) the whites truthfully reveal their signal; and (b) if the majority signal indicates X, all votes that are placed are for A (A/A); whereas (c) if the majority signal indicates Y, the whites vote for B and the blues for C (B/C).*

## B.6 Equilibria in *TopDownClosed*

In *TopDownClosed*, our main hypothesis *MH* implies that the whites do not have efficiency preferences any longer but maximize the joint payoffs of their own color group instead (color-group identity). Note that this is equivalent to being selfish since payoffs are perfectly aligned between individuals of the same color. Importantly, *WU* implies that selfish whites never vote for  $C$ , since they prefer any possible outcome of the vote over  $C$ ,

regardless of their beliefs about the state of the world, so that voting for  $C$  is a weakly dominated strategy for selfish whites. The blues, too, are selfish, as in *TopDown*.

Consider now potential equilibria in which the whites truthfully reveal their signals to each other on the first communication stage. Note that in such equilibria, the whites have identical beliefs on the voting stage, so that  $MC$  applies to them. Note that  $MC$  always applies to the blues, regardless of whether they are told the true signals or not.

**Proposition 3** (i) *There is a set of equilibria in *TopDownClosed* that fulfill the selection criteria. They have the following properties: The whites reveal their signals to each other, but babble to the blues. The whites vote for  $A$  if the majority message indicates  $X$  and for  $B$  otherwise, and the blues vote for  $C$  ( $AC/BC$ ). If (off equilibrium) there is no majority message on the first communication stage, arbitrary off-equilibrium beliefs of the whites and white votes consistent with these beliefs can be assumed; but the blues (unobservant of the deviation) are restricted to keep their prior beliefs and hence to vote for  $C$ . (ii) These equilibria are inefficient. (iii) These equilibria are the unique pure-strategy equilibria that fulfill all selection criteria.*

**Proof.** We first show that given truthtelling on the first communication stage, there can be no truthtelling on the second communication stage. We then show existence of the  $AC$ - $BC$  equilibria as characterized in (i). Part (ii) - inefficiency - directly follows from (i) and the definition of efficiency. Finally, we will prove (iii).

Assume now that the whites truthfully reveal their signals to each other on the communication stage. Assume for the sake of argument that there is also truthtelling on the second communication stage. Consider now a situation in which the majority signal indicates  $Y$ , but there has been one signal indicating  $X$ . On the voting stage, both the whites and the blues hence believe that the state of the world is  $Y$  with probability 0.7. But then, their preferences and  $MC$  imply that the whites vote for  $B$  and the blues for  $C$ . Under truthtelling, the whites' expected utility is  $0.3 \times 0 + 0.7 \left( \frac{1}{2} \times 20 + \frac{1}{2} \times 0 \right) = 7$ . If, by contrast, one of the whites who have received the signal indicating  $Y$  deviates to a lie, saying that his signal indicates  $X$ , the beliefs of the whites will not change since this is precluded by  $SCT$ , but the blues will believe that the state of the world is  $X$  with probability 0.7. Then,  $MC$  and the players' preferences imply that the whites will still vote for  $B$  and the blues will vote for  $A$ . For the whites, this yields an expected utility of

$$0.3 \left( \frac{1}{2} \times 20 + \frac{1}{2} \times 0 \right) + 0.7 \left( \frac{1}{2} \times 10 + \frac{1}{2} \times 20 \right) = 13.5.$$

Thus, the lie strictly increases the expected utility of the whites. Consider now a white  $i$  whose signal was  $s_i = Y$ . This white is pivotal on the second communication stage in the sense that his message determines the majority message sent to the blues (since the

other two whites are assumed to tell their true - contradictory - signals). Thus, this white has a strict incentive to lie on the second communication stage. This proves that under truthtelling on the first communication stage, there can be no truthtelling on the second communication stage if the signal distribution is 2 : 1.

Consider now a situation in which all three signals indicate  $Y$ . Then, under truthtelling on both communication stages, no white is the pivotal sender on the second communication stage any longer, and the individual lying incentive does no longer exist on the equilibrium path. Instead, a given white in this situation is indifferent between lying and revealing his signal, given that the other two whites reveal that their signals indicated  $Y$ . (Note that the whites know the signal distribution on the second communication stage since we assume truthtelling on the first communication stage.) However, the whites still *prefer* that the blues vote for  $A$  rather than  $C$ . To see this, note that their expected utility if the blues vote for  $A$  (and they themselves for  $B$ ) would be

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{0.3^3}{0.3^3 + 0.7^3} \left( \frac{1}{2} \times 3 \times 20 + \frac{1}{2} \times 3 \times 0 \right) + \frac{0.7^3}{0.3^3 + 0.7^3} \left( \frac{1}{2} \times 3 \times 10 + \frac{1}{2} \times 3 \times 20 \right) \\ & = 43.905. \end{aligned}$$

By contrast, if the blues vote for  $C$ , the whites' expected utility amounts to

$$\frac{0.3^3}{0.3^3 + 0.7^3} \times 0 + \frac{0.7^3}{0.3^3 + 0.7^3} \left( \frac{1}{2} \times 3 \times 20 + \frac{1}{2} \times 3 \times 0 \right) = 27.811.$$

Thus, the whites have a higher expected utility if the blues vote for  $A$  rather than  $C$ . Now note that the whites have identical beliefs on the second communication stage due to truthtelling on the first communication stage. Thus, MC applies to them on the second communication stage. But sending a majority message that indicates  $Y$  and thus making the blues vote for  $C$  violates  $MC$ . Thus, our selection criteria exclude equilibria in which any signal distribution leads to truthtelling on the second communication stage.

Consider now potential equilibria with truthtelling on the first communication stage and babbling on the second communication stage. Consider the voting stage first. The blues have their prior belief that both states of the world are equally likely. Thus, their selfish preferences and  $MC$  imply that they coordinate on voting for  $C$ . The whites, by contrast, know the actual signal distribution  $s$ . They prefer  $A$  whenever  $q(X | s) \geq 0.7$  and  $B$  otherwise. Hence, they also prefer a tie between  $A$  and  $C$  whenever  $q(X | s) \geq 0.7$  and a tie between  $B$  and  $C$  otherwise. But then, MC implies that they coordinate on voting for  $A$  whenever the majority signal indicates  $X$  and on voting for  $B$  otherwise. This proves the voting profile AC/BC on the equilibrium path.

Consider now the second communication stage. Given that the blues do not condition their beliefs on the messages sent, no white has an incentive to deviate from babbling to

conditioning his message on his signal. Note that this also holds true off equilibrium, i.e., after a deviation of a white / some whites on the first communication stage.

Now consider the first communication stage. Given that the whites believe each other, no white has an incentive to deviate to being silent or to lying. To see this, note that such a deviation would either change nothing or would distort the beliefs of the other two whites away from the true signal distribution. This distortion, in its turn, would either change nothing or distort the votes of the other two whites away from the voting profile that maximizes the whites' expected utility, given that the blues vote for  $C$ . Note that the blues cannot observe any deviation on the first communication stage. Hence, they cannot respond to such a deviation and will vote for  $C$  after it, too.

This proves parts (i) and (iii) of Proposition 3. Part (ii) is trivial. ■

From Proposition 3, the following outcome-related result can be derived:

**Result 3:** *In TopDownClosed, (a) the whites truthfully reveal their signals to each other but babble to the blues, and (b) if the majority signal indicates  $X$ , the whites vote for  $A$  but the blues for  $C$  ( $A/C$ ), whereas (c) if the majority signal indicates  $Y$ , the whites vote for  $B$  and the blues still for  $C$  ( $B/C$ ).*

## B.7 Equilibria in *NoChat*

In the *NoChat* treatment, there is no possibility to communicate. Therefore, both colors become self-interested and maximize the utility of their own color. Moreover, only the blues (know that they) have the same information set, namely their prior belief that the two states of the world are equally likely. The whites, however, have private independent information on the true state. Hence,  $MC$  applies to the blues but not to the whites.

**Proposition 4** (i) *There is a set of equilibria in NoChat that fulfill the selection criteria. They have the following properties: The blues vote for  $C$ , and (a) the whites vote for  $A$  ( $A/C$ ), or (b) the whites vote for  $B$  ( $B/C$ ), or the whites vote for  $A$  if their signal indicates  $X$  and for  $B$  otherwise (split-whites). (ii) These equilibria are inefficient.*

**Proof.** Since  $MC$  applies to the blues, we only have equilibria in which the blues coordinate on the same vote. Since the blues are self-interested in *NoChat*, votes other than  $C$  are weakly dominated for them. Hence,  $MC$  and  $WU$  restrict the analysis to equilibria in which the blues vote for  $C$ . The whites are self-interested, too. Given that the blues vote for  $C$ , each white will minimize the probability of the implementation of  $C$  (since  $C$  provides strictly lower expected payoffs than any other policy for a self-interested white, regardless of his signal). Voting for  $C$  is hence weakly dominated for the whites. Thus,  $WU$  excludes equilibria in which some whites, too, vote for  $C$ . Consider now an arbitrary



white  $i$ . If the two other whites vote for the same policy (that is not C), then  $i$ 's best response is to vote for this policy, too, in order to decrease the probability of C from 1 to 0.5. Hence, AC and BC are equilibria. If, now, the two other whites vote for the policy indicated by their signal (A if the signal indicates X and B otherwise), the best response of  $i$  is to vote in line with his signal, too. To see this, note that this strategy maximizes the probability of hitting the vote of the other two whites if they voted for the same policy, and hence minimizes the probability of C. Thus, split-whites is an equilibrium, too. Note that self-interest, MC (for the blues) and WU (for both colors) exclude other possible equilibria. This proves (i). Part (ii) follows from the definition of efficiency. ■

Proposition 4 implies the following outcome-related result:

**Result 4:** *In NoChat, the blues vote for C, regardless of the majority signal; and the whites vote for A or B or according to their signal (resulting in outcome A/C or B/C).*

Excluding all equilibrium outcomes with abstention, results 1-4 imply our testable hypotheses 1-4 in Section 3 of the paper. In these hypotheses, we focus on the treatment comparisons, i.e., on the comparative statics, rather than on point predictions.

## B.8 Predictions with standard preferences

Standard preferences would imply that all players are selfish maximizers of their own expected payoff. Due to our design, this is equivalent to assuming a color-group identity for both colors in all treatments. Hence, the predictions for treatments *NoChat* and *TopDownClosed* would not change if we assumed standard preferences.

By contrast, our predictions for *Deliberation* and *TopDown* would change: As is easy to show, there would not be any truth-telling equilibria but only babbling equilibria in these two treatments since each white would have an incentive to lie to the blues and report "x" even if her signal indicated "y". We omit the proof, but a crucial point in the proof is that selfish whites prefer A/A over B/C even under majority signal Y. Accordingly, if players were selfish, the predictions for *Deliberation* and *TopDown* would coincide with those for *NoChat*.

# C Supplementary online material

## Additional tables

Table C.1: Voting outcomes at the group level over time – Conditional on the received majority signal – First 10 rounds

	Majority signal: X				Majority signal: Y			
	NC	D	TD	TDC	NC	D	TD	TDC
A/C outcome	<b>0.303</b>	0.058	0.047	0.076	<b>0.128</b>	0.052	0.106	0.020
of this: split-whites	0.197	0.019	0.012	0.022	-	-	-	-
Almost A/C outcome	0.516	0.087	0.233	0.228	0.513	0.042	0.058	0.122
(Almost) A/C outcome	0.820	0.144	0.279	0.304	0.641	0.094	0.163	0.143
B/C outcome	0	0	0	0	0.026	<b>0.240</b>	<b>0.279</b>	<b>0.194</b>
of this: split-whites	-	-	-	-	0.013	0.115	0.154	0.082
(Almost) B/C outcome	0.016	0	0	0	0.179	0.479	0.654	0.469
Split-whites	0.279	0.019	0.012	0.022	0.051	0.135	0.173	0.092
LTED	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Almost LTED	0.025	0	0	0	0.013	0	0	0.010
(Almost) LTED	0.025	0	0	0	0.013	0	0	0.010
A/A	0	<b>0.548</b>	<b>0.337</b>	<b>0.228</b>	0	0.063	0	0.020
Almost all A	0.041	0.250	0.349	0.424	0.038	0.042	0.038	0.133
(Almost) all A	0.041	0.798	0.686	0.652	0.038	0.104	0.038	0.153
B/B	0	0	0	0	0	0.167	0.010	0.010
Almost all B	0	0.010	0	0.011	0	0.125	0.115	0.102
(Almost) all B	0	0.010	0	0.011	0	0.292	0.125	0.112
Other	0.098	0.048	0.035	0.033	0.128	0.031	0.019	0.112

Treatment names are abbreviated with NC (NoChat), D (Deliberation), TD (TopDown) and TDC (TopDownClosed). In “Almost” outcomes at most one player per color group deviates from the respective outcome. LTED refers to the “Let the experts decide equilibrium”. Figures printed in bold highlight the observed modal voting outcomes for the respective treatment and signal combination.

Table C.2: Voting outcomes at the group level over time – Conditional on the received majority signal – Last 10 rounds

	Majority signal: X				Majority signal: Y			
	NC	D	TD	TDC	NC	D	TD	TDC
A/C outcome	<b>0.375</b>	0.180	<b>0.161</b>	<b>0.237</b>	<b>0.443</b>	0.157	0.124	0.086
of this: split-whites	0.170	0.027	0.011	0.052	-	-	-	-
Almost A/C outcome	0.509	0.270	0.376	0.443	0.443	0.135	0.134	0.129
(Almost) A/C outcome	0.884	0.450	0.538	0.680	0.886	0.292	0.258	0.215
B/C outcome	0	0	0	0	0	<b>0.191</b>	<b>0.351</b>	<b>0.376</b>
of this: split-whites	-	-	-	-	0	0.067	0.175	0.226
Almost B/C outcome	0.009	0	0.011	0	0.034	0.236	0.278	0.237
(Almost) B/C outcome	0.009	0	0.011	0	0.034	0.427	0.629	0.613
Split-whites	0.259	0.027	0.022	0.052	0.011	0.079	0.175	0.247
LTED	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Almost LTED	0.018	0	0	0	0.023	0	0	0
(Almost) LTED	0.018	0	0	0	0.023	0	0	0
A/A	0	<b>0.234</b>	0.075	0.062	0	0.056	0	0.022
Almost all A	0.036	0.315	0.366	0.237	0	0.079	0.072	0.075
(Almost) all A	0.036	0.550	0.441	0.299	0	0.135	0.072	0.097
B/B	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Almost all B	0	0	0	0	0	0.124	0.010	0.011
(Almost) all B	0	0	0	0	0	0.124	0.010	0.011
Other	0.054	0	0.011	0.021	0.057	0.022	0.031	0.065

Treatment names are abbreviated with NC (NoChat), D (Deliberation), TD (TopDown) and TDC (TopDownClosed). In “Almost” outcomes at most one player per color group deviates from the respective outcome. LTED refers to the “Let the experts decide equilibrium”. Figures printed in bold highlight the observed modal voting outcomes for the respective treatment and signal combination.

## Chat dimensions

### Dimension 1 – General classification of chats

Table C.3: Rater 1: Fraction of groups in which the whites...

	Deliberation	TopDown	TopDownClosed
... stress the public spirit	0.22	0.22	0.23
... stress the interests of the own color group	0.11	0.12	0.01
... suspect lying	0.03	0.01	0.01
... stress trust	0.01	0.01	0.02
... mention circumstances as justification for behavior	0.22	0.14	0.10
... mention circumstances as information	0.27	0.28	0.21
... stress hope or optimism	0.07	0.13	0.10

Table C.4: Rater 1: Fraction of groups in which the blues...

	Deliberation
... stress the public spirit	0.09
... stress the interests of the own color group	0.13
... suspect lying	0.16
... stress trust	0.03
... mention circumstances as justification for behavior	0.13
... mention circumstances as information	0.23
... stress hope or optimism	0.04

Table C.5: Rater 2: Fraction of groups in which the whites...

	Deliberation	TopDown	TopDownClosed
... stress the public spirit	0.25	0.24	0.27
... stress the interests of the own color group	0.08	0.03	0.00
... suspect lying	0.02	0.00	0.00
... stress trust	0.02	0.00	0.02
... mention circumstances as justification for behavior	0.13	0.16	0.03
... mention circumstances as information	0.16	0.18	0.07
... stress hope or optimism	0.07	0.16	0.03

Table C.6: Rater 2: Fraction of groups in which the blues...

	Deliberation
... stress the public spirit	0.16
... stress the interests of the own color group	0.11
... suspect lying	0.18
... stress trust	0.05
... mention circumstances as justification for behavior	0.12
... mention circumstances as information	0.13
... stress hope or optimism	0.07

## Dimension 2 – Recommendations

Table C.7: Rater 1: Fraction of groups in which the whites...

	Deliberation	TopDown	TopDownClosed
... recommend voting for A	0.73	0.70	0.71
... recommend voting for B	0.41	0.49	0.29
... recommend voting for C	0.06	0.01	0.01
... recommend something different	0.04	0.01	0.06

Table C.8: Rater 1: Fraction of groups in which the blues...

	Deliberation
... recommend voting for A	0.53
... recommend voting for B	0.30
... recommend voting for C	0.54
... recommend something different	0.04

Table C.9: Rater 2: Fraction of groups in which the whites...

	Deliberation	TopDown	TopDownClosed
... recommend voting for A	0.73	0.70	0.71
... recommend voting for B	0.41	0.49	0.29
... recommend voting for C	0.08	0.02	0.01
... recommend something different	0.04	0.01	0.06

Table C.10: Rater 2: Fraction of groups in which the blues...

	Deliberation
... recommend voting for A	0.55
... recommend voting for B	0.30
... recommend voting for C	0.54
... recommend something different	0.03

### Dimension 3 – Addressees

Table C.11: Rater 1: Fraction of groups in which the whites...

	Deliberation	TopDown	TopDownClosed
... address the speech to all	1.00	1.00	1.00
... address their speech to their own color group only	0.28	0.22	0.01
... address their speech to the other color group only	0.34	0.19	0.14
... directly address a speech to s.o. from own color group	0.13	0.14	0.06
... directly address a speech to s.o. from other color group	0.18	0.00	0.00

Table C.12: Rater 1: Fraction of groups in which the blues...

	Deliberation
... address the speech to all	0.99
... address their speech to their own color group only	0.37
... address their speech to the other color group only	0.38
... directly address a speech to s.o. from own color group	0.15
... directly address a speech to s.o. from other color group	0.21

Table C.13: Rater 2: Fraction of groups in which the whites...

	Deliberation	TopDown	TopDownClosed
... address the speech to all	1.00	1.00	1.00
... address their speech to their own color group only	0.20	0.01	0.00
... address their speech to the other color group only	0.22	0.06	0.03
... directly address a speech to s.o. from own color group	0.09	0.04	0.02
... directly address a speech to s.o. from other color group	0.11	0.01	0.00

Table C.14: Rater 2: Fraction of groups in which the blues...

	Deliberation
... address the speech to all	0.99
... address the speech to their own color group only	0.29
... address the speech to the other color group only	0.18
... directly address a speech to s.o. from own color group	0.09
... directly address a speech to s.o. from other color group	0.11

## Dimension 4 – Showing respect

Table C.15: Rater 1: Fraction of groups in which the whites...

	Deliberation	TopDown	TopDownClosed
... show respect	0.17	0.17	0.15
... behave disrespectfully	0.31	0.14	0.04
... behave neutrally	1.00	1.00	1.00

Table C.16: Rater 1: Fraction of groups in which the blues...

	Deliberation
... show respect	0.13
... behave disrespectfully	0.28
... behave neutrally	1.00

Table C.17: Rater 2: Fraction of groups in which the whites...

	Deliberation	TopDown	TopDownClosed
... show respect	0.06	0.01	0.03
... behave disrespectfully	0.31	0.02	0.01
... behave neutrally	1.00	1.00	1.00

Table C.18: Rater 2: Fraction of groups in which the blues...

	Deliberation
... show respect	0.06
... behave disrespectfully	0.27
... behave neutrally	1.00



**Dimension 5 – Specific recommendations I**

Table C.19: Rater 1: Fraction of groups in which the whites...

	Deliberation	TopDown	TopDownClosed
... recommend LTED	0.00	0.00	0.00
... recommend A/C	0.02	0.00	0.00
... recommend All A	0.72	0.69	0.54
... recommend All B	0.40	0.46	0.26
... recommend All C	0.05	0.01	0.01
... recommend voting acc. to majority signal	0.14	0.14	0.43
... do not give any such recommendation	0.04	0.01	0.06

Table C.20: Rater 1: Fraction of groups in which the blues...

	Deliberation
... recommend LTED	0.00
... recommend A/C	0.07
... recommend All A	0.52
... recommend All B	0.27
... recommend All C	0.53
... recommend voting acc. to maj. signal	0.06
... do not give any such recommendation	0.03

Table C.21: Rater 2: Fraction of groups in which the whites...

	Deliberation	TopDown	TopDownClosed
... recommend LTED	0.00	0.00	0.00
... recommend A/C	0.02	0.00	0.00
... recommend All A	0.70	0.70	0.71
... recommend All B	0.40	0.49	0.29
... recommend All C	0.06	0.02	0.01
... recommend voting acc. to majority signal	0.03	0.00	0.00
... do not give any such recommendation	0.05	0.01	0.06

Table C.22: Rater 2: Fraction of groups in which the blues...

	Deliberation
... recommend LTED	0.00
... recommend A/C	0.06
... recommend All A	0.52
... recommend All B	0.29
... recommend All C	0.47
... recommend voting acc. to majority signal	0.01
... do not give any such recommendation	0.05

## Dimension 6 – Specific recommendations II

Table C.23: Rater 1: Fraction of groups in which the whites give recommendations to both color groups...

	Deliberation	TopDown	TopDownClosed
..., not mentioning signals or abstentions	0.95	0.98	0.75
..., mentioning signals, but not abstentions	0.08	0.14	0.43
..., not mentioning signals, but abstentions	0.01	0.00	0.01
... do not give any such recommendation	0.04	0.01	0.06

Table C.24: Rater 1: Fraction of groups in which the blues give recommendations to both color groups...

	Deliberation
..., not mentioning signals or abstentions	0.93
..., mentioning signals, but not abstentions	0.03
..., not mentioning signals, but abstentions	0.01
... do not give any such recommendation	0.06

Table C.25: Rater 2: Fraction of groups in which the whites give recommendations to both color groups...

	Deliberation	TopDown	TopDownClosed
..., not mentioning signals or abstentions	0.94	0.86	0.85
..., mentioning signals, but not abstentions	0.16	0.42	0.17
..., not mentioning signals, but abstentions	0.00	0.00	0.00
... do not give any such recommendation	0.05	0.01	0.06

Table C.26: Rater 2: Fraction of groups in which the blues give recommendations to both color groups...

	Deliberation
..., not mentioning signals or abstentions	0.94
..., mentioning signals, but not abstentions	0.08
..., not mentioning signals, but abstentions	0.00
... do not give any such recommendation	0.05

## Dimension 7 – Inter-group fairness and efficiency

Table C.27: Rater 1: Fraction of groups in which the whites...

	Deliberation	TopDown	TopDownClosed
... mention relative payoffs (W vs. B)	0.10	0.09	0.09
... mention joint payoffs (W + B)	0.19	0.20	0.13

Table C.28: Rater 1: Fraction of groups in which the blues...

	Deliberation
... mention relative payoffs (W vs. B)	0.11
... mention joint payoffs (W + B)	0.04

Table C.29: Rater 2: Fraction of groups in which the whites...

	Deliberation	TopDown	TopDownClosed
... mention relative payoffs (W vs. B)	0.08	0.10	0.03
... mention joint payoffs (W + B)	0.13	0.23	0.26

Table C.30: Rater 2: Fraction of groups in which the blues...

	Deliberation
... mention relative payoffs (W vs. B)	0.09
... mention joint payoffs (W + B)	0.04

# Translated instructions

Welcome to today's experiment!

You are taking part in a decision situation and it is possible for you to earn some money. The amount of money that you are able to win depends on your decisions and on the decisions of the other participants that are assigned to you. Moreover, it is influenced by the role that is randomly allocated to you. After having finished the experiment, we would like to ask you to fill in a short questionnaire.

Please note that from now on and throughout the experiment it is **not allowed to communicate** unless the computer explicitly asks you to do so. If you have any questions, please raise your hand out of your cubicle. One of the experimenters will come to you then. Throughout the experiment, it is forbidden to use mobile phones, smartphones, tablets or the like. Any violation of the rules leads to exclusion from the experiment and payment. All decisions are made anonymously, i.e. none of the participants learns about the identity of the others. Also the payment will be made anonymously at the end of the experiment.

## Instructions

### 1. What's it about – An overview

[NoChat: ] This experiment is about making a decision within a group between three different options A, B and C by way of vote.

[Deliberation / TopDown / TopDownClosed: ] This experiment is about making a decision within a group between three different options A, B and C through communication and by way of vote.

A group consists of three „white“ and three „blue“ members. Your payment depends on the decision that the group makes regarding the possible options. It depends, first, on the fact which of the options will be implemented. Second, it is determined by the role you are assigned to – the “white” one or the “blue” one. And third, it also depends on the situation that occurs – this can be either X or Y. The graph below, comprising two tables, shows how many points a white and blue group member can earn given the three options and depending the situation that occurs – X (left table) or Y (right table).

<b>Situation X</b>			<b>Situation Y</b>			
	White members	Blue members	White members	Blue members		
Options	A	20	20	A	10	0
	B	0	0	B	20	10
	C	0	10	C	0	20

The following applies for situation X: If option A is implemented, the white members and the blue members earn 20 points; if option B is implemented none of the members earns anything. If option C is implemented, the white members do not earn anything and the blue members earn 10 points.

The analogue applies for situation Y: If option A is implemented, the white members earn 10 points and the blue members do not earn anything; if option B is implemented, the white members earn 20 points and the blue members earn 10 points. If option C is implemented, the white members do not earn anything and the blue members earn 20 points.

The situation is not directly observable, but is selected randomly by the computer; both situations X and Y are equally likely i.e. they will be realized with a probability of 50%. The situation that is chosen by the computer is valid for the entire group; i.e. the payments for the white members as well as for the blue members are determined by either the left table or the right table. Thus, one could also say that the computer selects randomly one out of the two tables for the entire group, whereby both tables are equally likely.

Besides the partly different payments, there is also another difference between the white members and the blue members within a group: Each white member receives independent information by the computer on whether situation X or situation Y occurs. This information is true with a 70% probability (i.e. it is true in 70 out of 100 cases and wrong in 30 out of 100 cases). Thus, as this information does not always have to be true, it is possible that not all three white members receive the same information by the computer. The blue members do not receive any information by the computer.

*[NoChat: ]* In order to make a decision between the three options, the group goes through a two-stage process. On the first stage, all group members can take notes in order to sort out their thoughts. On the second stage the voting will be carried out. The option with the most votes will be implemented.

*[Deliberation: ]* In order to make a decision between the three options, the group goes through a two-stage process. On the first stage, all group members can chat together. On the second stage the voting will be carried out. The option with the most votes will be implemented.

*[TopDown: ]* In order to make a decision between the three options, the group goes through a two-stage process. On the first stage, all white group members can chat together and send messages to the entire group. The blue members can read these messages, but they cannot actively take part in chatting. On the second stage the voting will be carried out. The option with the most votes will be implemented.

*[TopDownClosed: ]* In order to make a decision between the three options, the group goes through a three-stage process. On the first stage, all white group members can chat together. The blue members cannot read these messages. On the second stage, all white group members can chat together and send messages to the entire group. The blue members can read these messages, but

they cannot actively take part in chatting. On the third stage the voting will be carried out. The option with the most votes will be implemented.

The experiment comprises 20 rounds.

In the following, the experiment will be explained in detail:

### **1. The allocation of the roles**

At the beginning of the experiment, the computer randomly assigns every participant either the role of a white member or that of a blue member. The **roles remain constant throughout the whole experiment**, i.e. one's own role will not change between rounds. Instead, in each round the group constellation will be re-determined: In each round the computer randomly allocates the participants to groups of six, consisting of three white members and three blue members.

In the following the course of an (arbitrary) round will be described. The experiment consists of **20 rounds**. The payments in any given round only depend on what happens in that round – they are independent of former rounds. The situation that occurs in a given round is likewise independent of the situations that have occurred in former rounds.

### **2. Course of a round**

**At the beginning of each round, the computer randomly assigns** the whites and the blues to groups of six, consisting of three white members and three blue members. Then each **white member** receives **information** by the computer on whether situation X or Y prevails, i.e. if the left or right table is correct. This information is true with a 70% probability. The blue members do not get any information.

*[NoChat: ]* Then a “**note**”-window opens where you can write down notes. Please use the window only for taking notes regarding things that are relevant for the experiment. The window will disappear after **two minutes**. You will see in the top right corner how much time you have left.

*[Deliberation: ]* Then a “**chat**”- window opens where **all group members**, the white and the blue members, can chat together. The computer randomly assigns everyone who enters a message a number that will be shown at the beginning of the message sent together with the role (white or blue). A possible pseudonym is for example „Blue 1“. Please note: The pseudonyms are only valid **for this round**. With the help of these pseudonyms you can address each other and keep track of which messages are sent from the same person during the chat. Throughout the chat you can try to influence the voting decisions of the others. Please only use this chat for exchanging views on things that are relevant for the experiment. It is not allowed to uncover one's own identity or the identity of other group members. The chat window will disappear after **two minutes**. You will see in the top right corner how much time you have left.

*[TopDown: ]* Then a “**chat**”- window opens where the **white group members** can chat together and send messages to the entire group. The blue members can read these messages, but they cannot

actively take part in chatting. The computer randomly assigns all white members who enter a message a number that will be shown at the beginning of the messages sent. A possible pseudonym is for example „White 1“. Please note: The pseudonyms are only valid **for this round**. With the help of these pseudonyms you can address each other and keep track of which messages are sent from the same person during the chat. Throughout the chat you can try to influence the voting decisions by the others. Please only use this chat for exchanging views on things that are relevant for the experiment. It is not allowed to uncover one's own identity or the identity of other group members. The chat window will disappear after **two minutes**. You will see in the top right corner how much time you have left.

*[TopDownClosed: ]* Then a **“chat”**- window opens for the white group members where they can chat together. The blue members cannot read these messages. They have to wait for the experiment to proceed. Subsequently, another chat window opens where the white group members can chat together and send messages to the entire group. The blue members can read these messages, but they cannot actively take part in chatting. In both chats, the computer assigns all white members who enter a message randomly a number that will be shown at the beginning of the messages sent. A possible pseudonym is for example „White 1“. Please notice: The pseudonyms are only valid **for this round**. With the help of these pseudonyms you can address each other and keep track of which messages are sent from the same person during the chat. Throughout the chat you can try to influence the voting decisions by the others. Please only use this chat for exchanging views on things that are relevant for the experiment. It is not allowed to uncover one's own identity or the identity of other group members. Each of these chat windows will disappear after **one minute**. You will see in the top right corner how much time you have left.

*[NoChat: ]* In the next step there is a secret **vote over the three options**. That means each group member can vote anonymously either for A or B or C or abstain from voting. Ultimately, the computer implements the **option with the most votes**. (In case of parity of votes the computer randomly chooses between the options with the most votes. Also in case that all group members abstain from voting, the computer randomly chooses one of the three options.)

*[Deliberation / TopDown: ]* After the chat there is a secret **vote over the three options**. That means, each group member can vote anonymously either for A or B or C or abstain from voting. Ultimately, the computer implements the **option with the most votes**. (In case of parity of votes the computer randomly chooses between the options with the most votes. Also in case that all group members abstain from voting, the computer randomly chooses one of the three options.)

*[TopDownClosed: ]* After the second chat there is a secret **vote over the three options**. That means, each group member can vote either for A or B or C or abstain from voting. Ultimately, the computer implements the **option with the most votes**. (In case of parity of votes the computer randomly chooses between the options with the most votes. Also in case that all group members abstain from voting, the computer chooses one of the three options.)



Then all group members are informed about the option that has been elected and they learn about the distribution of votes, i.e. how many votes option A has received, how many votes option B has received, how many votes option C has received and how many abstentions there have been. Moreover, the computer screen informs each group member about the situation that has occurred and how many points he or she has earned in the given round.

### *3. Total payment for the experiment*

At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly, and independently from each other, selected three rounds. All rounds are equally likely. The payments that you have earned in these selected rounds will be summed up and converted into EURO with the **exchange rate 1 EURO = 3 POINTS**. Your total earnings from the experiment consist of the resulting amount plus the show-up fee of 10 EURO.

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