



Fachbereich VWL / Department of Economics

EconNewsletter

Editorial Contact: Michael Paetz
tel: +49 40 42838-5561; e-mail: econ.newsletter.Wiso@uni-hamburg.de

NOVEMBER 20 – NOVEMBER 24, 2023

NEWSLETTER 2023-24

SEMINAR CALENDAR

HCHE Research Seminar

[Hans van Kippersluis, Erasmus Universität Rotterdam:](#)

Skipping your workout, again? Measuring and understanding time inconsistency in physical activity

Monday November 20
16:30-17:45
Esplanade 36, R. 4011/13

Quantitative Economics

[Christoph Meinerding, Bundesbank:](#)

Do Past Emissions Affects Firms' Supply of Green Technologies: Evidence from Technology-Related Job Postings

Tuesday November 14
12:15–13:30
R. 0079 (VMP 5)

Environmental and Development Economics

[Randy Walsh, University of Pittsburgh:](#)

Hell with the Lid Off: Locational Sorting in America's Most Polluted City

Wednesday November 22
12:15–13:45
R. 0079 (VMP 5)

Labour Economics

[Armando Meier, University of Lausanne:](#)

Early Socialization and the Gender Wage Gap

Thursday November 23
14:30–16:00
Esplanade 36, R. 4011/13

Microeconomics Seminar

[Stephan Lauermann, Universität Bonn:](#)

Persuasion and Information Aggregation in Elections

Thursday November 23
17:00–18:30
R. 0079 (VMP 5)

ABSTRACTS

Labour Economics

Armando Meier, University of Lausanne:

Early Socialization and the Gender Wage Gap

Abstract:

We study the impact of early socialization on gender inequality in the labor market. To this end, we link the gender environment in the primary-school cohort to later occupations and wages. We find that women exposed to more girls at this critical age earn more later on, leading to a reduction in the gender wage gap. We explore mechanisms and find that women exposed to a more female-dominated environment select into less gender-stereotypical occupations with higher wage potential. The gender environment at an early age, therefore, shapes career trajectories and lifetime earnings.

Microeconomics Seminar

Stephan Laueremann, Universität Bonn:

Persuasion and Information Aggregation in Elections

Abstract:

This paper studies a large majority election with voters who have heterogeneous, private preferences and exogenous private signals. We show that a Bayesian persuader can implement any state-contingent outcome in some equilibrium by providing additional information. In this setting, without the persuader's information, a version of the Condorcet Jury Theorem holds (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1997). Persuasion does not require detailed knowledge of the voters' private information and preferences: the same additional information is effective across environments. The results require almost no commitment power by the persuader. Finally, the persuasion mechanism is effective also in small committees with as few as 15 members.

The next EconNewsletter will be published on Monday, November 27, 2023.

Editorial deadline: Friday, November 24, 2023.

EconNewsletter

Department of Economics

University of Hamburg

Von-Melle-Park 5, 20146 Hamburg

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