Fachbereich VWL / Department of Economics

EconNewsletter

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DECEMBER 2 – DECEMBER 6, 2019

SEMINAR CALENDAR

Research Seminar “Labour Economics”
Wolfgang Lechthaler, CAU Kiel:
The Dynamic and Distributional Aspects of Import Tariffs
Monday December 2
16:30-18:00
Esplanade 36, R. 4011/13

Environmental and Development Economics
Daniel Heyen, ETH Zürich:
Public good provision: Theory and experimental design
Wednesday December 4
12:15–13:45
WiWi 0079 (VMP 5)

Hamburg Lectures on Law & Economics
Ass. Prof. Massimiliano Vatiero, Universität degli Studi di Trento:
Smart Contracts and Transaction Costs
Wednesday December 4
18:15–19:45
R. 110, Johnsallee 35

PhD Seminar
Fanny Schories, University of Hamburg:
Institutional Choice, Culture and Cooperation
Thursday December 5
12:15–13:15
WiWi 2095/2197 (VMP 5)

Research Seminar “Microeconomics”
Igor Letina, Universität Bern:
Killer acquisitions and the incentive to innovate
Thursday December 5
17:15–18:45
Raum S 28 (VMP 9)

HCHE Research Seminar
- no seminar -

Forschungsseminar “Quantitative Wirtschaftsforschung“
- no seminar -

Sollten Sie Interesse haben, sich mit einem/r der Vortragenden zu treffen, wenden Sie sich bitte an den entsprechenden Veranstalter. Weitere Infos finden Sie auf unserer Homepage: https://www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de/fachbereich-vwl/forschung/forschungsseminare.html
Research Seminar “Labour Economics”
Wolfgang Lechthaler, CAU Kiel:
The Dynamic and Distributional Aspects of Import Tariffs

Abstract:
We use a dynamic trade model with two sectors and two types of workers to analyze the optimal setting of income-generating tariffs. This approach allows us to take account of adjustment dynamics, distributional aspects and the time horizon of policy makers and workers. In response to a unilateral increase in tariffs aggregate consumption increases only sluggishly so that policy makers with a short time horizon tend to set lower tariffs. The level of tariffs preferred by specific workers depends on the sector where they are employed as well as their skill class, with the relative weight of both aspects determined by the time horizon of the workers. Unskilled workers in the unskilled-intensive sector are the ones most in favor of protectionism and might even benefit from a trade war.

Environmental and Development Economics
Daniel Heyen, ETH Zürich:
Public gob provision: Theory and experimental design

Abstract:
Inspired by the possibility to modify global temperatures on a short timescale and inexpensively through so-called ‘solar geoengineering’, Weitzman coined the term ‘public gob’: A public good (more of it is better) for some under some circumstances and a public bad (more of it is worse) for others under some other circumstances. In addition to free-riding incentives, public gobs are prone to ‘free-driving’: the agent with the strongest preference may set the public gob level for all, leading to over-provision of the public gob. We argue that public gobs aptly capture interactions involving externalities in examples that extend well beyond geoengineering. We develop a theoretical framework for the non-cooperative public gob provision that includes both Weitzman’s model and standard public good frameworks as special cases. We also present an experimental design to test preferences for public gob provision.
PhD Seminar
Fanny Schories, University of Hamburg:
Institutional Choice, Culture and Cooperation

Abstract:
I use economic lab experiments to examine the effect of more or less participatory decision-making procedures on cooperative behavior. There is evidence of a large democracy premium – a democratic decision increases cooperativeness – especially among subjects who initially preferred a different outcome. The experimental design controls for selection and information effects, and additional treatments isolate authority and legitimacy as two potential driving factors behind the democracy premium. Furthermore, a replication study in Egypt investigates whether the democracy premium is robust across cultures and interacts democratic preferences with religiosity and authoritarian values.

Research Seminar “Microeconomics”
Igor Letina, Universität Bern:
Killer acquisitions and the incentive to innovate

Abstract:
Competition policy observers are becoming increasingly concerned about adverse effects of mergers on potential competition. In particular, a lot of attention has been paid to so-called killer acquisitions, where an incumbent firm buys up an innovative start-up and then does not commercialize its research ideas. This paper deals with the effects of killer acquisitions on innovation in a model where an incumbent and an entrant can both invest in multiple research projects. We find that prohibiting killer acquisitions reduces the diversity of research approaches pursued by the firms and thereby the probability of developing breakthrough innovations. These findings have to be weighed against the well-known anti-competitive effect resulting from the elimination of the would-be entrant.

The next EconNewsletter will be published on Monday, December 9, 2019.
Editorial deadline: Friday, December 6, 2019.