



Fachbereich VWL / Department of Economics

EconNewsletter

Editorial Contact: Michael Paetz
tel: +49 40 42838-5561; e-mail: econ.newsletter.Wiso@uni-hamburg.de

NOVEMBER 4 – NOVEMBER 8, 2019

NEWSLETTER 2019-23

SEMINAR CALENDAR

Research Seminar “Labour Economics”

Marco Caliendo, Universität Potsdam:

Unintended Effects of Labor Market Policies: Evidence from Drug Prescriptions

Monday November 4

16:30-18:00

Esplanade 36, R. 4011/13

Environmental and Development Economics

Sebastian Tonke, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods: Wednesday November 6

Imperfect Knowledge, Information Provision and Behavior: Evidence from 12:15–13:45

a Large-Scale Field Experiment to Encourage Resource Conservation WiWi 0079 (VMP 5)

Hamburg Lectures on Law & Economics

Prof. Thushyanthan Baskaran, University of Siegen:

A leaky pipeline? Recontest rates and the underrepresentation of women in politics

Wednesday November 6

18:15–19:45

R. 110, Johnsallee 35

Research Seminar “Microeconomics”

Bhaskar Dutta, University of Warwick:

A Game of Hide and Seek in Networks

Thursday November 7

17:15–18:45

Raum S 28 (VMP 9)

HCHE Research Seminar

- no seminar -

Forschungsseminar “Quantitative Wirtschaftsforschung“

- no seminar -

PhD Seminar

- no seminar -

ABSTRACTS

Research Seminar “Labour Economics”

Marco Caliendo, Universität Potsdam:

Unintended Effects of Labor Market Policies: Evidence from Drug Prescriptions

Abstract:

We use individual information from prescription drug records to study unintended effects of labor market policies on participants' health status. We examine two popular and commonly used interventions that represent different reintegration strategies for unemployed workers: training programs and benefit sanctions. To establish a causal relationship we exploit the longitudinal aspect of the prescription records and estimate dynamic difference-in-differences models comparing treated and non-treated individuals before and after the treatment. Our results show that supportive interventions, such as training programs, reduce drug prescriptions related to cardiovascular and mental health diseases by about 6-7% within a year after the program start. The direct effect of participating, e.g. due to a change of daily routines, seem to be more important than the indirect effect through improved employment prospects. Restrictive interventions, such as benefit sanctions, have no long-lasting effects on drug prescriptions, but the notification of an upcoming sanction leads to a short-term increase in prescriptions for mental health issues, possibly induced by higher stress levels.

Environmental and Development Economics

Sebastian Tonke, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods:

Imperfect Knowledge, Information Provision and Behavior: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment to Encourage Resource Conservation

Abstract:

I show that imperfect knowledge about how to change one's outcomes is a severe obstacle to efficient behavior, but can be overcome by providing simple, low-cost information. In a natural field experiment among 14,796 customers to reduce residential water consumption in a severely water stressed country, customers of the national water utility receive a one-shot text message on their mobile phone with varying content. Messages providing previously unknown conservation strategies decrease consumption by 5.2 percent. This effect persists over eight months until rain season sets in. Two additional treatments that encourage customers to develop and act upon their own strategies are ineffective. They rule out that treatment effects are driven by behavioral mechanisms like salience, awareness of water scarcity or being asked to save water. Instead, the results and corroborating survey evidence suggest that customers lack knowledge on how to reduce consumption.

Hamburg Lectures on Law & Economics

Prof. Thushyanthan Baskaran, University of Siegen:

A leaky pipeline? Recontest rates and the underrepresentation of women in politics

Abstract:

We study why women are underrepresented in politics. Using a sample of 114,926 candidates who ran for local council seats across 4 local council elections in a German state, we show that female candidates are 4 to 5 percentage points less likely to recontest in the next election. This recontest gap between men and women can be observed among elected and unelected candidates, across almost all parties, and irrespective of a candidates individual electoral performance. As the recontest gap is an obvious impediment to achieving gender parity in politics, we explore its determinants. We find no evidence that parties discriminate against female candidates who want to recontest. Evidence also suggests that women do not give up more easily than men after a disappointing performance in the election. In contrast, we find that women are more likely to recontest in municipalities where overall political participation of women is larger, suggesting that the degree to which men dominate local politics is important for a given woman's decision to recontest. Among the individual characteristics of candidates, we find that relatively old and retired women exhibit no recontest gap to men, in contrast to young and employed women.

Research Seminar “Microeconomics”

Bhaskar Dutta, University of Warwick:

A Game of Hide and Seek in Networks

Abstract:

We propose and study a strategic model of hiding in a network, where the network designer chooses the links and his position in the network facing the seeker who inspects and disrupts the network. We characterize optimal networks for the hider, as well as equilibrium hiding and seeking strategies on these networks. We show that optimal networks are either equivalent to cycles or variants of a core-periphery networks where every node in the periphery is connected to a single node in the core.

The next EconNewsletter will be published on Monday, November 11, 2019.

Editorial deadline: Friday, November 8, 2019.

EconNewsletter

Department of Economics

University of Hamburg

Von-Melle-Park 5, 20146 Hamburg

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