SEMINAR CALENDAR

**Forschungsseminar “Quantitative Wirtschaftsforschung”**
Romain Baeriswyl, SNB: Tuesday June 25
*Double Overreaction in Beauty-Contests with Information Aquisition:* 12:15–13:45
*Theory and experiment* R. 0029 (VMP 5)

**Hamburg Lectures on Law & Economics**
Prof. Jaroslaw Kantorowicz, University Leiden: Wednesday June 26
*Measuring Citizens’ Preferences for Participatory Budgeting:* 18:15–19:45
*Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment* R. 110, Johnsallee 35

**PhD Seminar**
Steffen Müller, University of Hamburg: Thursday June 27
*Forecasting economic decisions under risk: The predictive importance of choice process data* 12:15–13:15
R. 0029 (VMP 5)

**Research Seminar “Microeconomics”**
Nora Szech, Karlsruher Institut für Technologie: Thursday June 27
*The (In)Elasticity of Moral Ignorance* 17:15–18:45
R. 0029 (VMP 5)

**HCHE Research Seminar**
- no seminar -

**Research Seminar “Labour Economics”**
- no seminar -

**Environmental and Development Economics**
- no seminar -

Sollten Sie Interesse haben, sich mit einem/r der Vortragenden zu treffen, wenden Sie sich bitte an den entsprechenden Veranstalter. Weitere Infos finden Sie auf unserer Homepage: https://www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de/fachbereich-vwl/forschung/forschungsseminare.html
ABSTRACTS

Hamburg Lectures on Law & Economics
Prof. Jaroslaw Kantorowicz, University Leiden:
Measuring Citizens’ Preferences for Participatory Budgeting: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment

Abstract:
The project examines what kind of institutional designs citizens prefer for participatory budgeting (PB). It seeks to add to two bodies of literature. On the one hand, it connects to the debate in the legitimacy literature regarding the question what drives citizens’ evaluations of political institutions and decision-making (e.g. Arnesen, 2017; Esaiasson, Gilljam, & Persson, 2017; Esaiasson et al., 2016; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002). On the other hand, it connects to the literature on democratic innovations (DIs) which studies how the institutional design of DIs relates to citizens’ evaluations and willingness to participate (Fung, 2006; Smith, 2009). Previous research in both strands of literature shows that various design features may matter for how citizens evaluate political institutions in general and democratic innovations in specific (e.g. de Sousa Santos, 1998; Lerner, 2014; Neblo et al., 2010; Strebel et al., 2018). Yet, we still know relatively little about how citizens weigh these design features and which ones matter most to them in the case of DIs (for a notable exception see Neblo et al., 2010). This project seeks to fill this gap in the literature by conducting a population-based survey experiment (Mutz, 2011) on the topic of neighborhood budgets (wijkbudgetten) among Dutch citizens living in large cities. We rely on the general notion that citizens’ evaluations are based to varying degrees on the input (Who participates? What is at stake?), throughput (What is going on during the process?), and output features of a neighborhood budget (What is the outcome? How efficient is the process?) (cf. Papadopoulos & Warin, 2007). We want to examine to what extent these different features matter for citizens’ preferences regarding neighborhood budgets.

PhD Seminar
Steffen Müller, University of Hamburg:
Forecasting economic decisions under risk: The predictive importance of choice process data

Abstract:
We investigate various statistical methods for forecasting risky choices and identify important decision predictors. Subjects are presented a series of 50/50 gambles that each involves a potential gain and a potential loss, and subjects can choose to either accept or reject a displayed lottery. From this data, we use information on 8800 individual lottery gambles and specify four predictor-sets that include different combinations of input categories: lottery design, socioeconomic characteristics, past gambling behavior, eyemovements, and various psychophysiological measures that are recorded during the first three seconds of lottery-information processing. The results of our forecasting experiment show that choice-process data can effectively be used to forecast risky gambling decisions;
however, we find large differences among models’ forecasting capabilities with respect to subjects, predictor-sets, and lottery payoff structures.

**Research Seminar “Microeconomics”**
Nora Szech, Karlsruher Institut für Technologie:
*The (In)Elasticity of Moral Ignorance*

*Abstract:*
We investigate the elasticity of preferences for moral ignorance with respect to monetary incentives and social norm information. We propose a model where uncertainty differentially decreases the moral costs of unethical behavior, and benchmark the demand curve for moral ignorance against a morally neutral context. In line with the model, selfishness is a main determinant of moral ignorance, and the demand curve for moral ignorance is highly elastic when information shifts from being costly to incentivized. Moral ignorance is considered morally inappropriate. Providing this information increases moral behavior but does not shift the demand curve for ignorance.

*The next EconNewsletter will be published on Monday, July 1, 2019.*

**Editorial deadline:** Friday, June 28, 2019.