Fachbereich VWL / Department of Economics

EconNewsletter

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JANUARY 7 – JANUARY 11, 2019

SEMINAR CALENDAR

HCHE Research Seminar
Prof. Gaby Sroczynski, UMIT, Hall in Tirol:
Health economic evaluations of screening programs
Monday January 7
16:30-18:00
Esplanade 36, R. 4011/13

Forschungsseminar “Quantitative Wirtschaftsforschung“
Till Strohsal, FU Berlin & BMWi:
Data Revisions to German National Accounts:
Are Initial Releases Good Nowcasts?
Tuesday January 8
12:15–13:45
R. 2095/2197 (VMP 5)

Environmental and Development Economics
Inge van den Bijgaart, University of Gothenburg:
Renewable energy implementation and fossil stock development
Wednesday January 9
12:15–13:45
Zentralbib. Recht, Rothenbaumchaussee 33, BG 3/4

Hamburg Lectures on Law & Economics
Dr. David Kosar, Masaryk-University:
Beyond Judicial Councils: Forms, Rationales and Impact of Judicial Self
- Government in Europe
Wednesday January 9
18:15–19:45
R. 1083a (VMP 5)

PhD Seminar
Johannes Roß, Universität Hamburg:
Cheap Talk and Risk
Thursday January 10
12:15–13:15
R. 2091/2201 (VMP 5)

Research Seminar “Microeconomics”
Alexander Koch, University Aarhus:
Motivational Goal Bracketing: An Experiment
Thursday January 10
17:15–18:45
Allende Platz 1, Raum 250

Sollten Sie Interesse haben, sich mit einem/r der Vortragenden zu treffen, wenden Sie sich bitte an den entsprechenden Veranstalter. Weitere Infos finden Sie auf unserer Homepage: https://www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de/fachbereich-vwl/forschung/forschungsseminare.html
Research Seminar “Labour Economics”
- no seminar -

ABSTRACTS

Environmental and Development Economics
Inge van den Bijgaart, University of Gothenburg:
Renewable energy implementation and fossil stock development

Abstract:
For the foreseeable future, sustained energy supply will either require continued investment in exploring and developing new resource stocks, as well as investment in renewable energy technologies. We explore how the return to renewable energy technologies are affected by the presence of previously developed, but not yet extracted, resource stocks. We find that this return is decreasing in previously developed fossil resource stocks, and for sufficiently low stock levels, exceed the per unit cost of fossil resource use, defined as the sum of per unit exploration and use costs. Additionally, the return renewable energy technologies falls in the market penetration of such technologies, with a full phase-out of fossil only economically efficient if the marginal cost of renewable energy technologies falls below marginal fossil use cost.

PhD Seminar
Johannes Roß, Universität Hamburg:
Cheap Talk and Risk

Abstract:
The aim of this paper is to theoretically and experimentally determine how individuals adapt their lying behavior when the negative consequence of dishonesty on others is not a secure outcome, but a lottery. This can impact dishonesty choices in multiple ways. Potential liars may use the lottery to intrinsically justify selfish behavior. If liars have image concerns, especially small lies may profit from being less detectable if only the final outcome is observable to the deceived. In the experimental design presented in this paper, the degree of observability is varied between treatments, to capture the degree to which individuals profit from the lottery clouding actual behavior. One example for such a situation are pre-election campaign promises. Politicians may have more information than the public on how probable the implementation of a policy is. As many political issues are influenced by external factors (e.g. foreign policy), a negative outcome does not necessarily prove a politicians dishonesty. This gives politicians 'wiggle-room' to behave more selfish and the possibility to talk themselves out of the responsibility.
Research Seminar “Microeconomics”
Alexander Koch, University Aarhus:
Motivational Goal Bracketing: An Experiment

Abstract:
We study in an online, real-effort experiment how the bracketing of non-binding goals affects performance in a work-leisure self-control problem. We externally induce the goal bracket – daily goals or a weekly goal – and within that bracket let subjects set goals for how much they want to work over a one-week period. Our theoretical model predicts (i) that weekly goals create incentives to compensate for a lower than desired performance today with the promise to work harder tomorrow, whereas daily goals exclude such excuses; (ii) that subjects with daily goals set higher goals in aggregate and work harder than those with weekly goals. Our data support these predictions. Surprisingly, however, when goals are combined with an externally enforced commitment that requires subjects to spend less than a minute each day on the task to get started working, performance deteriorates because of high dropout rates from the task.

ACTIVITIES OF DEPARTMENT MEMBERS

New Publications

The next EconNewsletter will be published on Monday, January 14, 2019.

Editorial deadline: Friday, January 11, 2019.

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