SEMINAR CALENDAR

Research Seminar “Labour Economics”
Johanna Mollerstrom, Humboldt Univ. Berlin & DIW:
Gender Differences in Self- and Other-Competition
Monday November 5
16:30-18:00
Esplanade 36, R. 4011/13

Forschungsseminar “Quantitative Wirtschaftsforschung“
Thomas Fischer, Lund University:
A Tractable Model of Wealth Inequality and Mobility
Tuesday November 6
12:15–13:45
R. 2095/2197 (VMP 5)

Environmental and Development Economics
Nick Hanley, University of Glasgow:
Improving the design of payment for ecosystem service policies:
spatial coordination and collective action
Wednesday November 7
12:15–13:45
Zentralbibliothek Recht,
Rothenbaumchaussee 33

Hamburg Lectures on Law & Economics
Prof. Henrik Lando, Copenhagen Business School:
But-for causation with multiple injurers
Wednesday November 7
18:15–19:45
R. 1083a (VMP 5)

PhD Seminar
Konstantinos Pilpilidis, Universität Hamburg:
The Times are a Changin’: Explaining Challenges of Governmental Transgressions
Thursday November 8
12:15–13:15
R. 2091/2201 (VMP 5)

Research Seminar “Microeconomics”
Jürgen Eichberger, Universität Heidelberg:
Equilibrium under Ambiguity for Belief Functions
Thursday November 8
17:15–18:45
Allende Platz 1, Raum 250

Sollten Sie Interesse haben, sich mit einem/r der Vortragenden zu treffen, wenden Sie sich bitte an den entsprechenden Veranstalter. Weitere Infos finden Sie auf unserer Homepage: https://www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de/fachbereich-vwl/forschung/forschungsseminare.html
Environmental and Development Economics
Nick Hanley, University of Glasgow:
Improving the design of payment for ecosystem service policies: spatial coordination and collective action

Abstract:
Payment for Ecosystem Service (PES) schemes are based on voluntary enrolment by land managers. Such schemes are designed to deliver additional environmental benefits to society relative to a no-payment situation. However, often the effective delivery of environmental benefits depends on spatial coordination of participation: examples of such contexts include wetlands restoration, catchment management, and biodiversity enhancement. In this presentation I summarize results from a number of recent lab and lab-in-field experiment studies where we tested out the performance of alternative mechanisms to try to enhance spatial coordination. These are the agglomeration bonus, spatially-connected conservation auctions and group participation (collective action) contracts.

PhD Seminar
Konstantinos Pilpilidis, Universität Hamburg:
The Times are a Changin': Explaining Challenges of Governmental Transgressions

Abstract:
The paper investigates the drivers of the decision to challenge ruler's transgressions and how this decision is made. A novel experiment is designed based on the one-shot coordinated resistance game by Weingast (1995). Participants challenge more than the equilibrium strategy only when the rule uses divide-and-conquer strategies, independent of whether they are the victims of transgression. The paper utilizes the response times of the participants to investigate this deviation. Evidence is found that the participants who challenged responded intuitively. This is evidence for the existence of a pro-social heuristic. Furthermore, when participants don't challenge, they appear to switch to reasoning. Hence, the working of social norms against transgression cannot be observed.
Hamburg Lectures on Law & Economics  
Prof. Henrik Lando, Copenhagen Business School:  
*But-for causation with multiple injurers*

**Abstract:**
Under the but-for requirement of causation, an injurer in tort cannot be held liable for more than the difference between the loss the victim would have suffered if the injurer had not been negligent, and the loss actually suffered by the victim. We demonstrate that, contrary to a widely accepted view, incentives may be insufficient under this requirement when two or more injurers cause harm to a victim.

The basic reason is that one injurer's negligence may lower the impact of another injurer's negligence, in which case there may be not only an efficient but also an inefficient Nash-equilibrium in the "game" played by the injurers. For instance, the negligence of either injurer may be sufficient for part or all of the loss, in which case neither injurer's negligence is necessary for it (duplicately caused injury). An inefficient equilibrium may then arise in which neither injurer takes due care, expecting the other not to do so. Courts and the Third Restatement of Tort Law actually loosen the requirement of causation in various ways, and we find that, with some reservations, these eliminate the inefficiency. These ways include considering duplicately caused injury as caused by the injurers, and, counterintuitively, when measuring damages, not subtracting benefits which an injurer's negligence bestows on the victim, when these benefits involve goods not actually harmed. In the case of more than two injurers, it may be warranted to expand the concept of causation further, as the Third Restatement does by employing the so-called NESS-test. We find that this test eliminates the potential inefficiency, but that so does the Shapley value in a less inclusive manner, when the injurers act simultaneously or without knowing each others’ acts.

Research Seminar “Microeconomics”  
Jürgen Eichberger, Universität Heidelberg:  
*Equilibrium under Ambiguity for Belief Functions*

**Abstract:**
We study Equilibria under Ambiguity with optimism and pessimism as introduced in Eichberger and Kelsey (2014) for the special case of beliefs modelled by belief functions. Belief functions provide a framework for combining context information in the spirit of Schelling (1960) with the strategy and payoff information given in the formal description of a game. We show existence of equilibria for finite games with an arbitrary number of players both under general and specific ambiguity about the opponents’ strategy choice. We illustrate by examples the potential of this approach to obtain better predictions about behaviour by considering context information.
The next EconNewsletter will be published on Monday, November 12, 2018.

Editorial deadline: Friday, November 9, 2018.

EconNewsletter
Department of Economics
University of Hamburg
Von-Melle-Park 5, 20146 Hamburg

To un/subscribe from/to this newsletter, please send an e-mail to econ.newsletter.Wiso@uni-hamburg.de