Fachbereich VWL / Department of Economics

EconNewsletter

Editorial Contact: Michael Paetz
tel: +49 40 42838-5561; e-mail: econ.newsletter.Wiso@uni-hamburg.de

OCTOBER 22 – OCTOBER 26, 2018

SEMINAR CALENDAR

Research Seminar “Labour Economics”
Helena Holmlund, IFAU: Monday October 22
How much does marital sorting contribute to intergenerational socioeconomic persistence? 16:30-18:00 Esplanade 36, Raum 4011/13

Hamburg Lectures on Law & Economics
Dr. Itamar Mann, University of Haifa: Wednesday October 24
Hydrosovereignty: Israel-Palestine in a Warming World 18:15–19:45 R. 1083a (VMP 5)

PhD Seminar
Philip Schnaars, Universität Hamburg: Thursday October 25
The Real Substitution Effect of Renewable Electricity 12:15–13:15 R. 2091/2201 (VMP 5)

Research Seminar “Microeconomics”
Tigran Melkonyan, Universität Warwick: Thursday October 25
The Economic Foundations of Psychological Commitment 17:15–18:45 Allende Platz 1, Raum 250

HCHE Research Seminar
- no seminar -

Forschungsseminar “Quantitative Wirtschaftsforschung“
- no seminar -

Environmental and Development Economics
- no seminar -

Sollten Sie Interesse haben, sich mit einem/r der Vortragenden zu treffen, wenden Sie sich bitte an den entsprechenden Veranstalter. Weitere Infos finden Sie auf unserer Homepage: https://www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de/fachbereich-vwl/forschung/forschungsseminare.html
ABSTRACTS

Research Seminar “Labour Economics”
Helena Holmlund, IFAU:
How much does marital sorting contribute to intergenerational socioeconomic persistence?

Abstract:
This paper investigates to what extent assortative mating contributes to intergenerational earnings persistence. I use an errors-in-variables model to demonstrate how pooling of partners’ ‘potential’ earnings affects intergenerational earnings persistence, and simulate persistence under different assumptions about assortative mating and women’s earnings distribution. Using Swedish data on cohorts born 1945–1965, I show that a substantial decline in marital sorting has contributed little to lowering intergenerational persistence. Variations in marital sorting must be large to affect intergenerational mobility to a great extent. Instead, the relative earnings distributions of men and women, in combination with sorting, are important for intergenerational persistence.

Hamburg Lectures on Law & Economics
Dr. Itamar Mann, University of Haifa:
Hydrosovereignty: Israel-Palestine in a Warming World

Abstract:
This lecture will examine the relationship between the legal-political construction of sovereignty and the management of water. Taking as its test case the history of Israel-Palestine since the establishment of the Israeli state, it will identify three different understandings of this relationship. First, it will review how Israeli law generated collective state ownership over water resources, in an arrangement largely influenced by socialist ideals. Second, it will reveal how starting from the 1990s, water was understood in regional terms. As such, it a certain kind of political optimism developed around water: sharing arrangements pertaining to an increasingly scarce resource were viewed as the basis for peace agreements. Third, with the advent of desalination, and the concomitant rise in the realization of the region's climate vulnerability, water became a geo-strategic tool both for projecting regional power and for new kinds of profit. The lecture will end by asking what should be the normative basis for ownership of desalinated water in the context of looming climate catastrophes.
PhD Seminar
Philip Schnaars, Universität Hamburg:
*The Real Substitution Effect of Renewable Electricity*

Abstract:
How much emissions from thermal power plants are offset by renewable electricity depends on the timing of infeed, the source of this electricity as well as the generation technology of the thermal power plant. Solar electricity is the least effective renewable technology and lignite the least affected conventional source by renewable infeed.

Research Seminar “Microeconomics”
Tigran Melkonyan, Universität Warwick:
*The Economic Foundations of Psychological Commitment*

Abstract:
People often psychologically commit to a course of action in strategic interactions, even where it might seem irrational to do so. For example, such psychological commitments may lead people to punish counterparts who violate an unenforceable agreement (at a cost to themselves), or to cooperate in the Centipede game and the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. What are the economic foundations of such psychological commitments? This paper provides a formal, reasoning-based account of psychological commitments based on “virtual bargaining”—a mode of reasoning that joins elements of individualistic and collaborative reasoning. We introduce two equilibrium concepts in extensive-form games that represent this type of reasoning: (i) virtual bargaining equilibrium and (ii) subgame virtual bargaining equilibrium. We formally analyze these solution concepts in four games representing broad classes of interactions and compare them with the subgame perfect equilibria. We find that, under certain conditions, virtual bargaining enables even self-interested individuals to psychologically commit, and stick, to a course of action that deviates from, and may lead to better outcomes than, standard predictions.

*The next EconNewsletter will be published on Monday, October 29, 2018.*

*Editorial deadline: Friday, October 26, 2018.*

EconNewsletter
Department of Economics
University of Hamburg
Von-Melle-Park 5, 20146 Hamburg

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