SEMINAR CALENDAR

HCHE Research Seminar
Prof. Hendrik Schmitz, Universität Paderborn: Monday July 9
*Health shocks and cognitive decline in older ages*
16:30-18:00
R. 4011 (Esplanade 36)

PhD Seminar
Christian Düben, Universität Hamburg: Thursday July 12
*Population, Light, and the Size Distribution of Cities*
12:15–13:15
R. 0029 (VMP 5)

Research Seminar “Microeconomics”
Hong Hwang, National Taiwan University: Thursday July 12
*Price versus Quantity Competition in a Mixed Duopoly: A General Analysis*
17:15–18:45
R. 0029 (VMP 5)

Research Seminar “Labour Economics”
-no seminar-

Forschungsseminar “Quantitative Wirtschaftsforschung“
-no seminar-

Hamburg Lectures on Law & Economics
-no seminar-
**ABSTRACTS**

**PhD Seminar**
Christian Düben, Universität Hamburg:
*Population, Light, and the Size Distribution of Cities*

*Abstract:*
Big cities benefit from pooling people, ideas and investment, but also suffer from negative externalities. The number of big and small cities in a country can have important economic implications. In our research we unlock new data sources to identify domestic city size distributions and derive determinants of cross-country variation in distributional patterns. In particular, we extract agglomerations from geo-spatial population and satellite based nighttime lights data via a globally consistent identification scheme. Our resulting dataset contains 13,844 cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants in 183 countries. Apart from a cross-sectional perspective we employ the panel dimension of the data from 1992 to 2013 to shed light on growth patterns and the evolving influence of geographical and institutional determinants.

**Research Seminar “Microeconomics”**
Hong Hwang, National Taiwan University:
*Price versus Quantity Competition in a Mixed Duopoly: A General Analysis*

*Abstract:*
This paper investigates social welfare in a mixed duopoly with partial privatization. It is found that the welfare ranking between Cournot and Bertrand competition is ambiguous, depending on the degree of privatization of the public firm. Specifically, social welfare is higher under Bertrand than Cournot competition if the degree of privatization is low or high. The ranking is reversed if the degree of the privatization falls in the middle range. Furthermore, if the two firms are allowed to take asymmetric competition strategies, social welfare is the highest if the public firm with partial privatization chooses price whereas the private firm chooses quantity as their competition strategies. These results are sharply different from those appeared in the mixed duopoly literature.
ACTIVITIES OF DEPARTMENT MEMBERS

New Publications


*The next EconNewsletter will be published on Monday, July 16, 2018.*

**Editorial deadline:** Friday, July 13, 2018.

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