

Accommodating Normative Divergence in European Foreign Policy Co-ordination: The Example of the Iraq Crisis

UWE PUETTER

Central European University, Hungary

ANTJE WIENER

University of Bath, UK

Abstract

In situations of international crises normative divergence regarding policy responses is a recurrent phenomenon. It is a problem which remains to be addressed despite assumptions about internationally established communities such as the liberal community of Western states. The case of the European Union's failure to co-ordinate a common policy response in connection with the war on Iraq demonstrates that conflict between Member States about appropriate common policy responses is enhanced by external crises. Common commitment to shared community norms is hence considered as an insufficient basis for policy consensus or, for that matter, sustainable compromise. The article discusses how and why these divergences emerge and suggests institutionalizing collective processes of norm contestation at the European level.

Introduction

In situations of international crises normative divergence regarding the choice of appropriate policy options is a recurrent phenomenon. It is a problem which remains to be addressed despite widely held assumptions about internationally established communities such as the liberal community of Western states. The problem applies both to the transatlantic relationship and common foreign policy-making in the European Union (EU). This article argues that such normative divergence is conducive to slowing down or even preventing

effective policy co-ordination in response to situations of international crises. One such situation of crisis has been the contested 2003 military intervention in Iraq. We argue that the case highlights how the inability to co-ordinate political positions internationally can potentially translate into outright paralysis of international and regional organizations. The following analysis demonstrates that normative divergence does make a difference in effective international policy co-ordination as a potential slippery slope. This observation stands in contrast to the generally held belief that Western states create a community of shared values and norms which facilitate rather than hinder co-operation in the international arena (Katzenstein, 1996; Schimmelfennig, 2000), in particular, in situations in which these values and norms are threatened. If the assumption about normative divergence is valid, the community approach needs to be scrutinized.

To that end, this article pursues an innovative two-fold approach. It combines insights into the role of fundamental norms of international law which are embedded in the 'normative structure' of world politics (Barnett, 1999; Reus-Smit, 1997) such as non-intervention and abstention from the use of force, on the one hand, with research on close co-ordination mechanisms at the intergovernmental level in the context of the EU, on the other. While the role of norms in international relations theory has been discussed with reference to the culture of security (Katzenstein, 1996; Adler and Barnett, 1998; Adler, 1997), foreign policy analysis remains and IR theory have yet to engage in more in-depth conversation. The literatures in IR and European integration theory, respectively, have yet to link research on norms with the question of appropriate mechanisms for intergovernmental policy co-ordination in beyond-the-state contexts. Relevant questions include, first, which lessons can be drawn from the persistent occurrence of normative divergence on foreign policy matters with a view to decision-making institutions and procedures in close communities of states such as the EU? And, secondly, how can we connect insights into the role of norms and the choice of appropriate procedures, on the one hand and the working methods used for co-ordinating common policy responses, on the other?

In answering these questions, the article proposes a theoretical and methodological framework for generating inroads into further empirical research. We consider the development of fundamental norms, principles and procedures as the three dimensions which indicate the democratic quality of an emergent political community beyond the state and investigate how these fundamental norms guide international policy decisions compared to their role in specific national contexts (Wiener, 2007b). Based on a comparative analysis, we review *procedures* for intergovernmental policy co-ordination in fields of EU decision-making such as, for example, the

'minister plus-one' procedure and comitology, respectively (Puetter, 2006, 2007). In addition, we revise the *organizing principles* that guide these procedures such as 'equal access to contestation' and 'mutual recognition' (Tully, 2002; Wiener, 2007a). This will enable us to formulate alternative institutional options to supplement existing procedures in EU foreign policy co-ordination. The article seeks to set out a framework for future research which can be applied to different instances of foreign policy co-ordination, in particular, and to other situations of international co-operation, more generally. To demonstrate the viability of this normative perspective on comparative policy analysis we highlight the case of divergent strategic decision-making within the EU's common foreign and security policy (CFSP) in relation to the Iraq crisis and the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1441.¹ To illustrate the argument we compare the cases of the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany.

The remainder of the article is organized in four sections. Section I details the argument. Section II identifies the parameters of the normative structure in world politics with a view to conducting an empirical study of British and German reactions to the Iraq crisis. It places these reactions within the – community – contexts of the UN's Security Council and the EU's CFSP. In addition, it illustrates the opportunities and constraints of the structural potential of fundamental norms by pointing out how behaviour in a particular instance of policy-making both facilitated and hindered policy co-ordination. Section III turns to the domestic context and demonstrates that underlying programmatic policy orientations of the political parties in power at the time, neither presented principled obstacles to co-ordination, nor provided a sufficient basis for converging ad hoc reactions to the unforeseen situation. Finally, section IV proposes procedural and principled policy innovations with a view to enhancing *connectivity* based on routinized dialogue.

I. Assessing the Normative Structure in World Politics

The following develops a conceptual perspective which treats the normative structure in world politics as a stable factor that provides guidance in international politics. We seek to demonstrate, however, that this stability notwithstanding, the normative structure *also* needs to be conceptualized as flexible, insofar as it changes in relation to discursive intervention.

¹ Security Council Resolution 1441 'The Situation between Iraq and Kuwait', S/RES/1441 (2002), available at: <<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/682/26/PDF/N0268226.pdf?OpenElement>>.

The Duality of Structures

This dual quality of structures has been recognized by approaches from both international law and international relations theory (Giddens, 1979; Reus-Smit, 1997; Wiener, 2007a). For international lawyers it is common to expect that the substance of law depends on input through legal discourse, i.e. deliberation, jurisprudence, learned opinion and other discursive interventions.² That emphasis on discourse as constitutive towards establishing substantive meaning of norms is not necessarily shared among political scientists who make conceptual distinctions between arguing (Risse, 2000), contestation (Dahl, 1971), deliberation (Cohen, 1997) and discursive interventions (Weldes and Saco, 1996). In international relations theory the distinctive input of language as an intersubjective element in the construction of norms was introduced in critical discussions of regime theory. In particular, Kratochwil and Ruggie's (1986) intervention in this debate singled out a constructive approach to discourse as intervening in politics as opposed to a behavioural one. This approach analyses the generation of substantive meaning rather than studying behavioural reactions to the norms, rules and beliefs that emerged in the environment of supranational regimes. The following builds on this approach with a view to conceptualizing dialogue in the process of common foreign and security policy co-ordination.

Different from the dual quality of structures assumption, studies on security communities hold that membership in a community is likely to enhance norm convergence (Katzenstein, 1996; Adler and Barnett, 1998). That is, liberal norms are expected to generate specific behaviour. For example, the community of 'civilized nations' (Art 38 ICJ) is assumed to entail particular norms, principles and standards including the sovereign equality of states (Article 2 [1] UN Charter) and, relatedly, respect for the principle of non-intervention, standards of prisoner of war treatment according to the Geneva Convention and so forth. Recurring divergences in the interpretation of the normative structure of world politics contradict the expectation that members of a community with a given identity to consider the same norms, principles and values as appropriate, as the 'liberal community hypothesis' holds (Schimmelfennig, 2003, p. 89).

By contrast, this article follows the dual quality assumption and therefore proposes to build on the related 'structure of meaning-in-use hypothesis'

² However, how this input is generated, i.e. whether politics or the law are or should be the driver in this process, is a highly contested issue among international lawyers and IR theorists. For the current debate over the future of international law, see among a growing number of contributors: Cohen (2004), Abbott *et al.* (2000), Reus-Smit (2001), Slaughter and Burke-White (2002), Slaughter (2004) and Koskenniemi (2007).

(Wiener, 2004, p. 202). Three assumptions guide this approach. First, norms entail a dual quality, as both constructed and structuring (Giddens, 1979, p. 69). Second, the meaning of norms is embedded in a 'structure of meaning-in-use' (Milliken, 1999, p. 231). And, third, meaning evolves through interactions in context. Since meaning evolves in relation to 'practices' in 'context' it is always contingent and subject to change, despite periods of stability. Since all individuals carry specific *normative baggage*, interpretations of meanings are expected to vary according to their context of emergence. As an interactive process intergovernmental negotiations over appropriate responses to foreign policy events bring the normative baggage of all individual participants to bear, thus facilitating input from and change of the normative structure. Here, behaviourist approaches are interested in studying variation in state behaviour as a 'reaction to' norms as intervening variables whereas reflexive approaches focus on the meaning of norms 'in relation with' practice as the dependent variable (Wiener, 2004, p. 191).

The following builds on both approaches. In light of both supranational and domestic normative structures, the UK's decision to support US interventionist politics in Iraq appears to run counter to behaviourist constructivist expectations of norm following. That is, the UK's position is neither exclusively constituted by the community nor by any inherent or historic strategic interests in world politics. In a nutshell, international British foreign policy behaviour appears as surprising, given a considerable overlap with key European allies regarding programmatic foreign and security policy objectives. Here, reflexive constructivist analysis which takes stock of the dual quality of norms can offer important insights.

Lack of Connectivity

We argue that the key to explaining foreign policy decisions of individual EU Member States lies in the theoretical acknowledgement *and* the empirical demonstration of diverging interpretations of the normative structure in world politics. While a type of norm may be shared, say by signatories of conventions, treaties or agreements, the meaning of norms is usually not standardized. It hence remains subject to contestation. As a consequence even those liberal principles which are considered as the fundamental norms of western democratic communities, i.e. human rights, democracy and the rule of law, become subject to contestation. Two aspects are important to explain and understand this phenomenon. First, processes of contestation reveal their political potential in times of crisis. Second, since they are largely rooted in domestic arenas, these processes used to remain isolated at times of limited transnationalization in the area of CFSP. In turn, under increasing conditions

of transnationalization, they will enhance a lack of *connectivity* among states. This disconnectivity is likely to enhance co-ordination problems in situations of international crises.


It follows that, at the very moment when policy co-ordination is required, the norms depicted in international conventions fall back to the status of 'treaty language' which by definition is open for a rather wide range of interpretation (Chayes and Chayes, 1993). Both international law in and by itself and the legal validity of normative discourse hence fail to inform common positions as one core condition for policy co-ordination despite the assumption of appropriateness. Students of international conflict therefore need to consider the possibility that agreement on norm types does not preclude agreement about normative meaning. To highlight these observations, this article addresses the link between contested meanings and diverging policy options with a view to identifying policy responses. Considering that discursive interventions are constitutive for the construction of meaning which ultimately contributes to the structure of meaning-in-use, empirical work needs to trace the processes of norm contestation. In addition, considering the cultural contingency of meaning, norm interpretation is traced with regard to its context-specific construction (see Figure 1).³ Empirically this translates into first identifying a given normative structure at time 0 and secondly assessing the variation among spatially specific meanings in order to understand and overcome supranational co-ordination problems.

We propose linking research on norms with the analysis of alternative institutional options for policy co-ordination. Whereas most of the research on norms has, so far, avoided a more policy-oriented perspective, this article sees the discussion of appropriate working methods for intergovernmental policy co-ordination at the EU level as inherently linked with the former perspective. By doing so, we seek to flesh out inroads into alternative working methods for intergovernmental co-ordination. So far, this research has essentially focused on factors that matter within the negotiation setting, thus ignoring the embeddedness of norms in processes taking place outside co-ordination forums. Empirical findings on the role of internal factors such as the socialization of negotiators, learning, or, the evolution of mutual trust, therefore, need to be linked with a reflexive analysis of discursive interventions which happen prior to, or, outside of negotiations over common policy responses.

To that end we discuss options for consensus-oriented policy formation among EU partners as a pre-condition for effective decision-making in the

³ We thank Alexander Kelle for the graphic adaptation of the concept of normative structure according to Wiener (2004).

Figure 1: Interventions in the Normative Structure



Source: Author's own data.

area of foreign policy. Given the sensitive nature of this policy area, package deals and side-payments are unlikely to move the decision-making process out of stalemate, as it may happen in traditional areas of EU activity. In other words, Member States are unlikely to agree to key foreign policy decisions at the EU level unless they are convinced that the chosen approach is appropriate. Moreover, we seek to demonstrate that the required consensus-building is neither a one-off event, nor can key liberal norms in world politics be seen as sufficient building blocks of such a consensus when it comes to defining specific policy responses. Therefore, the focus needs to be on the process of the contestation and interpretation of key foreign policy norms in the run-up to collective decisions at EU level.

II. Tracing Emerging Divergences – British and German Reactions to the Iraq Crisis at the European Level

This section traces the process of norm contestation in the aftermath of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 which led some EU Member States to join the US led alliance in favour of military intervention in Iraq and others to oppose it. The process is exemplified by British and German discursive interventions in the run-up and the aftermath of the decision about military

intervention in Iraq. The following first identifies the normative structure in world politics according to the three main sources of international law; secondly, it recalls the discursive interventions by key decision-makers in Britain and Germany; and thirdly, it focuses on how norms were operationalized in the debate regarding the decision about military intervention.

Contesting International Norms

The fundamental norms defined by the UN Charter and the Treaty Establishing the European Union (TEU), respectively, are considered as the central elements of the normative structure relevant in the case discussed here. The structure achieves a particular instructive role in times of crisis. It is on such occasions that the interpretation of its main elements comes to the fore. The actual structure of meaning-in-use, that is, the particular interpretation of the meaning is revealed by a situation of conflict. The contestation over norms is revealed by discursive interventions, as 'discourses do not exist "out there" in the world; rather, they are structures that are actualized in their regular use by people of discursively ordered relationships' (Milliken, 1999, p. 231). While international treaties are to be respected exclusively by the signatories of a particular treaty, the binding force of customary law unfolds its impact on all states which have not explicitly opposed it as so-called *persistent objectors*. In turn, the general legal rules of international law are considered as norms with *ius cogens* character with obligatory effect on all members of the international community. Currently, such norms include the abstention from the use of force and intervention as well as the respect for fundamental human rights.

The embeddedness of international legal norms in a particular social environment (Finnemore and Toope, 2001, p. 743) points to three factors which shed light on compliance with or contestation of international norms. They include the community (or communities) in which principal actors hold membership, the degree of social recognition with regard to the norm in question and the individually held connotations of normative meaning revealed by discursive interventions. In this case two international communities provide the reference for the social context of recognition including the UN, on the one hand and there in particular the environment of the Security Council and the EU, on the other. It can be argued that as a community with rules that are to a considerable degree more constitutionalized than those of the UN, the EU adds a second layer of membership ties. Thus, the core principles and values guiding the EU's CFSP are according to Article 11 (1) TEU the 'objectives' to 'safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of

the United Nations Charter'. In addition, the Member States of the EU have confirmed their appreciation of the Union's central constitutional norms of democracy, fundamental human rights and the rule of law in Article 6, TEU.

These principles are common, insofar as they are all recognized within the respective domestic constitutional realm of each Member State of the EU. They are stipulated as 'common values' by supranational European law as the guiding legal framework of EU common foreign and security policy decision-making. They therefore establish a link between core constitutional principles of regional and global politics as defined by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. If community membership enhances the social recognition of legal norms, then it should be expected that those states with membership of both communities would recognize, appreciate and indeed comply with rules in the same way. Yet, the point of contention emerged precisely with regard to these – presumably shared – community values. In fact, the 15 EU members were not in agreement, as the following discursive interventions demonstrate.

Discursive Interventions and EU Decision-Making During the Iraq Crisis

The two conflictive situations presented below include the discursive interventions in the aftermath of the UN Security Council resolution 1441 issued on 8 November 2002, on the one hand, and the operationalization of norms at the EU summit on Iraq which took place in Brussels on 17 February 2003 and the following debates, on the other. The first situation focused on the issue of whether or not to support military intervention in Iraq based on the question of Iraq's compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1441 and the related step of interpreting the meaning of non-compliance as the presentation of 'clear and present danger' and hence a security threat which would allow to apply UN Charter Article 51 (self-defence as a reaction to military force). Resolution 1441 defined the full and effective disarmament of Iraq as the goal to be achieved by the UN weapons inspectors' deployment to Iraq in the 60 days following that resolution. According to paragraph 2 of this resolution, the Security Council decided:

to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council; and accordingly decides to set up an enhanced inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions of the Council.⁴

Thus, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder noted:

⁴ See United Nations Security Council, S/RES/1441 (2002), Distr.: General 8 November 2002.

[M]y question was and is: *does the degree of threat* stemming from the Iraqi dictator *justify a war* that will bring certain death to thousands of innocent men, women and children? My answer was and is: no [. . .] As desirable as it is that the dictator leaves his post, the goal of resolution 1441 is the disarmament of Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. (BBC, 2003b, emphasis added)

Schröder stressed that Resolution 1441 ‘contains nothing automatic as far as military force is concerned’ (BBC, 2003a). The consensus in the German media reflected this view. The consensus was that a war against Iraq would present ‘a breach with international law’ and an ‘unconstitutional military intervention’ (Frankfurter Rundschau, 2003). In turn, Tony Blair’s interventions mobilized moral reasoning and once that was not entirely convincing, he resorted to the presence of a clear danger in light of Iraq’s potential of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in order sustain an interpretation of resolution 1441 as legitimizing military intervention.⁵

Norm Operationalization

The second situation regards discursive interventions as part of the process which sought to identify a long-term strategy including goals, principles and procedures in the area of foreign and security policy of a new enlarged European Union. At the Brussels summit on 16 February 2003 which brought together the leaders of the then 15 EU Member States for a special summit on Iraq, a joint declaration was signed which stated that ‘Iraq has a final opportunity to resolve the crisis peacefully’, in addition, it stressed that the weapons inspectors should be given ‘the time and resources the UN Security Council believes that they need’. Nonetheless, it did conceal that ‘inspections cannot continue indefinitely’.⁶ In light of the divided interpretation of the meaning of Resolution 1441 by EU Member States, the sense of unity presented by that statement was considerable. As EU’s foreign policy chief Javier Solana observed, for example ‘this proves the young and not-so-young Europe are together’.⁷ It was, however, rather quickly undermined by French and British interventions, which either blamed the new Member States for behaving irresponsibly by siding with the US, or praised them for their excellent sense of leadership.

⁵ On the UK government’s dossier on WMDs and the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s regime, see *Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction – The Assessment of the British Government*, 24 September 2003, available at: <<http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page271.asp>>.

⁶ *The Economist* (Economist.com), ‘United in theory, divided in practice’, available at: <www.economist.com/PrinterFriendly.cfm?Story_ID=1594961>, 20 February 2003.

⁷ *Euobserver.com*, ‘EU renews common position on Iraq’, available at: <www.euobserver.com/index.phtml?print=tur&sid=9&aid=9415>, 17 February 2003.

With regard to resolution 1441 Blair stressed '[t]his really is the final opportunity to disarm peacefully' and wondered whether or not Iraq should be accused of creating a situation of material breach of UN resolution 1441 if they were not co-operating.⁸ This perspective was presented to the House of Commons as a government 'emergency motion on Iraq' on 18 March 2003. The motion focused, in particular, on the issue of 'material breach on UN resolution' as well as the point of 'clear and present danger' based on weapons of mass destruction in possession of Saddam Hussein. As the motion reads:

[T]his house, [. . .] recognizes that Iraq's *weapons of mass destruction* and long range missiles and its continuing *non-compliance with security council resolution pose a threat to international peace and security*; [. . .] notes the opinion of the attorney general that, Iraq having failed to comply and Iraq being at the time of resolution 1441 and continuing to be *in material breach*, the authority to use force under resolution 678 has revived and so continues today; believes that the UK must uphold the authority of the UN as set out in resolution 1441 [. . .] and therefore supports the decision of Her Majesty's Government that the UK should use all means necessary to ensure the disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. (*Guardian*, 2003b, emphasis added)

The observation regarding the direct danger presented by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to the UK was sustained by the now infamous September 2002 dossier issued by Downing Street on alleged WMDs that prepared the way for war (*Guardian*, 2003a). According to that dossier, Iraq allegedly possessed WMDs that could reach the UK within three-quarters of an hour – a claim which was later proved as lacking substance. The outcome of some three months of debates ensuing from the time Resolution 1441 was issued on 8 November 2002 until February 2003 produced, in effect, two rival draft resolutions. Both demonstrate rather different interpretations of the normative structure of the liberal community of states. Thus, a US-UK draft resolution stated that:

[T]he security council, [. . .] noting that Iraq [. . .] *has failed to comply with and co-operate fully in the implementation of that resolution [1441]* [. . .] acting under chapter 8 of the charter of the UN, decides that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity afforded it in resolution 1441; decides to remain seized of the matter.

In turn, the French, German, Russian memorandum states that:

⁸ *Euobserver.com*, 'EU renews common position on Iraq', available at: <www.euobserver.com/index.phtml?print=tur&sid=9&aid=9415>, 17 February 2003.

Priority should be to achieve this [full disarmament] peacefully through the inspection regime. The military option should only be a last resort. So far, *the conditions for using force against Iraq are not fulfilled.* (*Guardian*, 2003a, emphasis added)

It is interesting to note that these discursive interventions tapped into various normative structures of meaning-in-use. Thus, while the interventions regarding situation one mobilize meanings which are opposed along an Atlanticist vs integrationist axis with reference to the larger world community of states which are assembled in the UN the interventions in situation two centre on meanings which are opposed along a west–east axis among the community of current and future EU Member States.

Foreign Policy Practices: Variation in Normative Meaning in Relation with the Dual Quality of Structure

The analysis of the consistently upheld and strategically applied opposition of Blair and his closest collaborators to the general legal rules in international law, which were backed by the majority of the UN Member States and despite overwhelming public disapproval in his own domestic constitutional context, suggests two alternative explanations. First, Blair's position represented an interest-based strategic choice founded in issue-area specific domestic preferences. Second, a new era in international law is in-the-making. Blair's support of the US position would then suggest a strong exclusively individual interest playing an active role in such a large structural change in world politics. As the following section demonstrates with reference to German and UK government party programmes, neither of these alternative explanations were to be expected from the normative structure-in-use in the relevant domestic arenas. The main issue at stake is then not a revision of international law. Instead, we argue, what is required in decision-making related to EU foreign policy in order to enhance collective police co-ordination in response to crises is identifying and establishing institutional framework conditions which allow for addressing the general contestedness of norm interpretations.

III. The Domestic Context – Programmatic Overlap between Britain's New Labour Government and the German Social-Democratic/Green Coalition

The above analysis suggests that divergent interpretations of core norms and principles guiding international and European co-operation in the foreign policy realm emerge inevitably during processes of norm operationalization. In other words, norms are contested by default as they always need to be

applied in specific situations. In particular in times of unforeseen crisis this leads to divergent interpretations, which can – if these interpretations translate into path-dependent behaviour – prevent policy co-ordination. However, following the above review of European reactions to the Iraq crisis it could be argued that the divergent interpretations were largely determined by domestic factors. One indication for this would be the existence of incompatible preferences regarding fundamental orientations on foreign policy in the two countries studied in this article. However, as it is demonstrated below this was evidently not the case. Most of the diverging positions in the area of foreign policy, in particular within the European context, have emerged despite a considerable degree of overlap between the programmatic and normative orientations of the domestic arenas considered here. The following briefly outlines the most striking parallels in the programmatic orientations of New Labour in Britain and those of the German Social Democratic/Green coalition in Berlin. In fact this review illustrates that fundamental principles of foreign policy as enshrined in partisan programmes and orientations are in many ways similar to norms on the international stage. As those involved in the process of developing policy responses in crisis situations government executives are in charge of interpreting and operationalizing programmatic principles. A detailed analysis of the evolution of positions in the domestic partisan arena is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, the illustration of the similarities between programmatic orientations in the two countries is insightful as it demonstrates where the main potential for a further development of intergovernmental co-ordination mechanisms at the EU level lies. As the final section of this article will highlight, the challenge is to interlink the unconnected discourses over norm operationalization at the European and domestic level at an early stage. At an empirical level we therefore treat party programmes not as the ultimate indicator for the choice of particular policy options by executive leaders in times of crisis.⁹ We rather want to demonstrate the relevance of the process of norm operationalization by showing that no principal obstacles to a co-ordinated European position existed in the first place.

New Labour Since 1997

In its 1997 election manifesto New Labour links its foreign policy vision to a stronger British involvement in EU politics. The new emphasis on Europe is in particular highlighted by the fact that the foreign policy chapter of the

⁹ Accounts from the literature on political parties have already pointed to the relevance of interpretation and the change of meaning in the process of the practical application of programmatic orientations as defined in party programmes. The authors are grateful to William Paterson and James Sloam for drawing their attention to this. See Paterson and Sloam (2005); Fairclough (2001).

manifesto is introduced under the heading 'We will give Britain leadership in Europe' (Labour Party, 1997). Advocating human rights and democracy in world politics, working through international organizations and a leading role within EU politics are set out to be the guiding principles. Most importantly, the Conservatives' scepticism towards the EU is identified as the main obstacle for greater influence within Europe. On defence the manifesto stresses the role of NATO and the then still existing Western European Union. At the international level the role of the UN and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe is highlighted. New Labour commits itself to an arms control policy covering biological and chemical weapons and a ban of anti-personnel landmines. In addition, the party promises to work for a 'substantial reform of the United Nations, including an early resolution of its funding crisis and a more effective role in peacekeeping, conflict prevention, the protection of human rights and safeguarding the global environment' (Labour Party, 1997). Moreover, the manifesto identifies the fight against global poverty as a 'clear moral responsibility'. The text continues with a strong commitment to human rights as a fundamental principal of British foreign policy and subscribes to the creation of a 'permanent international criminal court to investigate genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity' (Labour Party, 1997). These priorities are reconfirmed by the 2001 election manifesto. A more proactive role of Britain in the EU's developing foreign and defence policy is seen to enhance Britain's stance in the world. The manifesto also commits Labour to 'support a more modern and representative Security Council, with more effective peace-keeping' (Labour Party, 2001, p. 39).

The German Social-Democratic/Green Coalition

A brief outline of the programmatic orientations of two coalition parties – the Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and the Greens of foreign minister Joschka Fischer – highlights the high degree of overlap with New Labour's foreign policy agenda. The party programme of the SPD was written under the impression of the ending Cold War in 1989 and was then updated in the run-up to the 1998 elections, which brought the social democrats to power. The manifesto addresses foreign policy under the heading 'Peace within common security'. It starts with a clear rejection of war as a means of politics and subscribes to a 'peace policy' (SPD, 1998, p. 15) comprising international co-operation on economic, environmental, cultural and human rights issues. At the European level the programme demands a greater role for the EU in the area of foreign policy. Greater policy co-ordination among EU Member

States is seen to be a decisive step on the way to a 'regionally organized world society' (SPD, 1998, p. 16). The party programme demands a greater role for the UN in world politics and pledges political and financial support for the organization. Here, in particular a strengthening of the International Court of Justice, the reform of the Security Council and the creation of international forums for arms control are highlighted.

The link between regional European integration and the wider foreign policy agenda is also the cornerstone of the party programme of the smaller coalition partner in Berlin – the Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen). Again human rights, the protection of the environment, social and democratic development are defined as the guiding principles of decision-making in the area of foreign policy. Referring to Germany's particular historical background France, Britain and Poland are explicitly mentioned as the core partners in the context of European integration and striving for a greater role of the EU in foreign and security policy. In addition, the historic role of the transatlantic alliance with the US and a close relationship with Russia are seen to be integral elements of German foreign policy. The use of military force in the context of international peacekeeping operations is made conditional of the approval through the UN Security Council. Overall, the further 'legalization' (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2002, p. 163) of international relations is demanded. In this context, the Greens pledge support for the reform of the UN.

The above review of the programmatic preferences of the parties backing the governments in Britain and Germany shows a high degree of overlap. This applies in particular to the shared social democratic European tradition and core values such as internationalization, human rights, the battle against global poverty and the commitment to advance EU foreign policy co-ordination. Moreover, all three parties favour a stronger role for the UN, the International Criminal Court and progress in the area of arms control. These policy objectives and beliefs have been repeatedly reiterated and reconfirmed in key foreign policy speeches made by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair and the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. In particular, Blair's crucial 'Committed to Europe'¹⁰ speech and Schröder's government address in the German Bundestag after the attacks of September 11, in which he demanded 'unlimited solidarity'¹¹ with the US, are noteworthy. In addition,

¹⁰ Anthony Blair *Committed to Europe. Reforming Europe*, speech delivered at Ghent City Hall, Belgium, 23 February 2000, available at: <<http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page1510.asp>>.

¹¹ Gerhard Schröder *Regierungserklärung vor dem Deutschen Bundestag zum Terrorakt in den USA*, government address to the German parliament, 12 September 2001, <<http://www.bundesregierung.de/Reden-Interviews/Regierungserklaerungen-,11638.55757/regierungserklaerung/Regierungserklaerung-von-Bunde.htm>>.

statements and common initiatives by the two leaders on social and economic policy and the challenges of globalization have illustrated the common ground between the two governments.¹²

These findings underline one of the main assumptions of this article that the current dilemma characterizing EU foreign policy co-ordination is not so much the result of fundamental differences as regards the set of core norms and principles to which the 'family' of European nations subscribes. On the contrary, co-ordination failure emerges because the common set of principles and norms becomes subject to contestation and (re-)interpretation when operationalized during individual instances of policy-making. Although departing from a similar set of fundamental policy objectives and core normative beliefs, the practice of foreign policy-making in each country has led to different results. These findings run counter to the assumption that co-ordination at the European level failed essentially because of fundamentally diverging policy agendas.

IV. Accommodating Diversity: Defining Common Policy Responses at the EU Level

Since the beginning of the debate over the war in Iraq, British foreign policy appeared to have settled between a rock and a hard place. The unconditional support for the US-led military intervention ran counter to the ambition to 'lead in Europe'; in particular with regard to the expanding agenda of the EU's foreign and security policy. In fact, the British case can be seen as symptomatic for the state of European integration in this policy area. What applies to Britain conversely also applies to all other Member States. It is rather difficult to imagine that those countries, which opposed siding with the transatlantic tradition in the case of Iraq, are able to advance the fragile CFSP framework without substantial British support in the future. Building on the above empirical analysis this article would, however, caution against a view which suggests that the dispute over Iraq marked the end of European foreign policy co-ordination. This assessment is based on the finding that no fundamentally different foreign policy preferences existed within the ruling political parties in Britain and Germany. The emergence of diverging positions with regard to appropriate international action in the case of Iraq, therefore,

¹² Anthony Blair and Gerhard Schröder, *Der Weg nach vorne für Europas Sozialdemokraten. Ein Vorschlag von Gerhard Schröder und Tony Blair*, 8 June 1999, available at: <www.spd.de>; Gerhard Schröder *Regierungserklärung Globalisierung gemeinsam gestalten*, government address in relation to the G8 summit meeting in Cologne, 16 June 1999, available at: <http://www.bundesregierung.de/Reden-Interviews/Regierungserklaerungen-,11638.11708/regierungserklaerung/Regierungserklaerung-von-Bunde.htm>.

has its roots in the actual process of defining specific policy responses in a situation of crisis. Rather than departing from fundamentally different normative assumptions with regard to the key objectives of national foreign policy the diverging positions emerged at the very moment when policy-makers made use of the underlying and largely shared normative structure in world politics, as we illustrated above. Indeed, the conceptualization of the underlying normative structure, which guides foreign policy-makers, as a structure of meaning-in-use, is the starting point for our final discussion of alternative institutional options in the area of CFSP.

Reconnecting Domestic Discourses on Norm Application

Two main conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis with regard to the actual process of European foreign policy co-ordination. First, diverging interpretations of core norms and principles of an apparently shared normative structure in world politics are likely to emerge whenever specific policy responses to unforeseen events are required. Norms have a dual quality. They are structuring but at the same time become subject to change when 'applied' in foreign policy-making. Secondly, given the high degree of programmatic overlap as regards the main challenges in current world politics among the European partners – represented by Britain and Germany in this article – the main problem lies with the evolution of these diverging interpretations *in* situations of crises – not *prior* to them. Here, we have observed that these processes have occurred largely unconnectedly in the different domestic arenas resulting in an unexpected and relatively stark split between core European allies. The process of norm operationalization inevitably involves contestation and interpretation no matter whether it takes place within the domestic or international arena. However, as the experience from this failed attempt of EU foreign policy co-ordination has shown, once these processes are under way within the domestic context they lead to a certain path-dependency which makes co-ordination at the EU or UN level more difficult. This should come as no surprise as the process of contestation involves also a struggle for leadership in the respective domestic context. Both Blair and Schröder had to defend their policy choice against diverging positions by other domestic actors. Because of the nature of the issue at stake this partially involved linking one's own political future to the policy stance initially defined.

As a result of its dependency on domestic processes of norm operationalization which may lead to path-dependent behaviour, European foreign policy co-ordination has to accommodate a high degree of diversity as a permanent feature of its institutional framework. Consequently, the current

problems are unlikely to be solved once and for all through a debate about Europe's core interests in world politics from which common responses could be easily deduced in situations of crises. Instead, the policy-making process itself, the practice of finding responses to specific situations and events in world politics, will remain crucial for the evolution of national preferences on what are appropriate policy responses. As Guéhenno (1998, p. 32) has noted '[I]n the absence of a clearly defined European polity and of self-evident "European interests" which could be deciphered by an enlightened elite, the policy-making process which would create a European foreign policy becomes an essential component of a European foreign policy and an integral part of its substance.'

What does this mean for the practical organization of the co-ordination process at the EU level? The main objective would be to place more emphasis on collective processes of the interpretation of core norms and principles when assessing policy instruments. This applies in particular to the level of the most senior decision-makers in the area. What is required is a procedure which allows for common dialogue in order to facilitate mutual understanding of potentially contested norm interpretations as an integral part of the co-ordination set-up. Here, the challenge lies with the particular intergovernmental nature of foreign policy co-ordination at the EU level. As regards the widespread scepticism towards supranational solutions to co-ordination dilemmas, i.e. the strengthening of the role of the Commission or the elimination of veto options, alternative institutional arrangements need to be found for the accommodation and maintenance of a relatively high degree of diversity. At the same time past co-ordination failures need to be avoided. While there is a clear need for a strengthening of the current co-ordination procedures, the existing intergovernmental institutional framework will remain largely untouched for the foreseeable future.

Similar to a number of other common policy areas which have been revived ever since the entering into force of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU's CFSP does not follow the classical community method. Instead, the 'pillarization' (Winn and Lord, 2001) of EU governance implies that different forms of the characteristic mix of supranational and intergovernmental governance structures coexist within the EU. For the area of foreign policy this most notably implies that the Member States and the Commission share the right of initiative. Moreover, the European Council plays a strong role in defining the guidelines for policy formation. This intergovernmental bias is also reflected in the specific institutional patterns of the Council's work in this area. Council meetings are prepared by a Committee of Political Directors, the Policy Unit and the Political and Security Committee. These expert committees prepare the agenda as regards the substance of policy questions, thus limiting the role

of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), which is the main preparatory body within the Council in those policy areas which are governed through the classical Community method.

As Rummel and Wiedemann (1998) point out, the current foreign and security policy co-ordination regime lacks the capability to implement policy decisions. Due to the decentralized intergovernmental policy framework, policy decisions and their implementation require consensus formation among national governments and the different commissioners who share competences in this policy area. However, consensus formation among this large number of independent actors is not only hampered because of technical or procedural problems. In this context, the literature has paid less attention to collective processes of the interpretation of core norms and policy principles, which inform the choice of policy instruments in a given situation. This applies in particular to the level of the most senior decision-makers in the area – the foreign ministers and the heads of state and government who often exercise a considerable degree of influence over fundamental foreign policy decisions limiting the influence of national parliaments and other members of national governments. As we have seen above these actors are those who matter most in domestic processes of norm operationalization as they have privileged position in the formulation of specific policy options.

The Minister-Plus-One Approach

Experiences from the field of economic policy co-ordination may provide some guidance for future refinements of the current CFSP co-ordination framework. There are a number of parallels between foreign policy and economic policy co-ordination within the context of European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) suggesting the possibility of applying institutional solutions, which have proved to be successful in one policy area, to the other. Similar to the field of foreign policy, economic policy co-ordination takes place within a decentralized intergovernmental framework. This framework relies essentially on consensus formation among independent actors. Thus, it is possible to draw lessons from the experiences made so far.

In 1998 those EU Member States, which were the first to adopt the single currency, decided to create an informal group for a close policy dialogue among the most senior decision-makers in this policy area (see European Council, 1997). Until today the finance ministers of the euro area countries, the commissioner for economic and financial affairs and the president of the European Central Bank meet on a monthly basis to discuss common policy options and review national policies. The meetings of the so-called Eurogroup

complement the work within the Council of Ministers. The most decisive difference between the regular Council meetings, which focus on formal decision-making and the Eurogroup gatherings, is the applied working method. Whereas the Council framework is designed for formal decision-making, the minister-plus-one approach highlights the relevance of close informal policy dialogue. Only one senior policy adviser accompanies each minister. This creates an intimate atmosphere and allows for real conversations among the participants of the meetings. Such an environment is most different from Council meetings where far more than 100 people fill the room.

As the analysis of the Eurogroup experience has shown (Puetter, 2006) the limited number of the participants, the confidentiality of the discussions and the flexible agenda of the meetings are decisive factors in creating a negotiation environment where ministers engage in frank discussions about policy options and think aloud about potential alternative solutions. The case of the Eurogroup has further illustrated that the routinization of the informal policy dialogue leads to the evolution of a more fundamental working consensus among all involved actors. This consensus comprises shared interpretations of core norms and principles, which inform the assessment of policy options in times of crisis. Most importantly, this consensus has proved to be most viable where it emerges from processes of mutual norm contestation. In this way the minister-plus-one approach can be seen as a tool to provide a framework for collective processes of norm contestation and interpretation, thus generating self-commitment among the involved actors. The latter is of particular relevance in a decentralized policy framework, which nearly exclusively relies on national governments as regards the implementation of common policy initiatives and lacks any significant mechanisms for sanctioning non-compliance of European objectives.

The comparison between the field of economic policy co-ordination and the CFSP also suggests the compatibility of the minister-plus-one approach as currently applied by the Eurogroup with a number of other institutional features of the CFSP framework. For example, Eurogroup meetings are prepared exclusively by the relevant expert committee. This preparation regime strengthens the link between expert discussions, which put the emphasis on the solution of less controversial but still decisive technical questions and the more political debates among ministers. Informal policy discussions proved to be most successful where controversial positions were debated with a view to commonly perceived or shared problems. Such an approach is supported by the fact that each gathering among the ministers starts out with a common analysis of the political and (in the case of the Eurogroup) economic situation. Current events are assessed and interpreted in a collective process providing the basis for a discussion of policy options.

Conclusion

This article has highlighted the paradoxical nature of internal European disputes over appropriate responses to international crises in general and with reference to the diverging positions of the British and German governments in relation to UN Security Council resolution 1441 on Iraq in particular. It was observed that closer co-ordination between the two countries on the disputed military intervention in Iraq failed *despite* a shared commitment to the fundamental norms of the Western liberal world order. The lack of co-operation was considered as puzzling on the grounds of a number of shared community memberships, including the UN and, more importantly since it is constitutionally much more advanced, the shared membership in the EU. To shed light on this puzzle, the article conducted a comparative discursive analysis based on a critical constructivist approach which focuses on the input of 'practice' in 'context'.

The main finding is that norms offer neither stable guidance nor a specific template for policy design. Instead, they pertain to a generally perceived normative structure that offers a loose reference which requires specification in each specific case. They hence need to be operationalized and are, therefore, always subject to contestation. Rather than suspecting a general incompatibility of the underlying foreign policy strategies of Britain and Germany behind their diverging positions on Iraq, this article relates the emergence of these positions to the process of norm operationalization itself. We attribute the failure to co-ordinate a common and coherent European response to the Iraq crisis to the domestic nature of the discourses over norm interpretation in the area of foreign and security policy. It is, therefore, the *disconnectedness* of these discourses that lets decision-makers arrive in Brussels with predefined policy options. Such predefined positions leave little room for the development of common responses in situations of crisis that are of international origin and relevance.

In other words, differences between the positions held by different government representatives only come to the fore when it is too late for discussions about substantial differences. As a response to this dilemma the article suggests that decision-making within the CFSP framework puts greater emphasis on the collective assessment of foreign policy events, i.e. creating space in the policy process for the common interpretation and contestation of generally accepted principles of foreign policy formation. Most importantly, it was held that the emergence of consensus, or – in the absence of consensus – sustainable compromise is not a one-off event. Since norms are always inherently contested, the routinization of collective processes of norm contestation is considered an essential precondition for the EU's ability to better

react to unforeseen events. Here, the 'minister-plus-one' approach as applied in the regular Eurogroup meetings in the area of economic policy co-ordination has been proposed as a new institutional template.

Correspondence:

Uwe Puetter
Associate Professor, Head
Department of Public Policy
Central European University
Nador utca 9
H-1051 Budapest, Hungary
Tel +36 (0) 1 327 3000, ext 2335
Fax +36 (0) 1 235 6170
email: puetteru@ceu.hu

Antje Wiener
Professor of Politics and International Relations
Department of European Studies & Modern Languages
University of Bath
Bath BA2 7AY, UK
Tel +44 (0) 122538-4147
Fax +44 (0) 122538-6099
email: aw309@bath.ac.uk

References

- Abbott, K.W., Keohane, R.O., Moravcsik, A., Slaughter, A.-M. and Snidal, D. (2000) 'The Concept of Legalization'. *International Organization*, Vol. 54, No. 3, pp. 401–19.
- Adler, E. (1997) 'Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations'. *Millennium*, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 249–77.
- Adler, E. and Barnett, M.N. (1998) *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Barnett, M. (1999) 'Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel's Road to Oslo'. *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 5–36.
- BBC News (2003a) 'Germany Makes Plea to Prevent War', 14 February 2003, available at: <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2758917.stm>>.
- BBC News (2003b) 'In Quotes: Reaction to Bush Ultimatum', 18 March, available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2859485.stm>.
- Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (2002) *Die Zukunft ist grün* (Grundsatzprogramm von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen: Berlin).
- Chayes, A. and Chayes, A.H. (1993) 'On Compliance'. *International Organization*, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 175–205.

- Cohen, J.L. (2004) 'Whose Sovereignty? Empire Versus International Law'. *Ethics & International Affairs*, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 1–24.
- Cohen, J. (1997) 'Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy'. In Bohman, J. and Rehg, W. (eds) *Deliberative Democracy. Essays on Reason and Politics* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press), pp. 67–91.
- Dahl, R.A. (1971) *Polyarchy. Participation and Opposition* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press).
- European Council (1997) 'Presidency Conclusions. Luxembourg Meeting', available at: [«http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/032a0008.htm»](http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/032a0008.htm).
- Fairclough, N. (2001) *New Labour, New Language?* (London: Routledge).
- Finnemore, M. and Toope, S.J. (2001) 'Alternatives to "Legalization": Richer Views of Law and Politics'. *International Organization*, Vol. 55, No. 3, pp. 743–58.
- Frankfurter Rundschau* (2003) Interview with Dieter Deiseroth, Justice at the Federal Court of Public Administration, 15 March.
- Giddens, A. (1979) *Central Problems in Social Theory* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press).
- Guardian* (2003a) 'Battle of the Rival Texts', 25 February, [«www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,902543,00.html»](http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,902543,00.html).
- Guardian* (2003b) 'Full Text: Emergency Motion on Iraq', 18 March, available at: [«www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,916677,00.html»](http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,916677,00.html).
- Guéhenno, J.-M. (1998) 'A Foreign Policy in Search of a Polity'. In Zielonka, J. (ed.) *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International), pp. 25–34.
- Katzenstein, P. (ed.) (1996) *The Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press).
- Koskenniemi, M. (2007) 'The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics'. *Modern Law Review*, Vol. 70, No. 1, pp. 1–30.
- Kratochwil, F. and Ruggie, J.G. (1986) 'International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State'. *International Organization*, Vol. 40, No. 4, pp. 753–75.
- Labour Party (1997) *New Labour because Britain Deserves Better*, General Election manifesto, available at: [«http://www.labour.org.uk»](http://www.labour.org.uk).
- Labour Party (2001) *Ambitions for Britain*, General Election manifesto, available at: [«http://www.labour.org.uk»](http://www.labour.org.uk).
- Milliken, J. (1999) 'The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods'. *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 225–54.
- Paterson, W. and Sloam, J. (2005) 'Learning from the West: Policy Transfer and Political Parties'. *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 33–47.
- Puetter, U. (2006) *The Eurogroup. How a Secretive Circle of Finance Ministers Shape European Economic Governance* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).

- Puetter, U. (2007) 'Providing Venues for Contestation: the Role of Expert Committees and Informal Dialogue among Ministers in European Economic Policy Co-ordination'. *Comparative European Politics*, Special Issue, forthcoming.
- Reus-Smit, C. (1997) 'The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions'. *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 555–89.
- Reus-Smit, C. (2001) 'The Strange Death of Liberal International Theory'. *European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 573–93.
- Risse, T. (2000) '“Let's Argue!": Communicative Action in World Politics'. *International Organization*, Vol. 54, No. 1, pp. 1–39.
- Rummel, R. and Wiedemann, J. (1998) 'Identifying Institutional Paradoxes of CFSP'. In Zielonka, J. (ed.) *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International), pp. 53–66.
- Schimmelfennig, F. (2000) 'International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment'. *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 109–39.
- Schimmelfennig, F. (2003) *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Slaughter, A.-M. (2004) 'Disaggregated Sovereignty: Towards the Public Accountability of Global Government Networks'. *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 159–90.
- Slaughter, A.-M. and Burke-White, W. (2002) 'An International Constitutional Moment'. *Harvard International Law Journal*, Vol. 43, No. 1, pp. 1–21.
- Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (1998) *Grundsatzprogramm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands*, first adopted on December 20, 1989, revised on April 17, 1998.
- Tully, J. (2002) 'The Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to their Ideals of Constitutionalism and Democracy'. *Modern Law Review*, Vol. 65, No. 2, pp. 204–28.
- Weldes, J. and Saco, D. (1996) 'Making State Action Possible: The United States and the Discursive Construction of "The Cuban Problem", 1960–1994'. *Millennium*, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 361–95.
- Wiener, A. (2004) 'Contested Compliance: Interventions on the Normative Structure of World Politics'. *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 189–234.
- Wiener, A. (2007a) 'The Dual Quality of Norms and Governance beyond the State: Sociological and Normative Approaches to Interaction'. *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 47–69.
- Wiener, A. (2007b) 'Contested Meanings of Norms: A Research Framework'. *Comparative European Politics*, Special Issue, forthcoming.
- Winn, N. and Lord, C. (2001) *EU Foreign Policy beyond the Nation-State. Joint Actions and Institutional Analysis of the Common Foreign and Security Policy* (Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave).