Redefining Sovereignty via International Constitutional Moments?

Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Frankfurt am Main
Redefining Sovereignty via International Constitutional Moments?

Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Frankfurt am Main
fischer-lescano@jur.uni-frankfurt.de

Abstract

The article argues against recent attempts to subordinate the legal discourse to the logics of the political system. The discussion on global constitutionalism shows better than any other debate that the relationship of law and politics is one of two distinctive communication systems or discourses, which are autonomous in their operations. The mutual closeness and openness of these systems can only be understood if one keeps in mind the perspective entanglements with which law and politics take their respective altera pars under consideration.

It ranks among the accomplishments of the “new generation of interdisciplinary scholarship”1 that the social embedding of law has once again become part of the international research agenda. For decades realists and normativists have had hardly anything to say to each other since the pioneering work of Hans Morgenthau and E.H. Carr, on the one hand, and George Scelle and Hans Kelsen on the other.2 But from 1990 onwards a plentitude of works have appeared that attempt to

---

merge once more both “optics”. Anne-Marie Slaughter has proven to be a pivotal force in these debates. She has given significant impetus to the legalization debate, the network conception of international governance, the discussion of international legal liberalism and in the discourse on the methodology of international lawyers. Among political scientists as well as in the field of international law, she has been able to find a receptive audience. In the ever-growing discussion on global constitutionalism, Slaughter has also made a contribution. Together with William Burke-White, she has dedicated herself to “constitutional moments” and informed by political science and legal theory, she has attempted to outline the transformation of basic constructions of international law using the example of the fight against terror.

I.

From a methodological point of view, Slaughter and Burke-White’s text stands squarely in the tradition of interdisciplinary studies as practiced in the United States. After evaluating political positions of the nation states concerning the fight against terror, the authors come to the conclusion that following the events of September 11, 2001, a globally valid principle of “civilian inviolability” had emerged. This not only represented a new global "grundnorm", but also an “international constitutional moment”. As a legal consequence Slaughter and Burke-White describe the emergence of new rules which in particular contain a transformation of the norms of the prohibition of the use of force. At the heart of the matter, therefore, the authors offer a political analysis of the so-called “new threats” which lead Slaughter and Burke-White to normative demands:

To respond adequately and effectively to the threats and challenges that are

---


6 This does not imply that their approach is unchallenged, see for example the instructive criticism of Martha Finnemore & Stephen Toope, *Alternatives to ‘Legalization’: Richer Views of Law and Politics*, 55 (3) INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (2001) 751; see also, Jose Alvarez’s powerful critique of Slaughter, id., *Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter's Liberal Theory*, 12 (2001) EUR. J. INT’L L. 183.

7 They constantly use the German expression.
emerging in this new paradigm, we need new rules. Just as in 1945, the nations of the world today face an international constitutional moment. In the words of British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw: “Few events in global history can have galvanized the international system to action so completely in so short a time.”

Had the authors been satisfied with a requirement de lege ferenda, this would have been relatively unproblematic, and it would have been but one attempt among many others to develop an adequate strategy for contemporary challenges in the framework of a political debate. But the key to the work of the “new generation of interdisciplinary scholarship” represented by the authors lies much more in the fact that they mix paradigms of argumentation from political and legal science which cannot be cleanly delineated as “to be” or “ought to” and are produced through the application of a political concept of law. In other words, Slaughter and Burke-White mix requirements de lege ferenda with analyse de lege lata to such an extent that they do not limit themselves to the formulation of the desideratum to modify Art. 2 (4) of the UN Charter, but rather they determine “[T]he principle of civilian inviolability provides the common ground for the coalition arrayed against Al Qaeda.”

II.

Ironically for this enterprise that blends both facts and validity, Slaughter and Burke-White invoke precisely the author whose work was characterized by the clean separation of “to be” and “ought to”. Slaughter and Burke-White write “[T]ranslating these various sources of support for civilian inviolability into a globally acceptable Grundnorm,” thus interpreting Hans Kelsen’s Grundnorm clearly as a substantive norm. They take up the idea of the political optimization of values and principles as represented by the New Haven School and others, and dignify the “principle of

---

8 Slaughter & Burke-White, supra note 5.
9 The Latin term "De lege ferenda" means: "what the law ought to be (as opposed to what the law is)."
10 De lega lata: "what the law is (as opposed to what the law ought to be)."
11 Slaughter & Burke-White, supra note 5, at 16. This statement stands in notable contrast to that what they say about state responsibility. Cf. id. at 19-21.
12 Slaughter & Burke-White, supra note 5, at 18.
civilian inviolability” in direct reference to Kelsen, even using the German terminology of global “grundnorm”, as the basic norm of world society. This, however, has nothing to do with Kelsen’s conception. For him the Grundnorm, the basic norm, is a fiction. It shapes the answer to the question of the validity and self-determinacy of the legal order. Kelsen sketches the concept of an externalization of the foundation of validity of law in a scientific hypothesis about the validity of which there can be no doubt.

“no further question can be raised about the basis of its validity; for it is not a posited but a presupposed norm. It is not a positive norm, posited by a real act of will, but a norm presupposed in jurist thinking. It represents the ultimate basis of the validity of all legal norms forming the legal order. Only a norm can be the basis of the validity of another norm.”

The “grundnorm” is therefore only a norm that regulates how norms are created; it is not a norm belonging to substantive constitutional law as Slaughter and Burke-White maintain. To the contrary, it constitutes Kelsen’s attempt to positivize the foundation of validity of law and free it from political will, natural law or religious and other transcendental points of view. Kelsen’s legal pacifism and the pure legal theory were decidedly characterized by opposing a different model to the “real political” legal instrumentalism in the tradition of Carl Schmitt. Kelsen’s basic intention was to show that it is the legal order that constitutes the political system; that law cannot be found in a legal vacuum; that it is not politics but the idea of the “grundnorm” and its presupposed and hypothetical validity from which the norms of international law derive their own validity. The basic problem of the international legal order as Kelsen saw it, was the auto-interpretive or instrumental approach which nations applied when dealing with international law. This required that a world legal system be placed over and against it. “No law without a court” wrote Kelsen; and in another place he lamented, “there exists no authority accepted generally and obligatorily as

14 Slaughter & Burke-White, supra note 5, at 18.
18 Hans Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts 236 (1920).
19 Id. at 251.
competent to settle international conflicts.” A “world constitutional project” that considers as constitutional moments statements – however seriously uttered – by nation-states meant to justify the proliferation of armed conflict can hardly call upon the name of Hans Kelsen. Because for him, as a theoretician of pure legal theory, it was decisive that precisely this political instrumentalism concerning the legal system be ended. Thus for Kelsen, the question of a legal self-constitution becomes the decisive question in the formation of a legal order legitimized by the “grundnorm” and the function of the constitution is justified by the fact that it helps to secure the autonomy of the legal order by regulating the forms of norm creation.

III.

Slaughter and Burke-White’s use of the Grundnorm semantic is therefore obviously a marketing trick hiding the fact that the father of their constitutionalism is not the master-mind behind pure legal theory. To the contrary, their political-juridical evaluation technique stands in the tradition that was vehemently opposed by Kelsen in the Weimar debate; as it emphasises political decision-making and holds that it is not law but politics which must decide significant questions. Carl Schmitt formulated it unequivocally as early as 1934, and Hans Morgenthau wrote in 1940 in the American Journal of International Law that

“[i]n the international field the authoritative decision is replaced by the free interplay of political and military forces. […] a competitive contest for power will determine the victorious social forces, and the change of the existing legal order will be decided, not through a legal procedure […] but through a conflagration of conflicting social forces which challenge the legal order as a whole.”

---

21 HANS KELSEN, PEACE THROUGH LAW 13 (1944).
22 Ibidem.
23 Hans Kelsen, Die Selbstbestimmung des Rechts, in 2 DIE WIENER RECHTSTHEORETISCHE SCHULE: AUSGEWÄHLTE SCHRIFTEN VON HANS KELSEN, ADOLF JULIUS MERKL UND ALFRED VERDROSS 1445-1453 (Hans Klecatsky, ed., 1968); see also the analysis by ROBERT CHRISTIAN VAN OOVEN, DER STAAT DER MODERNE. HANS KELSENS PLURALISMUSTHEORIE 55-60 (2003), and JOCHEN VON BERNSTORFF, DER GLAUBE AN DAS UNIVERSALE RECHT. ZUR VÖLKERRECHTSTHEORIE HANS KELSENS UND SEINER SCHÜLER 169-172 (2001).
24 Kelsen, supra note 12, 113.
In 1929, Morgenthau had already dealt with the *Begriff des Politischen* [“concept of the political”]\(^{27}\) in his dissertation *Die internationale Rechtspflege, ihr Wesen und ihre Grenzen* [“International jurisprudence, its essence and its limits”]. The very heading of a subchapter in Morgenthau’s dissertation suggests the influence of Carl Schmitt’s essay *Der Begriff des Politischen* which appeared in 1927 in the *Archiv fuer Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*,\(^{28}\) even though Morgenthau does not quote the essay. In a fashion similar to Schmitt, who wanted to see so-called “political governmental acts” excluded from juridical review in national legal orders,\(^{29}\) Morgenthau postulates (and here he argues normatively) the primacy of political decision-making, i.e. *political questions* are not to be decided in the legal arena, but rather in the political one. Otherwise, political tensions would be subject to the impact of means “that are in no way suitable for it.”\(^{30}\) He continues by maintaining that he has found scientific proof for disputes that cannot be adjudicated:

“We have been able to prove the distinction of international conflicts in two categories whose ability to be resolved by legal judgment is not based on the arbitrariness of malicious or incompetent governments, but on a necessity proven by scientific means which are the expression of a defined empirically given situation. Further, the blurring of the borders between these two categories cannot be removed by means of juridical techniques, and comes about by necessity because of the contemporary state of inter-state relations.”\(^{31}\)

From a legal point of view the explosiveness of this assertion is that Morgenthau not only states the existence of non-justiciable governmental acts but also assigns the authority to decide about justiciability/non-justiciability to the realm of

\(^{27}\) *Id.* at 46-47.

\(^{28}\) Carl Schmitt, *Der Begriff des Politischen*, 58 ARCHIV FÜR SOZIALWISSENSCHAFT UND SOZIALPOLITIK 1 (1927).

\(^{29}\) CARL SCHMITT, *DER BEGRIFF DES POLITISCHEN* 22-23 (7th ed. 2002) (text of the 2nd ed. of 1932); see also Schmitt’s text “Der Führer schützt das Recht” from 1934: “In the 19th century Dufour, one of the fathers of French administrative law, defined every governmental act (acte de gouvernement) that evaded of judicial review in such a way that its goal is the defence of society, whether against internal or external, clear or hidden, or present or future enemies. Whatever one thinks of such conditions, they nonetheless refer to a legally essential feature of the political governmental act, which even in liberal constitutional states lead to legal recognition. In the case of doubt the fact that the limits of acts that are either empowering or non-empowering are not in the domain of the courts is self-explanatory when one considers the earlier references to the special feature of the governmental act and leadership roles.” Carl Schmitt, *Der Führer schützt das Recht*, in POSITIONEN UND BEGRIFFE IM KAMPF MIT WEIMAR, GENDIF, VERSAILLES, 1923-1939, 227, 230 (3d ed. 1994).

\(^{30}\) HANS MORGENTHAU, *DIE INTERNATIONALE RECHTSPFLEGE, IHR WESEN UND IHRE GRENZEN* 89 (1929).

\(^{31}\) Morgenthau, *supra* note 26, at 146-147. By the way, this statement is found in a chapter that Morgenthau titles: "Rechtspolitische Folgerungen" [consequences for the politics of law]. *Id.* at 131)
politics. He develops this thought further in his post-doctoral thesis presented in Geneva in 1934. Even though this was written at the start of the 20th century, it represented nothing new. Morgenthau could refer to a rich body of literature on legal realism. In his dissertation Morgenthau could rely on the work of the most significant representative of so-called Scandinavian legal realism, Anders Lundstedt who in 1925 in the domain of international law saw “nothing but the crudest policy of force.” Thus, what was new in Morgenthau’s realism was not the marginalization of law; the legal realists preceding him had already developed it. Rather new was that he connected this strategy of marginalization to a political scientific analysis that reached the intuition of his audience not only in the 1920s and 30s: law does not create peace; the utopias of Kant and the neo-Kantians surrounding Hans Kelsen have failed. What counts is not legal hair-splitting and a “misunderstood legalism and formalism” but rather the big questions of war and peace, which – it must be emphasized that Morgenthau argues normatively – shall only be decided politically.

The legal-theoretical language that Slaughter and Burke-White use by adopting Kelsen’s “pure legal theory” appears harmless. But Anne-Marie Slaughter has described in one of the programmatic essays on the content of the interdisciplinary program of the “new generation of interdisciplinary scholars” a fundamental shift in the tasks of jurisprudence and she degrades law to a political/social technique whose own value, function, and rationality would be replaced by an analysis of political conditions

“(1) to diagnose international policy problems and to formulate solutions to them; (2) to explain the function of particular legal institutions; and (3) to examine and reconceptualise particular institutions of international law generally.”

All of these are tasks having nothing to do with the actual work of the lawyer who is to examine the legality of a specific behaviour in the light of a valid norm. Such an analysis may perhaps serve to describe strategies for handling a problem de lege ferenda. But one cannot define the valid law in this way. This approach neglects existing international norms and sacrifices legal self-logic upon the altar of political

32 On American and Skandina vian legal realism in the 1920s see, ULRICH FASTENRATH, LÜCKEN IM VÖLKERRECHT 33 (1991), with further references.
33 Morgenthau, supra note 27, at 162; Morgenthau also quotes the legal Realist, ADOLF LASSON, PRINZIP UND ZUKUNFT DES VÖLKERRECHTS (1871).
34 ANDERS LUNDSTEDT, SUPERSTITION OR RATIONALITY IN ACTION FOR PEACE? 205 (1925).
36 Slaughter et al., supra note 1, at 373.
instrumentalism. This can in particular be raised against Slaughter and Burke-White and in general against those political legal theories for which law has always been without its own intrinsic value, “[L]aw is instrumental only, a means to an end, and is to be appraised only in the light of the ends it achieves.”

IV.

The problem of this political-legal technique becomes virulent where Slaughter and Burke-White depart from the level of theoretical reflection and legally justify political options to use force which are not as unobjectionable as they try to make them appear. While they consider the “evolving doctrine of humanitarian intervention” as a suitable procedure for the implementation of human rights, and while they insist that the “traditional ‘effective control’ test for attributing an act to a state seems insufficient to address the threats posed by global criminals and the states that harbor them” and that the “principle of civilian inviolability provides the common ground for the coalition arrayed against Al Qaeda” they also bring up a plethora of ensuing legal questions. One ought not underestimate that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention applies a balancing test (state’s rights vs. human rights), that the “effective control test” has also drawn its justification from the fact that this legal construction helps to hold the violence exceptions in international law under “effective control” and that the principle of “civilian inviolability” is open to such a degree that by referring to it one could even justify a humanitarian intervention accomplished by China to liberate the so-called “illegal combatants” at Guantanamo Bay. The normative components with which Slaughter and Burke-White line their political science analysis, however,

37 This is a Schmittian strategy of argumentation, see Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Ralph Christensen, Auctoritatis interpositio. Die Dekonstruktion des Dezisionismus durch die Systemtheorie, in 44 DER STAAT. ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STAATSLLEHRE, ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE, DEUTSCHES UND EUROPÄISCHES RECHT (2005, forthcoming).

38 Myres McDougal, Fuller v. The American Legal Realists, 50 YALE L.J. 827, 834 (1941); see also the criticism of Brunnée & Toope (supra note 13), 19.

39 Slaughter & Burke-White, supra note 5, at 19.

40 Slaughter & Burke-White, supra note 5, at 20.

41 Slaughter & Burke-White, supra note 5, at 16.


43 See the recent US supreme court decision in Hamdi vs. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2650 (2004), in which Justice Sandra Day O’Connor gives the remarkable explanation, “We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens…Whatever power the United Nations Constitutions envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake.” (citations omitted).
also point to the intrinsic limits of interdisciplinary projects. This limitation consists in the fact that they do not distinguish between normative and cognitive expectation.\(^{44}\)

In other words, it cannot be explained with the methodological approach employed by Slaughter and Burke-White why contemporary political challenges should have led *ipso iure* to the evolution of a global principle of civilian inviolability that even permits a humanitarian intervention; why this represents an international constitutional moment and by which rule a modification of the legal sovereignty principle followed. The attempt to transform the sovereignty principle of international law by relying on a political theory of law points to the weaknesses of interdisciplinary works where their proponents not only formulate political desiderata but formulate normative claims and try to make them appear *lex lata*. Where they attempt to merge two different streams of logic with a slant to universalism, i.e. politics and law, the legal character and the surplus value of a self-determined legal system\(^{45}\) get lost. In other words, it is suppressed by a political rationality. Hedley Bull recognized this as early as 1972. Directed at authors who today are categorized as “liberal anti-pluralists”\(^{46}\) such as those of the New Haven School, but also against Richard Falk, Bull wrote that

> “it may be said, however, that the blurring of the distinction between "is" and "ought" imposes a grave obstacle both to the work of identifying what rules are law, and to the work of establishing what rules are good rules […] It is apparent that many students of international law, particularly in the United States, are turning away from international law towards the wider field of the study of international order in all its aspects. This is in itself no bad thing […] It should be recognized, however, that what they are now doing is not properly called the study of international law. And it should be recognized also that the subject they are leaving behind them, the exposition and interpretation of existing legal rules, is one that demands continuing attention.”\(^{47}\)

Bull, himself one of the few interdisciplinary thinkers, put his finger on an interdisciplinary problem that presents itself today in much higher profile than it did in

---

\(^{44}\) On this decisive distinction, which is the poststructuralist reformulation of Kelsen’s dictum, that “it does not follow that because something is, something ought to be, and because something ought to be it cannot follow that something is” (HANS KELSEN, **REINE RECHTSLEHRE** 5 (reprint of the 2\(^{nd}\) ed. 2000), see: Fischer-Lescano (supra note 16).


the 1970s. His objections against instrumental interdisciplinary research should, therefore, not be underestimated. For in the end interdisciplinary projects that carry out political science theory as legal theory lead to an unfiltered intrusion of political science reasoning directly into legal rationality. That is nothing less than the attempt to politically usurp law by the fields of theory, methodology and, finally, education. As Philip Allott puts it

“there are two serious reasons why it would be regrettable, to say the least, if it were to become the tone and method for international law. The first is that it is a tone and a method for political, administrative and legislative debate and is not suitable for use by practitioners and governments applying law to the day-to-day conflicts of international relations. The second is that, whatever the high ideals of those who believe in it and practise it, the danger is that it will be a more apt weapon for those whom they would least wish to assist – the dialectical materialist and the cynical practitioner of Realpolitik.”

V.

It is precisely in Slaughter and Burke-White’s text on International Constitutional Moments that these problems become apparent. This rests in the fact that the discussion on global constitutionalism shows better than any other debate that the relationship of law and politics is one of two distinctive communication systems or discourses which are autonomous in their operations. The mutual closeness and openness of these systems can only be understood if one keeps in mind the perspective entanglements with which law and politics take their respective altera pars under consideration. Precisely in constitutional law it becomes apparent that law as well as politics are both based on preconditions that neither could generate by itself. Political


49 Generally on this point see, Koskenniemi (supra note 25), 17.


52 Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung (1992).


54 Cf. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Staat, Gesellschaft, Freiheit 60 (1976).
constitutional law is an evolutionary achievement which represents both separation and linkage between politics and law and, thus, guarantees to each of them its autonomous operation. If, however, in the framework of a political theory of law, the latter is deprived of its intrinsic value, one receives a completely insufficient picture.

Unless one wishes to negate a two hundred year-old tradition of an idea, “constitutional moments” are to be understood as those which deal with the legal constitution and limitation of authority within a self-determined social field. That is precisely where the focus of the discussion on global constitutionalism lies. Sovereignty and global law cannot be viewed as contradictory; national sovereignty is the condition of global law and global law is the condition of sovereignty being possible. Therefore, the reciprocal autonomy and union of the two have to be reflected: in other words, the fundamental paradox that international law constitutes nation states on the one hand and on the other, nation states constitute international law.

In this respect, the fight against terror has not changed anything. The war in Afghanistan which Slaughter and Burke-White use as their point of departure for their deliberations on International Constitutional Moments was not a moment that readjusted the relationship between law and politics. The world community continues to expect from politics behavior that conforms to international law. It is exactly this which prompted millions of demonstrators around the world to take to the streets. And it is exactly this which led Bruno Simma, in his separate opinion in the Platforms Case decided by the ICJ in November 2003, to the “consideration of Rechtspolitik,” demanding

57 Jürgen Habermas, Hat die Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts noch eine Chance?, in DER GESPÄLTENE WESTEN, KLEINERE POLITISCHE SCHRIFTEN X 113, 139-165 (2004).
59 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. preface and para. 6 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion of Judge Bruno Simma).
“courage of restating, and thus reconfirming, more fully fundamental principles of the law of the United Nations as well as customary international law (principles that in my view are of the nature of jus cogens) on the use of force, or rather the prohibition on armed force, in a context and at a time when such a reconfirmation is called for with the greatest urgency.”

In the military measures in Afghanistan it becomes manifest that power can strike back when offended. But there is nothing special or “constitutional” about that. To garnish the legal constructions which were invoked in this context by the epithet “constitutional moment” is not only flawed as a matter of legal theory, it is an unwarranted exaggeration that ignores the legal discourse on the issue of the intervention in Afghanistan and equally misinterprets the political statements given during the course of the global “fight against terror”. The officials and non-officials who were invoked by Slaughter and Burke-White regularly did not connect their demands for civilian inviolability with the issue of ius ad bellum. All statements given by representatives of nation states and international organisations with regard to human rights in the context of the military engagement in Afghanistan contain the usual political strategies of rhetorically reinforcing human rights principles. But those techniques leave serious lacunae. Their operationalisation, e.g. juridification, has to be achieved under the conditions of extremely vague values and principles, that share much of the natural law spirit. They remain political decorations if they are not accompanied by access rights to courts. And consequently the repeated invocation of the semantics of universality of human rights, of humanity etc., contrasts with the observation that Afghanistan is less a manifestation for a new global constitutional principle than a dark hour of human rights. In this sense, Amnesty International, for example, quotes in its October 2003 report an Afghan woman with the words: "No one listens to us and no one treats us like human beings." And the Secretary General states in his 2004 report on Afghanistan that “[T]he absence of legal and social support systems has left many women trapped in abusive situations, from which they

---

60 Id.

61 See e.g. the discussion on social and economic rights, where the production of well-meaning texts does not go along with the willingness to created access to courts: "However, with regard to the proposed elaboration of an optional protocol to the Covenant incorporating a mechanism for individual complaints, the Union was of the opinion that, if such a mechanism was to be established, it must be provided with a clear framework and avoid any overlap with existing mechanisms" (Representative of the European Community, 33rd meeting of the 58th session of the human rights committee, E/CN.4/2002/SR.33, 7; see also E/CN.4/2001/SR.31, 9); on the operationalization of the norms in question, see: Eibe Riedel, New bearings to the State reporting procedure: practical ways to operationalize economic, social and cultural rights — The example of the right to health, in PRAXISHANDBUCH UNO 345 (Sabine von Schorlemer, ed., 2002) and Robin R. Churchill & Urfan Khaliliq, The Collective Complaints System of the European Social Charter - An Effective Mechanism for Ensuring Compliance with Economic and Social Rights?, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 417 (2004).

sometimes try to escape by drastic measures, including suicide and self-immolation.”

From this perspective, Afghanistan seems not to be a constitutional moment for human rights but makes visible the serious problem of ‘exclusion’ of numerous individuals in world society. And the worst imaginable scenario might be that the society of the next century will have to accept the meta-code of inclusion/exclusion. And this would mean that some human beings “are included in function systems for (successful or unsuccessful) careers and others are excluded from these systems, remaining bodies that try to survive the next day; that some are emancipated as persons and others are emancipated as bodies.”

VI.

Slaughter and Burke-White misinterpret the rhetoric on the principle of civilian inviolability. In doing so, they perform the Herkulian job of effectuating the metamorphosis of political statements – that were solely aimed to pronounce human rights issues – into expressions of a opinio iuris concerning a change of the well established rules on the ius ad bellum. But they do not say what they do not say: the enthymen – in the Aristotelian sense of the word – they try to use a non-existing conditional link between the state practice of military measures in Afghanistan – via ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) and Enduring Freedom – and the legal measures to protect human rights. In fact, none of the politicians can be relied on in such an argumentation. Concerning the use of force in Afghanistan, a lot of legal arguments were put forward, but none of them was of the kind Slaughter and Burke-White want to make us believe they were. Instead of arguing with a doubtful balancing of human rights and state rights, state officials preferred to use the language of public international law as it is enshrined in the United Nations Charter, especially in Article 2 (4) of the Charter which prohibits “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,” with only two exceptions. Chapter VII measures and the right of self-defence as set out in Article 51

---


64 Niklas Luhmann, Globalization or world society: How to conceive of modern society?, 7 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY 67 (1997); on the problem of exclusion see also: Marcelo Neves, From the Autopoiesis to the Allopoiesis of Law, 28 JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY 242 (2001).

65 On the systematic of the Charter: NICO KRISCH, SELBSTVERTEIDIGUNG UND KOLLEKTIVE SICHERHEIT (2001); doubts on the validity of the prohibition of the use of force are only singular statements in legal literature: Thomas Franck, Who Killed Article 2 (4)?: 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 809 (1970); Jean Combacau, The Exception of Self-Defense in U.N. Practice, in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 9 (Cassese ed., 1986); against this CHRISTINE GRAY,
“[N]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”

The United States maintained in their notification\textsuperscript{66} to the Security Council dated October 7, 2001 that international law permitted military action against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan as measures of self-defence.

“In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, I wish, on behalf of my Government, to report that the United States of America, together with other States, has initiated actions in the exercise of its inherent right of individual and collective self-defence following the armed attacks that were carried out against the United States on 11 September 2001.”\textsuperscript{67}

The US argued that it was acting in accordance with international law. The measures against Al-Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan were to be categorized as self-defense because the attacks of 9/11 were

“made possible by the decision of the Taliban regime to allow the parts of Afghanistan that it controls to be used by this organization as a base of operation. Despite every effort by the United States and the international community, the Taliban regime has refused to change its policy. From the territory of Afghanistan, the Al-Qaeda organization continues to train and support agents of terror who attack innocent people throughout the world and target United States nationals and interests in the United States and abroad.”\textsuperscript{68}

\textsuperscript{66}The ICJ in its Nicaragua Decision held the reporting procedure of Article 51 for an important factor in qualifying military attacks as acts of self-defense, because “the absence of a report may be one of the factors indicating whether the State in question was itself convinced that it was acting in self-defence.” (ICJ Rep. 1986, 105, para. 200).


\textsuperscript{68}Ibidem.
Several statements of international organizations including the North Atlantic Organization,\(^69\) the Organization of American States,\(^70\) and also the UN Security Council are usually read as endorsing this self-defence approach. Especially Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 are remarkable, as they recognize in very general wording the right to react in self-defence.\(^71\) It is obvious that this recognition is not constitutive for the legality of the measures undertaken, except for the clarification that the Security Council did not want to state that its own measures were to restrict a potential right of self-defence.\(^72\) But even if the Security Council in its resolutions did strictly avoid classifying the terrorist attacks as “armed attacks,” the military measures in Afghanistan were the beginning of an ever growing discussion on the re-systematization, re-contextualization and re-description of the two norm complexes of public international law that regulate the exceptional right to use force.\(^73\) In this debate, serious questions of proportionality\(^74\) were raised. Issues of immediacy of self-defence,\(^75\) of anticipatory self-defence\(^76\) and of the relationship between actions under

---

\(^{69}\) “[I]t has now been determined that the attack against the United States on 11 September was directed from abroad and shall therefore be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack on one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” (NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, Oct. 2, 2001, www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011002a.htm).


\(^{73}\) Summarizing the political statements as an "attack on the defence-exception", Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Angriff auf die Verteidigung, in DER IRAK-KRIEG UND DAS VÖLKERRECHT 33 (Kai Ambos & Jörg Arnold, eds., 2004).


\(^{75}\) In the Nicaragua Case the ICJ held that measures were unnecessary when they were taken "several months after the major offensive of the armed opposition […] had been completely repulsed." (ICJ Rep.
Chapter VII- and self defence measures\textsuperscript{77} were subject of discussion. Also, the \textit{sui generis} character of the ISAF-mission\textsuperscript{78} that was placed under the military command of Operation Enduring Freedom\textsuperscript{79} was highly controversial. This controversy lost its virulence when the latter had changed its legal character from a self-declared self-defence operation to an intervention on invitation\textsuperscript{80} of the interim government in Kabul. This new Government under Hamid Karzai was installed during the Bonn negotiations,\textsuperscript{81} and later endorsed by SC Resolution 1383 (2001).\textsuperscript{82} It is more or less


\textsuperscript{79} The Security Council in its Resolution 1386 called "upon the International Security Assistance Force to work in close consultation with the Afghan Interim Authority in the implementation of the Force's mandate, as well as with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General" (SEC/RES 1386 (2001), cif. 4). When the Security Council met, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the President of the Council had already presented a letter dated 19 December 2001 (document S/2001/1217), containing an annex addressed to the Secretary-General regarding the relationship between the ISAF and other forces operating in Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom. The letter which was approved by the Security Council in its Resolution 1386 states that, "for reasons of effectiveness, the United States Central Command will have authority over the former so that activities between the two factions do not conflict with each other, and to ensure that there is no interference to the successful completion of Operation Enduring Freedom."

\textsuperscript{80} Generally on this: GEORG NOLTE, \textit{EINGREIFEN AUF EINLADUNG} (1999).

\textsuperscript{81} Under the leadership of Lakhdar Brahimi and supported by the "Six plus Two" group, on 5 December 2001 Afghan warlords - without Taliban participation - signed the "agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions" commonly called the "Bonn Agreement". As the result of the UN talks on Afghanistan the participants formed an Interim Administration under chairman \textit{Hamid Karzai} and agreed that this administration "shall be the repository of Afghan sovereignty" (Bonn Agreement, I.3, UN Doc. 2001/1154). Having reaffirmed "the independence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan" (Bonn Agreement, preamble) the parties pledged international assistance, in particular security assistance (see the letter of the Afghan Interim Foreign Minister, UN Doc. S/2001/1223; see also the Military Technical Agreement between ISAF and the Interim Government, Jan. 4, 2002, documentation in: 8
dependent on the good will of the Afghan warlords, who have effective control over most parts of Afghanistan.  

However, all these questions are of only secondary importance compared to another argumentation strategy regarding the issue of lawful self-defence measures that accompanies Slaughter and Burke-White's legal theoretical de-formalization-project in a more legal-dogmatic fashion. This legal dogmatic project raises questions which touch the very basis of the global order, as the fundamental principle of political differentiation of world society is called into question. In 1977, Hedley Bull formulated the maxim that international law has to "state the basic rules of coexistence among states and other actors in international society. These rules [...] relate to three core areas: there are rules relating to the restriction of violence among states and other actors; rules relating to agreements among them; and rules relating to sovereignty or independence."  

Obviously, in a polycentric society, e.g. in world society, this is only one perspective and the demand for "justice" points out that the usurpation of the legal code by political theory and practice tries to marginalize economical, religious, social self-governance tendencies and to replace them by a political monopoly. The emptiness of the legal code thus is a demand for justice.  

This is equally true for the reaction to terrorism. To fight terror primarily by military means is an inappropriate strategy.  

---


advocates find themselves – consciously or unconsciously – on the Schmittian mission of deterritorialization, of promoting the end of the primary principle of political order, the nation state. When Carl Schmitt criticised the adoption of the Geneva Conventions in the “Theorie des Partisanen” (Partisan Theory) for the reason that they “loosen or even undermine the clear distinctions between war and peace, military and civilian, state war and civil war” he associated this with the belief that this would open the door “for a kind of war that would destroy those clear distinctions. As a result legalization of compromise [Kompromissnormierung] would seem to be a thin bridge over a sewer”. 88 Schmitt possessed an “unsurpassed sense for the antiquated” 89 and he was convinced that the attempts to outlaw war with legal means would fail because no one had considered “how the civilian’s victory over the soldier is affected if one day the civilian puts on the uniform and the partisan takes it off.” 90 Schmitt’s prophecy addresses a basic intuition that, despite its antiquity, has remained until this day and is attributed much plausibility; global law is an obstacle to politics and has proven to be counterproductive for the political realisation of a global peace order. The credo “we need new rules” 91 of Old-European and New Haven lawyers is a reaction to the so-called asymmetrical shift in military affairs and accomplishes the project of Carl Schmitt. As Martti Koskenniemi states correctly, this is probably not due to “bad faith or conspiracy on anybody's part,” 92 but to the logic of an argument, i.e. the logic of the hybridisation and de-formalisation of clear distinctions which is going to change the primary principle of the political-juridical order.

The first dimension of this strategy is to open Article 51 of the UN Charter and to include private acts as possible causes for self-defence actions. This relies primarily on the wording of “armed attack” and is marginalizing an important factor: terrorist attacks regularly do not fall out of an extra-territorial black whole. They are directed from a territory that belongs either to the target state or to a third state. Classifying terrorist attacks as “armed attacks” does therefore not ipso iure lead to the legality of a military response that affects the territorial integrity of another state. For the last fifty years Article 51 of the Charter had to be read in the context of Article 2 (4) for which it served as an exception. To isolate Article 51 UN Charter from Article 2 (4) and to reduce the attack-defence-problematique to the actors “target state” and “targeting
terrorists” violates not only the neminem laedere\textsuperscript{93} rule of possibly affected third-states, but will also change the legal construction of the political world and the distinction among territorial states.

It is one of the achievements of modernity that military engagement on the territory of another state needs a legal justification, "which is clear, unambiguous, subject to proof, and not easily open to misinterpretation or fabrication".\textsuperscript{94} This legal justification can consist either in a Chapter VII mandate of the Security Council or in Article 51 UN Charter, but the condition of the latter is that the state is responsible for the alleged private attacks. It is still undecided if a dissolution of this nexus is only a norm projection or if it is a norm-in-the-making. But the critical voices against the manipulation of this principle of political organization and to change the underlying philosophy of the UN Charter\textsuperscript{95} are quite visible\textsuperscript{96} and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory strengthened their position of a territorial based non-use-of-force-system of the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{97} The Court dismissed the Israeli argument drawing inter alia on Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373, stating that

“Article 51 of the Charter thus recognizes the existence of an inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State against another State. However, Israel does not claim that the attacks against it are imputable to a foreign State. The Court also notes that Israel exercises control in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and that, as Israel itself states, the threat which it regards as justifying the construction of the wall originates within, and not outside, that territory.”\textsuperscript{98}

The second dimension of the strategy of de-formalisation is the intention to loosen the “effective control test” that the ICJ had developed in the Nicaragua

\textsuperscript{93} The Latin neminem laedere means: "to hurt no one".

\textsuperscript{94} LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 142 (1979).

\textsuperscript{95} On this: HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 800 (1950).

\textsuperscript{96} See the statements of O’Connell, supra note 71; Michael Bothe, Friedensrecht und Kriegsrecht, in VÖLKERRECHT para. 11 (Wolfgang Vitzthum ed., 2004); Marcelo Kohen, The use of force by the United States after the end of the Cold War, and its impact on international law, 197, 209 in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 2003); Yves Sandoz, Lutte contre le terrorisme et droit international: risques et opportunités, 12 SZIER 319, 338 (2002); but see, Yoram Dinstein, Humanitarian Law on the Conflict in Afghanistan, 96 ASIL PROCEEDINGS 23 (2002).

\textsuperscript{97} ICJ Rep. 2004.

\textsuperscript{98} ICJ, Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ Rep. 2004, para. 139, emphasizes AFL.
The argument that already the Tadic-judgement of the ICTY might have changed the decisive test-criteria of the ICJ to an overall-control-test neglects the fact that both decisions are made in quite a different context. Both tribunals had to deal with the problem whether certain acts of violence were attributable to a State. Yet, in the Tadic case, a positive answer to the question of attribution led to the applicability of international humanitarian law. In the Nicaragua case, it led to the justification of the use of force because the first use of force in question would have constituted an armed attack by a State. Both regimes use different concepts of accountability, e.g. the ICTY having to decide on the applicability of humanitarian law, on one side, the ICJ dealing with the sensitive question of the exception to the prohibition of use of force, on the other, and it is a truism that even in national law accountability differs in a civil law context from accountability in a criminal law context. Furthermore, Derek Jinks has remarked, the application of the proposed rule might have possible counterproductive effects, especially for its advocates. A changed accountability regime of ius ad bellum might

“render states less likely to support opposition groups in rogue states for fear that the conduct of any such groups could be imputed to the supporting state. Indeed, this potential implication would disproportionately affect powerful states, like the United States, that actively support regime change in illiberal states. Recall that it was US support for the contra rebels at issue in the Nicaragua case before the ICJ. Under HSR [Harbor and Support Rule, AFL], the US would have been responsible for war crimes and other atrocities committed by the contras. In addition, the US provided extensive material and tactical support to Northern Alliance troops in Afghanistan. Substantial evidence suggests that these fighters committed numerous atrocities during the course of the conflict. Although the US may be accountable for these acts, this accountability would issue from the ‘primary rules’ of the Geneva Conventions that require states ‘to ensure respect’ for its substantive provisions. Two important points follow from these observations: (1) states may be hesitant to support any opposition movements over whom they exercise little or no control (such as the African National Congress in South Africa in the 80s and early 90s); and

---

102 Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 53.
(2) a decline in such support may frustrate global democracy promotion and antiterrorism efforts.\textsuperscript{103}

Consequently, the disregard of primary-rules mechanisms, \textit{e.g.} cooperation against money laundering, measures against financing of terrorism etc.,\textsuperscript{104} and the priority focus on the manipulation of the secondary rules of state responsibility has serious consequences for states. If the attempts to manipulate the test criteria for accountability in the regime of \textit{ius ad bellum} became successful and in future cases an overall-control or the harbour-and-support test were to be applied, the lines between military and police, combatant and civilian, war and peace will again become blurred. In this respect, one of the paradoxes of the present discussion is that the protagonists supporting the recognition of a right of self-defence against non-state attacks on foreign territories also claim that there is \textit{a priori} no possibility of an “armed conflict between terrorists and states in the sense of humanitarian international law,”\textsuperscript{105} that terrorists \textit{a priori} do not attain the status of combatants.\textsuperscript{106} On the one hand an extension of the exceptions to the use of force is supported, arguing that terrorist acts justify self-defence actions. On the other the advocates of this thesis deny the legal protection of humanitarian law to those who shall be a legitimate object of armed self-defence.\textsuperscript{107} This is incoherent, because A shall be \textit{a priori} non-A.

VII.

The projects of Anne-Marie Slaughter, Michael Reisman, Robert Keohane, Kenneth Abbott \textit{et al.} in terms of a political usurpation of law and of a political primacy in decision making concerning the adequate strategy for a globalisation of

\textsuperscript{103} Jinks, \textit{supra} note 71, at 92.


\textsuperscript{105} Bruha, \textit{supra} note 91, at 413. It must be stressed that Thomas Bruha assumes that general human right standards must be applied at a minimum.

\textsuperscript{106} Giorgio Agamben’s criticism of the treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo focuses on the denial of basic human rights to prisoners: “neither prisoners nor accused, rather mere detainees, they are subject to a ruling body, a detention, the length and existence of which are not determined, seeing as it is exempted from law and judicial review. The only possible comparison is one with the legal situation of jews in Nazi camps who lost all legal identity regarding State citizenship, but at least maintained the Jewish identity.” (Giorgio Agamben, \textit{Der Gewahrsam. Ausnahmezustand als Weltordnung}, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, April 19, 2003, 33; cf. \textit{id.}, \textit{STATE OF EXCEPTION} (2005, forthcoming))

security issues,108 will result in a scenario where global aristocratic networks of government109 could violently implement their understanding of human rights and security against the prevailing practices of other nations in every society of this world.110 In this case the entire world population would become the object of the military enforcement of security principles.111 The era of statehood would come to an end. The era of a Schmittian “Großraum”112 would begin. A new Großraumordnung, symbolised by the triumph over defined spaces, could discard the territorial sovereignty of the state113 and draw lines of friendship and enmity in a de-territorialized and de-juridified realm.114

It was Hannah Arendt who first recognised the human rights aspect in this dark prophecy of the end of statehood pronounced by Carl Schmitt. In Arendt's dictum The Decline of the State and the End of Human Rights115 the dangers of the de-territorialization tendencies become visible: Although it is important that human rights and security issues are no longer subjected to the arbitrariness of regional political power, it is equally important to recognise that human rights and security considerations are often offered “as an excuse for political intervention into matters that can only be decided – be it democratically or not – at the national level”.116 If global society’s political system was able to convince society of the importance of the distinction between friend and foe, civilisation and barbarism, humanity and bestiality, then policy could be made without having to fear political consequences.117 In this

---

108 Recent international relations theory describes these political processes as 'securitization' (BARRY BUZAN & OLE WAEVER & JAAP DE WILDE, SECURITY: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS (1998)); see already the enthusiastic dictum of Ernst Forsthoff (one of the most influential students of Carl Schmitt) on the possibilities of a legitimatory exploitation of the security issue (ERNST FORSTHOFF, DIE VERWALTUNG ALS LEISTUNGSTRÄGER 8 (1938).


110 Martti Koskenniemi, The Police In the Temple: Order, Justice and the UN - A Dialectical View, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 325, 327 (1995); see also Finnemore & Toope (supra note 6), 751.

111 Ingeborg Mau, Menschenrechte als Ermächtigungsnormen internationaler Politik oder: der Zerstörte Zusammenhang von Menschenrechten und Demokratie, in RECHT AUF MENSCHENRECHTE 279 (Hauke Brunkhorst et al., eds., 1999).

112 CARL SCHMITT (1939), VÖLKERRECHTLICHE GROSSRAUMORDNUNG MIT INTERVENTIONSVERBOT FÜR RAUMFREMDE MÄCHTE (1941).

113 Id., 51, 310-312.


case political decisions would be determined by unrestrained fundamentalism and radicalism. Such a course would lead to certain catastrophe. Therefore, if the territorial state is not to die a slow death then, firstly, the global political system must stand up as the guarantor of statehood and, secondly, must develop forms of intervention that do not intervene in regional politics. This involves the paradoxical situation in which the global political system has to guarantee difference and equality at the same time.

“difference, in that the segmentary differentiation into territorial states assists in bringing together the varying regional elements and ensures collective decisions can be made on the global level; [...] equality, since the form of the segmentary differentiation must be able to establish a minimum form of ‘similarity’ of the sectors. This occurs through the reduction of equality to 'statehood' and the reduction of statehood to the possibility of collectively binding decision making capability.”

To determine these decision-making processes, to clarify the underlying circumstances and to decide the legally permitted forms of interventions, a minimum of procedure is required. The issues at stake are too fundamental as for being decided solely in the political realm of auto-legitimizing nation states à la Slaughter and Burke-White. The indeterminacies in the distinctions between attack and defence, war and peace, police and military, civilians and terrorists, combatants and non-combatants and in accountability/non-accountability evince the need for legal remedies in which norm-projections are distinguished from valid norms. This legal procedure is necessary due to the increased complexity of problems in global society and to end the abuse of global law by global politics. Thus, the most important project for global constitutionalists is to strengthen the independence of global law and to implement constitutional moments, e.g. Marbury moments. Although this appears to be against

---

118 NIKLAS LUHMANN, DIE POLITIK DER GESELLSCHAFT 219 (2000).
119 Luhmann, supra note 118, 226; see also Lothar Brock, World society from the bottom up, in OBSERVING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. NIKLAS LUHMANN AND WORLD POLITICS 86, 90-100 (Mathias Albert & Lena Hilkemeier, eds., 2004).
120 Luhmann, supra note 118, 227.
122 Instructive for the symbolic constitution and the structural requirements of nominal constitutional regimes: MARCELO NEVES, VERFASSUNG UND POSITIVITÄT DES RECHTS IN DER PERIPHEREN MODERNE (1992).
123 On the absence of a Marbury moment within the UN regime, see, Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 53; Geoffrey Watson, Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and the World Court, 34 HARV. INT'L. L. J. 1, 45 (1993); Thomas Franck, 'Power of Appreciation': Who is the ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 519, 638 (1992); but see the Trial Chamber of the ICTY in its decision "Prosecuter v. Dusko Tadic", 10/2/1995 (32 I.L.M. 35, 41-42 (1996)) on the "The Issue of Constitutionality": "These arguments [of the Security Council concerning the establishment of the ICTY, AFL] raise a series of constitutional issues which all turn on the limits of the power of the
the spirit of an era which to adopt a phrase used by Niklas Luhmann back in 1975 “is naive in political issues and replaces structural achievements by good intentions” and therefore believes more dramatic means of conflict repression are unavoidable. In this perspective the most serious global constitutional challenge lies within global law having to ensure and extend its independence from world politics. To put it in the words of Jacques Derrida

“Politicization, for example, is interminable even if it cannot and should not ever be total. To keep this from being a truism or a triviality, we must recognize in it the following consequence: each advance in politicization obliges one to reconsider, and so to reinterpret the very foundations of law such as they had previously been calculated or delimited. This was true for example in the Declaration of the Rights of Man, in the abolition of slavery, in all the emancipatory battles that remain and will have to remain in progress, everywhere in the world, for men and for women. Nothing seems to me less outdated than the classical emancipatory ideal.”

In order to contribute to this classic emancipatory ideal, to cater for the inclusion of individuals, international constitutional moments have to be moments in which the legal system emancipates itself from political pressure and implements the rule of law in global society. In short, constitutional moments must be Marbury moments. “Redefining sovereignty” therefore must entail a redefinition of the autonomy of the global legal system.

Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and determining what action or measures can be taken under this Chapter, particularly the establishment of an international criminal tribunal. […] It is clear from this text [Art. 39 of the Charter, AFL] that the Security Council plays a pivotal role and exercises a very wide discretion under this Article. But this does not mean that its powers are unlimited. […] The Security Council is thus subjected to certain constitutional limitations, however broad its powers under the constitution may be.”

124 Luhmann, supra note 121, at 2 and 4.

125 On this demand, see ANDREAS FISCHER-LESCANO, GLOBALVERFASSUNG. DIE GELTUNGSBEGRÜNDUNG DER MENSCHENRECHTE (2005); cf. Erika de Wet, Judicial review as an emerging general principle of law and its implications for the International Court of Justice, 47 NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 181 (2000).