

War Economy and the Social Order of Insurgencies

An Analysis of the Internal Structure of UNITA's War Economy

Kirsti Stuvøy

Arbeitspapier

Nr. 3 / 2002

Universität Hamburg - IPW

Forschungsstelle Kriege,
Rüstung und Entwicklung

Research Unit of Wars,
Armament and Development



Anschrift und Bezugsadresse

Universität Hamburg - IPW
Forschungsstelle Kriege, Rüstung und Entwicklung
Allende-Platz 1
D - 20146 Hamburg
Telefon 040/42838-3689
Fax 040/42838-2460
<http://www.akuf.de>

ISSN 1432-8283

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1. Introduction

After a period of meager international media interest in the Angolan civil war, the breaking news on February 23, 2002, announcing the death of a man once described as “*A Key to Africa*”¹ was astounding. Jonas Savimbi, the longtime leader of the insurgent movement *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA), had died in combat. Overnight commentators began to discuss the possible implications of this sudden change, and within weeks, a peace agreement was signed, promising millions of suffering Angolans a new chance to rebuild their lives under peaceful conditions. On the background of the emerging peace building process in Angola, the relevance of this development to the analytical interest of this paper must be clarified. The main argument for choosing the Angolan war as a case study was the possibility of observing patterns of social organization during a prolonged conflict. Between the mid-1960s and the late 1990s, UNITA exercised control over vast territories in Angola, until significant elements of the UNITA system of organization disintegrated in the late 1990s. With an analysis of this period, the functional mechanisms of UNITA’s system of domination are examined in context of the continuous evolution of the insurgent organization. The current peace-building process does not challenge the relevance of such a detailed analysis of the UNITA system, as the main aim of recognizing patterns of social reproduction in an insurgent system of organization and the dynamic adaptability of the insurgent war economy, can still be met. An additional structural change with relevance to the organization of insurgencies was the collapse of the Communist block. Despite being considered a watershed in recent history, the end of the totalitarian communist regimes in Eastern Europe did not fundamentally alter the nature of violent conflicts in 1989/90. Due to the gradual decline of East-West antagonism, its influence on the nature of conflicts must be analyzed as a historical process. In this paper this requirement is met by examining the period of insurgent control over major Angolan provinces with a primary focus on the structural changes of the UNITA system of organization over time. In regard to the current situation in Angola, this study contributes to a better understanding of the societal basis of the insurgent movement, which is significant to the consolidation of peace as this process depends on the ability to integrate the former UNITA-controlled areas into the rest of Angola’s political and social system.

The primary motivations for a case study on UNITA were an interest in the analysis of contemporary wars and the current trend of an economic approach to conflict studies. In recent years, the economic approach gained increasing attention, exemplified by the establishment of a multimillion-dollar research project on “*The Economics of Civil Wars, Crime and Violence*” at the Post-Conflict Unit of the World Bank.² With a focus on the ability of certain actors to profit from war, the economic approach theorizes primarily on how economic activities influence conflict dynamism. Despite this predominance of economic aspects, however, the *interaction* of economic and political factors is explicitly recognized as the central analytical category. But further theoretical

¹ Bridgland, Fred: Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa. London: Hodder and Stoughton 1986.

² For more information on this research project, see <http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict>

elaboration on this interaction is scarce, and instead the primary focus remains on economic motives for violence. In this regard, the economic approach is vulnerable to criticism. The following study addresses this shortcoming and defines the interconnection between political and economic structures as the central analytical question: *How can the interaction between political and economic structures in contemporary wars be examined?* Due to this theoretical objective, the main emphasis of this study is on the development of an alternative analytical approach to war economies. This approach is then tested in the case study on UNITA. The results of the empirical study are used to define theoretical requirements for further study of war economies.

With this focus on the interaction between political and economic aspects, the internal functional logic of contemporary war economies emerges as the core object of analysis. For the purpose of this paper, a war economy is conceptualized as a form of social organization. The functioning of this social system is dependent on the existence of both a system of domination and an economic structure guaranteeing the material means of support of the system. In contrast to this focus on the societal level of war economies, the economic approach primarily emphasizes the interaction between local war economies and the world market. The economic approach thus defines the international system as the main level of analysis. Interaction with global trading networks is recognized as a central condition for the sustainability of local war economies in this study as well. However, external factors are assessed exclusively in regard to their influence on the internal functioning of war economies.

The objective of this study both draws upon and supplements the economic approach. To begin with, therefore, the emergence of an economic approach to conflict studies is examined in chapter one. The valuable contribution of this approach to the academic discipline of conflict studies is ascertained. On the basis of a shortcoming of this novel approach, however, the theoretical foundation of this study is developed in chapter three. The theoretical section is concluded with the introduction of a hypothesis in chapter 3.3. Successively, the theoretical framework is tested in the case study on UNITA in chapter four. Both the political and the economic structures of UNITA's system of insurgent organization are examined. In chapter five, the results of the empirical study are discussed in regard to the central research question on the interaction between political and economic structures. In the concluding chapter six, we discuss how the empirical results of the case study influence the theoretical considerations on how to study war economies, as presented in chapter three.

2. The Emergence of an Economic Approach

As an object of research, war is recognized as a complex social phenomenon causing considerable methodological and theoretical challenges.³ Even defining war has proven difficult, in spite of a basic consensus on the reference to ‘organized mass violence’.⁴ Adding to this complexity, in the post-Cold War-era conflict research has been dominated by a discussion of apparent novel and altered dynamics in contemporary wars. From this discourse, the economic approach originated. Due to “*the role of the debates as images in shaping self-understanding and practice in the discipline*”⁵, we briefly examine the central debates in conflict studies in the post-Cold War-era, and subsequently define the central research questions within the economic approach.

2.1. From “Proxy Wars” to “New Wars”

The first debate is recognized in the criticism of the Cold War-approach to conflict studies, in which the notion “*proxy war*” was particularly paramount. According to this paradigm, every battlefield in the Third World⁶ could potentially be used in the bipolar power struggle, thereby avoiding direct confrontation between the two superpowers and the risk of nuclear devastation. Insurgents and incumbents in internal conflicts frequently attracted support, both financial and logistical (including troops), from either the Communist block or the West during the Cold War. The main emphasis on external factors in this concept came, however, to be viewed as increasingly overrated in comparison to the influence of internal determinants. This perception was strengthened, when the initial illusion of a prompt termination of presumed “proxy wars” with the end of the Cold War was devastated, and it became clear that the expected ‘*peace dividend*’ would not pay off. If there was a peace dividend to be had on the African continent, very few countries reaped the benefits from it, as wars continued unabated in Angola

³ The challenges involved in theorizing about war have been elaborated extensively elsewhere, see for example Jung, Dietrich: *Tradition – Moderne – Krieg. Grundlegung einer Methode zur Erforschung kriegsursächlicher Prozesse im Kontext globaler Vergesellschaftung*. Münster: LIT Verlag 1995, pp. 14-24 and Siegelberg, Jens: *Kapitalismus und Krieg. Eine Theorie des Krieges in der Weltgesellschaft*. Hamburg, Münster: LIT Verlag 1994, pp. 16-36.

⁴ Cf. Siegelberg: *op cit.*, p. 17.

⁵ Wæver, Ole: *Figures of International Thought: Introducing Persons Instead of Paradigms*. In: Neumann, Iver B.; Wæver, Ole (eds.): *The Future of International Relations. Masters in the Making?* London, New York: Routledge 1997 (pp. 1-37), p. 9. With this in mind, Wæver compartmentalized the history of the discipline International Relations into four main debates. His intention is here transferred to the examination of the study area conflict research in the post-Cold War-era. However, the ‘debates’ discussed here are selective and not to be (mis-)understood as a comprehensive review of the discipline. The debates are not systematized periodically, as they partly overlapped and continue to represent different research agendas within the discipline.

⁶ During the Cold War-era, this term distinguished certain countries from the ‘First’ World (the West) and the Communist ‘Second’ World. Although anachronistic, the term ‘Third World’ is used throughout this paper as a matter of convenience, in order to distinguish broad geographical areas. The ‘South’ is used as a synonym.

and invariably on the Horn of Africa, and new wars began in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Rwanda. Nonetheless, when the Communist block collapsed, the influence of both external and internal factors on internal wars could be reassessed, unrestrained from global power relations and the concept of bipolarity.

Researchers then suggested the emergence of new patterns of violence in contemporary wars, based in particular on the observation of wars in Africa and Eastern Europe during the 1980s and 1990s. An influential contribution to this second debate was Kaldor's introduction of the term "*new wars*", projected as a mixture of pre-modern and modern characteristics. "New Wars" involve a blurring of "*the distinction between what is private and what is public, state and non-state, informal and formal, between what is done for economic or political motives.*"⁷ In comparison to earlier wars, Kaldor defined the distinctiveness of "new wars" with reference to the goals, the mode of warfare, and how wars are financed. Firstly, while "old" wars were dominated by geo-strategic and ideological goals, "new wars" are dominated by identity politics.⁸ Secondly, the new mode of warfare draws upon experiences from guerrilla wars, although the "winning-hearts-and-minds"-strategy of former "freedom fighters" is replaced by intimidation of insecurity and fear for the purpose of establishing territorial control: "*Hence, the strategic goal of these wars is population expulsion through various means such as mass killing, forcible resettlement, as well as a range of political, psychological and economic techniques of intimidation.*"⁹ Various combatants are involved in contemporary conflicts, including regular soldiers, paramilitaries, warlords, police forces and mercenaries, who may both confront and co-operate with each other. Thirdly, economic activities in "new wars", such as plunder or black market operations, are incorporated into the globalized world economy. The sustenance of these activities is dependent on continued use of violence; hence, the perpetuation of war is inherent in the functional logic of the war economy.¹⁰ However, the concept of "new wars" also attracted criticism, particularly in regard to the justification of the noted characteristics as fundamentally "new". The broad distinction between "new" and "old" wars was described as an 'overestimation' and a 'misinterpretation' of old wars.¹¹ According to the "new wars"-theory, old wars were dominated by well-defined ideological causes, while new are caused by tribal, ethnic or no cause; grievance in old is replaced by greed and loot in new wars; popular support is replaced by lack of popular support, and the central control of use of violence in old, is contrasted by senseless, sporadic violence in new wars.¹² However, a broad distinction between new and old wars cannot be supported by empirical evidence, which demonstrates the coexistence of various features.¹³

⁷ Kaldor, Mary: *New & Old Wars. Organised Violence in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity Press 2001 (reprint of the 1999 edition, with a new afterword.), p. 2.

⁸ "[T]he claim to power on the basis of a particular identity – be it national, clan, religious or linguistic." Ibid., p. 6.

⁹ Ibid., p. 8.

¹⁰ Cf. Ibid., pp. 8-9.

¹¹ Cf. Kalyvas, Stathis: "New" and "Old" Civil Wars: Is the Distinction Valid? May 2000, p. 6, paper retrieved December 12, 2001 from www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/warpeace.

¹² Cf. Ibid., p. 5.

¹³ Kalyvas' rejected the distinction between new and old wars by arguing that ideological concerns are not eliminated from new wars; popular support in general varies; violence is per se cruel, and it is not

Kaldor's proposition of "new wars" also influenced a debate on the political nature of current conflicts. In contrast to Kaldor's emphasis on the struggle for access to the state, Mark Duffield rejects the idea that current conflicts are mainly about the control over state power.¹⁴ Duffield recognizes the emergence of alternative political projects in the South, which include the state system, but "*no longer seek or even need to establish territorial, bureaucratic or consent based political authority in the traditional sense.*"¹⁵ A central feature of this process is the emergence of globalized political economies, characterized by parallel and gray structures operated by influential non-state actors. The development of new forms of political and economic interaction beyond the state, is not temporary, but must be understood as "*a reflection of embedded and long-term processes.*"¹⁶ In consequence, the conceptualization of current conflicts in terms of the nation-state must be rethought. Despite their diverging assessments of the political nature of contemporary wars, Kaldor focusing on access to the state and Duffield on the emergence of alternative forms of governance, both authors are concerned with the use of violence in context of globalization and changing political structures. This discussion of the political nature of war was in the early 1990s challenged by an idea of war as apolitical, here recognized as a third debate. These arguments provoked vehement criticism, however, which emanated in the economic approach to conflict research.¹⁷

2.2. The Irrationality versus the Rationality-Argument

The scholars recognized in the third debate, most prominently Robert D. Kaplan (1993, 1994), were strongly criticized among academics, but achieved considerable attention among central policy makers: Kaplan's analysis of the political development in Sierra Leone (Kaplan 1994) was faxed to every US embassy in Africa.¹⁸ In addition to Kaplan, Martin Van Creveld (1991) and Daniel Patrick Moynihan (1993) are referred to as representatives of the same trend. By its opponents, this trend was termed '*New Barbarism*' and '*chaos theory*' in an attempt to subsume the central criticism in captivating slogans.¹⁹ The idea of barbaric and chaotic wars was based on observations of the course of events in internal wars erupting when the Communist block eroded. Characteristics such as tribal or ethnic sympathies, a blurred distinction between war and crime, and the weakening of the state were interpreted as a re-emergence of the

clear whether certain groups go to war in order to loot, or loot in order to continue fighting. Cf. Kalyvas: op cit.

¹⁴ Cf. Kaldor, Mary: *Cosmopolitanism and Organised Violence*, 2000, p. 5, paper retrieved December 15, 2001 from www.theglobalstudies.ac.uk/authors/kaldor.htm, and Duffield, Mark: *Post-modern Conflict: Warlords, Post-Adjustment States and Private Protection*. In: *Civil Wars*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1998 (pp. 65-102).

¹⁵ Duffield: *Post-modern Conflict*, 1998, p. 76.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 98.

¹⁷ An additional debate focusing on the ethnic aspects of war is not examined here, due to minimal influence on the development of an economic approach. Despite criticism, however, the ethnic approach remains the single most dominant approach co-existing with the economic approach, and continues to influence, in particular, media analyses of war.

¹⁸ Richards, Paul: *Fighting for the Rain Forest. War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone*. Oxford: James Currey 1996, pp. xiv. Kaplan's most prominent analyses are Kaplan, Robert D.: *Balkan Ghost: A Journey through History*. London: Macmillan 1993 and Kaplan: *The Coming Anarchy*. In: *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 273, No. 2, 1994 (pp. 44-76).

¹⁹ Cf. Richards: *Fighting for the Rain Forest*, 1996, pp. xiii and Keen, David: *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars*. Adelphi Paper 320. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998, p. 10.

‘formlessness’ of medieval wars in Europe, prior to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia.²⁰ According to this argument, current conflicts are characterized by a confusion of political, social, economic and religious motives. With a “*neo-Malthusian*” view, based on the demographer Thomas Malthus’ doomsday’s prophecies resulting from exponential population growth, New Barbarism argues that overpopulation, diseases and migration, combined with a scarcity of resources, disrupt the social environment and evidently cause the eruption of violent clashes.²¹ The order experienced during the Cold War ideological struggle is replaced by a perception of contemporary wars as anarchic. Both the idea of inevitable cultural clashes, most prominently propagated by Samuel Huntington (1993, 1996), and natural causes of violence were instrumental in bringing about an impression of essentially uncontrollable conflicts, in which belligerents operate as bandits in an anarchic environment.²²

The chaos theory attracted strong criticism, most clearly expressed by David Keen, who emphasized the inability of analysts to imagine the existence of rational structures in an unfamiliar environment: “*We tend to regard conflict as, simply, a breakdown in a particular system, rather than as the emergence of another, alternative system of profit and power.*”²³ When analyzing the functioning of the apparent anarchy, the ‘irrational’ features are likely to represent a ‘reconstituted system’ shaped by political and economic interests of the various actors involved. Conflict analysts must therefore direct attention to the “*vested interests, political and economic, which are driving the apparent ‘chaos’ – and indeed the vested interests that may be driving its depiction as chaos.*”²⁴ In order to understand the logic of this emerging alternative system, researchers must focus on the possible positive effects of war: “*What use is conflict? In whose interest is it waged? Who produces violence, how, and why?*”²⁵ Both political and non-political functions of violence in contemporary internal wars are recognized:

²⁰ Cf. Kaplan: *The Coming Anarchy*, 1994, p. 46. Duffield also elaborated on the re-emergence of features of medieval warfare, but focused exclusively on the forms of political authority: “[T]he neomedieval model of political authority (...) is the emergence of multiple, overlapping and autonomous areas of sovereignty side by side with a weak central competence.” Duffield: *Post-modern Conflict*, 1998, p. 88.

²¹ Cf. Kaplan: *The Coming Anarchy*, 1994, p. 48, p. 54. Kaplan draws extensively upon work by Thomas Homer-Dixon, who argued that environmental degradation and resource scarcity inflict conflict upon poor countries. Kaplan welcomes Homer-Dixon’s argument because finally, *natural*, and not social causes of social and political changes are in focus (Cf. *Ibid.*, p.60). Homer-Dixon developed his argument in the early 1990s when he was Director of the research group “*Project on Environmental Change and Acute Conflict*”, and explained his view in Homer-Dixon: *Destruction and Death: As Resources Are Wasted, Mass Violence Will Rise*. In: *New York Times*, January 31, 1992, and Homer-Dixon: *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 1999.

²² Cf. Richards: *Fighting for the Rain Forest*, 1996, p. xiv. One particularly evident example of this perception of anarchic conflicts is Kaplan’s literary description of young rebels, who he observed while traveling in West Africa: “*They are like loose molecules in a very unstable social fluid, a fluid that was clearly on the verge of igniting.*” Kaplan: *The Coming Anarchy*, 1994, p. 46.

²³ Keen, David: *Organised Chaos: Not the New World We Ordered*. In: *The World Today*, Vol. 52, No. 1, 1996 (pp. 14-17), p. 14. Expressing his determined rejection of perceptions of irrational, apolitical banditry in contemporary conflicts, Keen noted: “*Faced with international analysts’ depictions of ‘mindless violence’ in troublespots around the globe, we need to ask whether it is the violence that is mindless or the analysis.*” *Ibid.*, p. 15.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

²⁵ Keen: *The Economic Functions of Violence*, 1998, p. 11.

Firstly, *political functions* aimed at changing the law and administrative policies in order to alter the distribution of economic resources and privileges controlled by the state, either progressively, i.e. reducing political and economic inequalities, or regressively, i.e. maintaining or increasing these inequalities. Secondly, *non-political functions* aimed at creating a system in which violence is means to achieving economic benefits, personal security and an increased social status, thereby ignoring the rule of law.²⁶ According to these functions, conflicts are dominated by both economic and political motives. During the course of the conflict, these motives may change if parties to the conflict experience new economic opportunities and develop an interest in prolonging the conflict. The political aim of winning the war can then become subordinate to economic agendas for which the continuation of conflict is beneficial. In order to understand such logics, the economic structures in contemporary conflicts must be examined.²⁷

Although an analysis of the economic advantages experienced by certain actors and groups can improve the understanding of conflict dynamism, prominent protagonists of the economic approach emphasize that it cannot replace the analytical interest in political aspects. The economic structures must be examined in correspondence with political agendas, and the emphasis should be on an “*emerging political economy from which the combatants can benefit*.”²⁸ While recognizing the impact of economic agendas on conflict dynamism, François Jean and Jean-Christophe Rufin argued that decision making-processes in conflict situations are *primarily* political in character, and that protracted conflicts remain dependent on power.²⁹ Due to this emphasis on the co-existence of economic and political agendas, the economic approach is recognized as a complementary, rather than a unique, explanatory framework within conflict research. A coherent theory of a political economy of war, however, has yet to be elaborated. The economic approach primarily theorizes about the impact of economic activities on conflict dynamism, while particularly emphasizing the international context, i.e. the

²⁶ Cf. Berdal, Mats; Keen, David: Violence and Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: Some Policy Implications. In: Millennium, Vol. 26, No. 3, 1997 (pp. 795-818), pp. 798-799, and Keen, David: Incentives and Disincentives for Violence. In: Berdal, Mats; Malone, David M. (eds.): Greed and Grievance. Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2000, (pp. 19-41), p. 23.

²⁷ Drawing on the paradigm that ‘war is a continuation of politics by other means’ introduced by Carl von Clausewitz, Keen created the slogan “*war has increasingly become the continuation of economics by other means*.” Keen: The Economic Functions of Violence, 1998, p. 11. On emerging economic motives in war, see also Berdal; Keen: Violence and Economic Agendas, 1997, p. 798 and Keen, David: A Rational Kind of Madness. In: Oxford Development Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1997 (pp. 67-75), p. 69.

²⁸ Keen: The Economic Functions of Violence, 1998, p. 12. “*Rather than abandoning a ‘political’ analysis in favour of an ‘economic’ one, it is important to recognise that contemporary ‘complex emergencies’ have been characterised by the **interaction** of political and economic agendas. We are not suggesting that contemporary civil wars, the resort to violence, and the breakdown of peace processes can be understood by reference to economic motivations alone. It is the relationship between economic factors and other sources of violence, especially their interaction with political objectives, which is our main concern.*” (emphasis in original) Berdal; Keen: Violence and Economic Agendas, 1997, p. 800.

²⁹ Cf. Jean, François; Rufin, Jean-Christophe: Vorwort. In: Jean; Rufin (eds.): Ökonomie der Bürgerkriege. Hamburg: Hamburger Edition 1999 (pp. 7-14) (originally published in French: Economie des guerres civiles. Paris: Hachette 1996), p. 9.

internationalization of war. In the following section, the central analytical variables within the new research agenda are examined.

2.3. A New Research Agenda: War Economy

In a traditional perception of war economies, the state is *the* central actor: An intensive mobilization of resources under state control can significantly increase production during wartime.³⁰ Contemporary war economies are, however, observed primarily in internal conflicts and are dominated by informal and criminal activities, in which both state and non-state actors are involved. A significant premise of these war economies is the dependence on external markets, i.e. the interaction with regional and international trading networks.³¹ For the purpose of distinguishing analytically between intricate forms of trade, Peter Lock introduced a holistic model with three spheres: (1) *The regular economy*, regulated by the rule of law and tax payments ensuring the reproduction of the state; (2) *the informal economy*, with limited applicability of the rule of law and marginal tax payments, partially regulated by violence, and (3) *the globally organized criminal economy*, a parasite to the other two sectors, characterized by lawlessness and violent interaction.³² Other authors, such as Kate Meagher and Mark Duffield, also focus on various forms of global economic exchange, termed ‘parallel trade’ and ‘transborder trade’.³³ Evidence of the interaction between the informal economy and the formal sector can be detected in statistical anomalies, such as countries exporting what they do not produce and importing what they cannot consume.³⁴ This informalization of the economy represents a methodological challenge in particular to traditional economic research, which is faced with a lack of reliable statistical data required for the conduct of classical economic analysis. Instead, detailed empirical and historical analyses are essential in order to understand the structure and

³⁰ Cf. Jean; Rufin: Vorwort, 1999, p. 12.

³¹ The insight that war economies must be examined in context of global economic interaction is a universal statement among central authors within the economic approach. See Berdal, Mats; Malone, David M.: Introduction. In: Berdal; Malone (eds.): *Greed and Grievance*, 2000 (pp. 1-15), p. 2; Jean; Rufin: Vorwort, 1999, pp. 9-10; Keen: *The Economic Functions of Violence*, 1998, p. 11, and Lock, Peter: *Söldner und Rebellen: Zur Rolle der Gewalt in afrikanischen Ökonomien*. In: *Internationales Afrikaforum*, 36. Jhg., Nr. 1, 2000 (pp. 63-74), p. 66.

³² Cf. Lock, Peter: *Sicherheit à la carte? Entstaatlichung, Gewaltmärkte und die Privatisierung des staatlichen Gewaltmonopols*. In: Brühl, Tanja et.al.: *Die Privatisierung der Weltpolitik. Entstaatlichung und Kommerzialisierung im Globalisierungsprozess*. Bonn: Verlag J.H.W. Dietz Nachfolger 2001 (pp. 200-229), pp. 207-209.

³³ Parallel trade comprises trade in legal goods through illegal or unofficial channels, e.g. cheap textiles from East Asia may be informally imported and incorporated into regional trading networks. Transborder trade comprises trade both in legal and illegal goods through the same channels. Due to the similarities in the organizational structure, Duffield favors the term transborder trade for comparative purposes. Cf. Meagher, Kate: *Informal Integration or Economic Subversion? Parallel trade in West Africa*. In: Laverne, Réal (ed.): *Regional Integration and Cooperation in West Africa. A Multidimensional Perspective*. Trenton (NJ), Asmara: Africa World Press, Inc. 1997 (pp. 165-187), pp. 167-168, Meagher, Kate: *The Hidden Economy: Informal and Parallel Trade in Northwestern Uganda*. In: *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 17, No. 47, 1990 (pp. 64-83) and Duffield, Mark: *Globalization, Transborder Trade, and War Economies*. In: Berdal; Malone (eds.): *Greed and Grievance*, 2000 (pp. 69-89), p. 76.

³⁴ Cf. Meagher: *Informal Integration or Economic Subversion*, 1997, p. 181.

origin of parallel trade.³⁵ The economic approach to conflict studies reflects upon this research interest and addresses the qualitative changes in wars related to informalization and criminalization of global economic interaction.

The concept of globalization, despite its “*notoriously imprecise*”³⁶ nature, is recognized as a central analytical variable within the economic approach. This process transforms the economic and financial systems and creates new economic opportunities, also for actors in civil wars.³⁷ When bipolarity eroded and the external support from one of the superpowers and their allies to clients in various wars terminated, alternative economic strategies began to play a more prominent role. With control over local assets and access to global markets, combatants sought to establish a financial base. The dependence of local war economies on international trading networks is summarized in the motto that “*today’s so-called warlords or failed states may act locally, but to survive they have to think globally.*”³⁸ The internationalization of internal wars is, however, not limited to interactions with global trading networks. Through presumable apolitical human relief operations, the international community has also influenced conflict dynamism. The delivery of humanitarian aid into a conflict area requires the consent of the armed group(s) controlling the specific territory. Aid can be taxed or seized by rebels, who may distribute it to selected groups. In this manner, relief agencies can be co-opted by parties to a conflict and become politically involved.³⁹ The economic approach addresses how the changing structures of global economic interdependence and the import of external resources into a conflict-ridden country influence the functioning of local war economies.

In context of globalization, the role of the state is also redefined, and several research projects have in recent years addressed these changes, i.e. the ‘weak’, ‘failed’

³⁵ Cf. Carbonnier, Gilles: Conflict, Postwar Rebuilding and the Economy: A Critical Review of the Literature. WSP Occasional Paper No. 2, 1998, retrieved February 11, 2001 from www.unrisd.org/wsp/pop2/toc.htm; Jean; Rufin: Vorwort, 1999, pp. 12-13 and Meagher: The Hidden Economy, 1990, p. 81. Jean and Rufin note that the problem related to statistical data explains why relief workers were the first to observe changing economic activities in conflict areas, among them Jean himself, who worked for Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF).

³⁶ Berdal; Malone: Introduction, 2000, p. 7.

³⁷ Cf. Ibid., pp. 7-8. “*In short, it is the highly “transnational and networked characteristics” of modern war economies that allows us to talk of a fundamentally new context in which to study and approach wars.*” Ibid., p. 8. Globalization and liberalization do not cause war economies, but they represent fundamental conditions of global economic interaction, both legal and illegal.

³⁸ Duffield: Globalization, Transborder Trade, and War Economies, 2000, p. 84. The internationalization of contemporary wars has led to considerations of complicity: “*A high level of complicity among international companies, offshore banking facilities, and Northern governments has assisted the development of war economies.*” Ibid. Duffield suggests that the supply of arms from Northern companies to the South is an “*extreme example of the commercial complicity (...). Without this help, war economies would find it difficult to survive.*” Ibid., p. 85.

³⁹ Cf. Duffield, Mark: The Political Economy of Internal War: Asset Transfer, Complex Emergencies and International Aid. In: Macrae, Joanna; Zwi, Anthony (eds.): War and Hunger. Rethinking International Response to Complex Emergencies. London, New Jersey: Zed Books 1994 (pp. 50-69), pp. 58-63. Awareness has been increased on this issue, but the discussion on whether or not humanitarian aid does have an impact on the course of civil wars continues. See Shearer, David: Aiding or Abetting? Humanitarian Aid and Its Economic Role in Civil Wars. In: Berdal; Malone (eds.): Greed and Grievance, 2000 (pp. 189-203).

and 'Shadow' state.⁴⁰ In regard to internal wars, the core concern is the ability of the state to control resources as well as legal and political developments. An erosion of such capacities can be exploited by insurgents or other internal actors: *"In shadow states, where no authority exists that is willing or capable of providing a public good, entrepreneurs manage their own economic environment through means of violence."*⁴¹ Parallel to the erosion of the state monopoly of violence, private arrangements of protection emerge under the control of insurgents, warlords or mercenaries. With the ability to exercise territorial control by means of violence, establish a trading monopoly and install a taxation system, belligerents can develop a 'mini-state'.⁴² Based on the assumption that *"the emergence of war economies (...) reflect and feed on extreme cases of state collapse"*⁴³, the economic approach examines the interaction between the nature of state authority and conflict dynamism in context of a changing international environment.

In contrast to the focus on the international context, Keen introduced the terms *"top-down"* and *"bottom-up"* violence, for the purpose of systematizing how economic considerations influence the strategies of local actors: *"Top-down violence refers to violence that is mobilized by political leaders and entrepreneurs – whether for political or economic reasons."*⁴⁴ With the objective of maintaining power and hindering opposition to their unrestricted access to economic resources, elites encourage violence, which is then exploited as a justification of repression. In contrast, *"bottom-up"* violence is induced by civilians, for security, psychological or economic reasons, and resembles crime: *"The violent may be intent on preserving their physical security; they may be looking for excitement or for the immediate rectification of a perceived wrong. They may also be following their own economic agendas."*⁴⁵ In response to the disintegration of the state, civilians also respond with developing a grassroots war economy.⁴⁶

In addition to these considerations of qualitative changes in current wars, a quantitative approach to war economies has emerged from the field of development economics.⁴⁷ Economies in wartime have conventionally been considered a deviation

⁴⁰ For an overview of the numerous studies in this field, see Schlichte, Klaus: Why States Decay. A Preliminary Assessment. Research Unit of Wars, Armament and Development. Hamburg: Institute of Political Science, Nr. 2, 1998.

⁴¹ Reno, William: Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil Wars. In: Berdal; Malone (eds.): Greed and Grievance, 2000 (pp. 43-68), p. 54.

⁴² Cf. Keen: Organised Chaos, 1996, p. 16. Keen referred to this development of insurgent controlled state-like organizations as *"privatising war"*.

⁴³ Berdal; Keen: Violence and Economic Agendas, 1997, p. 812.

⁴⁴ Keen: Incentives and Disincentives for Violence, 2000, p. 25.

⁴⁵ Keen: The Economic Functions of Violence, 1998, p. 46. On top-down and bottom-up violence, see Ibid., pp. 23-54.

⁴⁶ Chingono and Mwanasali both focus on the re-organization of the economy in context of the disintegration of the state (*"coping strategies"*) and insurgent activities. See Chingono, Mark F.: The State, Violence and Development. The Political Economy of War in Mozambique, 1975-1992. Aldershot, Brookfield, Hong Kong: Avebury 1996 and Mwanasali, Musifiky: The View from Below. In Berdal; Malone (eds.): Greed and Grievance, 2000 (pp. 137-153).

⁴⁷ As such, qualitative and quantitative approaches epitomize an interdisciplinary approach to war economies. Economists in *"The Development Research Group"* of the World Bank, centered round Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, and researchers at the Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford,

from a benevolent development path, a 'normality' that must be reestablished rapidly, and have therefore mainly been neglected by development economists. Recently, however, economists have defined the examination of the human costs of war with statistical analysis, i.e. entitlement losses and distributional consequences, and how the economy functions in conflict situations, i.e. production, agriculture, import dependence and changes in economic behavior, as scholarly aims.⁴⁸ A novel research tool is an extended view of Sen's entitlement approach, i.e. the claims of households to goods and services such as food, water supply, health services and education. By examining the destruction and creation of entitlements, the aim is to assess how standards of living are affected by conflict, i.e. the distribution of losers and winners, in order to clarify whom experiences incentives to prolong the conflict.⁴⁹ In addition to these attempts to enter the 'black box' of economic activities during war, statistical analysis have been applied on the question of economic agendas as causes of conflict. In the operationalization of the hypothesis "greed or grievance" as motives for civil war, Paul Collier contrasted proxies of greed with those of grievance.⁵⁰ From a statistical comparison of large-scale internal conflicts since 1965, Collier concluded that „*economic agendas appear to be central to understanding why civil wars start. Conflicts are far more likely to be caused by economic opportunities than by grievance.*“⁵¹ Collier's study is noteworthy because it diverges from the core interest in conflict dynamism, i.e. what is caused by conflict, within the economic approach.

The main objections to Collier's study, however, concern the questionable choice of proxies and the inability to theorize on the interaction between political and economic factors, a fundamental assumption of the economic approach. The utility of the economic approach, as defined by Keen, was expected in the ability to note the development of altered socio-economic power arrangements, as mentioned above. So far, however, the economic approach has failed to address the emergence of alternative power structures as a consequence of interactions between economic and political structures. In most analyses, the primary focus is on economic motives for violence. Although the analysis of economic agendas in internal wars is a positive contribution to the field of conflict research, an exclusive focus on economic aspects is simplistic. The economic approach has therefore implemented a one-dimensional approach, which initially prompted the protest against the irrationality-argument and the rejection of New Barbarism. The insight that apparent anarchic social processes can represent a different

in particular Frances Stewart and Valpy FitzGerald, have dominated the increased research interest in war economies among development economists.

⁴⁸ Cf. Stewart, Frances; FitzGerald, Valpy: Introduction: Assessing the Economic Costs of War. In: Stewart; FitzGerald (eds.): War and Underdevelopment Vol. 1: The Economic and Social Consequences of Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001 (pp. 1-20), pp. 5-18, and FitzGerald, E.V.K; Stewart, Frances: Editor's Introduction. In: Oxford Development Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1997 (pp. 5-10), p. 6.

⁴⁹ Sen's definition of direct (subsistence) and market entitlements (monetary transactions) is extended by public, civic and extra-legal entitlements. For further elaboration see Stewart; FitzGerald: Introduction, 2001, p. 6. Sen introduced his entitlement approach in Sen, Amartya: Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlements and Deprivation. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1981.

⁵⁰ As proxies to measure economic agendas in wars, Collier used primary commodities, the proportion of young men in society and the endowment of education. Proxies of grievance were ethnic or religious hatred, economic inequality (ownership of land), lack of political rights and government economic incompetence. Cf. Collier, Paul: Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective. In: Berdal; Malone (eds.): Greed and Grievance, 2000 (pp. 91-111), pp. 91-97.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 91.

order with its own logic, was convincingly argued by Chabal and Daloz in their hypothesis of the “*instrumentalization of disorder*.”⁵² The economic approach has recently proven receptive to these ideas, and the analytical objective is redefined in the direction of a broader social science category, concerning the transformation of political authority in a global context.⁵³ The objective of this paper is affiliated with this study area. In the following chapter we develop a theoretical framework for an integrated analysis of both political and economic aspects.

⁵² Chabal, Patrick; Daloz, Jean-Pascal: *Africa Works. Disorder as Political Instrument*. Oxford: James Currey 1999.

⁵³ This development was noted in an unpublished paper by Aust, made available to the author. Aust, Björn: *Kriegswirtschaften in innerstaatlichen Kriegen: Aufarbeitung und Diskussion des Forschungsstandes*. Fall 2001.

3. The Internal Functional Logic of War Economies

Developing a theoretical framework

In the economic approach to conflict studies war economies are conceptualized as alternative socio-administrative systems of power, profit and protection. The interaction of political and economic structures is recognized as the central object of analysis. Beyond these key statements, however, further theoretical elaboration on how to study war economies as systems of social organization has not been accomplished. This chapter reflects upon this theoretical shortcoming of the economic approach. With exclusive focus on insurgent movements, war economies are here understood as a form of social organization, which we refer to in the present as ‘social order’. Analytical interest focuses on the social reproduction and dynamic adaptation within this order, comprising both a political and an economic structure. The interaction between these two structures determines the functional logic of an insurgent ‘social order’. In order to analyze this functional logic, in this chapter we develop a theoretical framework with two basic pillars: (I) a framework for the isolated analysis of the political and the economic structure, and (II) a framework for the analysis of the reciprocal influence between these two structures. The chapter concludes by presenting a hypothesis to account for the external influence on the internal structure of an insurgent ‘social order’. The primary task below is to define the constitutive elements of this order.

3.1. War Economy as a ‘social order’

An insurgent war economy is located within the geographical borders of a state, but is also intermeshed with regional and global trading networks. This ‘open’ character of contemporary war economies illustrates the necessity of carefully assessing the influence of both external and internal factors on conflict dynamism. The exchange between an insurgent war economy and the world market is important due to belligerents’ dependence on the opportunity to sell commodities and gain access to fluid (‘hard’) currencies and commodities, such as weapons and other military and non-military equipment, from abroad. The state in whose territory the insurgent economy is located also represents an external influence. Hence, the two war economies, the economy of the state and the insurgent economy, are considered distinct systems which are external to one another, but which nevertheless interact in a two-level competitive relationship. The insurgent movement competes with the state apparatus both for political authority and for access to economic resources within a specific territory. Although contemporary war economies are characterized by interaction between internal and external factors, the core research interest here is in the internal functional logic of an insurgent war economy. While the external influencing factors cannot be ignored, the international system is not the central level of analysis. The scope of interest with regard to external factors is limited: The aim is not to examine the motives of the numerous international agents with which an insurgent economy interacts, nor how the war economy of the state functions. Interest in external factors is exclusively defined in terms of how the interplay between the external dimension and the insurgent war economy potentially influences and changes the internal structure of an insurgent system of organization.

Derived from the economic approach, war economies are in this paper conceptualized as socio-economic power arrangements: A war economy is a form of social organization with two central analytical categories – namely, a political and an economic structure – which, taken together, are here referred to as a ‘social order’⁵⁴. The perpetuation of this order is a prerequisite for a sustained insurgency. In his amplification of the sociological theory of Norbert Elias, Dietrich Jung emphasized that *“social reproduction theoretically comprises three elementary functions all empirical societies have to fulfill – the control of physical force, the guarantee of material means, and the production and preservation of symbolic means of orientation.”*⁵⁵ How societies fulfill the elementary functions is based on both modern and traditional, or mixed, forms of social organization.⁵⁶ The two elementary functions, internal control of physical force and the guarantee of material means, correspond directly to the two main categories of an insurgent ‘social order’, as referred to in this paper. The third elementary function, symbolic means of orientation such as collective symbols and customs, is in our analysis included in the political structure (see p. 25). Before introducing a working definition, we shall explore the central categories of an insurgent ‘social order’ in greater detail.

The two central categories of an insurgent ‘social order’ are supplemented by the additional component violence, defined as *“an act of power with the intention of hurting someone physically.”*⁵⁷ Violence does not represent a single category, but is rather inherent in the two main categories. Max Weber averred that the threat of or use of physical force is the *ultima ratio* of all forms of political organization: *“It is possible to define the “political” character of an organization only in terms of the means peculiar to it, the use of force.”*⁵⁸ Thus, the exercise of political authority is inextricably linked to the monopolization of the use of physical force. More recently, Georg Elwert has elaborated a link between economy and violence in his conception of ‘markets of

⁵⁴ The use of ‘order’ in our context is based on the definition of order as “[t]he condition in which the laws or usages [i.e. informal institutions (KS)] regulating the public relations of individuals to the community, and the public conduct of members or sections of the community to each other, are maintained and observed.” The Oxford Dictionary, Second Edition. Prepared by J.A. Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1989 (keyword: order), p. 905.

⁵⁵ Jung, Dietrich: The Political Sociology of World Society. In: European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 7(4), 2001 (pp. 443-474), p. 452. Jung’s detailed analysis of Elias is included in his dissertation, see Jung: Tradition–Moderne–Krieg, 1995, pp. 91ff.

⁵⁶ In order to account for the various forms of social reproduction, Elias introduced the term “figuration”. The dynamic development of societies involves the continuous erosion and formation of new figurations, which exemplifies the changing and interdependent character of society. Cf. Jung: Tradition–Moderne–Krieg, 1995, p. 95.

⁵⁷ Author’s translation of Popitz’ definition: “Gewalt meint eine Machttaktion, die zur absichtlichen körperlichen Verletzung anderer führt.” Popitz, Heinrich: Phänomene der Macht. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr 1992 (2. stark erw. Aufl.), p. 48.

⁵⁸ Weber, Max: Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Edited by Roth, Guenther and Wittich, Claus: Berkley, Los Angeles, London: University of California 1978 (1st printing 1968), p. 55. Cf. Weber, Max: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie. Studienausgabe Johannes Winckelmann. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr 1980 (fünfte, rev. Auflage), p. 29. The analysis of Weber’s terminology is based on the original German text, but the quotes are cited from the English edition. Henceforth quoted as: Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1980 and Weber: Eng. ed., 1968.

violence' (*Gewaltmärkte*).⁵⁹ While rejecting an approach to violence as something irrational and emotional that neglects the "*specific social character*"⁶⁰ in the majority of cases in which the use of violence is observed, Elwert theorizes on how rational economic behavior determines the social structure on markets of violence. Such markets occur particularly in areas in which a monopoly of physical force is non-existent, i.e. arbitrary use of violence is a general characteristic. Actors operating on these markets (micro-level) develop their own instruments (extortion, robbery, trading in stolen property and illegal commodities) for the purpose of generating profits. Their rational economic motives help to explain the development of certain routines, norms and expectations, which shape a specific social structure in which the use of violence is unrestricted.⁶¹ The emergent patterns of organization (macro-level) can stabilize this distinctive order, which may prove to be highly profitable.⁶² Hence, Elwert's primary interest is in how the strategic use of violence for the generation of profits forms the social structure on markets of violence and consequently, influences conflict dynamism. The interplay between economic activities and altered forms of social organization is also the central research topic of William Reno, who particularly emphasizes the changing forms of political authority in Africa.⁶³ With an analytical focus on informal markets, Reno examines how these markets determine the reallocation of production factors, the access to resources and the control of populations.⁶⁴ On the basis of the dynamic developments of informal markets, alternative arrangements of political authority emerge, for which Reno has introduced the term '*Shadow State*', comprising "*the emergence of rulers drawing authority from their abilities to control markets and*

⁵⁹ Elwert, Georg: *Gewaltmärkte. Beobachtungen zur Zweckrationalität der Gewalt*. In: Trotha, Trutz von (ed.): *Soziologie der Gewalt*. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Sonderheft 37/1997. Opladen, Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag 1997 (pp. 86-101).

⁶⁰ "*Wer Gewalt mit begrenzter rationaler Kontrolle und Adrenalinausstoß assoziiert, erkennt den spezifisch sozialen Charakter der menschlichen Gesellschaften dominierenden Gewaltform, nämlich der strategischen Gewalt.*" Ibid., p. 87.

⁶¹ Cf. Ibid., pp. 87-88. Tyrell strongly criticizes Elwert's singular focus on actors' economic motives as oversimplified: Although violence can be instrumentalized for economic purposes, Elwert's elaboration on 'markets of violence' completely excludes the possibility that cultural and idealistic aspects also influence the dynamic use of violence in civil wars. Cf. Tyrell, Hartmann: *Physische Gewalt, gewaltsamer Konflikt und der Staat. Überlegungen zu neuerer Literatur*. In: *Berliner Journal für Soziologie*, Band 9(2), 1999 (pp. 269-288), pp. 276-277.

⁶² Although the overall damage experienced by a war-torn society is negative, certain actors and warlords may continue to consider the ability of using violence for the purpose of maximizing profits as preferable in comparison to alternative social orders. Cf. Elwert, Georg: *Vorwort: Gewalt als inszenierte Plötzlichkeit*. In: Koehler, Jan und Heyer, Sonja (eds.): *Anthropologie der Gewalt. Chancen und Grenzen der sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung*. Berlin: VWF (Verlag für Wissenschaft und Forschung) 1998 (pp. 1-7), pp. 6-7. Inflicting an end to the functioning of this social order can, according to Elwert, be achieved through the establishment of a monopoly of violence, the depletion of internal resources and/or by terminating the supply of external resources. Cf. Elwert: *Gewaltmärkte*, 1997, p. 94.

⁶³ See Reno, William: *Warlord Politics and African Studies*. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers 1998, Reno, William: *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995, and Reno, William: *Welthandel, Warlords und die Wiedererfindung des afrikanischen Staates*. In: *WeltTrends*, Nr. 14, Jg. 5, 1997 (pp. 8-29).

⁶⁴ Cf. Reno: *Corruption and State Politics*, 1995, pp. 9-10.

their material rewards.”⁶⁵ Rulers with access to state institutions as well as informal sources of power act to sustain their control over people and territory by establishing informal deals with local leaders. Local *strongmen*, who are not formally recognized as heads of state, exercise power in accordance with their personal interest and attempt to enhance their power by exploiting markets, i.e. private interests gain preponderance over collective interests. The term warlord therefore embraces both (1) *warlord tactics*, meaning local strongmen challenging the power of the head of state, as well as (2) heads of weak states who use *warlord politics* to privatize their pursuit of power through informal deals.⁶⁶ The changing forms of political authority in Africa are a result of these interactions between informal economic activities and power. The emergence of altered social institutions in the context of war economies is also emphasized by Trutz von Trotha in his consideration of a ‘*sociology of violence*’.⁶⁷ Trotha argues that the development of such a sociological theory must begin by recognizing the characteristics of violence (phenomenology), which are then transformed into a theory of different ‘*forms of violence*’ (*Ordnungsformen der Gewalt*).⁶⁸ For the development of a ‘*sociology of violence*’, the analytically distinct micro- and macro-levels, i.e. the links between individual social action and structural processes in society, must be combined.⁶⁹ The use of violence should thus be analyzed as a sociological process, in which violent actions shape new structures and altered forms of societal organization.⁷⁰

While Weber defined violence as a fundamental category of all forms of political organization, Elwert, Reno and Trotha focus on the links between violence, economic rationality and modified social structures. Thus, the contemporary authors examine violence as a form of social action, as Trotha has explicitly noted.⁷¹ In context of an

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 3. Reno is elsewhere more specific in his definition of a Shadow State: “[A] very real, but not formally recognized, patronage system that was rigidly organized and centered on rulers’ control over resources. This control bound rulers’ potential rivals to them in exchange for largesse without the need to create strong bureaucracies they feared would heighten independent tendencies among elites.” Reno: Warlord Politics and African States, 1998, p. 2.

⁶⁶ Cf. Reno: Warlord Politics and African States, 1998, p. 16. In contrast to the usage of the term warlord on both heads of state and local strongmen, the term Shadow State refers exclusively to formally recognized heads of state using both state institutions and informal markets in order to perpetuate their political authority.

⁶⁷ Trotha distinguishes the ‘sociology of violence’ from the ‘sociology of causes’, which has previously dominated sociological studies of violence and war. He advocates a shift in focus away from causes and the question “why?” to the question “how?”. Trotha argues that the correlation between causes and violence in the sociology of causes has developed into a listing of factors, based on the principle of multicausality, which equals a broad description of social problems in society. This multidimensional approach and its comprehensiveness undermine the explanatory capability of the sociology of causes, thereby evidently making the case for an increased focus on violence itself and its dynamics. Trotha, Trutz von: Zur Soziologie der Gewalt. In: Trutz, T. von (ed.): Soziologie der Gewalt, 1997 (pp. 9-56), pp. 16-20.

⁶⁸ “Der Schlüssel zur Gewalt ist in den Formen der Gewalt selbst zu finden.” Ibid., p. 20.

⁶⁹ Trotha suggests that Clifford Geertz’s concept of “*thick description*” is suitable for establishing the necessary theoretical link between micro- and macro-levels of analysis. The combination of levels of analysis comprises a fundamental methodological debate in the social sciences and will not be further elaborated here. Ibid., p. 21. See Geertz, Clifford: The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers 1973.

⁷⁰ Cf. Trotha: Zur Soziologie der Gewalt, 1997, p. 21. This idea can be explained as a chain of causality: cause – effect – cause.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 12.

insurgent ‘social order’, the primary analytical interest is also in the functioning of violence as a social action. However, in contrast to Elwert, who emphasizes the use of violence exclusively for a rational economic purpose on markets of violence, the analytical focus here is on the functioning of violence as a social action both within the economic and the political structure. The specific functions of violence within an insurgent ‘social order’ can only be established on the basis of empirical investigation. We shall now attempt to introduce a working definition of the term insurgent ‘social order’.⁷²

An insurgent ‘**social order**’ comprises both a political system of authority and an economic structure. In the economic process of achieving access to resources and applying them profitably, violence functions as a mechanism enabling the extraction of resources.⁷³ The political structure is a reflection of the importance of social institutions⁷⁴ in a war economy dominated by informal activity and the necessity of a form of social organization for the reproduction of a sustained insurgency.

Although Reno, Trotha and Elwert focus on the dynamic interaction between economic activities, violence and forms of political authority, which, taken together, encompass the research interest in this paper, neither of the authors delivers a framework for the operationalization of this approach in a case study. The challenge is then to create a coherent theoretical framework for the analysis of the interactions between political and economic structures in an insurgent ‘social order’. The two dimensions are approached using different theoretical frameworks, and to begin with, we focus on the political structure.

3.1.1. The Political Structure

An insurgent movement⁷⁵, which challenges the authority of the state with the objective of capturing power, gaining control over economic resources or instituting an

⁷² This conceptualization was developed in co-operation with Dr. Jens Siegelberg, the managing director of the Research Unit on Wars, Armament and Development, University of Hamburg. The *Working Group on the Causes of War (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung, AKUF)* is an outstanding example of successful co-operation between students and researchers connected to this group, due to the positive influence on students’ education and the synergistic effects generated by well-established researchers. Another researcher connected to the AKUF-network, Dr. Klaus Schlichte, presented a similar definition of war economy: “*Eine Kriegsökonomie ist also ein sozialer Raum, in dem die Verteilung und Aneignung von Ressourcen gewaltgesteuert verläuft: Physische Gewalt wird eingesetzt, um Güter zu erlangen, um Chancen ihrer Veräußerung abzusichern, und um Ressourcen zu generieren.*” Schlichte, Klaus: *Profiteure und Verlierer von Bürgerkriegsökonomien*. Unpublished version, made available to the author, of Schlichte’s presentation at the International Conference “*Economy of Civil Wars*”, in Hofgeismar, October 19-21, 2001, organized by the NGO “*medico international*” in co-operation with Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC).

⁷³ Riekenberg emphasizes the tendency of warlord systems to exhaust, as opposed to ensure sustainable development of resources, thereby limiting the dynamic development and prevailing abilities of this particular economic system. Cf. Riekenberg, Michael: *Warlords. Eine Problemskizze*. In: *Comparativ*, Heft 5/6, 1999 (pp. 187-205), p. 190.

⁷⁴ Institutions, here understood as informal institutions, are based on the regularity of social interactions, such as norms, customs and tradition. See North, Douglass C.: *Institutionen, institutioneller Wandel und Wirtschaftsleistung*. Tübingen: Mohr 1992.

⁷⁵ The term insurgency is adopted from Clapham, who stated that this term incorporates guerrilla movements, but also movements that developed from a small-scale guerrilla to the size of conventional armies. With the term insurgency any romantization connected to the terms guerrilla

alternative political agenda, is required to establish an organizational structure to mobilize for a coordinated and sustained armed struggle. An insurgent administration adopts a political agenda, a military and a financial strategy, a recruitment plan and develops a tactic for the control of captured territories and interactions with civilians. To various extents, insurgent movements can rely on being considered legitimate by the population inhabiting the territory under their control, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the state and the state monopoly of physical force.⁷⁶ In competition with and parallel to the officially recognized state apparatus, the organizational structure of an insurgent movement can be conceptualized as a '*quasi-state*'. The concept of quasi-state was initially introduced by Robert H. Jackson⁷⁷, albeit with a different connotation. In order to validate an application of quasi-state, which deviates from the original definition, we revisit the central assumptions in Jackson's extensive elaboration of the concept and examine the possibility of transferring the term to an insurgent 'social order'. The importance of establishing the viability of an alternative application of the term quasi-state is explained by our intention of applying theoretical concepts, predominantly used in analyses of the state, on the object of an insurgent 'social order'. If we are able to define an insurgent 'social order' as a quasi-state, an alternative usage of such a concept would be justified.

Jackson's central research interest is the nature of sovereign statehood in Third World states. In the de-colonization process subsequent to the Second World War, the right to independence of every colony, regardless of the ability to self-government, was justified by a new doctrine establishing "*the principle of self-determination as an unqualified human right of all colonial people.*"⁷⁸ Colonization was deemed illegitimate and '*juridical statehood*' was ensured through international law in support of territorial jurisdiction.⁷⁹ In contrast to strong juridical statehood, which implies that "*ex-colonial states have been internationally enfranchised and possess the same external rights and responsibilities as all other sovereign states*"⁸⁰, the weak '*empirical statehood*' challenges the concept of statehood in Third World-states. Empirical statehood embraces the advantages traditionally enjoyed by populations within an independent state, such as the institutionalization of protection of human rights and the provision of socio-economic welfare. The beneficiaries of empirical statehood in Third World states are often narrow elites, who co-exist with a disadvantaged citizenry. Based on this discrepancy between secure juridical and underutilized empirical statehood, Jackson refers to the "new" states as quasi-states: Quasi-states enjoy equal sovereignty in legal

and 'freedom fighters' is avoided. Cf. Clapham, Christopher: Introduction: Analysing African Insurgencies. In: Clapham (ed.): African Guerrillas. Oxford: James Currey 1998, p. 1. However, throughout the text we alternate between 'insurgency' and 'armed movement'.

⁷⁶ Cf. Clapham, Christopher: Africa and the International System. The Politics of State Survival. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996, p. 222.

⁷⁷ Jackson, Robert H.: Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990. Jackson initially elaborated the concept of "quasi-state" in co-operation with Carl Rosenberg, see Jackson; Rosenberg: Sovereignty and Underdevelopment: Juridical Statehood in the African Crisis. In: The Journal of Modern African Studies, 24(1), 1986 (pp. 1-31), and Jackson; Rosenberg: Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and Juridical in Statehood. In: World Politics, 35(1), 1982 (pp. 1-24).

⁷⁸ Jackson: Quasi-states, 1990, p. 25.

⁷⁹ International law and material aid function as a "*kind of international safety net*" (Ibid., p. 5) for Third World States. Therefore, for the study of these states Jackson favors an analytical approach combining studies of both the legal and the normative order which secure their continued existence.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 21.

terms, but they do not possess the institutional capacity to constrain individuals in administrative offices, although they exercise limited respect for the constitution and the rule of law.⁸¹ The distinction between juridical and empirical statehood, which Jackson uses to clarify the term quasi-state, cannot be directly transferred to an insurgent 'social order'. On the contrary, insurgent movements seem to represent quasi-states in opposite terms: Insurgent movements do not possess juridical statehood, but through provision of services, such as basic needs and security, to civilians under insurgent control, their status can be considered an alternative form of empirical statehood. In contrast to our emphasis on empirical statehood, however, Clapham, notes that insurgent movements are involved in international diplomatic activities, which represent an alternative form of juridical statehood: Although participation on the international diplomatic arena is largely restricted to officials representing legally recognized governments, insurgent leaders have, while travelling on documents issued by 'friendly states' or even the targeted state, engaged with political leaders world-wide in almost the same manner as representatives of recognized states.⁸² An insurgent order may also be underpinned by specific rules and norms, for example sanctions on sexual abuse, either imposed by the insurgent leadership or based on social conventions.⁸³ As such, insurgent movements may be considered legitimate by civilians and may also exceed the legitimacy of the formal government. Although insurgent movements do not qualify in strict terms of juridical statehood, Clapham states that *"insurgent movements may for many purposes be regarded as quasi-states themselves, and they exercise many of the functions of statehood, including the conduct of external relations."*⁸⁴ Thus, an insurgent movement can be conceptualized as a quasi-state, though necessitating an adjustment of the original definition, which emphasizes the existence of juridical and the lack of empirical statehood: An insurgent 'social order' can be perceived in terms of empirical statehood when providing socio-economic benefits and security, and can invariably qualify in terms of juridical statehood through international diplomatic activities.

The applicability of the term quasi-state to the social organization of an insurgency underlines the necessity of examining the political structure of an insurgent 'social order'. The political structure is composed of an institutionalized system of authority, and as an analytical approach to the analysis of the functioning of this system we confer with Max Weber's *'Sociology of Domination' (Herrschaftssoziologie)*. The central argument in Weber's sociological theory is that a secure order is based on a belief in the legitimacy of this specific order. In *"Economy and Society"*, Weber elucidated the three ideal types of legitimate authority: Legal, traditional and charismatic authority. How a

⁸¹ Cf. Ibid., 1990, pp. 21-22. Jackson argues that the novelty of quasi-states is not found in their empirical differences, but in the evaluation and response of the international society to inequality and underdevelopment in these states. Due to the prominent principle of sovereignty, external intervention is not a qualified response to deficiencies in Third World states, which can hardly be deprived of their sovereign status. Consequently, *"quasi-states are creatures and their elites are the beneficiaries of non-competitive international norms."* Ibid., p. 24. This linkage between the prevalence of quasi-states and the norms and principles of the international system explains why the level of analysis in Jackson's study is not the state, but the state-system and its norms. This aspect is not elaborated further here, since we are exclusively interested in the terminology and not in Jackson's analytical methodology.

⁸² Cf. Clapham: Africa and the International System, 1996, p. 223.

⁸³ Cf. Clapham: Analysing African Insurgencies, 1998, p. 10.

⁸⁴ Clapham: op cit, 1996, p. 222.

system of domination claims support for the order, i.e. legitimacy, determines the functioning of the administration and the nature of the exercise of authority. Hence, Weber's primary sociological interest was the administration of authority, i.e. "*how systems really work*."⁸⁵ The three ideal types of legitimate authority represent a standardized approach to the study of systems of domination. The ideal types cannot be empirically observed in their 'pure' forms, but as analytical concepts, the ideal typical categories serve as a basis for the comparison of empirical reality, which is characterized by a mix of features.⁸⁶ The conceptualization of social phenomena as ideal types (idealization) is based on an abstraction from reality and "*the reconstruction of some isolated particularities of social instances and their regular and genetic correlation*."⁸⁷ Logically, ideal types fall short of incorporating the complexity of 'real' phenomena. Ideal types are merely a scientific tool for the systematization of empirical observations, i.e. comparing, testing and explaining, in societies characterized by increasingly interdependent relations, and should not be confused with reality. The astonishing feature of Weber's theory is its universal character, which allows a comparison of virtually all different arrangements of authority by defining the question of the foundation of their legitimacy as the core analytical interest.⁸⁸

With a focus on the arguments behind an insurgent movement's claim to legitimacy, Weber's sociological theory is here applied for the purpose of establishing the mechanisms ensuring the sustainability of an insurgent political order. In the empirical analysis, observations regarding the political structure in an insurgent 'social order' will be tested against the criteria defined on the basis of Weber's theory. With the aim of specifying a matrix of questions as a guide to the empirical case study, we shall now explore Weber's sociology of domination in greater detail.

3.1.1.1. The Terminology of Weber

While Weber defined **power** (*Macht*) as "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests"⁸⁹, the probability of **domination** (*Herrschaft*) is based upon a belief in the 'rightfulness' (**legitimacy**) of an authority to achieve obedience from a specific group of persons when commands are issued.⁹⁰ Power may be exercised in an inexhaustible number of social relations, that is, in all

⁸⁵ Roth, Guenther: Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire-Building in the New States. In: *World Politics*, Vol. XX, No. 2, 1968 (pp. 194-206), p. 195.

⁸⁶ "*The concept is ideal typical in the sense that 'it removes itself from empirical reality which can only be compared or related to it' (Weber, 1904, p. 102, cf. pp. 93-4). Hence ideal types cannot be directly falsified if empirical reality seems not to fit them even approximately.*" Quoted from Outwaite, William; Bottomore, Tom (eds.): *Dictionary of Social Thought*. Oxford, Malden (MA): Blackwell 1993, p. 270 (keyword: ideal type). The Weber-text referred to here is an English translation of the "*Objektivitätsaufsatz*": Weber, Max: Die "Objektivität" sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis. In: *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*. Johannes Winkelmann. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr 1973 (1904) (pp.146-214).

⁸⁷ Jung: *The Political Sociology of World Society*, 2001, p. 447.

⁸⁸ Cf. Jung: *Tradition – Moderne – Krieg*, 1995, p. 105.

⁸⁹ Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 53.

⁹⁰ Cf. Weber: *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 1980, p. 28, p. 122 and p. 544. "*Domination (Herrschaft) is the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons.*" Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 53.

conceivable situations, in which a person is in a position to impose his will. Domination, in order to be precise and viable as a scientific category, is limited to a constellation in which the governed obediently respond to commands issued by the authority: “In our terminology domination shall be identical with authoritarian power of command.”⁹¹ The process of carrying out an order is indistinguishable from their, i.e. the subjects’, individual principles for rationalizing their own conduct (‘Maxime ihres Handelns’).⁹² The incorporation of a command into personal motivation for action is a fundamental characteristic of the concept of domination. The exercise of domination is therefore not based on the existence of corresponding interests, but on ideas as the essence of authority: Domination is the claim to obedient responses to commands, irrespective of whether such commands coincide with actual interests.⁹³ However, Weber’s specification of the two forms (interest vs. ideas) as ideal types implies that the distinction must not be confused with reality, where both interests and ideas are the foundation of authority. This aspect is reexamined in chapter 3.1.1.2. with the presentation of a guide to the empirical analysis.

The process of exercising authority is based upon the ability of a ruler to achieve obedient response to his commands from the governed. This process is organized by an administration, and hence authority is primarily an organizational task.⁹⁴ The threat of or use of physical force (Gewaltsamkeit) is, as noted in chapter 3.1., the ultima ratio of enforcement of obedience within a political organization.⁹⁵ Physical force, however, is neither considered the only, nor the normal instrument for the enforcement of

⁹¹ Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 946.

⁹² Cf. Weber: *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 1980, p. 544. With this specification, Weber defined authority as a specific form of power. “*To be more specific, domination will thus mean the situation in which the manifested will (command) of the ruler or rulers is meant to influence the conduct of one or more others (the ruled) and actually does influence it in such a way that their conduct to a socially relevant degree occurs as if the ruled had made the content of the command the maxim of their conduct for its very own sake. Looked upon from the other end, this situation will be called obedience.*” Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 946.

⁹³ “*Eine Autorität, d.h. ein unabhängig von allem Interesse bestehendes Recht auf “Gehorsam” gegenüber den tatsächlichen Beherrschten*” Weber: *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 1980, p. 542. Jung makes clear, that this presumption is fundamental to Weber’s definition of authority as an ideal type: „*Mit dieser idealtypischen Abstraktion versucht Weber, Herrschaft nicht über interessenbedingtes, sondern über das an einer Ordnung orientierte, also über Ideen vermittelte Handeln zu präzisieren.*” Jung: *Tradition – Moderne – Krieg*, 1995, p. 103. Weber specified two ‘pure forms’ of authority in relation to this distinction between ideas and interests: (I) Domination by virtue of a constellation of interests, and (II) Domination by virtue of authority (power to command and duty to obey). While the former is found in a monopoly position on an economic market, the latter is found in the authoritarian power of the father in a house or a prince. Cf. Weber: *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 1980, p. 542.

⁹⁴ “*Every domination both expresses itself and functions through administration.*” Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 948. The exercise of authority is dependent on the existence of an administration, either a „*Verwaltungsstab*“ or „*Verband*“, which Weber subsumed in the term „*Herrschaftsverband*“ Cf. Weber: *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 1980, p. 29.

⁹⁵ The general term ‘political organization’ was specified by Weber in the term *Vergesellschaftung*, comprising different societal arrangements for the control and monopolization of violence: “*politische Gemeinschaft*”, “*politischer Verband*” and “*Staat*”. These different forms of political *Gemeinschaft* have in common the basic characteristic of control of use of physical force within a geographical territory. The three arrangements represent different levels of institutionalization in the development of a state. Cf. Schlichte, Klaus: *Krieg und Vergesellschaftung in Afrika. Ein Beitrag zur Theorie des Krieges*. Münster: LIT Verlag 1996, p. 84.

obedience, but applies when alternative instruments fail to achieve the objective.⁹⁶ Hence, a stable system of authority cannot rely exclusively on the enforcement of obedience through violent means, but must be complemented by a perception of legitimacy.⁹⁷ By focusing both on administration and legitimacy, “Weber emphasized both the organization that implements and the beliefs that sustain a given system.”⁹⁸

An administrative apparatus establishes the link between the leadership and the governed and exercises the task of enforcing obedience over time: “A circle of people who are accustomed to obedience to the orders of leaders and who also have a personal interest in the continuance of the domination by virtue of their own participation and the resulting benefits, have divided among themselves the exercise of those functions which will serve the continuation of the domination and are holding themselves continuously ready for their exercise. (...) The term apparatus shall mean the circle of those persons who are holding themselves at the disposal of the master or masters in the manner just defined.”⁹⁹ The willingness of officials in the administrative apparatus to comply with the orders of the ruler is based both on the readiness to exercise certain functions and the existence of benefits in the continuation of this order, such as material benefits, remuneration and social honor.¹⁰⁰ The dependence of the ruler on his administration for the delegation and the implementation of orders is a structural problem, which may challenge the stability of the regime. The primary advantage of the leadership in relation to the governed, is the limited number of members, i.e. the “law of the small number.”¹⁰¹ The ruling minority can relatively promptly reach agreements on strategies, thereby securing the continued existence of their powerful administrative positions. By means of for example secrecy, in regard to decision-making processes, intentions and information, the leadership can limit the ability of the governed to express criticism and protest.¹⁰²

The sociological character of relations of domination is determined by, firstly, the relations between the ruler, his administrative apparatus and the masses, which Weber specified as: (I) The relationship between the master(s), and the apparatus, and (II) the relationship between (a) the master/masters and the apparatus, and (b) the ruled (civilians). Secondly, the sociological character of the structure of domination is

⁹⁶ Cf. Weber: *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 1980, p. 29. “*The threat of force, and in the case of need its actual use, is the method which is specific to political organizations and is always the last resort when others have failed.*” Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 54.

⁹⁷ Jung specified that Weber’s emphasis of a common idea and not interests as the foundation of domination, excludes the option of enforcing obedience exclusively by violent means. The existence of a shared consciousness between the sovereign and the governed is a presupposition for the perception of legitimacy. Understanding legitimacy therefore implies tracing the foundation of a shared consciousness and the reciprocal relationship between the ruler and the governed. Cf. Jung: *Tradition – Moderne – Krieg*, 1995, p. 104.

⁹⁸ Bendix, Reinhard: *Max Weber. An Intellectual Portrait*. London: Heinemann, 1960, p. 297.

⁹⁹ Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 952.

¹⁰⁰ “*When a civil servant appears in his office daily at a fixed time, he does not act only on the basis of custom or self-interest which he could disregard if he wanted to; as a rule, his action is also determined by the validity of an order (...), which he fulfills partly because disobedience would be disadvantageous to him but also because its violation would be adhorrent to his sense of duty (of course, to varying degrees)*” Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 31. On the relationship between the administration and the ruler, see also Bendix: *Max Weber*, 1960, pp. 296-297.

¹⁰¹ Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 952.

¹⁰² Cf. Weber: *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 1980, p. 548.

influenced by the specific organizational principles and norms of the administration, which determine the distribution of powers of command.¹⁰³ Weber applied this structure of organizational units within a system of authority as a standard approach to the discussion of political order.¹⁰⁴ In regard to the examination of the political structure of an insurgent 'social order', these formal categories can be transformed and adapted for the systematization of a hierarchy of organizational units in an insurgent political order. Weber distinguished three units (master, administration, civilians), but for our purposes, soldiers are introduced as an additional unit, and therefore, in total four units are recognized: The leader, the administration, soldiers and civilians. This deviation from Weber's standardized approach is justified by the challenge of recruiting soldiers to a non-state organization lacking formal legitimacy. The relationship between the leadership and the soldiers in an insurgent movement is therefore of specific interest. Thus, in our adaptation of Weber, soldiers are considered a sub-unit of the organizational apparatus, which Weber specified as master(s) and administration. The central analytical interest concerns, firstly, the interaction between the sub-units in the organizational apparatus and secondly, the interaction between these and civilians. In order to develop a guide to the empirical analysis, we now focus on the principles and norms underlying the functional logic of the organization of domination.

Weber specified the sociological character of relations of domination by focusing on the primary principles explaining the existence of obedience in a stable political order, subsumed in the term legitimacy.¹⁰⁵ Weber distinguished three 'pure forms' of legitimate domination and categorized the primary premises of legitimacy as legal-rational, traditional and charismatic domination. Based upon these ideal types of legitimacy, we develop a guide to the analysis of an insurgent political structure. The central question converges around the assessment of the foundation of legitimacy: To what extent do rational-legal arguments, traditional beliefs or charismatic aspects legitimize the authority of an insurgent movement? Prior to the introduction of a matrix of questions as a guide to the empirical analysis, we now examine the three ideal types in more detail.

Legal Domination

The fundamental principles of legal domination (*Rationale Herrschaft*) are the rule of law, impersonality and knowledge.¹⁰⁶ The legitimacy of the ruler is dependent on his willingness to govern in accordance with rules and laws underpinned by an impersonal order. Obedience is based on respect for the legal foundations of authority, and not related to a specific sympathy for the ruler as a person. A rational-legal form of domination is thus based on "a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands."¹⁰⁷ The structure of the

¹⁰³ "The sociological character of the structure of any particular case of domination is determined by the kind of relationship between the master or masters and the apparatus, the kind of relationship of both to the ruled, and by its specific organizational structure, i.e., its specific way of distributing the powers of command." Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 953. Cf. Weber: *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 1980, p. 549.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Schlichte: *Krieg und Vergesellschaftung in Afrika*, 1996, p. 86.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Weber: *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 1980, p. 549.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 124-130.

¹⁰⁷ Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 215. Cf. Weber: *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 1980, p. 124.

administrative apparatus is characterized by division of labor and specification of areas of competence. Although the legitimacy of the ruler is based on the rule of law, the nature of the leader may be characterized as charismatic or traditional, e.g. hereditary monarchy. The relevance of charisma also to legal domination supports the idea of the potential universal character of charismatic authority.¹⁰⁸ However, the basic principles of rational authority, i.e. legality and impersonality, remain unaffected, in spite of the influence of charisma.

In the 'pure form' of legal-rational domination, the hierarchically organized bureaucracy is characterized by a clear distinction between the private person and the official position, i.e. impersonality. The appropriation of public commodities for personal benefit is unacceptable. The bureaucrats are linked to their ruler through contracts and are hired not due to their personal relations, but their qualifications and knowledge. The juridical rules and principles in a legal-rational form of authority establish formality as the superior characteristic and thereby eliminate arbitrariness from the leadership.¹⁰⁹

Traditional Domination

A traditional form of authority (Traditionale Herrschaft) is based on "an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them."¹¹⁰ The relationship between the ruler, his administrative staff (personal retainers or vassals) and the ruled is based on respect and admiration for the leader as a person, i.e. reverence and piety, and/or religious explanations for obedient behavior towards this particular person.¹¹¹ The relationship between the administrative staff and the ruler is determined by "[p]ersonal loyalty, not the official's impersonal duty."¹¹² Traditional authority is also limited by a set of rules and principles, but their 'rightfulness' is accepted on the basis of customs and traditions preserved over time, in contrast to the rationality and formality of legal-rational principles. The limitation of obedience is defined by the perception of what constitutes a break with tradition: The ruler can design his regime in accordance with his interpretation of tradition, but must be sensitive to the prospect of retainers and subjects interpreting the traditional framework differently.¹¹³ This lack of formally defined rules implies that the relationship between the sovereign and the governed is characterized by elastic

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Jung: Tradition – Moderne – Krieg, 1995, p. 106. The debate on the potential universal character of charismatic authority is of theoretical interest, but will not be elaborated further here, due to minimal relevance to our objective.

¹⁰⁹ The basic principles of formality and rationality are also inherent in a capitalist market economy, and Weber stressed the parallel development of a legal-rational state apparatus and capitalism. Cf. Jung: Tradition – Moderne – Krieg, 1995, p. 129.

¹¹⁰ Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 215. Cf. Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1980, p. 124.

¹¹¹ Cf. Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1980, p. 130. Bendix noted that the administrative apparatus in traditional domination consists of personal retainers in a patrimonial form of traditional authority, and of vassals in a feudal society. Cf. Bendix: Max Weber, 1960, p. 298.

¹¹² Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 227.

¹¹³ Cf. Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1980, p. 130. In the case of dissatisfaction with the behavior of the leader, criticism will eventually be directed towards the leader as a person, and not the system as such, and "*the accusation may be that he failed to observe the traditional limits of his power.*" Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 227.

restrictions of authority: The ruler is equipped with powerful instruments for exercising authority according to his personal preferences and material wishes.¹¹⁴

Traditional authority may be exercised without an administration in small family units, but with the necessity of organizing authority in larger social units, an administration and a military force emerge as a consequence of socio-structural developments.¹¹⁵ In such an administration, the staff is bound to the sovereign through personal relations in a patrimonial form of authority. Primary characteristics of patrimonial authority are the dependence of the administration on the ruler and the lack of a distinction between position and person, i.e. resources are considered private, in contrast to public, goods.¹¹⁶

Charismatic Domination

Charismatic authority expresses an exceptional quality of a single individual “by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional power or qualities.”¹¹⁷ On the basis of such qualities, an individual exercises influence and leadership over a group of people, the ‘followers’ or ‘disciples’. The acceptance of authority is independent of the objective assessment of the qualities of the leader, since the commitment to obedience is based on followers’ perceptions of these qualities, and not on the acceptance of the rule of law. Hence, charismatic domination is “resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him.”¹¹⁸ The charismatic mode of authority is based on emotional relations with the absence of any form of technical training. Rules and principles are non-existent and instead the charismatic leader practices an ad hoc-decision-making strategy.¹¹⁹ Legitimacy is dependent on the ability of the charismatic leader to secure the well being of his followers. Due to the personalized character, it is difficult to establish charisma as a sustainable form of authority. If, however, the followers are interested in the continuation of the nature of the authority, and the members of the administration are concerned with the preservation of their societal positions and their links to the leadership, charismatic authority may be ‘routinized’ (Veralltäglicung). Charisma is then channeled into traditionally or legally oriented institutions. For example, the heroism of the leader is transformed into a hereditary rule

¹¹⁴ Cf. Jung: Tradition – Moderne – Krieg, 1995, p. 141. Jung emphasizes that this is a fundamental feature of all forms of traditional authority.

¹¹⁵ Cf. Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1980, p. 133.

¹¹⁶ Cf. Ibid., pp. 134-136. The organization of the economy is affected by the structure of a traditional form of domination: The belief in traditional rules and customs, and the ability of the authority to influence societal relations in accordance with his personal, arbitrary wishes, hinder the development of rationality as a guiding principle for economic interaction. Monopolies prevail and the development of a free market economy is obstructed. Ibid., pp. 137-138.

¹¹⁷ Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 241.

¹¹⁸ Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 215. Cf. Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1980, p. 124.

¹¹⁹ Cf. Weber: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 1980, pp. 140-141. “*There is no such thing as appointment or dismissal, no career, no promotion. There is only a call at the instance of the leader on the basis of the charismatic qualifications of those he summons. (...) There is no system of formal rules, or abstract legal principles, and hence no process of rational judicial decision oriented to them.*” Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 243.

or a bureaucratic office. Over time, charismatic authority is then challenged by an increasing importance of principles of rationality.¹²⁰

While the legitimacy of both legal and traditional authority is derived from specific rules, principles and norms, which define the limitations of legitimate actions, charismatic authority differs fundamentally in regard to the absence of any rationally defined rules.¹²¹ The specific impersonal character of legal authority is contrasted by the obsession with a person and personality both in traditional and charismatic forms of domination.

3.1.1.2. Implications for the Conduct of the Empirical Study

Two central aspects of Weber's sociology of domination define the key components of our theoretical framework for the empirical analysis of the political structure of an insurgent 'social order'. Firstly, the analytical units are specified in accordance with Weber's categorization of relations of domination (see pp. 20-21). Secondly, the term legitimacy constitutes the fundamental concept for analyzing the mechanisms ensuring stability and perpetuation of a 'social order'.

Two main analytical units within the political structure of an insurgent 'social order' were recognized above: (I) the organizational apparatus, comprising the sub-units leader, administration and soldiers, and (II) civilians. In order to highlight the mechanisms, which institutionalize these units in an insurgent system of authority, we develop a matrix of questions regarding the foundations of legitimacy. The core question must incorporate the influence of time¹²²: *How does the leadership of an insurgent movement manage to reproduce and sustain legitimacy over time?* The leadership of an insurgent movement must on the one hand create mechanisms for the perpetuation of the leadership itself in competition with potential rival factions within the administration. On the other hand, the leadership must create mechanisms, which hinder civilian opposition, and instead further the perception of legitimacy. The matrix of questions on the foundation of legitimacy is specified in regard to the analytical units recognized:

Legal-rational legitimacy: Is the organizational structure and the choice of strategy based upon a legal framework, i.e. a constitution and/or a political program, and an impersonal order? Which rational incentives exist for (a) members of the apparatus, (b) civilians to co-operate with and be loyal to the leader of the insurgent movement? Such incentives comprise access to education, medical treatment and/or a societal network.

Traditional beliefs: To what extent is tradition (customs and norms) used as a justification for action, strategy, and thus, authority? What forms of tradition are used to claim the 'rightfulness' of authority?

Charismatic aspects: To what extent does the leader as a person strengthen the legitimacy of the movement, due to his perceived charismatic qualities?

¹²⁰ Cf. Weber: *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 1980, pp. 142-143 and p. 148, and Jung: *Tradition – Moderne – Krieg*, 1995, p. 107.

¹²¹ Jung therefore characterizes the foundation of charismatic authority as "*specifically irrational*." Jung: *Tradition – Moderne – Krieg*, 1995, p. 106.

¹²² The importance of time has been emphasized by Clapham, who defined "*dispensability*" as the "*ultimate test*" of the effectiveness of a leadership in an insurgent movement over time, tested for example on whether a leader was successfully and peacefully replaced or if the loss of a leader would result in the collapse of the movement. Cf. Clapham: *Analysing African Insurgencies*, 1998, p. 9.

The adaptation of Weber's framework sketched out here differs from Weber in one specific theoretical assumption. While Weber emphasized that legitimacy is based on the perception of ideas and the development of a common consciousness between the ruler and the governed (*Maxime ihres Handelns*), the transformation of the ideal types into a matrix of questions stresses the importance of interests to a somewhat greater extent. Weber did emphasize the importance of shared interests in regard to sustaining the loyalty of administrative officials, but in regard to the masses he considered ideas the specific foundation of legitimacy and obedience.¹²³ Nonetheless, ideas and interests cannot be understood as separate aspects, but represent ideal typical categories, which in reality are observed in mixed forms. Jung argued explicitly that an empirical study of relations of domination must begin at the 'intersection' of interests and ideas.¹²⁴ In order to understand this 'intersection', we recall the elementary functions of social reproduction, comprising the control of physical force, the guarantee of material means, and symbolic means of orientation, introduced in chapter 3.1. Collective symbols and customs function as means of orientation, which shape certain patterns of behavior and define a specific group-identity. The identification of individuals with the group further integration, i.e. the coherence of the 'social order'.¹²⁵ Jung's argument explains the necessity of combining an analysis of the foundation of legitimacy with a focus on symbolic means of orientation. A matrix of questions on the political structure of an insurgent 'social order' must therefore include a focus on group-identity: How is a group-identity, i.e. group solidarity, shaped within the 'social order'?

With an analytical focus on legitimacy, social mechanisms are defined as the nucleus of the analysis. Recent insurgency-oriented studies have also emphasized the importance of focusing on social mechanisms. In his comparative study of the insurgencies in Mozambique and Angola, William Minter did not define "*technical military questions, but rather the social mechanisms*"¹²⁶ as the key concern regarding the question "*How Contra Warfare Works: The Military Component*."¹²⁷ Christopher Clapham stressed both the existence of a shared "*commitment to common principles and goals*" as well as "*an effective structure through which it [an insurgent movement (KS)] seeks to achieve those goals*"¹²⁸ as basic analytical criteria for the examination of insurgencies. For the comparative analysis of insurgencies, Clapham defined the internal structure of the organization (leadership, ideology and organization), the relations with host societies, the links to the international system and the outcomes of an insurgency, i.e. the impact on the functioning of the state, as the main analytical categories. The two former are incorporated in our theoretical approach based on

¹²³ The importance of ideas and interests was discussed in Ch. 2.1.1.1., p. 25. Weber also noted that an obvious shared interest between the authority and the administrative officials may undermine the perception of legitimacy among civilians. Cf. Weber: *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 1980, p. 123.

¹²⁴ "*Die Analyse empirischer Herrschaftsverhältnisse muß daher am Schnittpunkt von Interessen und Ideen (...) ansetzen.*" Jung: *Tradition – Moderne – Krieg*, 1995, p. 104.

¹²⁵ Jung stresses the instrumental role of a common social identity ("*sozialer Habitus*") for the creation of "*survival units*". The use of physical force and identity must therefore be analyzed as related concepts. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 101-102.

¹²⁶ Minter, William: *Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique*. London, New Jersey: Zed Books/Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press 1994, p. 173.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, Ch. 7, pp. 172-203.

¹²⁸ Both quotes from Clapham: *Analysing African Insurgencies*, 1998, p. 10.

Weber's sociology of domination. The question of relations with the international system is relevant only to a limited extent, concerning the external influence on the internal structure, as defined above. Assessing how insurgencies can be related to the continuing problems of African statehood (outcomes) requires an analytical focus on the state, which is not relevant here. Clapham suggested that informal variables could be tested by examining aspects such as the functioning of the formal structure, the level of coherence and discipline within the movement.¹²⁹ Minter emphasized aspects of the same nature, such as recruitment strategies, control systems, assimilation of new recruits and patterns of strategic organization.¹³⁰ Due to his analytical interest in the strategic role of South Africa in the insurgencies in Mozambique and Angola, Minter also examined the operational role of external sponsors. Based on these variables suggested by Clapham and Minter, the mechanisms influencing the relations between the units in the organizational apparatus of an insurgent 'social order' recognized above, can be enumerated. Firstly, the relationship between the leader and the administration is influenced by incentives for loyalty, the access to or exclusion from power and the centralization of power. Secondly, influential variables for the relationship between the leadership and the soldiers are recruitment strategies, socialization programs and control systems.

In regard to the relations with civilians, we are facing a different challenge, which both Clapham and Minter have called attention to. Although he recognized the importance of relations with civilians for insurgencies, Clapham emphasized the difficulty of operationalizing "*cultural criteria*".¹³¹ A potential influential variable is identified in the receptivity of host societies to ideologies or organizational models.¹³² Clapham is nevertheless skeptical to the analytical validity of such an analysis, and abandons any attempt to pursue an analytical method based on cultural criteria.¹³³ Clapham does, however, stress the necessity of insurgent movements to establish

¹²⁹ The *formal structure* includes units such as a command council, military formations etc. Aspects to be examined are for example: (a) The level of autonomy enjoyed by the various organizational units in comparison to the ability of the leader to assert himself; (b) whether or not the movement is operating in a bureaucratic fashion or on an individual level in areas outside of conflict, and (c) whether the new recruits enjoy formalized training, or are left on their own. *Level of coherence* involves examining any fragmentation processes within the movement and eventually the character of the splits, e.g. along ethnic, personal or ideological lines. *Discipline* can be examined with questions such as: Is criminal behavior (murder, rape, looting) by the soldiers tolerated or is a system of punishment for lack of discipline in place? Are children recruited? Cf. Ibid., p. 10.

¹³⁰ Cf. Minter: *Apartheid's Contras*, 1994, pp. 172-203.

¹³¹ "*Insurgent organizations must nonetheless be created on the ground, to an appreciably greater extent than any other form of African political organization, and it is plausible to assume that they must be constructed in large part from the social materials that they find there.*" Clapham accordingly concluded that analyzing and understanding insurgencies is "*a job for the political anthropologist.*" Clapham: *Analysing African Insurgencies*, 1998, p. 11.

¹³² "*Organization may in essence come, not from the top down, but from the bottom up.*" Ibid., p. 12.

¹³³ "*Even if this exercise [behavioural studies with attitudinal surveys (KS)] can be conducted with some degree of plausibility, and there have been very few attempts to conduct such studies of African guerrillas, there are still considerable hazards in applying the results to specific political circumstances. It is all too easy to use supposedly entrenched cultural criteria to 'explain' what turn out to be no more than transient political phenomena.*" Ibid., p. 13. The best known study within the social sciences, in which such variables were operationalized, in context of the developed world, is Almond, Gabriel A.; Verba, Sidney: *Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. An Analytical Study*. Boston, Little Brown: Princeton University Press 1965.

alternative identities, which bind their supporters together and simultaneously distinguish them from their opponents with the purpose of mobilizing support.¹³⁴ In Weber's terminology, this perception of identity is incorporated in the conception of creating a common consciousness, an idea, which legitimizes the specific mode of authority. In our analytical approach, we additionally refer to symbolic means of orientation, on the basis of which a common idea, i.e. group solidarity, is established. Minter operationalized the analytical interest in co-operation with civilians by focusing on 'how life was' in the territories under insurgent control. Analytical criteria were the supply of food and services, the role of tradition and the use of persuasion or violence in order to obtain co-operation from civilians.¹³⁵ From these examples on how to approach an analysis of the relationship between civilians and insurgents, three categories of incentives are identified: 1. Materialistic incentives (services), 2. Idealistic incentives (common identity, solidarity), and 3. Violent incentives (corporal punishment, fear of torture etc.).

In Weber's heuristic approach, legitimacy and physical force represent fundamental categories. With our focus on the foundation of legitimacy as well as on the functioning of violence within the political structure of an insurgent 'social order', the balance between repression and legitimacy over time is a basic category in the empirical study.

While the theoretical framework developed for the political structure was based upon the work of a classical theorist within the social sciences, the analytical framework for the economic structure, to which we now turn, is based upon the contemporary economic approach to conflict studies.

3.1.2. The Economic Structure

The economic approach to conflict studies includes a diverse research agenda with a focus on multiple actors and their various economic strategies. The exclusive interest here concerns the economic activities of an insurgent movement. In analogy to the political structure, the central research questions of the economic approach are transformed into a matrix of questions as a guide to the empirical analysis in chapter three.

A prerequisite for a sustained insurgency is to solve a number of material challenges, such as mobilizing resources for the acquirement of military equipment, non-military equipment (communication tools, fuel, batteries, food) and the establishment of a reward system for administrative officials and recruits. How these material requirements are met, influences strategic choices and the organization of the insurgency, hence conflict dynamism.¹³⁶ Due to the mobilization of local resources, contemporary war economies are diverse in character. Whether resource scarcity or affluence, the application of different economic strategies of combatants and civilians is subject to comparative empirical analysis.¹³⁷ Keen introduced seven categories of

¹³⁴ Cf. Clapham: *Analysing African Insurgencies*, 1998, p. 13.

¹³⁵ Cf. Minter: *Apartheid's Contras*, 1994, pp. 204-217.

¹³⁶ Cf. Jean; Rufin: *Vorwort*, 1999, pp. 9-10.

¹³⁷ 'Scarce resource war' refers to the depletion or scarcity of resources as causes of increasing grievances which eventually result in violent conflict. 'Abundant resource war' refers to violent conflict over access to and control over valuable resources. Whether a resource is scarce or abundant is, however, not relevant: Any kind of resource represents a value, whether scarce or abundant is

economic tactics, which usually involve disregard of existing laws: *pillage*, which supplements or replaces the salaries of soldiers; *protection money* demanded from those who are spared from experiencing violence and includes the organization of private security or militias; *monopolistic control of trade*, i.e. ‘forced markets’ with price-control and the legalization of previously illegal trade, such as the drug trade; *labor exploitation*; *depopulation of land* in order to gain control over natural resources; *stealing aid supplies*¹³⁸ and *the institutionalization of benefits to the military* as conflict may justify a sizeable military and its participation in the government.¹³⁹ While Keen emphasized economic activities conducted both by government representatives and insurgent movements, Rufin, in contrast, introduced only two broad categories of economic strategies, for which the control of the state is not a prerequisite: *pillage and organized criminality*. Firstly, pillage involves the expropriation of resources from civilians, frequently combined with ransom demands. The novel aspect of pillage in contemporary war economies is found in the enhanced competition for control of internally available resources: While humanitarian sanctuaries used to be situated across the border, separated from the area of extended fighting, humanitarian assistance is nowadays increasingly supplied into combat areas, and thus, these resources are exposed to intensified competition.¹⁴⁰ Secondly, in addition to destructive pillage insurgent movements can establish a prosperous war economy based on organized criminality, with the potential of improving the welfare of civilians.¹⁴¹ In a criminalized war economy, resources are illegally extracted and illegally produced. Insurgents may trade in illegal goods, such as drugs and goods protected by environmental laws, e.g. ivory and teak, but also in legal commodities, e.g. gold and precious stones. A criminalized war economy gains distinction in comparison with destructive pillage, due to considerations of sustainability.¹⁴²

The extraction of local resources by insurgent movements is similar to activities conducted by the state in a peace environment, except for the non-existence of tax

relative, and this value can be exploited to enhance power. The significant aspect is how resource exploitation is conducted, the pattern of political economy, and the level of consensus over the distribution of power. Le Billon, Philippe: *The Political Economy of Resource Wars*. In: Cilliers; Dietrich: *Angola's War Economy. The Role of Oil and Diamonds*. Johannesburg: Institute for Security Studies, 2000 (pp. 21-42), pp. 22-26.

¹³⁸ “*Violence may serve a purpose, first, in precipitating relief and, second, in gaining access to this relief once it arrives.*” Keen: *Incentives and Disincentives for Violence*, 2000, p. 30.

¹³⁹ Cf. Keen: *The Economic Functions of Violence*, 1998, pp. 15-17 and Keen: *Incentives and Disincentives for Violence*, 2000, pp. 29-31.

¹⁴⁰ When pillage is applied in a situation dominated by scarcity of resources, Rufin recognizes the possibility of induction of man-made hunger catastrophes. Cf. Rufin, Jean-Christophe (eds.): *Kriegswirtschaft in internen Konflikten*. In: Jean; Rufin: *Ökonomie der Bürgerkriege*, 1999 (pp. 15-46), pp. 28-30. Keen examined this aspect in his extensive study of the hunger catastrophe in Sudan, see Keen, David: *A Disaster for Whom?: Local Interest and International Donors During Famine Among the Dinka of Sudan*. In: *Disasters*, 15 (2), 1991 (pp. 58-73). Such catastrophes may prompt increased contributions by international humanitarian organizations, which supply external resources into the conflict area. In situations dominated by scarcity, external supply can change the relationship between insurgents and civilians, because of fierce competition for resources. The relief agencies must take into account extensive pillage, both from combatants and other possible perpetrators.

¹⁴¹ Local populations can profit from this criminalized economy, e.g. heroin production in Afghanistan and Burma, cocoa production in Colombia. Cf. Le Billon: *The Political Economy of Resource Wars*, 2000, p. 32.

¹⁴² Cf. Rufin: *Kriegswirtschaft in internen Konflikten*, 1999, pp. 30-32. Trade in restricted products give insurgent movements profit from price distortions, which they can exploit with their extra-legal position.

payments and the lack of respect for legal restrictions. In competition with the state-controlled, regular economy, an insurgent war economy functions as a parallel economic system. Criminal production requires effective organization for the control of territory and civilians, in which the use of physical force functions as a central instrument of governance.¹⁴³ The condition of ‘decaying’ or ‘weak’ states can affect the establishment of a parallel insurgent economy, as both political and economic control of the state erodes and insurgent movements are faced with a less coherent contender.

Empirical analyses have indicated the importance of the nature of the resource in question, i.e. whether or not a resource is easily transportable and exchangeable. Empirical studies have also identified a tendency to avoid resources that require large infrastructure investments, such as oil.¹⁴⁴ An alternative source of income for insurgent movements may be the supply of security services to international companies investing in conflict zones, as insurgent movements demand payment in return for guarantees of the security of foreign workers.¹⁴⁵

The novelty of contemporary war economies is found in the incorporation of insurgent parallel economies in international trade networks. The extraction of local resources is the basis for trade with external agents, in exchange of which armaments and other goods are imported. While war economies in the 1980s were dominated by (humanitarian and military) sanctuaries in neighboring countries, the current ‘shadow’ trade networks rely on a number of secret connections operating in a potentially global system of distribution.¹⁴⁶

The reliance on local resources alters insurgent military strategies. The dominant principle of mobility in guerrilla warfare is substituted by increased attention to the tactics of conventional forces and the establishment of territorial control in close proximity to resources and transportation routes. Insurgents become interested in establishing control over airports, harbors and cities, due to their significance for the generation of profits (banks, transportation) and the control of access to markets abroad.¹⁴⁷ The development of local war economies can also change insurgent movements’ organizational patterns. In comparison to the Cold War-era, during which a number of insurgent movements received external patronage and the economic benefits were distributed from the top to the bottom, the operation of a parallel economy requires a different form of organization. An insurgent movement must mobilize recruits, who extract, produce or loot resources. A distributional system from the bottom to the top

¹⁴³ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 32. This aspect is accounted for in Elwert’s market of violence.

¹⁴⁴ Le Billon argued that whether a war economy is based on productive, e.g. crops or extractive resources, e.g. minerals, influence the use of violence. While production involves structural violence, such as in labor coercion and the control of trade, for the extraction of resources, violence is used primarily to establish territorial control, possibly including battle for the state. These two forms of violence are not mutually exclusive, as some resources may involve both territorial control and coercion of labor, for example plantations or cattle raising. Although Le Billon comments on a significant aspect of war economies, the lack of clarity in his terminology weakens his argument. The general question concerning what forms of violence are used for which objectives in war economies nonetheless remains an interesting research topic. See Le Billon: *The Political Economy of Resource Wars*, 2000, p. 26.

¹⁴⁵ Cf. Rufin: *Kriegswirtschaft in internen Konflikten*, 1999, p. 33.

¹⁴⁶ The existence of a Diaspora can be influential to the global interconnectedness of insurgent economies. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

¹⁴⁷ Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 37-39 and Le Billon: *The Political Economy of Resource Wars*, 2000, p. 30.

must be established, in order to secure the resource base of the movement. Recruits may, however, develop a personal interest in keeping the resources, and start behaving in a similar manner to criminal gangs with the potential of causing fragmentation and weakening discipline and chains of command in the movement.¹⁴⁸ In this context, violence may function as a mechanism both for the implementation of discipline within the organization itself and in interaction with civilians for the purpose of achieving access to resources.¹⁴⁹ How economic strategies influence the functional logic of the use of physical force in an insurgent 'social order' is therefore a significant analytical aspect.

The existence of various economic agents, applying diverse strategies for the extraction of resources, has led to an interest in the systematization of different types of war economies. As criteria for comparison, Rufin suggested the relationship between external and internal resources, the role of the state, pre-war economic conditions, geographical distribution of resources, and access to external political support.¹⁵⁰ The task of systematizing and categorizing diverse war economies is therefore an interesting future research topic.

The core research interest guiding our analysis of the economic structure in an insurgent 'social order' is how an insurgent movement generates resources, establishes a financial basis and operates an exchange system. Two main dimensions are recognized in the economic structure: Firstly, the generation of internal resources, i.e. the internal dimension. Secondly, the interconnectedness with external trade networks for the purpose of acquiring cash and material, i.e. the internal-external dimension. The relationship between these two dimensions is the central analytical criterion for the establishment of a matrix of questions:

Internal dimension: *How are local resources generated (nature of resources, control of territory, population, infrastructure)? How is the local economy organized?*

Internal-external dimension: *How are external contacts established? How does the exchange system function?*

The economic approach draws attention to how economic activities correspond to conflict dynamism in regard to organizational patterns (fragmentation, discipline), the military strategy (territory, infrastructure, control over civilians) and the importance of competition for political power in comparison to control over resources.¹⁵¹ Although the

¹⁴⁸ Cf. Rufin: *Kriegswirtschaft in internen Konflikten*, 1999, pp. 42-43. An analysis of organizational changes related to the allocation of resources was applied in Mozambique. The author concluded that the altered methods of resource allocation partly erased the distinction between the leader and the fighters. While the organization offered armaments and territory for the extraction of resources as well as trade networks and slave labor, the fighters were confronted with multiple opportunities for individual economic strategies. The author labeled these changes a shift from a client network to a 'protoclient network'. Cf. Weissman, Fabrice: *Mosambik: Krieg als Mittel der Bereicherung*. In: Jean; Rufin: *Ökonomie der Bürgerkriege*, 1999 (pp. 243-277).

¹⁴⁹ Cf. Rufin: *Kriegswirtschaft in internen Konflikten*, 1999, p. 44. Civilians can also be a hindrance to resource exploitation and this perception may lead to forced eviction, massacres, forced labor, or total neglect. Le Billon: *The Political Economy of Resource Wars*, 2000, p. 32.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. Rufin: *Kriegswirtschaft in internen Konflikten*, 1999, pp. 34-36.

¹⁵¹ In his study of the war economy in Liberia, Montclos is interested in the relationship between competition for economic resources and political power positions, and formulates the question "*ob das Streben nach Ressourcen Vorrang vor den politischen Machtkämpfen bekommen konnte, bei denen es ja auch um Pfründe und den Anteil am nationalen Kuchen ging.*" Montclos, Marc-Antoine:

economic approach has directed attention toward the interactions between economic strategies and political authority, a theoretical framework has yet to be elaborated. In the following section, we discuss a theoretical concept emphasizing the interconnectedness of political and economic aspects, and develop a strategy for the application of this concept to our main research question. On the basis of this discussion, a hypothesis is introduced.

3.2. Reciprocal Influence of Political and Economic Structures

The central research interest of this paper is how political and economic structures mutually influence one another and define the internal functional logic of an insurgent 'social order'. A theoretical framework for the isolated analysis of both the political structure, based on Weber's three ideal types of authority, and the economic structure, derived from the economic approach to conflict studies, has been developed. For the implementation of our main research objective, however, the analytical distinction between the two structures needs to be transcended. This task requires a theoretical framework for describing the reciprocal influence of political and economic structures in an insurgent 'social order'. For the purpose of analyzing another political entity, the state, Weber's concept of *patrimonialism* was in the 1970s adopted as an analytical tool for the assessment of the functioning of newly de-colonized states in the Third World. The lack of a distinction between political and economic spheres was the main analytical condition for the application of patrimonialism to the analysis of these states. The interconnectedness of political organization and economic activities also explains the attractiveness of this concept for our objective. An alternative application of patrimonialism to the study of an insurgent movement, instead of a state, is justified by the consideration of an insurgent 'social order' as a quasi-state (see pp. 21-23). Although lacking strict juridical statehood, an insurgent movement can qualify as quasi-state in terms of empirical statehood and/or juridical statehood. Additional justification for an alternative application is provided by a prominent protagonist of this concept S.N. Eisenstadt, who has suggested that patrimonialism is applicable to the analysis of various forms of political organization, not exclusively the state. Eisenstadt argued that the usefulness of patrimonialism is 'greatest' for the assessment of problems of political life and organization, which is the essence of our objective.¹⁵² A basic assumption is therefore that the concept of patrimonialism can be usefully adapted and applied as a theoretical framework for the analysis of the interaction between political and economic structures in an insurgent 'social order'.

The first step in the process of applying patrimonialism in this context is to establish the constituent components of the concept: *What are the key features defining the reciprocity between economic and political structures in patrimonialism?* The second step is to transfer patrimonialism to our object of research: *Which mechanisms are recognized as the theoretical parameters influencing the reproduction of a patrimonial 'social order'?*

Liberia und die Ausplünderung eines Landes. In: Jean; Rufin: *Ökonomie der Bürgerkriege*, 1999 (pp. 219-242), p. 219.

¹⁵² Cf. Eisenstadt, S.N.: *Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism*. Sage Research Papers in the Social Sciences. Vol. 1, Series No. 90-003 (Studies in Comparative Modernization Series), Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications 1973, p. 12.

3.2.1. Patrimonialism in Weber's Terminology

In Weber's sociological theory, patrimonialism is a specific form of traditional domination. The original form of patrimonialism, patriarchalism, is defined as private authority within the *oikos*, i.e. the domestic household. The expansion of authority through the subjection of *extrapatrimonials*, i.e. civilians outside the original area of influence (domain), required increased organization. Patrimonialism then emerged from the process of decentralizing the authority in the *oikos* (*Hausgewalt*), which materialized through subordinates' acquirement of property rights to housing, land and livestock.¹⁵³ As a consequence of the expansion of authority, patrimonialism is redefined as *political* patrimonialism, beyond the private authority over relatives and servants in the *oikos*.¹⁵⁴ The decentralization of the *oikos* does not, however, alter the organization of subordinates, which follows the same logic as the original form of authority in the *oikos*, based on loyalty and fidelity. This specific form of patriarchal authority is by Weber defined as patrimonial: "*We shall speak of a patrimonial state when the prince organizes his political power over extrapatrimonial areas and political subjects – which is not discretionary and not enforced by physical coercion – just like the exercise of his patriarchal power.*"¹⁵⁵ The legitimacy of a patrimonial authority is based on personal loyalty and the lack of an impersonal legal framework. Traditional norms and customs ensure obedience and simultaneously restrict the power of the sovereign.¹⁵⁶ Those subject to patrimonial authority are obliged to secure "*the material maintenance of the ruler*"¹⁵⁷ through services and taxes. The loyalty of the ruled is based on reciprocity, as the master's dependence on their compliance and regular payments implies that he must provide services in reward. The value of reciprocity is defined by "*external protection and help in case of need, then "humane" treatment and particularly a "customary" limitation of economic exploitation.*"¹⁵⁸

¹⁵³ Cf. Weber: *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 1980, p. 583. The decentralization of authority was the intention of the ruler (lord), who "*settles dependents (...) on plots within his extended land-holdings, with a house and a family on their own, and provides them with animals (...) and equipment.*" Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 1010.

¹⁵⁴ Cf. Breuer, Stefan: *Max Webers Herrschaftssoziologie*. Frankfurt a.M., New York: Campus Verlag 1991, p. 87. Breuer examined Weber's discussion of patrimonialism not only in "Economy and Society" but also in other articles and books, and emphasized diverging features of the concept within Weber's work as a whole. However, Breuer concluded that the research community has, for the most part, received the term patrimonialism positively. *Ibid.*, pp. 85-90. Médard also noted that Weber did not offer a systematic definition of patrimonialism, but that the essence of this form of traditional authority is expressed in the lack of a distinction between public and private spheres. The discussion of a lack of differentiation between patrimonialism and patriarchalism will be elided here, since the primary concern is the organizational structure of political authority referred to as patrimonialism, which can be examined independently of this theoretical debate. See Médard, Jean-François: *Patrimonialism, Neo-patrimonialism and the Study of the Post-colonial State in Subsaharian Africa*. In: Marcussen, Henrik Secher: *Improved Natural Resource Management – the Role of Formal Organisations and Informal Networks and Institutions*. Occasional Paper, No. 17, Roskilde: International Development Studies, Roskilde University 1996, (pp. 76-97), p. 80.

¹⁵⁵ Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 1013. Despite the reference to the state in this quote, the main argument here concerns the applicability of patrimonialism to alternative forms of political organization, as defined above.

¹⁵⁶ Cf. Weber: *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 1980, p. 178 and p. 584.

¹⁵⁷ Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 1014.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 1010.

The expanding domain is managed by a patrimonial administration organized according to the personal interests of the sovereign: "*The patrimonial ruler treats all political and administrative affairs as he would his personal affairs.*"¹⁵⁹ In an expanding organization, a personal relationship between the sovereign and the 'bureaucrats' is difficult to maintain. The distribution of privileges (benefices, fiefs, rewards) to individuals exercising an administrative office is therefore introduced as a mechanism for the enforcement of compliance.¹⁶⁰ The patrimonial 'bureaucrats' are granted access to economic resources, with which they secure their personal prosperity while also producing a surplus for the ruler.¹⁶¹ The sovereign thus establishes a common interest between the continuation of his authority and the economic and social advantages of privileged groups, by linking administrative posts to social and economic privileges.

The practice of attaching material benefits to administrative offices may lead to a tendency of monopolizing the access to such offices. The 'bureaucrats' may manage to secure their positions through the definition of legal foundations ('stereotyping'), potentially challenging the authority of the ruler. The ruler attempts to avoid monopolization as well as the expansion of any individual power basis by creating a control system.¹⁶² Establishing a control system is necessary due to the potential threat to the unity of the central authority imminent in the emergence of an independent power basis. A powerful instrument for sustaining authority is the military, whose loyalty must be unconditional.¹⁶³ To counter the development of powerful officials who constitute a potential threat to his authority, the sovereign may also appeal to the masses. The ruler legitimizes his authority by creating the perception of caring for the welfare of the subjects ('followers') and introducing social policies as an instrument for securing the control of the masses.¹⁶⁴

¹⁵⁹ Médard, Jean-François: *The Underdeveloped State in Tropical Africa: Political Clientelism or Neo-patrimonialism?* In: Clapham, Christopher (ed.): *Private Patronage and Public Power. Political Clientelism in the Modern State*. London: Frances Pinter 1982 (pp.162-192), p. 178.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. Weber: *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 1980, p. 596 and p. 598. "*Free men derived such great advantages from serving a lord that they accepted the at first inevitable submission to the ruler's personal power.*" Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 1026. Although Weber emphasized the necessity of an administration for the functioning of patrimonial authority, he questioned the suitability of the term 'bureaucrat' in this context. That is the reason why inverted commas are used here.

¹⁶¹ Cf. Médard: *The Underdeveloped State*, 1982, p. 178. Such relationships are characterized as clientelism and political patronage. Clapham noted the origin of this concept in Mediterranean peasant societies, and described patron-client relations as following: "*The essence of this relationship was that the client was offered services, whether economic or military, to the patron, in exchange for which the patron offered some security or protection to the client against the uncertainties of peasant life, the whole exchange being encapsulated within a set of moral obligations, often symbolized for instance, by godparenthood.*" (p. 2). In another definition Clapham reduced complexity: "*clientelism is a relationship of exchange between unequals.*" (p. 4). Quotations from Clapham, Christopher: *Clientelism and the State*. In: Clapham (ed.): *Private Patronage and Public Power. Political Clientelism in the Modern State*. London: Frances Pinter 1982 (pp. 1-35).

¹⁶² Such strategies might include controlling the area under influence by travelling, letting loyal servants travel, spying, introducing time limits on administrative offices, letting family members exercise the most important posts, and supporting competitors in the case of the emergence of powerful administrators. Cf. Weber: *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 1980, pp. 605-606.

¹⁶³ Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 585-587 and p. 613.

¹⁶⁴ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 652. "*The "welfare state" is the legend of patrimonialism, deriving not from the free camaraderie of solemnly promised fealty, but from the authoritarian relationship of father and*

The original economic base of patrimonial authority is barter economy, but the development of trade and monetary relations can create a monopolistic economic structure in addition to the establishment of a tax system.¹⁶⁵ Independent economic power is disliked by the sovereign, who rejects the establishment of economic enterprises on a rational-legal basis, and instead attempts to control trade, import and export as powerful instruments for securing loyalty.¹⁶⁶ The territory under patrimonial control is a source of economic profit both for the authority himself and his administrators. The mismanagement of resources (predatory behavior) can have potentially destructive effects, since it presupposes the existence of resources to exploit: *“When patrimonialism is exacerbated it becomes self destructive.(...) When the public resources have gone, there is nothing left “to eat””*¹⁶⁷

The examination of Weber’s concept of patrimonialism allows a specification of the social mechanisms determining the reciprocal influence of economic and political structures in an insurgent ‘social order’. The link between administrative offices and economic privileges creates a common interest between the administration and the ruler in the continuation of a specific social order. The risk of an emergent, independent power base among individuals within the administration requires the ruler to establish a control system and a military arm, with which to coerce consent. Welfare policies are introduced in order to secure the loyalty of the masses. In return, the masses ensure the material maintenance of the ruler through services and tax payments. Administrative positions function as an instrument for the appropriation of economic benefits, and are treated as private, not public, positions: *“Economic and political resources, wealth and political power are directly exchangeable.”*¹⁶⁸

Regarding the application of patrimonialism to the analysis of an insurgent ‘social order’, we must note the implications related to the process of institutionalizing a specific order by establishing legal rules. This would distort the assumption of a patrimonial mode of political organization, as Médard made clear: *“By definition, patrimonialism is inversely proportional to the degree of institutionalization of the state.”*¹⁶⁹ A legal framework does not correspond to the traditional principles of patrimonial authority. This argument also affected the application of patrimonialism on the analysis of newly decolonized states in the 1970s. In order to validate our alternative application of patrimonialism, we briefly examine this debate.

3.2.2. Contemporary Adaptation of Patrimonialism

The research interest in “new” states resulted in a renewed discussion of the application of Weber’s sociological theory of domination. In a critique of earlier attempts to apply Weber in the field of African studies, Roth argued that Weber’s theory was

children. The “father of the people” (Landesvater) is the ideal of the patrimonial state.” Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 1107.

¹⁶⁵ Cf. Weber: *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 1980, p. 586.

¹⁶⁶ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 648. Weber also recognized the usefulness of possession of precious metals, which is interesting in regard to the discussion of ‘resource-based insurgencies’: *“The power positions of all rulers transcending the level of the primitive village headman were based on their possession of precious metals in raw or unfinished form. They needed this treasure above all for the maintenance of their following, the body-guards, patrimonial armies, mercenaries and especially officials.”* Weber: Eng. ed., 1968, p. 1092.

¹⁶⁷ Médard: *Patrimonialism, Neo-patrimonialism*, 1996, p. 95.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

*“underutilized, and, in fact, reduced to the dichotomy of bureaucracy and charisma.”*¹⁷⁰ In the 1970s, a central theme in the debate on how to analyze developing societies was the coexistence of traditional and modern forms of societal organization. According to Eisenstadt, Roth, accompanied by Zolberg with his comparative study of several states in Africa¹⁷¹, was among the first scholars to apply Weber to the study of these societies.¹⁷² Eisenstadt explained the reemergence of the concept of patrimonialism as a response to the inadequacies of central assumptions in modernization theories, in particular the presumption of a one-directional development terminating in ‘modernity’. The patrimonial approach alternatively emphasized the existence of a specific internal ‘logic’ in the societal development of “new” states.¹⁷³ The mixed character of societies in these states, described as *“post-traditional”* in rejection of the ‘traditional versus modern’-dichotomy, did, however, also raise questions about the usefulness of applying patrimonialism, originally intended for the analysis of rather non-complex societies, to the analysis of these states. Eisenstadt argued that the concept of patrimonialism embraces societies with different degrees of political differentiation, from kinship, tribal forms of social order to more complex empires, all distinguished from the institutionalized, rational-legal order. The usefulness of patrimonialism was recognized in the ability to examine how difficulties of political organization are dealt with.¹⁷⁴ In contrast to Eisenstadt’s positive appraisal of a universal applicability of patrimonialism as an analytical tool for studying political structures, Theobald critically argued that patrimonialism ignores substantial differences by merely focusing on the role of clientage networks in various societies: *“Like its predecessor, charisma, patrimonialism is being used to explain political cohesion in virtually any society; it has become something of a catch-all concept, in danger of losing its analytical utility.”*¹⁷⁵ The analysis of political organization in “new” states led to the recognition of specific means of political struggle, among them clientelism, patronage, prebendalism, nepotism, ‘belly politics’ and factionalism.¹⁷⁶ These terms, however, describe practices for which the common denominator is the lack of distinction between private and public spheres. This is exactly the essence of patrimonialism, and Médard therefore argued that the

¹⁷⁰ Roth: *Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire-Building*, 1968 p. 195.

¹⁷¹ Zolberg, Aristide R.: *Creating Political Order. The Party-States of West-Africa*. Chicago: Rand McNally & Company 1966.

¹⁷² Cf. Eisenstadt: *Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism*, 1973, p. 7.

¹⁷³ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

¹⁷⁴ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 12 and p. 60.

¹⁷⁵ Theobald, Robin: *Patrimonialism (Research Note)*. In: *World Politics*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 4, 1982 (pp. 548-559), p. 555.

¹⁷⁶ The extensive literature on these aspects has not been consulted in its entirety, but among the various works in question, two significant contributions to the debate ought to be highlighted: Schmidt, Steffen W.; Guasti, Laura; Landé, Carl H.; Scott, James C. (eds.): *Friends, Followers, and Factions. A Reader in Political Clientelism*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press 1977 and Eisenstadt, S.N.; Lemarchand, René (eds.): *Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development*. (Contemporary Political Sociology, Vol. 3). Beverly Hills, London: SAGE Publications 1981. On ‘belly politics’ see Bayart, Jean-François: *The State in Africa. The Politics of the Belly*. London, New York: Longman 1993 (First published in French as *L’État en Afrique. La politique du ventre*. Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1989). According to Médard (op cit., 1996, p. 81), Richard Joseph suggested to replace the term patrimonialism with prebendalism, see Joseph, Richard: *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria, the Rise and the Fall of the Second Republic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1987.

usefulness of patrimonialism is the ability to subsume a variety of observed practices, which express variations of the same phenomenon, i.e. the lack of distinction between private and public domains, in one heuristic theoretical concept.¹⁷⁷ As an ideal type, patrimonialism demands generality, thereby avoiding confusion between the abstraction of the model and reality. This argument also explains the usefulness of patrimonialism for our objective, as it allows us to define a guide to the empirical analysis on the basis of the ideal typical character of a patrimonial system.

The application of patrimonialism as a theoretical framework for the study of political organization in “new” states initiated a debate on the necessity of adding the prefix “neo-“ to the Weberian concept. In order to avoid a-historicity by applying a concept of traditional authority to the analysis of modern political societies, the prefix expresses the understanding of a historically mixed type, in which a patrimonial order co-exists with rational-bureaucratic institutions as the foundation of legitimacy.¹⁷⁸ The process of decolonization led to the establishment of indigenous bureaucracies in “new” states, which simultaneously became patrimonialized and developed a specific functional logic: *“This patrimonialization of the state has brought about a “neo-patrimonial” state, a kind of hybrid of patrimonialism and bureaucracy.”*¹⁷⁹ Patrimonialism in “new” states is therefore not simply a survival of pre-modern, traditional forms of social organization, but the result of a specific historical experience. While Médard in 1982 referred to neo-patrimonialism as an ideal type¹⁸⁰, he later explained that he had adjusted his ideas in response to criticism, and concluded that *“in interpreting neo-patrimonialism only as a mixed and modal form, and not as an ideal type, there can be no more ambiguity.”*¹⁸¹ In regard to the application of patrimonialism in the present study, this theoretical discussion requires us to decide whether the prefix “neo-“ is necessary for describing the patrimonial logic of an insurgent ‘social order’. While the analytical method of ideal types provides the justification for an alternative application of patrimonialism, and therefore requires the use of the ideal typical term patrimonialism, our object of research does not represent an unaltered pre-modern, traditional form of social organization. Instead, an insurgent ‘social order’ is the result of historical developments, which triggered the emergence of insurgent movements, e.g. decolonization led to the foundation of liberation movements. Thus, although patrimonialism serves as term of reference in this study, an insurgent ‘social order’ represents a neo-patrimonial system. We will now attempt to adapt the analytical concept of patrimonialism to our present undertaking.

3.2.3. Patrimonialism in an Insurgent ‘Social Order’

From the discussion of patrimonialism in the previous section, we extract a cluster of factors of special concern for examining the interconnection between economic and political structures in an insurgent ‘social order’. The functioning of a patrimonial

¹⁷⁷ Cf. Médard: *The Underdeveloped State*, 1982, pp. 165-177, and Médard: *Patrimonialism, Neopatrimonialism*, 1996, pp. 81-82.

¹⁷⁸ Cf. Médard: *op cit.*, 1982, p. 180, and Médard: *op cit.*, 1996, p. 84.

¹⁷⁹ Médard: *op cit.*, 1996, p. 84.

¹⁸⁰ Neo-patrimonialism *“should be used as an ideal type: in systematically checking, for each particular political system, the reality to the model.”* Médard: *op cit.*, 1982, p. 186.

¹⁸¹ Médard: *op cit.*, 1996, p. 85.

system is defined by factors such as (a) elite co-operation, (b) distributive policies, and (c) the control system. According to a patrimonial logic, an insurgent administration organized in a patronage system stabilizes the role of the leader as the head of the organization and the main distributor of patronage goods and services. The central mechanism securing the functioning of the 'social order' is the distribution of economic wealth and benefits among members of the administration. The reproduction of this social system depends on the ability of the leader to reinforce his control over central political powers and economic resources, and the ability to prevent the development of rival groups with an autonomous access to sources of power. Hence, the establishment of a network institutionalizing mutual dependency between the authority and the elite, distributing welfare as well as the operation of a control system, are decisive factors in the perpetuation of a 'patrimonial insurgent social order'.

The use of physical force was in section 3.1. recognized as a superior dimension in the 'social order', influencing both the economic and the political structure. The use of physical force enables coercion, the ability to enforce discipline and consent, as well as the suppression of potential disruptions to the functioning of the specific order. Elites may use physical force for the purpose of hindering fragmentation, which can negatively influence their political, economic and social positions, thereby securing the continuation of the advantageous distribution of resources to the demanding elites. The use of physical force may also be related to a decrease in legitimacy. Weber noted that the monopoly of physical force is fundamental to internal control in a political organization, but should not be the central instrument for achieving obedience in a stable system of domination. Thus, increased use of violence in an insurgent 'social order' corresponds to decreasing legitimacy. On the basis of these considerations, including the use of violence for economic purposes, we examine the use of physical force in an insurgent 'social order' in this paper.

In regard to the impact of external factors on the internal functional logic of an insurgent 'social order', a question concerning the possible limited explanatory capability of patrimonialism emerges: To what extent can patrimonialism explain the character of an insurgent movement's interaction with the world market? External factors are primarily examined in the internal-external dimension of the economic structure. This exchange process is based on the ability to make trade agreements, i.e. to negotiate prices and quantities. Patrimonialism may be less useful for explaining the functioning of the internal-external dimension than a rational, profit-maximizing logic. Insurgent movements' interactions with external actors are, however, not limited to trade. Additional external influences are inherent in interactions with representatives of the world community, state and non-state actors, on issues such as emergency relief, financial assistance and negotiations of a cease-fire or a peace agreement. An insurgent movement must be familiar with the international diplomatic language and present its political attitudes in accordance with international norms, for example those of human rights and democracy. Similarly to the connections between insurgent movements and their international business partners, the communication with international political actors may also be based on the principle of rationality, rather than patrimonialism. The concept of patrimonialism therefore describes the main, but cannot be the exclusive, approach to the examination of the 'social order'. In order to assess the influence of external relations on the internal functional logic of an insurgent 'social order', the explanatory framework of patrimonialism must be supplemented. On the basis of this argument, we can then develop the central hypothesis.

3.3. Hypothesis

The distinction between an internal logic and the impact of external factors indicates that structural heterogeneity is a fundamental feature of an insurgent 'social order'. In his consideration of the structure of societal change in developing societies, Jung presented structural heterogeneity, observable in the co-existence of interdependent traditional and modern elements, as the essence of his argument.¹⁸² Uneven historical processes have led to a "patchwork of contradicting societal elements"¹⁸³ which transforms traditional forms of political organization, patterns of material production and values in context of modern elements.¹⁸⁴ As a social phenomenon, this process of transforming traditional forms of social organization, both co-existing with and reciprocally influenced by modern forms of organization, has been termed as "contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneous" (*Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen*).¹⁸⁵ The actions of 'big men' in neo-patrimonial African states is explained in accordance with this concept of the 'contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneous': "Caught in a complex network of international, transnational, regional, local and personal ties, the 'big man entrepreneur' must act according to a hybrid normative setting of tradition and modernity at the same time."¹⁸⁶ The analytical tool for the analysis of hybrid forms of social organization is the ideal typical differentiation between modern and traditional societies.¹⁸⁷ With reference to structural heterogeneity and hybrid forms of authority, a hypothesis on the internal functional logic of an insurgent 'social order' is introduced, which accounts for external influence. Hence, both the internal, societal dimension and the international level are combined in the hypothesis. The central argument is that the logic of the internal system's organization differs from the logic underlying the functioning of the external relations, and thus, creates a hybrid internal logic in the 'social order'.

The internal system of authority in an insurgent 'social order' is dominated by a patrimonial network institutionalizing mutual dependency between the elites and the ruler, in which the central functional mechanism is the ruler's monopoly on political authority and economic resources. An internal control system is installed in order to enforce coherence and consent from soldiers and civilians. The use of physical force is intensified when the basis of legitimacy and the symbolic reproduction erodes. The functional logic of external relations is economic and legal rationality. The co-existence of a patrimonial logic and the modern rational logic results in a hybridization of the insurgent 'social order'.

¹⁸² Cf. Jung: Tradition-Moderne-Krieg, 1995, p. 188.

¹⁸³ Jung: Political Sociology of World Society, 2001, p. 456.

¹⁸⁴ Cf. Jung: Tradition-Moderne-Krieg, 1995, pp. 185-188.

¹⁸⁵ Cf. Jung: Political Sociology of World Society, 2001, p. 456. Jung elaborates this concept in his dissertation, see Jung: Tradition-Moderne-Krieg, 1999, pp. 159ff.

¹⁸⁶ Jung: Political Sociology of World Society, 2001, p. 457.

¹⁸⁷ Jung introduced ideal typical criteria for modern capitalist and traditional societies in Jung: Tradition-Moderne-Krieg, 1995, pp. 123-146.

4. The UNITA ‚Social Order‘ in Angola

War has been ravaging in Angola for four decades. The liberation war (1961-1975) was succeeded by an internal war, in which the insurgent movement UNITA fought against the Angolan state, which has been governed by the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA) since independence was attained in 1975. The social consequences are devastating, expressed by Angola's ranking as number 146 out of 162 countries in the 2001 Human Development Report.¹⁸⁸ Absurdly enough, the protracted nature of the Angolan conflict defines its attractiveness for our theoretical objective. The central analytical question is how political and economic structures have interacted and shaped the functional logic of the UNITA 'social order' over time. The perpetuation of the conflict suggests that UNITA has managed to establish a viable organization for the reproduction of both its political authority and its economic system. The insurgent movement UNITA therefore well suits our purpose of observing patterns of social organization over time. The availability of sources is another reason for choosing UNITA as a case study, as UNITA is a rather well documented insurgent force. Scholarly analysis, in particular by William Minter (1994), who based his study on interviews with several ex-UNITA combatants, and Linda Heywood (2000, 1998, 1989), who emphasizes Angolan rural history and culture, are among the most prominent sources on UNITA's political structure. Additionally, a number of foreign journalists visited UNITA in the 1970s and the 1980s and provided eyewitness reports on the organization of UNITA-administered villages. Among the most well known journalistic travelers are Franz Sitte, Leon Dash and Fred Bridgland. Particularly, the massive book by Bridgland (1986) is a useful source on the early years of UNITA's insurgency, although the political context of the Cold War must be kept in mind when examining these sources. On the development of UNITA's political structure since the late 1980s, the fortnightly journal *Africa Confidential* (AC) was informative, as were also various publications by Human Rights Watch (HRW). Recently, three reports published by the United Nations (UN) have contributed to novel information on both UNITA's political and economic structure. These reports were the result of investigative work done by two committees established by the Security Council in order to monitor the application of sanctions against UNITA. The success of the first committee, the *Panel of Experts* (Res. 1237 (1999)) under the leadership of the Canadian Ambassador Robert Fowler, led to the establishment of a Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA (Res. 1295 (2000)).¹⁸⁹ A further source, which is particularly informative on UNITA's economic structure, is a detailed study published by the South African Institute of Security Studies (Cilliers & Dietrich 2000).

¹⁸⁸ United Nations Development Program (UNDP): Human Development Report 2001. Retrieved March 22, 2002 from www.undp.org/hdr2001

¹⁸⁹ The three UN reports are: Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA, S/2000/20310, March 10, 2000 (the so-called "Fowler-Report"), Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions, S/2000/1225, December 21, 2000 and Supplementary Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions Against UNITA, S/2001/966, October 12, 2001. Reports henceforth quoted as Fowler-Report 2000; Final-Report 2000, and Supplementary-Report 2001.

The sources will be critically analyzed, keeping in mind the Angolan information deficit, described as “few solid facts, merely disputed versions of reality.”¹⁹⁰ The same scholar stated that “one can only relate to Angola, with some sort of dignity, through first hand experience”¹⁹¹, thereby disputing the believability of external observers. In particular, the structures of UNITA’s system of social organization and interaction with the world market have been described as mainly concealed: “With respect to territories held by UNITA, **much remains unknown, including their social organisation and their links with wider (shadowy) regional economies.**”¹⁹² In contrast, the following analysis is a qualitative study of the form of insurgent organization based exclusively on thorough analysis of the available literature. Aspects, on which more information is required, are identified. This study therefore illustrates the procedure for critically examining sources pertaining to complex realities.

Prior to our inquiry into the UNITA ‘social order’, we shall recapitulate the history of the war.

4.1. The History of the Angolan Civil War

The war in Angola, designated as “the World’s Worst War”¹⁹³, began as a struggle for independence from Portuguese colonial domination in the liberation war 1961-1975. Since the late 15th century, the Portuguese had gradually extended their domination over the territory, which is now Angola. In an international environment favoring anti-colonialism subsequent to the Second World War, the Portuguese reluctance to decolonize and prepare their colonies for a stable transition, was seen as a reflection upon the authoritarian policies of the Salazarist regime of *Estado Novo* (New State, 1928-1974). The Portuguese center was economically dependent on the exploitation of the colonial economic resources.¹⁹⁴

The anti-colonial struggle was dominated by three liberation movements, which displayed distinctive perceptions of Angolan nationalism.¹⁹⁵ The three movements have been described as representatives of the main ethno-linguistic groups, the Ovimbundu (35-40 percent of Angola’s population) of the Central Highlands, the Mbundu (25 per

¹⁹⁰ Potgieter, Jakkie: “Taking Aid From the Devil Himself.” UNITA’s Support Structures. In: Cilliers; Dietrich: Angola’s War Economy, 2000 (pp. 255-273), p. 255.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Emphases added. Power, Marcus: Patrimonialism & Petro-Diamond Capitalism: Peace, Geopolitics & the Economic of War in Angola. In: Review of African Political Economy, No. 90, 2001 (pp. 489-502), p. 500.

¹⁹³ Shiner, Cindy: The World’s Worst War. In: Africa Report, Vol. 39, No. 1, 1994 (pp. 13-20), p. 13.

¹⁹⁴ Cf. Guimarães, Fernando Andresen: The Origins of the Angolan Civil War. Foreign Intervention and Domestic Political Conflict. London: Macmillan Press 1998, p. 15 and Hodges, Tony: Angola from Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism. Oxford: James Currey 2001, pp. 7-8.

¹⁹⁵ An additional, fourth liberation movement, the *Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda* (FLEC), was founded in 1963 with the objective of achieving independence for the oil-rich northern enclave Cabinda. FLEC split into several factions in the 1980s, but continued a “low-intensity” conflict in the 1990s. A definitive settlement of the Cabinda-issue has not yet been achieved. FLEC will be excluded in the remaining analysis, due to limited relevance to the core question. On the recent development in Cabinda, see Teege, Silja: Angola (Cabinda). In: Rabehl, Thomas: Das Kriegsgeschehen 1998. Daten und Tendenzen der Kriege und bewaffnete Konflikte. Opladen: Leske + Budrich 1998, pp. 68-70.

cent) of Luanda and its hinterland, and the Bakongo (15 percent) of the northern areas. A simplistic ethno-linguistic interpretation of the conflict is, however, deficient. As we will see, other structural distinctions considerably shaped the relationship between the three movements. As one of the earliest movements founded in 1956, the MPLA combined Angolan nationalism with Marxist ideology. The Mbundu was their primary political constituency, with a considerable membership of urban *mestiço* (mixed race) and *assimilado* (Portuguese status acquired through education).¹⁹⁶ At the outbreak of the war, the *União das Populações de Angola* (UPA)¹⁹⁷ was the most prominent liberation movement. In 1962 the UPA joined a united front, which was renamed *Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola* (FNLA), and initiated the Angolan revolutionary government in exile (GRAE).¹⁹⁸ The FNLA represented a distinct anti-Communist form of Angolan nationalism, and attracted support primarily from the Bakongo. The third liberation movement, UNITA, was established in 1966 by a former prominent member of the FNLA, Jonas Savimbi. His resignation from the FNLA was eventually caused by dissatisfaction with the centralized leadership of Holden Roberto, the leader of the FNLA. With claim to the support of his fellow Ovimbundu, Savimbi and UNITA mobilized the largest ethnic group in Angola, which had not yet been recruited by the other movements. UNITA positioned itself ideologically as anti-Communist, but established a radical image by incorporating the teachings of Mao.¹⁹⁹

Despite their links to different regional constituencies, the liberation movements unanimously advocated Angolan nationalism and the independence of the Angolan state from Portugal. Regardless of their similarities and the primary aim of independence, however, the three movements were unable to establish a united front against Portuguese rule. Angola's independence was therefore only indirectly a result of internal efforts, and was rather strongly influenced by the military coup in Portugal on April 25, 1974.²⁰⁰ Subsequently, the Portuguese government initiated negotiations with the three movements, which culminated in the Alvor Accords on January 15, 1975. Independence was scheduled for November 11, 1975, but the process of colonial withdrawal and transfer of authority to an interim government rapidly collapsed into a fierce rivalry between the three movements. The inability to establish a transitional arrangement, combined with the rapid exodus of the Portuguese regime, created a power vacuum in which the internal Angolan power struggle, underlying the anti-colonial struggle, materialized.

The underlying causes of the antagonism between the three movements are explained with reference to ethnicity, socio-economic disparities, ideological differences and personal rivalries. While the ethnic aspect does shed light on the links

¹⁹⁶ For a concise account of the origin of the MPLA, see Guimarães: *The Origins of the Angolan Civil War*, 1998, pp. 37-48.

¹⁹⁷ The UPA was originally known as *União das Populações do Norte de Angola* (UPNA), a movement founded in Congo-Zaire in the 1950s. The political aim of the movement was the restoration of the ancient Kingdom of Kongo, located in the northern areas of Angola and in neighboring countries. This regional focus prompted accusations of an ethnic political agenda.

¹⁹⁸ On the origin of UPNA, UPA, FNLA and the GRAE, see Guimarães: *The Origins of the Angolan Civil War*, 1998, pp. 48-57.

¹⁹⁹ Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 76-82.

²⁰⁰ Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 85-86, Hodges: *Angola from Afro-Stalinism*, 2001, p. 9 and Cornwell, Richard: *The War for Independence*. In: Cilliers; Dietrich (eds.): *Angola's War Economy*, 2000 (pp. 43-67), pp. 56-57.

between the liberation movements and their primary supporters, it does not explain the origin of the conflict. This is partly due to the frequent interactions between the different groups, observable in the membership of the movements, and partly due to the lack of an ethnic component in the respective political agendas.²⁰¹ Alternatively, the inter-group conflicts became critical in context of socio-economic disparities emanating in colonial society. The distinction between urban capitalist society (MPLA) and rural peasant societies (FNLA, UNITA) has been interpreted both as a center-periphery conflict (the dependency perspective) and as a class struggle.²⁰² Personal rivalries during the anti-colonial struggle, e.g. between Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi and internal quarrels within the MPLA, further aggravated the structural disparities. The broad ideological dispute between Marxists and anti-Marxists fortified these cleavages. The rural nationalists of the FNLA and UNITA, whose primary supporters were disadvantaged under colonial rule due to lack of educational opportunities, explicitly distanced themselves from the MPLA. The other movements criticized the MPLA-constituency of urban *mestiço* and *assimilado*, as these were considered the main beneficiaries of colonialism.²⁰³ Multiple causal variables generated the impression of a “*complex interplay of personal ambition and regional factors that created turmoil in the anti-colonial forces in the early 1960s.*”²⁰⁴ The internal animosities, linked to different identities, socio-economic disparities and the historical experience of colonialism and anti-colonialism, are ingrained in the dynamic of the Angolan conflict.

An external component was added to the internal power struggle when the liberation movements attracted foreign assistance after 1974.²⁰⁵ The Soviet Union aided the MPLA, while the USA assisted the FNLA and UNITA. In 1975, Cuba sent military advisors and ground troops to support the MPLA. In the same year the regional hegemon South Africa entered the conflict in alliance with the FNLA and UNITA, motivated by the objective of undermining nationalist aspirations in South-African ruled Namibia.²⁰⁶ With the assistance of Cuban troops and Soviet aid, the MPLA gained

²⁰¹ This does not exclude that identity was used in political propaganda, but it emphasizes the importance of not relying exclusively on one explanatory variable. The three movements used ethnic ideological appeals only to a limited extent. Luansi argues explicitly that an ethnic-regionalist factor was partly present in the policies of the FNLA, but does not apply in regard to the MPLA and UNITA. Cf. Luansi, Lukonde: Angola. Zwischen regionaler Hegemonie und nationalem Selbstmord. Die Suche nach einer Lösung. Marburg: Tectum Verlag 2001, p. 104.

²⁰² In his article, Clarence-Smith discusses Heimer's conceptualization of the Angolan conflict as a distinction between a central capitalist society and a cluster of rural, pre-capitalist societies. Clarence-Smith favors the class perspective, i.e. a distinction between a capitalist class and a class of peasant societies. See Clarence-Smith, W.G.: Class Structures and Class Struggles in Angola in the 1970s. Review Article. In: Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1980 (pp. 109-126). See Heimer, Franz-Wilhelm: Der Entkolonisierungskonflikt in Angola. München: Weltforum-Verlag 1979.

²⁰³ Cf. Guimarães: The Origins of the Angolan Civil War, 1998, p. 33, pp. 80-81, and Pereira, Anthony W.: The Neglected Tragedy: The Return to War in Angola. In: Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 32 (1), 1994 (pp. 1-28), pp. 5-7.

²⁰⁴ Heywood, Linda: Contested Power in Angola, 1840s to the Present. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press 2000, p. 165.

²⁰⁵ For a detailed analysis of the externalization of the conflict 1974-76, see Guimarães: The Origins of the Angolan Civil War, 1998, pp. 85-113.

²⁰⁶ There is some insecurity regarding the date of the resumption of Soviet and US aid, as well as the date of deployment of South African and Cuban troops. In his extensive study, Guimarães states that

control of the capital Luanda and proclaimed the *People's Republic of Angola* with Agostinho Neto as president on November 11, 1975. In response, the FNLA and UNITA announced a united government of the *Democratic People's Republic of Angola*, which soon failed. Subsequently, political changes in the USA led to the adoption of the Clark Amendment in December 1975, according to which US support to the anti-MPLA forces temporarily came to an end. This development, combined with the retreat of South Africa in 1976, significantly changed the military balance, most clearly recognizable in the deterioration of the FNLA as a fighting force after 1976.²⁰⁷ With control of the post-colonial state, the MPLA emerged as the victorious party and attempted to rebuild a strong and centralized state with the backing of Cuba and the Soviet Union.

In contrast to the FNLA, UNITA was, with South African support, able to reorganize and establish an effective insurgent movement. Based on the guerrilla strategy of "hit-and-run", UNITA soon launched attacks on important infrastructure, such as the Benguela Railway, and aimed at hurting the MPLA economically.²⁰⁸ During the 1980s UNITA expanded its military capability to a conventional level, and with assistance from the South African Defense Force (SADF), established control over large territories in the southern provinces and the Central Highlands. UNITA practically exercised parallel sovereignty with the MPLA government, functioning as a "state-within-the-state" (quasi-state).²⁰⁹ Under the Reagan-Administration (1980-1988) US involvement resumed, and after the repeal of the Clark Amendment in 1985, direct assistance followed.²¹⁰ In response, Soviet arms transfers to the MPLA increased, as did the continuous presence of Cuban troops, reaching a height of 50,000 troops in the mid-1980s. The internal conflict in Angola became heavily entrenched in the bipolar struggle for international hegemony and came to be viewed as a 'proxy war'. Certainly, the external intervention during the crucial years between 1974-76, significantly

the beginning of Soviet aid to the MPLA has been variously suggested as between August and October 1974. The CIA presumably began aiding the FNLA in July 1974 and UNITA in the summer 1975. In August 1975, South Africa began to set up training camps both for the FNLA and UNITA, and in October 1975, the South African Defense Force (SADF) entered Angola. Cuban troops were airlifted into Angola in November 1975. The Cuban intervention was then considered a response to South Africa's presence in the country, since Cuban troops arrived in November while SADF was in Angola already in October. Bridgland, however, argued that Cuban assistance arrived between March and May 1975, as noted by the head of the CIA Task Force to Angola, John Stockwell. According to this version, Cuban advisors arrived before UNITA began to receive assistance from both the USA and South Africa. These attempts to justify the external intervention by determining who responded to whom, makes erroneously clear how preoccupied Angola observers have been with external factors. See Guimarães: op cit., pp. 100-104, pp. 109-111 and Bridgland: Jonas Savimbi, 1986, pp. 572-574.

²⁰⁷ Cf. Guimarães: op cit., pp. 112-113 and Bridgland: op cit., pp. 226-227. FNLA reentered the political scene in Angola in the early 1990s and participated in the election in September 1992.

²⁰⁸ De Beer, Hannelie; Gamba, Virginia: The Arms Dilemma: Resources for Arms or Arms for Resources? In: Cilliers; Dietrich: Angola's War Economy, 2000 (pp. 69-93), p. 74.

²⁰⁹ Cf. Pereira: The Neglected Tragedy, 1994, p. 9, and Paffenholz, Thania: Nach mehr als 30 Jahren Krieg: Waffenstillstand in Angola. Inhalt – Hintergründe – Empfehlungen. In: HSFK-Standpunkte, Nr. 1, Januar 1995 (pp. 1-11), p. 4.

²¹⁰ While the Clark Amendment prohibited direct US assistance, other countries were encouraged by US officials to provide aid. For example, the Chinese delivery of military goods to UNITA in 1979 was presumably encouraged by the US, as the then National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski functioned as instigator. The Reagan-Administration promoted the involvement of foreign troops to combat communism around the world, known as the 'Reagan Doctrine', without providing direct military assistance to UNITA until after 1985. Cf. Bridgland: Jonas Savimbi, 1986, pp. 345-348.

influenced the course of the conflict, and in order to attract continued external support, the belligerents adjusted their political agendas in accordance with their alliances. The liberation movements thus achieved external support by successfully presenting their interests in the international context of the Cold War, i.e. by “*importing an international rivalry*.”²¹¹ The internal power struggle, however, continued to define conflict dynamism. The importance of domestic factors was evident when the external initiation and backing of an Angolan peace process, following the international changes in the late 1980s, collapsed with the resumption of conflict in 1992.

In their diplomatic efforts to reach a peace agreement in Angola, US strategists linked the issue of Namibian independence to the withdrawal of Cuban troops. After hesitant negotiations throughout the 1980s, an agreement was reached in 1988.²¹² Subsequently, the external backers to the warring parties in Angola pushed for negotiations, which led to the signing of the Bicesse Accords in May 1991. Prior to the talks, the MPLA had adopted a new political agenda, favoring a multi-party system, and liberalized the economy.²¹³ The peace agreement foresaw the incorporation of UNITA’s armed branch into the unified armed forces, the *Forças Armadas de Angolanas* (FAA).²¹⁴ In addition, the agreement entailed plans on demobilization, the extension of government administration to UNITA controlled areas, as well as parliamentary and presidential elections. The UN established the *United Nations Angola Verification Mission II* (UNAVEM II) to monitor and support the transformation to peace.²¹⁵ This process, however, developed tediously, and the time schedule for the military reforms was repeatedly extended and completed only a few days ahead of the elections on 29-30 September 1992. The weaknesses of the implementation process proved fatal, as UNITA rejected the election results, which were approved by international observers, and resumed fighting. As explanations for the failure of the peace process, analysts emphasized the inadequate UN mandate and its resources, the short time frame for implementation, the failure to ensure the fulfillment of the military conditions, the decision to carry out the elections despite unsatisfactory verification and the lack of a power sharing arrangement between the two main protagonists.²¹⁶ Having lost the presidency to MPLA’s José Eduardo dos Santos, Savimbi led UNITA in the most violent phase of the Angolan conflict. Despite the withdrawal of external support in the

²¹¹ Guimarães: *The Origins of the Angolan Civil War*, 1998, p. 199.

²¹² In the New York Accords 1988, or ‘Tripartite Agreement’, Angola, Cuba and South Africa agreed on Cuban and South African withdrawal, and UN supervised elections in Namibia. UNITA was not a party to this agreement. Cf. Hodges: *Angola from Afro-Stalinism*, 2001, pp. 11-12.

²¹³ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

²¹⁴ UNITA’s armed branch, the *Forças Armadas Libertação Angola* (FALA) and MPLA’s military arm, the *Forças Armadas Populares Libertação de Angola* (FAPLA) were included in the united FAA, as defined in the peace agreement in 1991. To avoid an inflation of acronyms, exclusively UNITA and MPLA are referred to throughout the text, without distinguishing between the political organization and military units of the movements. When necessary, specifications are made.

²¹⁵ UNAVEM I verified the withdrawal of Cuban forces.

²¹⁶ Cf. Tvedten, Inge: *The Angolan Debacle*. In: *Journal for Democracy*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1993 (pp. 108-118), p. 117, Marcum, John: *Angola: War Again*. In: *Current History*, Vol. 92, No. 574, 1993 (pp. 218-223), p. 223, and Paffenholz: *Waffenstillstand in Angola*, 1995, p. 7. See also Anstee, the UN Special Representative during the transition phase, from March 1992 to June 1993, for a thorough examination of this process: Anstee, Margaret Joan: *Orphan of the Cold War. The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992-1993*. London: Macmillan Press 1996.

early 1990s, UNITA used its control over diamond mining areas and links to ‘friendly’ states and foreign business representatives to establish an intricate net of informal trading. The large weapons surplus caused by the collapse of the Communist block was beneficial to UNITA’s supply chains. UNITA initially achieved a military edge, but the government used oil revenues to rearm²¹⁷, and eventually, the development of the military situation led to renewed peace negotiations under the auspices of the USA, Russia and Portugal, the so-called Troika. With the signing of the Lusaka Protocol on November 20, 1994, a new attempt to resolve the Angolan conflict began. Again, the demobilization of UNITA proved difficult. The UN, which mobilized UNAVEM III, again experienced difficulties in influencing the situation, and in 1997, the UN withdrew its troops. A small observer mission, the *Missão de Observação das Nações Unidas em Angola* (MONUA) remained until 1999. The UN instead focused on close monitoring of the sanctions imposed on UNITA. Sanctions on the delivery of arms, military equipment and fuel to UNITA were adopted in 1993, and extended to UNITA bank accounts, foreign travel by UNITA representatives and the closing of UNITA offices abroad in 1997. Finally, in 1998 sanctions were introduced on diamond-trade, prohibiting the purchase of diamonds from UNITA or UNITA controlled areas.²¹⁸ Regardless of the intentions declared by the parties to the conflict in the Lusaka Protocol, violent clashes continued and the definitive resumption of war was obvious when President Dos Santos in December 1998 declared that the only path to peace is war.²¹⁹ In the renewed military offensive, the government troops initially suffered serious losses, but throughout 1999 they imposed major defeats on UNITA. While UNITA had been able to control over 50-80 percent of Angolan territory during the 1990s²²⁰, the insurgents were now forced to withdraw to the bush and readopted guerrilla tactics. Although the government was confident it would win the military battle, both parties seemed unable to achieve military control over major areas in the country. In 2001 there were reports on a willingness of leaders from both parties to negotiate. When Savimbi died in combat on February 22, 2002, renewed demands for negotiations emerged, and on April 4, 2002 a peace agreement was signed. During the last years, there were indications that UNITA was suffering from increasing transaction costs in their diamond trade, an effect of the UN sanctions imposed in 1998.²²¹ The defections of high-profile UNITA-representatives throughout the 1990s, and the considerable number of deserters, which between December 2000 and August 2001 amounted to 4,500, led to speculations about a deteriorating insurgent force.²²²

²¹⁷ The government used oil revenues to finance the military expansion, justified by referring to ‘national security’. The oil industry accounts for almost 50 percent of all economic activity in Angola, 58 per cent of GDP in 1996 and 48,5 percent in 1997. The largest expenditure is on defense, comprising 35 per cent of total government expenditure in 1996 and 36,3 percent in 1997. Estimates adopted from a report by the British NGO Global Witness: *A Crude Awakening*. London 1999, pp. 7-8. These statistics are merely indications, due to the lack of transparency in the accounting of the Angolan economy.

²¹⁸ See Fowler-Report 2000, paragraphs 3-4.

²¹⁹ Cf. Hodges: *Angola from Afro-Stalinism*, 2001, p. 16.

²²⁰ Cf. Johnson, Dominic: *Warlords außer Kontrolle. Angolas andauernde Tragödie und der Krieg in der Region*. In: *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, No. 3, 1999 (S. 336-343), p. 338.

²²¹ Cf. Hodges: *Angola from Afro-Stalinism*, 2001, p. 17.

²²² See *Angola Peace Monitor*, published by ACTSA (Action for Southern Africa), Issue No. 11, Vol. VII, 1. August 2001. Retrieved January 20, 2001 from www.anc.org.za/angola/apm0711.html

During the 1990s, the dynamic development of the conflict further aggravated the historical socio-economic disparities. Urbanization, intensified by the military actions of the contenders, has led to an uprooting of traditional social structures.²²³ The number of internally displaced persons (IDP), at the end of 2001 estimated at 4,1 million, roughly one third of the approximately 12 million inhabitants, is an unmistakable indication of a critical societal situation.²²⁴ Political elites have used identity as a prominent argument in their competition for power, particularly in the 1992 election campaign, as UNITA emphasized fear of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and disadvantages for the Ovimbundu, and the MPLA focused on an intellectual, urban image.²²⁵ The resource wealth of diamonds and oil benefited the administration of the patrimonial state, and corruption is widespread among military and political elites incorporated in the clientelist system of the MPLA-state.²²⁶ A renowned newspaper therefore concludes: *“Only a war economy could veil the extent of enrichment and corruption.”*²²⁷

The paradox of a destructive war co-existing with the generation of enormous economic profits has emanated in the suggestion that a “new” war is observable in Angola. According to Clapham’s terminology, the Angolan war began as a ‘liberation insurgency’, which after independence in 1975 continued as a ‘reform insurgency’, succeeded in 1992 by a ‘warlord insurgency’.²²⁸ Additionally, Cillier suggested the term ‘resource-based insurgency’, which overlaps with the term warlord insurgency, but reflects upon the international context of these conflicts, as insurgents interact with global markets. The war in Angola represents such a category because it *“demonstrates the dynamics of a new type of regional and economically determined insurgency war, much more closely linked to the regional informal economy and even the global economy and its criminal component than previous wars. (...) As with all insurgencies, so-called resource wars are essentially internal in character and regional in their dynamics.”*²²⁹ Yet another scholar argues that UNITA’s current insurgency against the Angolan state is best described as a ‘criminal insurgency’, due to the lack of political

²²³ Cf. Pereira: The Neglected Tragedy, 1994, p. 12 and Paffenholz: Waffenstillstand in Angola, 1995, p. 4.

²²⁴ See Norwegian Refugee Council: Updated Background Information on the IDP situation in Angola. Retrieved April 14, 2002, from www.idpproject.org

²²⁵ Cf. Johnson: Warlords außer Kontrolle, 1999, p. 339. Both parties have been accused of conducting tactical killings, especially shortly after the election in 1992.

²²⁶ On clientelism and corruption in Angola, see Messiant, Christine: The Eduardo Dos Santos Foundation: Or, How Angola’s Regime is Taking Over Civil Society. In: African Affairs, 100, 2001 (pp. 287-309).

²²⁷ Author’s translation. Neue Züricher Zeitung: Fehlende Wirtschaftsreformen in Angola. Herrschende Klasse pflegt die eigenen Konti, July 31, 2001, p. 13.

²²⁸ Clapham categorized insurgencies as ‘Liberation insurgencies’ with the objective of achieving independence from minority or colonial rule; ‘Separatist Insurgencies’ with the objective of establishing a separate state or special autonomous status for a particular people or region; ‘Reform Insurgencies’ with the objective of reforming the government structure; and ‘Warlord Insurgencies’ with poorly defined aims, largely associated with the personal ambitions of the leader, but may include establishing an organizational structure separate from the state system. See Clapham: Africa and the International System, 1996, pp. 209-212 and Clapham: Analysing African Insurgencies, 1998, pp. 6-7.

²²⁹ Cilliers, Jakkie: Resource Wars – A New Type of Insurgency. In: Cilliers; Dietrich (eds.): Angola’s War Economy, 2000 (pp. 1-19), p. 16.

objectives and the dominance of economic motives.²³⁰ These attempts at re-labeling the war in Angola draw attention to the dynamic development of the conflict, but must be criticized for the tendency to isolate the resource-base as the single determinant. The central argument in this paper is that UNITA's economic strategies must be analyzed within the context of the political organization of the insurgency. A theoretical framework was developed for the isolated analysis of political and economic structures respectively. To begin with, we examine the political structure of the UNITA 'social order', with an analytical focus on the foundation of legitimacy.

4.2. The Political Structure of the UNITA 'Social Order'

4.2.1. *The Genesis and Consolidation of UNITA*

Under the leadership of Jonas Malheiro Savimbi (1934-2002), a group of liberation activists entered the province Moxico in Eastern Angola from Zambia in 1966 and established the first anti-colonial movement with a leadership present inside Angola. While the leadership of the internationally well-known movements, the FNLA and MPLA, resided in exile in Kinshasa and Brazzaville respectively, Savimbi succeeded in implementing his central political tenet of living among the people. Based on the teachings of Mao, the mobilization of civilians was considered crucial for effective guerrilla warfare.²³¹ UNITA's founding conference took place on March 13, 1966, as around 67 delegates elected a Central Committee and adopted a Constitution.

Prior to the establishment of an internal base in 1966, Savimbi gathered his political experience in interaction with Angolan and other African liberation activists in the European exile community and on international conferences. Savimbi left Angola in 1958, where he grew up in the Central Highlands, to study in Portugal, where he soon became involved in the Communist opposition movement associated with MPLA's Agostinho Neto.²³² In his early phase of political activity, Savimbi also met MPLA's main rival, Holden Roberto of the UPA/FNLA, but Savimbi expressed his primary sympathies with the 'progressive' MPLA. From this diverse experience with exile politics, in February 1961 Savimbi nevertheless decided to join the UPA/FNLA. He was appointed Secretary General of the FNLA and later Foreign Minister of the GRAE.²³³

²³⁰ Cf. Malaquias, Assis: *Diamonds are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: The Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy*. In: *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (pp. 311-325), 2001.

²³¹ Cf. Bridgland: *Jonas Savimbi*, 1986, p. 77 and Marcum, John: *The Angolan Revolution, Volume II: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare 1962-1976*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1978, pp. 182-183. Savimbi based his strategy on Mao's *Military Writings*, in which the importance of popular support, political organization and self-reliance was elaborated.

²³² Savimbi's political activities soon attracted the attention of the Portuguese secret police, the *Polícia Internacional de Defesa de Estado* (PIDE). After imprisonment, Savimbi escaped to Switzerland in 1959, where he earned a diploma in political science, on the basis of which he is addressed as "Dr. Savimbi" in UNITA publications. On Savimbi's childhood and his experience in Portugal and Switzerland, see Bridgland: *Jonas Savimbi*, 1986, pp. 29-64.

²³³ Wolfers and Bergerol critically remark that "*the mechanism of this unprecedented advance is not recorded*." Bridgland's account of Savimbi's interaction with central political figures while studying abroad indicates that personal relations, combined with FNLA's attempt to broaden the regional diversity in its leadership, played a crucial role. The details of his promotion, however, are not fully

Savimbi's political engagement was dominated by disparities with Roberto, and as an advocate of reform, Savimbi became the leading figure of an opposition group within the FNLA/GRAE. On a meeting of the *Organization of African Unity* (OAU) in July 1964, Savimbi publicly criticized Roberto's FNLA of tribalism in favor of the Bakongo, accused Roberto of incompetent administration, including corruption, and restated his disagreement with FNLA's military strategy. Ultimately, Savimbi announced his resignation.²³⁴ Due to the increasing dissatisfaction with the co-ordination of the anti-colonial struggle among the fractured Angolan exile community, a number of experienced activists joined Savimbi in his effort to establish a third liberation movement. Both experienced military and political leaders from the FNLA, Angolan students in exile, among them Jorge Valentim who later became the information secretary of UNITA, as well as a number of local leaders from different areas in southern Angola, supported Savimbi.²³⁵ From his broad political experience, Savimbi could also rely on support from various international and African diplomatic contacts. Emphasizing the importance of mobilization from inside, UNITA promoted an inclusive approach but nevertheless positioned itself as the representative of the majority groups inside Angola, primarily the Ovimbundu, but also Chokwe and other sub-groups in the south.²³⁶ Savimbi rejected a distinct ideological agenda, but emphasized the 'Christianity of Africans'. Marcum noted that these attitudes implied an exclusion of the Marxist and atheist MPLA.²³⁷ The reference to religion was of particular interest with regard to the Ovimbundu, as the activities of foreign Protestant missionaries since the late 19th century considerably influenced the development of a relatively autonomous Ovimbundu community. A successful appeal to the support of the Ovimbundu was dependent on the ability to establish an alliance with the Protestant church. Pro-MPLA authors argued that Savimbi exploited this sense of solidarity among Ovimbundu Protestants when he encouraged the Ovimbundu to unite. The appeal for unity was interpreted as a rejection of an inclusive approach to the struggle for independence.²³⁸ The political agenda of the new movement thus combined the acclamation of Mao with the rejection of ideology, applied the slogan of inclusiveness simultaneously with a regional-cultural focus, and the warning against superpower involvement did not halt UNITA representatives' plead for assistance both in the USA, in China and in Eastern Europe. One scholar has accordingly described UNITA's political framework as "*an ideological hotchpotch*" consisting of "*a loose mixture of terms such as 'socialism', 'liberation' and 'freedom' that betrayed a rather broad ideological scope lacking any cohesiveness.*"²³⁹ Hence, inconsistencies in UNITA's political agenda were noted already in the initial phase of its existence. An analytical focus on the foundation of

comprehended. Cf. Wolfers, Michael; Bergerol, Jane: *Angola in the Frontline*. London: Zed Press 1983, p. 194 and Bridgland: Jonas Savimbi, 1986, pp. 64-70.

²³⁴ Cf. Marcum: Vol. II, 1978, pp. 135-136 and Bridgland: Jonas Savimbi, 1986, pp. 73-79.

²³⁵ Marcum analyzed the various factions, which supported Savimbi in the early 1960s in greater detail, see Marcum: Vol. II, 1978, pp. 161-165.

²³⁶ Cf. Marcum: Vol. II, 1978, pp. 165-166 and Bridgland: Jonas Savimbi, 1986, p. 86. Savimbi explained his political attitude in correspondence with former missionaries from the United Church of Christ, New York. Marcum based his outline of UNITA's policy agenda on letters from Savimbi to a representative of this church.

²³⁷ Cf. Marcum: Vol. II, 1978, p. 380, footnote 250 from p. 166.

²³⁸ Cf. Wolfers; Bergerol: *Angola in the Frontline*, 1983, pp. 205-209.

²³⁹ Guimarães: *The Origins of the Angolan Civil War*, 1998, p. 81. "*Liberty, Negritude, and Socialism*" was a UNITA slogan during the transitional period 1974-76. Heywood: *Contested Power*, 2000, p. 187.

legitimacy, however, as elaborated in chapter two, helps explaining the ‘mixture’ of political ideas. From an analysis of UNITA’s political strategy in context of societal dynamics, the link between UNITA and rural communities in Central, Eastern and Southern regions is recognized as the core traditional foundation of UNITA’s legitimacy. In order to understand the foundation of UNITA’s legitimacy, the societal structure in the Central Highlands, which incorporated both Ovimbundu traditions and Protestant religious influences, is a core analytical variable. On this aspect, which is now examined in more detail, the extensive work of Linda Heywood is a profound source.

A central argument in Heywood’s study is that the emergence of anti-colonial activities among the Ovimbundu differed from experiences in other regions in certain fundamental ways. This formed a specific Ovimbundu nationalism, distinguished from Bakongo (FNLA) and Mbundu (MPLA) nationalism.²⁴⁰ The political and social activities of Ovimbundu Protestants dominated this alternative path to political awareness. From the late 19th century on, Ovimbundu, in affiliation with foreign Protestant missionaries, directed the establishment of community institutions such as schools, hospitals and churches in the Central Highlands and southern Angola. Protestant Ovimbundu were, to a larger extent than in other regions and in Catholic-influenced Ovimbundu regions, responsible for the conduct of community services. Their active involvement institutionalized a largely independent Ovimbundu-based organizational structure in the Protestant missionary regions. In contrast to the hierarchically (and racially) organized Catholic Church, the flexible and egalitarian Protestant structures provided Ovimbundu Protestants with opportunities to establish themselves as an influential social group. Traditional Ovimbundu beliefs and customs were adapted to the demands of their new faith. Ovimbundu institutions were incorporated into Protestant institutions, albeit with modifications, and Protestant Church representatives performed many of the same functions as traditional authorities.²⁴¹ Prior to the expansion of colonial rule to the Central Highlands between 1890-1904, the traditional structure of Ovimbundu society was dominated by around 20 different Ovimbundu kingdoms. Although these kingdoms were not politically unified, they had a common set of political traditions and cultural beliefs. These included the belief in hereditary rights and the supernatural powers of the ruler, as well as the acceptance of the ruler as the highest juridical authority, based on his traditional knowledge and wisdom.²⁴² Due to the growing influence of outsiders, the power and the privileges of the ruling lineage were in steady decline, but the Ovimbundu adjusted and created new societal institutions, which helped forming a distinct regional solidarity. The village structure established and managed by Protestant Ovimbundu facilitated the emergence of Pan-Ovimbundu solidarity, detached from colonial authority and instead closely linked to memories of pre-colonial times and resistance to Portuguese rule.

In Protestant educational institutions, the younger generation was taught to be proud of their historical heritage. By law everyone was required to speak Portuguese, but the local language Umbundu was frequently used in communication and in education on the history of Ovimbundu kingdoms in the Protestant schools. The increased use of

²⁴⁰ Cf. Heywood: *Contested Power*, 2000, pp. 154-161.

²⁴¹ Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 106-112.

²⁴² Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-4.

Umbundu after 1961 was evidence of a growing solidarity among Ovimbundu.²⁴³ In contrast to the other streams of nationalism, Ovimbundu nationalists gained distinctiveness from the knowledge of local languages, while particularly MPLA representatives knew only Portuguese. The oral tradition was particularly important in Ovimbundu tradition, as the older generations frequently relied on fables told in Umbundu when explaining values to the younger generation. UNITA incorporated this tradition into its political program, and used fables to mobilize local supporters. Hence, UNITA combined modern guerrilla strategy with traditional culture.²⁴⁴ Many younger Ovimbundu observed a clear contradiction between a distinct Ovimbundu legacy, disseminated through the Protestant educational institutions, and their parents' assimilation into Portuguese society. They began to question colonial policies and this eventually undermined their willingness to accept assimilation.²⁴⁵ When Ovimbundu in the late 1950s became increasingly involved in the anti-colonial struggle, the children of educated Ovimbundu Protestants were the leading figures. The father of Jonas Savimbi for example, Loth Savimbi, was a teacher educated by North-American Protestant missionaries. Instead of teaching, however, Loth accepted better-paid employment on the railway and gained prominence among the Ovimbundu for establishing churches and schools in villages along the Benguela Railway.²⁴⁶

Benefiting from close contacts with foreign missionaries, many Ovimbundu achieved scholarships to study abroad. The initiative to establish a distinct southern-based liberation movement came from this group. The personal experience with the politics of decolonization and Western democracy at European and American educational institutions among these initiators, combined with concern for Ovimbundu culture, set the standard for a political program based both on tradition and forward-looking political ideas, which also offers an explanation for the inconsistencies in UNITA's ideology.²⁴⁷ When Jonas Savimbi emerged as the spokesman of the southerners in the Angolan exile community in the early 1960s, the dominant ideological agendas of Marxism, Pan-Africanism and Socialism were abandoned, in favor of regionalism: *"To gain legitimacy within the anticolonial struggle, they pushed to protect southern interests and worked to secure parity for party positions for their members within the movements."*²⁴⁸ The Protestant Ovimbundu background influenced

²⁴³ Prior to 1961, young Christians used Umbundu primarily in conversation with the older generation. Cf. Ibid., p. 157.

²⁴⁴ The importance of fables in UNITA's political education was noted by Leon Dash, the American journalist who stayed with UNITA for seven months in 1977. Dash, Leon: *Teaching Politics With Fables*. The Washington Post, August 11, 1977, page A1. Bridgland portrays how Jonas Savimbi learned the history of the Central Highlands and local languages from his grandfather, a traditional chief. Cf. Bridgland: *Jonas Savimbi*, 1986, pp. 36-37.

²⁴⁵ Regarding the development of political awareness among Ovimbundu, Heywood argues that the younger generation of Ovimbundu was better prepared than their parents to challenge colonial policies. While their parents had been pre-occupied with establishing the Protestant institutions, which may explain their apolitical attitudes, the upbringing of the younger Ovimbundu was based on stories about their proud historical heritage, which urged the development of a Pan-Ovimbundu identity. Heywood also notes that it may be argued that the formation of a modern Ovimbundu-identity emerged from conscious policies of the liberation movements. Cf. Heywood: *Contested Power*, 2000, pp. 156-157.

²⁴⁶ Cf. Bridgland: *Jonas Savimbi*, 1986, pp. 35-36.

²⁴⁷ Cf. Heywood: *Contested Power in Angola*, 2000, p. 173.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 163.

the crystallization of UNITA as a third force in the Angolan liberation struggle: “[T]he Protestant network of schools, meetings, and religious services that had first brought the young leaders together helped them to create rapidly a new organization, including not only Ovimbundu, but other Angolans (such as those of the east) who had been a part of the Protestant mission field.”²⁴⁹ Although diverse regional groups were a part of UNITA-administered areas, Savimbi exploited the regionalist sentiments among Ovimbundu, and simultaneously propagated his image of a dedicated Angolan nationalist, multi-lingual and educated, willing to deal with the same hardship as his supporters by living in the bush inside Angola. Thus, nationalism and regionalism were pragmatically combined in the genesis of UNITA as a cohesive liberation movement: “Crucial to his [Savimbi’s (KS)] success was his reliance on Umbundu ethnic loyalty, expressed through language and customs, and his opportunism in portraying UNITA as a multi-ethnic movement with long historic ties (through long-distance trading and migrant labor) to other parts of Angola and to Zambia, South Africa, and Katanga.”²⁵⁰

After initial difficulties with coordinating its guerrilla strategy, UNITA applied a more coherent strategy from October 1968. UNITA combatants were instructed to establish contact with local chiefs and appeal to the sympathies of the peasants by referring to their cultural values and economic disadvantages in colonial society.²⁵¹ While Portuguese counter-insurgency tactics prevented large-scale infiltration of core Ovimbundu areas in the Central Highlands, UNITA successfully recruited supporters willing to resettle to newly established UNITA-villages, centered around the Lungue Bungu valley in Moxico-province. The organizational principles of Protestant villages in the Central Highlands, which had supported the development of Ovimbundu solidarity, served as a model for UNITA’s social organization from the early 1970s on.²⁵² The village structure significantly influenced the perception of UNITA inside Angola, and Heywood concludes that “the villages associated with UNITA helped to give the movement an aura of legitimacy.”²⁵³ Around this time, Savimbi began to invite Western journalists, who came to live with UNITA. In their eyewitness reports, they commented on the well-organized UNITA-villages and a high morale among the troops. Dash reported to have registered four hospitals and ten elementary schools in UNITA-controlled areas in 1973.²⁵⁴ With only few troops at its disposal in the early 1970s, estimated at 600-800²⁵⁵, the UNITA-administration had to rely on cooperative relations with the local population in order to establish territorial control and an area of influence at this early stage.

Beyond the mobilization of local villagers, the organizational structure in UNITA was institutionalized on seminal congresses and internal conferences of cadres.²⁵⁶ A

²⁴⁹ Heywood, Linda: *Unita and Ethnic Nationalism in Angola*. In: *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 27(1), 1989 (pp. 47-66), p. 52.

²⁵⁰ Heywood: *Contested Power in Angola*, 2000, p. 168.

²⁵¹ Cf. Marcum: Vol. II, 1978, pp. 167-168.

²⁵² Cf. Heywood: *Contested Power in Angola*, 2000, pp. 171-173.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

²⁵⁴ Bridgland referred extensively to the early visits of Sitte (1971) and Dash (1973), see Bridgland: Jonas Savimbi, 1986, pp. 118-126.

²⁵⁵ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 115 and p. 128.

²⁵⁶ On the following description of the congresses, see Marcum: Vol. II, 1978, pp. 166-167, p. 194 and Bridgland: Jonas Savimbi, 1986, p. 86, pp. 107-108, pp. 123-124.

number of policy-making congresses were organized, during which delegates discussed strategies, introduced new policies, such as the people's assemblies of 16 villages, and elected members to the central organs, the Central Committee and the Political Bureau. After the founding Congress in Muangai in 1966, the second UNITA congress was held on August 12-30, 1969 and a third congress took place on August 13-19, 1973. Central personalities in UNITA's leadership during these early years were Savimbi as president, nicknamed 'Molowini' (Son of the People); Miguel N'Zau Puna as Secretary General; Samuel Chitunda, whose nom de guerre was Samuel Chingunji, as chief of staff; José Samuel Chiwale as General Commander of the Armed Forces; Politbureau members Tony DaCosta Fernandes and Jorge Isaac Sangumba, and Savimbi's close aide Pedro 'Tito' Chingunji. Both N'Zau Puna and Fernandes originated from Cabinda and contributed to non-Ovimbundu representation in the top-leadership.

UNITA's organizational structure also included a military police, the '*Dragons*', a powerful unit responsible for ensuring soldiers' compliance.²⁵⁷ As the central figure, Savimbi was protected by a personal security force, established in 1969, which increased from 100 to 400 members within a year.²⁵⁸ UNITA evidently established a viable organizational system securing the central control of physical force. With regard to the examination of the foundation of legitimacy, however, the question is whether the hierarchically organized administration underpinned a rational-legal perception of legitimacy in Weber's terminology. Heywood notes that the establishment of formal institutions were, quite frankly, considered necessary for a professional movement: "*Moreover, by transforming UNITA into a full-fledged hierarchical organization with its own flag and symbol (the cockerel), its Central Committee, its youth and women's committee, and its party Congresses, Savimbi equipped UNITA with all the prerequisites of a nationalist movement.*"²⁵⁹ The unifying symbols (flag, cockerel) functioned as symbolic means of orientation, which additionally to the incentives for loyalty inherent in the social services provided in the UNITA-villages, contributed to the development of a distinct UNITA identity. The preoccupation with establishing a hierarchic organization, with spheres of competence, inflicted the impression of professionalism. In context of the competition between the three Angolan liberation movements, a well-organized organizational structure was a prerequisite for effective and legitimate participation in the political struggle. To the extent that a specific education was required for UNITA officials, one of Weber's criteria for rational-legal legitimacy, military experience was predominant. At this early stage, it appears that UNITA promoted efforts to establish an administration which embodied a form of rational-legal foundation of legitimacy.

The impression of professionalism was enhanced when the UNITA-leadership responded skillfully to the changes in Portugal after the coup in April 1974. Savimbi traveled extensively and diplomatically advocated a unification of the fragmented Angolan forces, while simultaneously emphasizing that the centrist and multi-ethnic UNITA-agenda was the best option for a post-independence government.²⁶⁰ During the

²⁵⁷ Cf. Bridgland: Jonas Savimbi, 1986, p. 110.

²⁵⁸ Cf. Ibid., p. 107.

²⁵⁹ Heywood: Contested Power, 2000, pp. 168-169. UNITA's broad based youth and women's organizations were *Juventude Revolucionária de Angola* (JURA) and *Liga da Mulher Angolana* (LIMA).

²⁶⁰ Cf. Bridgland: Jonas Savimbi, 1986, p. 145 and Heywood: Contested Power, 2000, p. 192.

negotiations of a transition to independence, UNITA was also severely criticized: In July 1974 the pro-MPLA, Paris-based magazine *Afrique-Asie* published letters exchanged between Savimbi and Portuguese officials, which claimed that an alliance between UNITA and the Portuguese army had allowed UNITA to operate undisturbed in the Lungue Bungu area.²⁶¹ As a result, UNITA was initially condemned by the FNLA and MPLA for signing a truce with the Portuguese in June 1974, shortly before the revelation of cooperation with Portugal. In lack of alternatives, the other movements soon thereafter followed suit. Instead of preparing for the elections stipulated in the Alvor Accord, however, the three rivals engaged in a ferocious arms race and plunged into internal war. Aimed at securing their respective regional bases, the FNLA launched attacks in the Bakongo-dominated areas; the MPLA in coastal urban areas, while UNITA struggled for Ovimbundu representation.²⁶² When the tripartite interim government, inaugurated in January 1975, failed, and the prospects of elections deteriorated, Savimbi saw his chances of using UNITA's Ovimbundu constituency as an electoral base ruined.²⁶³ In this turbulent period, UNITA expanded its influence in central Angola and Savimbi fortified his position as the leader of the Ovimbundu, evident in the expanding membership of UNITA. In June 1974, UNITA established a headquarter in Huambo, in a core Ovimbundu province, and began to create a party apparatus in the region. With a strategy of systematically establishing contacts with traditional chiefs and young educated Ovimbundu, UNITA attracted supporters based both on political persuasion and social pressure.²⁶⁴ From his interviews with 16 ex-UNITA members in 1989, Minter concluded that the majority of UNITA-recruits between 1974-1976 joined UNITA voluntarily because "*they saw UNITA as the natural movement for their region.*"²⁶⁵ Recruits were trained by UNITA-members, veterans from the Portuguese army or UNITA-veterans, at training bases inside Angola, but some were also sent to Tanzania or Morocco for officer training.²⁶⁶ While UNITA in the early 1970s was considered the smallest anti-colonial movement, the increased recruitment during the transitional phase led to reports of 10,000 or even 15,000-16,000 UNITA troops in 1975.²⁶⁷ Thus, the main Ovimbundu support for UNITA crystallized

²⁶¹ In the late 1960s and early 1970s, UNITA rarely engaged militarily with the Portuguese, but clashed rather frequently with the MPLA. The contact between UNITA and Portuguese officials was established via timber cutters, around 1971, which explains the code-name Operation Timber. Evidential documents published in *Afrique-Asie* and in Portuguese sources were made available to English readers by Minter, William (ed.): *Operation Timber: Pages from the Savimbi Dossier*. Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press, Inc. 1988. UNITA characterized the documents as forgeries, and Western journalists only reluctantly referred to the claims in the 1970s. There are today few doubts about the validity of these documents.

²⁶² Cf. Heywood: *Contested Power*, 2000, p. 183.

²⁶³ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 191.

²⁶⁴ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 194 and Minter: *Apartheid's Contrasts*, 1994, p. 217. Minter notes that the evidence is ambiguous in regard to the increase in UNITA's supporter base at this time, due to lack of systematic polls. The main support for UNITA came from Ovimbundu, but there was no unanimity.

²⁶⁵ Minter: *Apartheid's Contrasts*, 1994, p. 177. "[F]or Ovimbundu youth and for ethnically diverse Moxico province, *Unita was the most prominent and most accessible movement.*" *Ibid.*

²⁶⁶ Cf. Minter, William: *Behind the UNITA Curtain*. In: *Africa Report*, Vol. 35, No. 2, 1990 (pp. 45-48), p. 47 and Heywood: *Contested Power*, 2000, p. 194.

²⁶⁷ After his 24-hour investigative trip to Angola in August 1975, the chief of the CIA Angolan Task Force, John Stockwell, reported that UNITA had 4,000 more or less trained troops and 6,000 trainees, and described UNITA as a well-run political organization. These estimates deviated from Heywood's

between 1974-1976. This period was important for the identification of Ovimbundu with UNITA and their perception of Savimbi as their legitimate leader: *"It was during the months following the signing of the cease-fire [1974 (KS)] that Savimbi became the de facto leader of the Ovimbundu masses and the dominant force in Ovimbundu nationalism."*²⁶⁸

When the MPLA emerged as the victorious party in 1975, UNITA nonetheless threatened to disintegrate. UNITA lost major external backing and suffered heavy losses in an attack on Huambo.²⁶⁹ UNITA then retreated to the bush and began its version of the counterpart Mao's 'Long March' on February 9, 1976. The march lasted more than seven months and was invigorated in the movement's history as a boost to the morale. Tito Chingunji recalled that *"All of us who were on the march believed by the end of it that the war really could be won."*²⁷⁰

4.2.2. The UNITA Regime in Jamba: "Terras Libres de Angola"²⁷¹

UNITA's reorganization for continued resistance against the MPLA-state began in late 1976. A central base was established in Cueleí, but the constant threat of attacks required frequent relocation. In 1979, UNITA finally established a permanent headquarter in Jamba, situated in the sparsely populated south-eastern province Cuando Cubango, close to the border of Namibia.²⁷² From 1976-1979, however, UNITA's remobilization strategy included frequent visits by Savimbi or other representatives of the leadership to villages, particularly in the Central Highlands. Savimbi was greeted with singing, dancing and other traditional symbols expressing devotion to his leadership. A long-term strategy was recognizable in the efforts to train and educate both civilian and military personnel. Soldiers were sent to training camps in Morocco and Namibia, young women were sent to Paris to attend secretarial and language courses, and youths were sent abroad to study in Portugal, Switzerland, France and the USA, only to return years later. An increasing presence of nurses in UNITA-villages in central Angola around 1977 improved the ability to provide health services. While some chose to freely relocate to UNITA-villages, both the MPLA and UNITA used forceful displacement as a tactic to control the mobility of civilians. Caught in the middle between the MPLA and UNITA, civilians proved flexible, albeit having no other option but adapting to whichever fighting force controlled their area. Additionally, along with the indications

reference to 15-16,000 UNITA troops, but these differences indicate the major insecurities regarding reliable numerical data from these years. Cf. Stockwell, John: *In Search of Enemies. A CIA Story*. London: André Deutsch 1978, p. 155 and Heywood: *Contested Power*, 2000, p. 195.

²⁶⁸ Heywood: *Contested Power*, 2000, p. 193.

²⁶⁹ According to UNITA information, 600 guerrillas were killed in the defense of Huambo on February 9, 1976. The revelation of the presence of South African troops in Bridgland's article in the *Washington Post* on November 23, 1975, had enormous negative effects on UNITA. The unholy alliance with the apartheid regime South Africa led external backers, particularly in Africa, to withdraw their support for UNITA. See Bridgland: *Jonas Savimbi*, 1986, pp. 174-181, p. 191 and p. 248.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 278. During the march through the bush region in central and eastern Angola, UNITA-members struggled with malnutrition, constant danger of attacks and sheer exhaustion. The march ended in Cueleí, about 150 km southeast of Huambo on August 28, 1976. Around 1,000 'followers' initially began the march together with Savimbi, but upon arrival in Cueleí, only 79 were still in the column. For an extensive account of the march, see Bridgland: *Jonas Savimbi*, 1986, pp. 246-278.

²⁷¹ *Free Lands Angola*.

²⁷² The exact location of Jamba was unknown, which is why Human Rights Watch on their map of Angola notes "approximate location", see appendix II.

that UNITA approached civilians both with forceful interaction and societal assistance, a third factor was the voluntary decision of village chiefs to bring villagers behind UNITA. Antonio Vakulakuta, a prominent village leader from the southern Cunene province, brought hundred of volunteers to UNITA's resistance in 1977.²⁷³

During the long march, UNITA had relied on 'friendly' villages for both food and shelter. Since the relationship between the insurgents and villagers was one of a complicated nature, there was always a risk of civilians working as MPLA informants. To avoid information leakage, a classification system was developed; according to which those loyal to UNITA were allowed to live close to government-controlled areas, while others were displaced to areas more difficult to flee, such as the bush.²⁷⁴ With this strategy, UNITA institutionalized its authority over civilians by implementing a control system.

During the reorganization in the late 1970s, a new trend occurred in UNITA's administrative structure. Young recruits who had benefited from expanding educational opportunities in the last phase of colonial rule, and who also had frequently served in the Portuguese army during the 1960s, joined UNITA. Despite the lack of experience from fighting against the Portuguese, their technical skills represented a valuable asset and, according to Savimbi, contributed decisively to the successful remobilization of the movement.²⁷⁵ Having initiated a revitalization of UNITA, in April 1979 the movement relocated to Jamba. The rationale for this strategic move was not exclusively the need to escape frequent government attacks, from which UNITA suffered heavily. Bordering on South African-controlled Namibia, the geographical location offered a cost-effective supply route for the delivery of South African aid by land, as an alternative to expensive transport by air.²⁷⁶ During the 1980s, UNITA expanded its territorial control and established an organizational structure in Jamba, consisting of a president, ministries, an army and a sub-level bureaucracy providing a link between villages and the central administration. Based on these UNITA governance structures in Jamba, one commentator labeled this system of authority the *"Republic" of Jamba*.²⁷⁷ A critical commentator, whose antipathy with UNITA leaders has led her to avoid interviews with any UNITA-representatives, argues that *"Savimbi's image and the entire creation of Jamba was South Africa's, and on a day to day basis it depended entirely upon Pretoria and the CIA."*²⁷⁸ Contrary to this view, it appears that although UNITA relied on foreign support, both financially and militarily, the internal organizational structure, which ensured sustained cohesiveness, was the entire product of the UNITA leadership.

In the late 1980s, the population in Jamba was estimated at 8,000 to 10,000, with 80,000 to 100,000 in the surrounding area. Although UNITA-guerrillas were active in

²⁷³ Cf. Bridgland: Jonas Savimbi, 1986, pp. 290-294. On indiscriminate reprisals on both sides during this period of transformation to independence, see Bridgland: Jonas Savimbi, 1986, pp. 227-228, Wolfers; Bergerol: Angola in the Frontline, 1983, p. 213, Africa Watch: Angola: Civilians Devastated by 15 Year War. New York: Africa Watch 1991, pp. 1-3 and Minter: Apartheid's Contras, 1994, pp. 218-219.

²⁷⁴ Cf. Minter: Apartheid's Contras, 1994, p. 218.

²⁷⁵ Cf. Bridgland: Jonas Savimbi, 1986, pp. 290-291.

²⁷⁶ Cf. Ibid., p. 339 and Minter: Apartheid's Contras, 1994, p. 189.

²⁷⁷ Heywood: Contested Power, 2000, p. 212.

²⁷⁸ Brittain, Victoria: Death of Dignity. Angola's Civil War. London, Chicago (Illinois): Pluto Press, 1998, p. 12.

most Angolan provinces, this did not necessarily imply administrative control. Most rural areas became increasingly detached both from the MPLA-state and the alternative UNITA-administration during the 1980s. One source assumes that 250,000 people in the country as a whole (that is less than five percent out of a population-estimate of 10 million in the 1970s) was directly or indirectly administered by UNITA. However, in 1991, an estimated 600,000 to 1 million people lived in UNITA controlled areas.²⁷⁹

The leadership structure in UNITA continued to consist of a Political Bureau and a Central Committee, which arranged three Congresses between 1977 and 1986.²⁸⁰ During the Jamba-years, central figures in UNITA's leadership were Savimbi as President; N'Zau Puna as Secretary General; Tito Chingunji as former Foreign Minister and Politburo member since 1983, who in the late 1980s was stationed in Washington D.C.; chief of staff and Savimbi's nephew Isaac 'Ben-Ben' Pena; member of the unit of political orientation 'Block'; secretary of information Jorge Valentim; foreign minister Tony DaCosta Fernandes and secretary of education Jaka Jamba.²⁸¹ With ministries for agriculture, natural resources, education and civil administration, a UNITA-bureaucracy was established which provided services to the inhabitants in the 'free lands'. One of the services UNITA proudly presented to Western observers was the educational system. In 1988, UNITA reported to have 975 primary schools and eight secondary schools, as well as 300 students abroad. The health sector was also presented as a success, including both a central hospital in Jamba, and decentralized military and civilian health services. Although these figures must be assessed with the necessary skepticism, interviews with eyewitnesses indicate that there was a sustained effort to provide community services in UNITA-controlled areas.²⁸² Food production in the Jamba-system was partly organized on special UNITA-farms, such as the agricultural center in Mavinga, or in 'joint ventures' with local villagers, for which UNITA provided seeds

²⁷⁹ While Minter referred to 80,000-100,000 inhabitants in the Jamba-region in the 1980s, he noted that there were 113,000 registered in the province Cuando Cubango for the 1992 election. The other estimates are from Africa Watch. Cf. Minter: *Apartheid's Contrasts*, 1994, p. 189, Africa Watch: Angola, 1991, p. 2 and Africa Watch: Angola. Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides. New York: Africa Watch 1989, pp. 40-41.

²⁸⁰ Policy-making congresses continued to take place, with a fourth Congress in March 1977, a fifth congress on July 26-31, 1982 and a sixth congress on August 27-31, 1986. Among the 1,600 delegates in 1977 were Leon Dash, who reported on lively debates on issues concerning the social organization of UNITA. The fifth Congress resulted in the 'Mavinga Declaration', expressing unequivocal support of Namibian independence, which was reinstated on the sixth congress. Cf. Dash, Leon: UNITA. Self-Criticism Deep in the Hidden Forest. In: Washington Post, August 13, 1977, p. A1. See also Bridgland: Jonas Savimbi, 1986, p. 444 and James III, W. Martin: *A Political History of the Civil War in Angola 1974-1990*. New Brunswick, London: Transaction Publishers 1992, p. 95.

²⁸¹ See UNITA (ed.): *Die Führung der UNITA. Jamba 1990* (Deutsche Ausgabe im Auftrag der UNITA-Vertretung in der BRD).

²⁸² Regarding the figures on number of schools, the above mentioned numbers from Heywood are contrasted by Minter's reference to UNITA claims of 3,139 primary schools in 1988. Minter's interviewees referred to schools in the Jamba-area, but regarding the situation outside Jamba, the information was more variable, some confirming there was a school in every UNITA-village, others denying. The numbers presented by UNITA seem to be unreliable, and to comment on the validity of these figures then seems arbitrary. Estimates on the number of nurses are of the same nature. Cf. Heywood: *Unita and Ethnic Nationalism*, 1989, p. 62 and Minter: *Apartheid's Contrasts*, 1994, p. 220 and p. 229 (footnote 32).

against an obligation to hand over a quota of each product.²⁸³ When UNITA-troops operated in contested areas, food was either ‘taxed’ from UNITA-friendly civilians, or looted from government-controlled villages. In addition to food, there were reports on looting of cattle and clothing.²⁸⁴ Imports from South Africa contributed to a privileged position for the population in and around Jamba. The population in northern Angola, in the former FNLA-area of influence, also contributed to the UNITA-system of food production. UNITA did not exercise direct administrative control over civilians in the northern areas, but provided protection against attacks from the MPLA. In the eastern Moxico province, UNITA claimed authority, but frequent reports on mining of farmland, led Africa Watch to conclude that UNITA used food deprivation as a systematic tactic for denial of livelihood in this region. Another strategy frequently applied by UNITA in eastern Angola, was forcible resettlement of civilians who were forced to move to Jamba and provide both farming and military services.²⁸⁵

The civilian organization in the Jamba-era was based on the same structures as in the Lungue Bungu-valley during the liberation war, but on a larger scale. In contrast to MPLA’s strategy of re-educating local leaders, UNITA incorporated traditional structures into the UNITA-system by leaving the village administration with local elders. The *sekulu*, i.e. the village counselor, whose authority was based on wisdom and experience, and the *ocimbanda*, religious practitioners who conducted ceremonial services, traditionally comprised the village leadership.²⁸⁶ In alliance with these traditional authorities, UNITA managed societal institutions, schools, health services and churches, in rural villages. In return, villagers mobilized food and gathered intelligence for UNITA. Religious institutions were also included in UNITA’s system of domination, due to the incorporation of traditional Ovimbundu beliefs in the Protestant missionary villages. Protestant leaders played a central role in administering, as well as training and mobilizing support from non-Ovimbundu inhabitants.²⁸⁷ Hence, UNITA relied on the well-established Protestant structures in combination with traditional beliefs for the organization of a civilian administration. With this strategy, UNITA established a common interest with local authorities, thereby ensuring the loyalty of central figures. The central role of these traditional individuals underlined UNITA’s legitimacy, as it “*guaranteed him [Savimbi (KS)] the allegiance of the villagers who still regarded the sekulus and ocimbandas as legitimate political representatives.*”²⁸⁸ In addition to these links to rural society, UNITA administered a political program and appointed political activists to mobilize civilians by criticizing the

²⁸³ Bridgland describes a farm jointly owned by UNITA and villagers, where the villagers worked one day a week for UNITA in exchange for which they were allowed to use the tractor on private land. Cf. Bridgland: Jonas Savimbi, 1986, p. 402.

²⁸⁴ Cf. Minter: Apartheid’s Contras, 1994, p. 219.

²⁸⁵ Africa Watched reported extensively on forceful practices by UNITA, see Africa Watch: Angola, 1989 and Africa Watch: Angola, 1991.

²⁸⁶ Cf. Heywood: Contested Power, 2000, pp. 7-8.

²⁸⁷ Cf. Heywood: UNITA and Ethnic Nationalism, 1989, pp. 60-61 and Heywood: Contested Power, 2000, pp. 212-213. On the links between UNITA and the Protestant church, see also Schubert, Benedict: Der Krieg und die Kirchen. Angola 1961-1991. Luzern: Edition Exodus 1997, pp. 60-68, pp. 201-206.

²⁸⁸ Heywood, Linda: Towards an Understanding of Modern Political Ideology in Africa: The Case of the Ovimbundu of Angola. In: The Journal of Modern African Studies, 36 (1), 1998 (pp. 139-167), p. 165.

MPLA-state. Africa Watch reported on especially assigned organizers, so-called *animadores*, who visited villages to inform about UNITA and the political situation and provided goods, such as clothing, food, pots and pans, to the villagers.²⁸⁹ The planning of the northern offensive provided further insight into the local focus in UNITA's political program. Before UNITA established cooperative relations with the Bakongo, UNITA officers frequently visited the region, interacted with the people and made tape-recordings, which were then sent to the 'cultural unit' in Jamba.²⁹⁰ Thus, UNITA supplemented the Ovimbundu traditions and Protestant structures with modern strategies of political mobilization. In spite of voluntary support for UNITA, however, numerous reports on forcible resettlement revealed that kidnapping was also a UNITA strategy for building a social base. In this context, Minter's lesson from his extensive comparative study of the guerrilla wars in Angola and Mozambique must be recalled: *"The success of guerrilla armies, as that of conventional armies, does not necessarily depend on extensive voluntary mobilization of civilians."*²⁹¹

The functioning of the military factor in the Jamba-regime was also based both on political mobilization and disciplinarian mechanisms.²⁹² During the 1980s, recruits were, in contrast to the majority of volunteers in the period 1974-76, mainly forced to serve. Frequent practices were the conscription of recruits living in UNITA-zones or abduction from government-controlled areas. Due to the predominance of force in the recruitment process after 1980, Minter labeled this the 'second generation' of UNITA soldiers. In the military training, recruits learned that desertion would be punished with execution, and eyewitness reports confirmed such practices. In order to hinder recruits from fleeing, UNITA applied a strategy of relocation, separating recruits from their home communities to areas where both terrain and often also the local languages were unknown to them. Escaping from Jamba was difficult, due to the location far away from populated areas. The technical training of recruits was well organized with three months basic training and six months specialized training.²⁹³ Training camps were situated around Jamba, close to the Namibian border, with both UNITA and South African officers as instructors. The training included political justification of the UNITA-cause. In the highly politicized environment, political education was the central mechanism for mobilization, with the use of physical force as a subordinate sanctioning mechanism. With regard to the payment of UNITA-recruits, there were contradictory reports on both lack of payment and regular pay.²⁹⁴ The military service offered rewards, however, such

²⁸⁹ Cf. Minter: *Apartheid's Contras*, 1994, p. 219 and Africa Watch: *Angola*, 1989, pp. 95-96. Africa Watch reports on several 'information' meetings between civilians and UNITA, e.g. Africa Watch: *Angola*, 1989, p. 92 and Africa Watch: *Angola*, 1991, pp. 11-12.

²⁹⁰ Cf. Bridgland: Jonas Savimbi, 1986, pp. 597-598. Apparently, UNITA was recording information on Angola's history and culture, which for generations was preserved by oral tradition. Reference to such material was not encountered in any other sources, but if they exist, they would be an interesting source on UNITA's system of organization and Angolan history.

²⁹¹ Minter: *Apartheid's Contras*, 1994, p. 288.

²⁹² On the military factor, see Minter: *Apartheid's Contras*, 1994, pp. 172-203, unless otherwise noted.

²⁹³ Africa Watch added that UNITA-recruits were instructed in aspects relevant to human rights protection during warfare, such as respect for signals of surrender and not to destroy peoples' corps. The application of such practices, however, is a critical question. Cf. Africa Watch: *Angola*, 1989, p. 67.

²⁹⁴ Bridgland referred to an unpaid UNITA-army, while AC in 1989 reported on regular payments. It is imaginable that a change in payment occurred in the late 1980s, but such speculations could not be

as advancement, overseas military and civilian training, medical care and the prospect of power after victory. In comparison to the average soldier, the military leadership was privileged. Officers experienced relative autonomy in the conduct of warfare and had close contact with Savimbi.²⁹⁵ During the 1980s, however, the deployment of SADF was of considerable importance to UNITA's military performance. In contrast to the descriptions of a well-organized UNITA force, including both semi-regular forces, guerrillas and special forces, analyses of South Africa's involvement impart the image that UNITA generally played a supplementary role, and was subordinate to SADF in the conduct of military operations.²⁹⁶

Beyond the well-organized social services, military training and unifying UNITA-symbols in the Jamba quasi-state, allegations of tactical use of physical force against critics from within, surfaced in the late 1980s. In 1988, UNITA defectors in Portugal first informed external analysts about their eyewitness observations of corporal punishment.²⁹⁷ According to these allegations, tactical use of physical force, including beating, killing and burning families alive after witchcraft accusations, was a deliberate strategy to eliminate prominent figures seen as a potential challenge to Savimbi's indisputable authority. Two witchburning incidents were reported, which took place in March 1982 and September 1983, to which also eyewitnesses referred.²⁹⁸ In a public session on the Party Congress in 1982, the alleged 'reactionaries' Tony Fernandes, Samuel Chiwale and Colonel Kanjangu were severely beaten, but also other leaders were allegedly killed on Savimbi's orders in the early 1980s. Linked to a dispute between Savimbi and the regional leader Vakulakuta from 1984, followed by Vakulakuta's death, dissatisfaction with an increasing predominance of Ovimbundu-representation within the movement also emerged during the 1980s.²⁹⁹ The most spectacular case of hindering an emergent individual power base within UNITA's leadership was the eviction of one of UNITA's most prominent families, the Chingunji-family. This severe incident attracted international media attention in the early 1990s, when the popular former UNITA-representative in the US, Tito Chingunji, was detained and later killed in Jamba.³⁰⁰ While Savimbi throughout the 1980s was able to sustain his

verified. Cf. Bridgland: Jonas Savimbi, 1986, p. 391 and p. 413 and AC: Angola: War and Peace in the MPLA, Vol. 30, No. 16, 1989 (pp. 1-2), p. 2.

²⁹⁵ Cf. Bridgland, Fred: A War for Africa, 1990, p. 383. Bridgland's description of UNITA (pp. 381-388) in this book was based on the memories of SADF Colonel Fred Oelsig, who worked with Savimbi from 1986 to 1989.

²⁹⁶ Cf. Minter, William: Glimpses of the War in Angola: Three South African Accounts... A Review Article. In: Africa Today, Vol. 39, Nos. 1&2, 1992 (pp. 130-134). Minter's statement results from his review of three books on South Africa's involvement in Angola, see Breytenback, Col. Jan: They Live by the Sword: 'Buffalo Battalion' – South Africa's Foreign Legion. Alberton, South Africa: Lemur Books 1990, Bridgland, Fred: The War For Africa: Twelve Months that Transformed a Continent. Gibraltar: Ashanti Publishing 1990 and Heitman, Helmoed-Römer: War in Angola: The Final South African Phase. Gibraltar: Ashanti Publishing 1990.

²⁹⁷ Cf. Randal, Jonathan C.: New Reports Charge Abuses By UNITA Rebels in Angola. In: The Washington Post, March 14, 1989, p. A20 and Dash, Leon: Blood and Fire: Savimbi's War Against His UNITA Rivals. In: The Washington Post, September 30, 1990, p. D1.

²⁹⁸ Cf. Minter: Apartheid's Contras, 1994, p. 222. UNITA also established own villages for witches, which suggests that the practice of recognizing witches was not such a rare incident. Cf. Ibid., p. 224 and Heywood: Towards an Understanding, 1998, p. 165.

²⁹⁹ Cf. Minter: Apartheid's Contras, 1994, p. 220, p. 224. After he deserted N'Zau Puna denied Savimbi's personal responsibility for Vakulakuta's death.

³⁰⁰ Tito was killed together with Wilson dos Santos and members of their families in 1991. Heywood refers to allegations that 35 members of the Chingunji-family were eliminated between 1980 and

hegemony over UNITA with a stable, cohesive second-rank leadership, mainly including N'Zau Puna, Tito, Tony Fernandes and Jeremias Chitunda, the first high-profile defection occurred in the run-up to the elections in 1992. UNITA co-founder Fernandes and long-time Secretary General N'Zau Puna, two central cadres from Cabinda, defected in early 1992. They held Savimbi personally responsible for the deaths of Tito Chingunji and Wilson Dos Santos.³⁰¹ When Jeremias Chitunda died in an attempt to escape from Luanda after violent clashes broke out after the election in 1992, Savimbi was forced to rely on other top leaders.

The contradiction is obvious between the evidence of a well-organized Jamba-Republic, providing social services, and the brutal eviction of political opponents and tactical use of repression. Some commentators have therefore referred to Jamba as a Potemkin village.³⁰² The inconsistency of the social organization on the one hand, and the terror machine on the other, did, however, not necessarily delegitimize UNITA as a system of domination. Although the terror practices were severely inhumane and undemocratic, they indicated the existence of other, alternative restrictions of legitimate authority. In his sociology of domination, Weber elaborated on the elastic restrictions of traditional authority, where customs and norms define the limit of subordinates' tolerance of a ruler's behavior. Based on the perception of what constitutes a break with tradition, however, the ruler must be sensitive to the prospect of retainers and civilians interpreting the traditional framework differently. Considering the fact that internal disparities among leading representatives in UNITA first emerged after 1988, with the first high-profile defections in 1992, it is presumable that elements of the terror tactics in the earlier years did not initially offend members of the cadres to such an extent that they decided in favor of defection. The terror tactics were not unknown to inhabitants in Jamba and surrounding areas, as eyewitness accounts demonstrate. A focus on the traditional legitimacy of the UNITA-system of domination helps explaining the functioning of the system and the coexistence of inconsistent practices, i.e. terror versus social services. Heywood supplies the basis for an alternative interpretation.³⁰³

A core principle in traditional Ovimbundu political ideology, which was characteristic for most rural Angolans, is a dichotomous conception of political authority, comprising both a *blacksmith king* and a *hunter king*. The blacksmith king represented consultative qualities and attempted to achieve consensus in decision-making processes. On the contrary, the hunter king represented absolutist principles and ruled in an independent, autocratic style. For the benefit of the common good, autocratic

1991. Minter indicates that the eviction of the Chingunji-family began in 1974, but notes that these allegations could be retrospective explanations for natural deaths. Savimbi and the Chingunji-family were referred to as the two big clans among the Ovimbundu. Cf. Heywood: *Towards an Understanding*, 1998, p. 147 and Minter: *Apartheid's Contras*, 1994, p. 223. Bridgland published his version of the allegations and, in a personal style, distanced himself from Savimbi, see Bridgland, Fred: *Angola's Secret Bloodbath*; Jonas Savimbi and His Hidden War Against UNITA's Leaders. In: *Washington Post*, March 29, 1992, p. C1.

³⁰¹ Cf. Minter: *Apartheid's Contras*, 1994, p. 225. UNITA then released a report, claiming that N'Zau Puna ordered the killing of Tito and Dos Santos, see Ottaway, David B.: *UNITA Probe Blames Deaths on Defector*. In: *Washington Post*, May 12, 1992, p. A14.

³⁰² Minter refers to an account of Radek Sikorski, a journalist who spent three months with UNITA in 1989, who blamed UNITA for notoriously lying to him and presenting him with a series of Potemkin villages. Minter: *Apartheid's Contras*, 1994, p. 229, footnote 33. Also Brittain refers to Jamba as a Potemkin village which functioned as "*the centre of a highly organised and repressive terror machine*" Brittain: *Death of Dignity*, 1998, p. 12.

³⁰³ The following section is based primarily on Heywood: *Towards an Understanding*, 1998.

practices were accepted. In addition to the ideal of a blacksmith and a hunter king, rulers were perceived as possessors of supernatural qualities, exercised through magic and witchcraft.³⁰⁴ Witchcraft accusations functioned as an instrument of social sanctioning and could also result in the elimination of the autocratic ruler, justified by charges of what *“people regarded as overstepping his constitutional power.”*³⁰⁵ The nature of this restriction defined the limits of manipulation, in consistence with Weber’s theory of traditional legitimacy. Witchcraft trials were thus *“a critique of personal behavior, not a critique of the authoritarian concept of power”*³⁰⁶, which is also a fundamental principle in Weber’s theory. The two antagonistic conceptions of political leadership, the absolutist hunter and the more democratic blacksmith king, exercised parallel influence on Ovimbundu political ideology. During colonial rule, this two-fold principle of political domination continued to influence Ovimbundu political beliefs. Foreign missionaries strengthened the blacksmith-component, due to the general principles of democracy and self-help in the church practices of foreign Protestant missionaries. Core traditional political beliefs nevertheless sustained as traditional norms and beliefs were incorporated into Protestant institutions managed by Ovimbundu. The autocratic elements in Savimbi’s leadership were therefore legitimized by the concept of the hunter king. As a leader, Savimbi possessed the ability to recognize witches and separate them from society, justified both by the necessity of the ruler to defend the common good and Savimbi’s image as an unselfish ruler. The defections in 1992, almost a decade after the alleged witchcraft burnings took place, may therefore have *“less to do with their [the defectors’ (KS)] distaste for the witchcraft aspects of the traditional African ideology, and more to do with their resentment that Savimbi was using his power for personal aggrandisement.”*³⁰⁷ Heywood notes the impossibility of demonstrating a *direct link* between the sustenance of Savimbi’s authority and the use of traditions in UNITA’s system of domination, but concludes that *“no one can doubt, however, that Savimbi’s willingness to incorporate rituals and beliefs from the Ovimbundu past helped to legitimise his rôle as one of the architects of modern Angolan nationalism.”*³⁰⁸ The assessment of traditional beliefs in context of UNITA’s political structure demands a careful consideration of the distinction between manipulation and legitimization. In the following section, we examine how these tendencies influenced UNITA’s ‘social order’ in the 1990s.

4.2.3. “Nem guerra, nem paz”³⁰⁹: UNITA Negotiating for Legitimate Access to State-Power

Throughout the 1990s, the political structure of UNITA’s ‘social order’ was dominated by a tendency towards fragmentation. Coinciding with this internal development, UNITA was a party to high-stake negotiations aimed at achieving a viable political

³⁰⁴ Savimbi, for example, was praised as a man of *“voracious sexual appetite”* and *“heroic powers of endurance”*. Russel, Alec: *Big Men, Little People. Encounters in Africa*. London: Pan Book 2000 (first published by Macmillan, London 1999), p. 101.

³⁰⁵ Heywood: *Towards an Understanding*, 1998, p. 157.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 166.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

³⁰⁹ *“Neither war nor peace.”* Spears, Ian S.: *Angola: A Backgrounder*. In: *Southern Africa Report*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1999 (pp. 7-9), p. 7.

agreement on peace in Angola. In the turbulence over political deals on the division of power and influence, disagreements emerged, not only in relation to the other main protagonist MPLA, but also within the movement. The internal disparities in UNITA are therefore seen as a consequence of the attempt to transform UNITA from a “*war machine to political contender*.”³¹⁰

Shortly after the election in September 1992, observers began to see the contours of two factions within UNITA: A political unit wanting to stay within the political process, despite electoral defeat, and a second unit in favor of a renewed military campaign.³¹¹ The militarist faction clearly decided on UNITA’s strategy in the subsequent phase, as fighting resumed in late 1992. The Lusaka Protocol reportedly undermined the internal cohesion among UNITA cadres, as two camps of ‘moderates’ and ‘hardliners’ clashed on the eighth party congress in Bailundo in 1995, evident in a growing division between a ‘Huambo-camp’ and a ‘Bié and Benguela-camp’.³¹² Party congresses continued to take place during the 1990s, the seventh in Jamba in March 1991 and the eighth in 1995.³¹³ While the ‘Bié and Benguela-camp’ was close to Savimbi in earlier years, their involvement in the negotiations of the Lusaka Protocol reduced their influence. The central UNITA-negotiators, Secretary General Eugenio Ngolo ‘Manuvakola’ was penalized within the UNITA system, as the Protocol was considered a compromise with the government, which did not pay justice to UNITA’s military superiority at that time.³¹⁴ Many of the formerly prominent representatives in UNITA’s administration were subsequently replaced by members of the ‘Huambo-camp’, described by reporters as less conciliatory. General Gato, who replaced Manuvakola as Secretary General in 1995, was referred to as one who “*see[s] peace with Luanda as compromising UNITA and also as a threat to their [UNITA cadres’ (KS)] personal security*.”³¹⁵ Three months later, however, observers reported differences between a ‘conciliatory’ Savimbi, actively performing on the international diplomatic arena, and ‘his hardline military’.³¹⁶ Although this development was rejected as a bargaining ploy, it further underlined the turbulence within a leadership partaking in high-stake negotiations for legitimate access to the state. The impression of a diminishing cohesion within the UNITA-leadership

³¹⁰ Brittain, Victoria: Angola: The Final Act? In: Southern Africa Report, 1992 (pp. 18-22), p. 21.

³¹¹ Cf. AC: Angola: Bullets Threaten the Ballots, Vol. 33, No. 2, 1992, pp. 1-3.

³¹² The ‘Huambo-camp’ included Vice-President Antonio Sebastião Dembo, General ‘Gato’, deputy Chief of Staff Demostenes Chilingutula and Artur Vinama. Members of the ‘Bié and Benguela’-camp were ‘Ben Ben’, Commander ‘Bejia’, military intelligence chief ‘Bock’ as well as Jorge Valentim and Jaka Jamba. Cf. AC: UNITA – Guests of the King of Bailundo, Vol. 36, No. 4, 1995, p. 2.

³¹³ Cf. AC: Angola: King of the South, Vol. 32, No. 7, 1991, p. 7 and AC: UNITA – Guests of the King of Bailundo, Vol. 36, No. 4, 1995, p. 2.

³¹⁴ Manuvakola was detained by UNITA in February 1995, but was kept alive, according to own statements, because international visitors should occasionally get to meet him. In December 1995 he was put under house arrest in Andulo, and in August 1996 he was moved to Bailundo, before he in 1997 managed to escape to Luanda. From an interview with HRW: Angola Unravels. The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process. New York 1999, p. 57.

³¹⁵ AC: UNITA – Guests of the King of Bailundo, 1995, p. 2. Two potential leaders in the post-Savimbi UNITA were also spotted at this congress: Carlos Morgado and Abel Chivukuvuka. Little information could be found on the responsibilities of Morgado. Chivukuvuku later abandoned Savimbi.

³¹⁶ Cf. AC: Angola: Inside the Tent, Vol. 36, No. 14, 1995, pp. 5-6.

was reinforced when a high-level UNITA-representative defected in 1995.³¹⁷ The fractionalization between moderates and hardliners began to take form in 1997, when 70 UNITA-deputies took their seats in the National Assembly, in accordance with the election results from 1992. Four UNITA-members were appointed ministers and 7 Vice-Ministers, to the national government of unity, the *Governo da Unidade e de Reconciliação de Angola* (GURN), inaugurated on April 11, 1997. Influential personalities within UNITA's political structure, such as Jorge Valentim, Abel Chivukuvuku, Jaka Jamba, Isaías Samakuva, Demóstenes Chilingutilla and Ben-Ben now resided in the capital Luanda and participated actively in civilian politics. Savimbi was based in the Central Highlands, moving between Andulo and Bailundo, and relied on a group of military hardliners for decisions on UNITA's future strategies. Savimbi's group included Secretary-General Gato, Vice-President Antonio Dembo, and the Generals Bock and 'Numa'. A growing division between "UNITA-Luanda" and "UNITA-Bailundo" was recognized, as the Luanda-branch allegedly enjoyed "good life in Luanda", while the atmosphere in Bailundo was described as "isolated and mired in paranoia. Now there are reports of heavy drinking, bitter arguments and detentions."³¹⁸ The ultimate break between the two camps came in 1998 when a 'renewed' party, *UNITA Renovada* (UNITA-R), was launched under the leadership of Jorge Valentim. The MPLA-government played a central role in the initiation of this new party, and was believed to have granted the five founders of UNITA-R three million US dollars each.³¹⁹ By isolating the militarist camp around Savimbi and directing attention exclusively to UNITA-R, the government intended to continue the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol without further delay. Prior to the public announcement of the new party, the government on August 31, 1998 suspended UNITA-ministers and deputies, and stopped the supply of services (salaries, electricity, telephone, transport) to those refusing to disassociate themselves from Savimbi.³²⁰ With such an obvious link to the government, UNITA-R failed to establish a credible challenge to Savimbi's Bailundo-faction, and several central UNITA-representatives in Luanda refused to join the new party. The fragmentation of the Luanda-camp was obvious when the leader of the UNITA-members of parliament, Abel Chivukuvuku in November 1998 announced a further UNITA faction and rejected both UNITA-R and Savimbi's camp. As a well-respected politician in Luanda, abroad and among UNITA members, Chivukuvuku represented a potentially serious challenge to Savimbi's leadership.³²¹ However, also Chivukuvuku failed to recruit influential supporters, and consequently, the Luanda-

³¹⁷ Cf. SouthScan: Angola: High Level Defector Claims Savimbi Plans More War, Vol. 10, No. 9, 1995, p. 71. The defector was Colonel Isaac Monteiro 'Zabarra', former secretary to one of Savimbi's hardline military advisors, General 'Bock'.

³¹⁸ AC: Angola: Regional Rebound, Vol. 38, No. 11, 1997, p. 3. See also AC: Angola: De Matos Makes Plans, Vol. 38, No. 24, 1997, pp. 4-5.

³¹⁹ Cf. AC: Angola: Strings Attached, Vol. 39, No. 20, 1998, pp. 1-2. The leadership in the new party consisted of Valentim, Manuvakola, Demostenes Chilingutilla, João Junior and Geronimo Ngongo. Under www.unita.org UNITA-R presents its leading representatives and political program.

³²⁰ In disrespect of the law and the voters, the government allowed Valentim to choose representatives of the new UNITA-R to take the seats in parliament. Valentim kept 55 UNITA deputies and tasked Manuvakola to choose the 15 replacements. Cf. AC: Angola: Strings Attached, 1998, p. 2.

³²¹ Abel Chivukuvuku has family links to the Ovimbundu royal line (Bailundo), from which he profits in his appeal for voters. Cf. AC: Angola: Facing up to Savimbi, Vol. 39, No. 23, 1998, pp. 4-5 and AC: Angola I. Battle of Bailundo, Vol. 40, No. 21, 1999, pp. 5-6.

camp appeared fractionalized and lame. The beneficiaries of this development within UNITA's Luanda-camp were the MPLA-government, who managed to paralyze a potentially powerful opposition, and Savimbi: "*There [in Luanda (KS)], the government, mixing blandishment and patronage, has divided UNITA into rival factions, while Savimbi is using the crisis to purge potential opponents from the party.*"³²² The pattern of fragmentation in UNITA recently consolidated and in 2001, five factions were recognized.³²³ Firstly, the militarist oriented *UNITA-Savimbi* was recognized as the dominant faction. In tight co-operation with 'Gato', Savimbi continuously opted for a military solution, and infrequently expressed willingness to negotiate. The MPLA-sponsored *UNITA-R*, now with Manuvakola as the leading figure, fell into political oblivion. Abel Chivukuvuku continues to gather support for his candidacy as a 'presidential hopeful', thus the label *UNITA-Autonomie*. Yet another faction in Luanda, *UNITA-Luanda*, was critical to Savimbi's militarist faction, but its leader, Jaka Jamba, refused to initiate a government-influenced party. Among UNITA's international representatives, *UNITA-International*, there were indications of increasingly tense relations with Savimbi.³²⁴ In this state of fragmentation, Savimbi was forced to rely on a diminished number of trusted aides as well as on a new generation of UNITA-leaders. While most cadres during the 1980s were either among the founding members of UNITA (first generation) or joined the insurgent movement during the re-mobilization in 1974-1976 (second generation), most UNITA commanders are now young. This 'third generation' was brought up in UNITA-controlled zones and educated in Jamba or on UNITA-scholarships abroad, and this dependence on the movement has eventually ensured their loyalty.³²⁵ Central figures in Savimbi's immediate leadership since the mid-1990s, were Vice-President Dembo, Secretary General Gato, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Alcides Sakala, Chief of Staff General Geraldo Abreu 'Kamorteiro' and General Esteves 'Kamy' Pena.³²⁶ An increasing centralization in the 1990s was intended to secure the continued functioning of the administration, and "*Savimbi's personal grip means that even the most highly placed defectors cannot give the government precise information.*"³²⁷ Savimbi's concern for domination, not only within

³²² AC: Angola: Savimbi's Splitters, Vol. 40, No. 14, 1999 (pp. 5-7), p. 6.

³²³ See AC: Angola: Who blinks first? Vol. 42, no. 11, 2001, pp. 1-3.

³²⁴ UNITA's international representatives, who despite UN sanctions, have continued their international lobby activities under the guise of NGOs, such as the "*Commission for Justice, Peace and Reconciliation in Angola*" located in Lisbon, have been kept short of money, and reportedly some of them are struggling with heavy debts. Savimbi's distrust was alerted for example against UNITA's representative in the USA, Jardo Muekalia, who was a friend of Tito Chingunji and is close to Abel Chivukuvuku, a potential challenge to Savimbi's authority. Cf. Supplementary-Report, 2001, paragraphs 46-63.

³²⁵ Cf. AC: Angola: All About Power, Vol. 40, No. 3, 1999, pp. 4-5, Supplementary-Report, 2001, paragraphs 16-17 and AC: Angola: Savimbi's Splitters, 1999, pp. 5-7.

³²⁶ Cf. Supplementary-Report, 2001, paragraph 19.

³²⁷ AC: Angola: All About Power, Vol. 40, No. 3, 1999, p. 4. The knowledge of UNITA's storage of supplies (fuel, arms, diamonds) and airstrips is said to have been exclusively reserved for Savimbi. In his testimony to HRW, Manuvakola noted: "[N]ot even I could demand that Dr. Savimbi talk to me... We are just like chickens in the coop that do not know whether the next day they will be taken to the frying pan or whether something else will happen. However, chickens contentedly eat their corn every day because they do not know what will happen tomorrow, nor do they care. For human beings this is impossible, we cannot live with the knowledge that tomorrow we will be killed." HRW: Angola Unravels, 1999, p. 58.

UNITA, but in the general restructuring of the Angolan political system, was apparent when he denied the position as Vice-President, offered to him by the MPLA-government.³²⁸ The centralization of power within UNITA was based on the principle of keeping knowledge about the different administrative units at an absolute minimum. The internal administration operates in a cell structure with marginal horizontal coordination. There are four political commissions, but these are all subordinated to the 'General Political Commission', chaired by Savimbi, who is responsible for the coordination of all activities. Consequently, the General Commission also functions as a central internal control mechanism.³²⁹

The increasing centralization of UNITA during the 1990s led to frequent comments on Savimbi's hegemony over the movement, illustrated by headlines such as "*Savimbi's War*" and "*Savimbi's Personality Drives Angolan War*".³³⁰ With reference to the "psychological make-up of Savimbi" Hodges states that "[h]is [Savimbi's (KS)] role in the Angolan conflict confirms the importance of the individual in history."³³¹ Yet another scholar notes that "up to 100,000 people had been killed – all in the name of one man's [Savimbi's (KS)] pride."³³² Savimbi's absolute power is seen as a result also of his charismatic qualities legitimizing the control apparatus: "This is a product partly of his personal charisma and genuine leadership qualities, but it is reinforced by a fearsome security apparatus, a culture of zero tolerance of dissent and a personality cult that has parallels with those of Mao Tse-Tung and Kim Il-Sung."³³³ However, the role of Savimbi must be assessed in context of the institutionalized system, within which this personality operated – a system of power, profit and protection. In his elaboration of charismatic domination, Weber noted the difficulty of installing charisma as a sustainable form of authority, as charisma tends to be transformed into traditional or legal-rational forms of domination. The potential universal character of charisma, however, implies that charismatic qualities influence other forms of authority. This is the function that Savimbi's charisma has fulfilled in UNITA's system of authority: Savimbi's charismatic qualities were beneficial to the functioning of the UNITA 'social order', but has had a subordinate function in comparison to the traditional basis of legitimacy and the control system of the organizational apparatus. A central institution, designed to ensure the internal cohesiveness in the UNITA-administration is the

³²⁸ A UNITA-representative explained why Savimbi denied the vice-presidency: "[F]rom the government's point of view, the idea was simply, look, you come here, we give you the vice-presidency, we give you five Mercedes... and just forget about everything else. From that perspective it [was] difficult for somebody like [Savimbi] to take it. It is very hard to simply come out and to say now you are the vice-president but all you do is you wake up in the morning, you read the papers and then you look at your Mercedes." Spears, Ian S.: Angola: A Backgrounder. In: Southern Africa Report (Toronto), Vol. 15, No. 1, 1999 (pp. 7-9), p. 8.

³²⁹ Cf. Supplementary-Report, 2001, paragraphs 18 and 22. The four political commissions focus on political strategy and external relations; administration of areas under UNITA-control, production and financial management; security and juridical issues, and the coordination of political and military issues respectively.

³³⁰ Cf. "*Savimbi's War*" ("Savimbi's krig") in the Third World Magazine-X, 6, 2000, retrieved July 1, 2001 from <http://solidaritetshuset.org/x/0006/savimbi.html> and "*Savimbi's Personality Drives Angolan War*" in The Financial Gazette, South Africa, October 21, 1999, retrieved September 25, 2001 from www.cyberplexafrica.com/fingaz/99/stage/archive/991020/briefing-index.htm.

³³¹ Hodges: Angola from Afro-Stalinism, 2001, p. 19.

³³² Russel: Big Men, Little People, 2000, p. 104.

³³³ Hodges: Angola from Afro-Stalinism, 2001, p. 18.

Brigada de Informação Geral (BIG).³³⁴ BIG recruits agents within UNITA's operational command structure, in units abroad and in other UNITA cells to observe the work of their colleagues and report on disobedient behavior and suspicious information. Thus, BIG represents an internal 'Soviet-style' control system. The existence of this system indicates that intimidation is a central disciplinarian practice within the movement.

UNITA's military strategy was subject to considerable changes during the 1990s. When UNITA in 1992 resumed fighting as a consequence of the, according to UNITA, fraudulent election, the tactic was to attack urban areas and undermine the state administration of the country. UNITA's military advances resulted in speculations about partition as UNITA's strategic objective.³³⁵ In the renewed military campaign in 1998, UNITA aimed at destabilization, by forcing civilians to flee the countryside into the already overcrowded cities, referred to as "*victory by social explosion*."³³⁶ In pursuit of this tactic, UNITA committed brutal atrocities against civilians. Although frequent mutilations and indiscriminate use of landmines demonstrate UNITA's authority over civilian life, such practices must be examined with regard to its functions: forcible recruitment and kidnapping of women and children are mechanisms sustaining UNITA's military apparatus.³³⁷ Estimates of UNITA-troops in 1995 amounted to 60,000 soldiers, but in 1998 western intelligence sources suggested 15,000 high-caliber troops and 10,000 support forces.³³⁸ During the 1990s, many UNITA commanders joined the reorganized government forces, the FAA, and in 1996, one third of the top generals in the Angolan army were reportedly ex-UNITA.³³⁹ The government advances in the Central Highlands in 1999 inflicted problems on UNITA's command and infrastructure located in the area. The government also launched a strategy aimed at depopulating the country-side, in order to deny UNITA access to food provided by civilians. Reports on UNITA-military units operating autonomously, indicated a deteriorating centralized control.³⁴⁰ Consequently, UNITA's dominance over provinces became questionable in the late 1990s. Certain localities remained under UNITA-control however, and the UN reported in 2001 that UNITA had safe havens at their

³³⁴ BIG is one of two units comprising UNITA's intelligence unit. The second one is the Service for Clandestine Intelligence (*clandestinidade*), operating primarily in urban areas gathering information on the government. See Supplementary-Report, 2001, paragraphs 26-27.

³³⁵ In an effort to mediate between the MPLA and UNITA in the tense situation after the elections in 1992, South Africa proposed a federalized system with a strong "UNITA-state" as a political solution to the conflict. Cf. Tvedten, Inge: *The Angolan Debacle*. In: *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1993 (pp. 108-118), pp. 115-116.

³³⁶ AC: *Angola: Savimbi's Splitters*, Vol. 40, No. 14, 1999, p. 6. See also AC: *Angola: War Drums Sounding*, Vol. 39, No. 16, 1998, pp. 1-3.

³³⁷ "*UNITA's rape and enslavement of women and girls for sex is not only a vicious expression of power over the individual, but also a means of expressing dominance over the community and acts as a rewards system for UNITA soldiers and commanders.*" HRW: *Angola Unravels*, 1999, p. 53

³³⁸ Cf. AC: *Angola: War Drums Sounding*, Vol. 39, No. 16, 1998, pp. 1-3 and AC: *Angola: Inside the Tent*. Vol. 36, No. 14, 1995, pp. 5-6. Currently, as the demobilization of UNITA-troops is being prepared, 50,000 UNITA soldiers is frequently cited. This (over-)estimation presumably includes a number of 'support forces', among them many civilians, with only rudimentary training.

³³⁹ Cf. Brittain, Victoria: *Angola: It's Not Over*. In: *Southern Africa Report*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1996 (pp. 3-7), p. 6.

³⁴⁰ Cf. AC: *Angola: War Drums Sounding*, Vol. 39, No. 16, 1998, pp. 1-3.

disposal in the north and the northeast.³⁴¹ Observers assessed the military situation: “UNITA’s army isn’t as strong as it was in 1993 and the government’s isn’t as weak. UNITA is overstretched and with a serious recruitment problem and divisions in the leadership over Savimbi’s strategy.”³⁴² Recent reports on the reorganization of UNITA’s military regions indicated a continuously functioning central command, despite lack of vast territorial control in late 2001.³⁴³ As a constant destabilizing factor in most of the country’s provinces, particularly in Moxico and the Central Highlands, as well as in areas close to the capital, UNITA continued to prevent the stabilization of government control.³⁴⁴

In this environment of insecurity, UNITA continued to organize civilian administration in many regions until the late 1990s. In 1993, UNITA moved its headquarters from Jamba to Huambo, and from Huambo to Andulo and Bailundo in late 1994. In mid-1993, UNITA was reported to uphold their valuable relations to village representatives, who provided food, shelter and soldiers in return for assistance with educational and health services.³⁴⁵ The election results from 1992, see appendix IV, also indicated a continuous solid civilian support-base for UNITA: among its core constituency in the Central Highlands, in the provinces Huambo, Bié, Benguela and Cuando Cubango, UNITA won a majority-vote of 57 percent, while MPLA won 30 percent in these provinces.³⁴⁶ In all other provinces, however, MPLA won, as UNITA lost in northern, eastern and southern regions, where they had expected victory.³⁴⁷ In rural areas, where the support for UNITA was most profound, UNITA’s social organization continued to function throughout the 1990s. The governing of urban areas, however, proved troublesome. In Huambo, controlled by UNITA from March 1993 to November 1994, it was difficult to activate civil servants, many of whom had not received their salary in months. UNITA’s inability to establish a functioning administration led to criticism of lack of interest in civilian structures.³⁴⁸ However, in a town south of Huambo, Caala, UNITA soon established its own courts, security forces and a taxation system.³⁴⁹ UNITA’s difficulties with the administration of urban centers were explained with reference to the sharp distinction between an urban economy and the subsistence economy in Jamba, and the troublesome transformation from an insurgent movement to a democratic player: “UNITA is trapped by its past. It is a peasant-based guerrilla movement which has outgrown its military success but does not have the structures to convert to government.”³⁵⁰ UNITA managed to sustain an administrative and an economic base, but in the latter half of the 1990s, tactically

³⁴¹ See Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Angola (S/2001/351), April 11, 2001, paragraph 16. See also Final-Report 2000, paragraph 15.

³⁴² AC: Angola: The UN Tries Again. Vol. 40, No. 19, 1999 (pp. 1-3), p. 3.

³⁴³ Cf. SouthScan: Angola: Savimbi ‘set up new UNITA military structure’. Vol. 15, No. 7, 2000 pp. 55-56 and Supplementary-Report 2001, paragraph 20.

³⁴⁴ Cf. The Economist: Angola’s War. From a Scorched Land, A Hint of Peace, Vol. 362, No. 8260, Feb. 16th-22nd, 2002, p. 41.

³⁴⁵ Cf. AC: Angola: Hope from Abidjan, Vol. 34, No. 9, 1993, pp. 6-7.

³⁴⁶ Cf. Marcum, John: Angola: War Again. In: Current History, Vol. 92, No. 574, 1993 (pp. 218-223).

³⁴⁷ In its core constituencies, Luanda, Bengo, Malanje and Cuanza Norte, MPLA won 73 percent and UNITA 16 percent. In aggregate, MPLA 54 percent and UNITA 33 percent. Ibid.

³⁴⁸ Cf. Brittain, Victoria: Angola: It’s Not Over. In: Southern Africa Report, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1996, p. 7.

³⁴⁹ Cf. AC: Angola: Hope from Abidjan, Vol. 34, No. 9, 1993, pp. 6-7.

³⁵⁰ Cf. Ibid., p. 7.

avoided capturing cities, which implied responsibility for civilians.³⁵¹ UNITA's administration of Jamba also deteriorated, with 40,000 civilians reportedly lacking food in 1996, while also being denied freedom of movement by UNITA.³⁵² Troops were relocated to the strategically important diamond areas in the northern provinces, while 4,000 civilians remained in Jamba in 1999, continuously suffering from lack of food and medicine.³⁵³ UNITA's civilian organization prevailed, however, in crisis situations, as the escape both from Andulo and Jamba prior to government attacks in 1999 was organized by UNITA. The UN also reported that UNITA-structures were upheld in the Nangweshi refugee camp in Zambia, a camp established to care for the refugees from Jamba, and expressed concern about UNITA using the camp as a logistic base and recruitment center.³⁵⁴ Although UNITA continuously influenced civilian forms of organization, its ability to establish a stable administration with functioning educational and health services, yet protection and a centralized control of use of physical force, had vehemently deteriorated or even perhaps becoming non-existent in the late 1990s. Even issues such as protection and centralized control of physical force had become a difficult for UNITA to bear. In late 1997, UNITA's relationship with traditional representatives was increasingly tense and there were numerous reports of UNITA killing and publicly executing traditional chiefs.³⁵⁵ In 2001, the UN concluded that *"with possibly a few exceptions, there is no longer any civilian/administrative UNITA organization of importance in the country."*³⁵⁶

Summary: UNITA's Political Structure

A continuous factor in UNITA's political structure was the village system. The organization of community institutions, an agricultural system and the concern for local tradition, culture and language were the pillars of these UNITA-villages. Local chiefs and traditionally authoritative figures had a central position within the village administration, which urged the development of a common interest between the local elite and UNITA, both benefiting from the prevalence of this system. The mobilization of local responsibility implied that UNITA primarily functioned as a sovereign control organ, which also included indiscriminate use of physical force. With regard to the perception of legitimacy, the village structure provided both materialistic and idealistic incentives for civilian support of UNITA, criteria recognized in the theoretical framework in chapter two. UNITA-soldiers profited from well-organized training programs, including political justification, and access to medical care. Despite these benefits, broad scale voluntary recruitment was dominant only during the transformation to independence, succeeded by abduction as the main recruitment strategy during the 1980s and 1990s. Concerning the balance between repression and legitimacy, UNITA established a monopoly on use of physical force, a military police and a secret agent system, which functioned as permanent control mechanisms within the UNITA 'social order'. This control system did, however, not necessarily delegitimize UNITA's authority, due to the prevalence of traditional political ideology

³⁵¹ Cf. AC: Angola I: Shell-shocked, Vol. 40, No. 8, 1999, pp. 5-6.

³⁵² Cf. HRW: Angola. Between War and Peace, 1996, pp. 27-28.

³⁵³ Cf. HRW: Angola Unravels, 1999, pp. 63-64.

³⁵⁴ Cf. Supplementary-Report, 2001, paragraphs 30 and 33.

³⁵⁵ Cf. HRW: Angola Unravels, 1999, p. 63.

³⁵⁶ Supplementary-Report, 2001, paragraph 21.

and the acceptance of authoritarian practices in times of crisis. While civilians generally did not have much choice, although continued support for UNITA was evident in the 1992 election results, a significant aspect with regard to the brutality of UNITA's control system, is the reason why high-stake defections did not occur until the early 1990s, despite knowledge about the nature of the system. The privileged members of UNITA's leadership experienced incentives to be loyal to UNITA, and the internal turbulence in the 1990s must therefore be further examined in context of economic aspects.

The village structure and its traditional underpinning primarily contributed to UNITA's legitimacy. UNITA's efforts to establish a rational-legal foundation of legitimacy began early, but despite sustained efforts, rational-legal aspects were not a main foundation of legitimacy in UNITA's system of domination. The charismatic qualities of Savimbi must be seen in context of the two other types of legitimacy. Savimbi's charisma was beneficial, but not superior to other functional mechanisms such as the control system and the centralized administration. Despite the institutionalization of UNITA's domination, the foundation of legitimacy remained primarily traditional.

4.3. The Economic Structure of the UNITA 'Social Order'

During the last decade, UNITA's involvement in the international diamond trade has evoked a debate on the complicity of international corporations and national governments in internal wars.³⁵⁷ As the world's fourth largest diamond producer by value, Angola possesses a lucrative potential for the international diamond industry.³⁵⁸ The economic successes of UNITA have been guaranteed by the insurgents' ability to extract and market diamonds. Primary analytical interest here is in the composition and the management of UNITA's economic structure. In the theoretical framework (Ch. 3.1.2.), two dimensions were identified, which must be successfully combined as a prerequisite to a viable insurgent economy: firstly, the internal dimension of organizing the extraction of domestic resources, and secondly, the internal-external dimension of interacting with foreign business representatives. The economic dependence on exchange with the external environment, in order to achieve access to necessary military and non-military equipment, represents a potentially significant external influence on the internal functioning of the insurgent 'social order'. In the following section, both the internal and the internal-external dimension of UNITA's economic structure are examined, before and after the peace agreement from Bicesse 1991.

4.3.1. UNITA Establishing an Economic Structure, 1966-1991

In accordance with Mao's theory of guerrilla warfare, the UNITA-leadership institutionalized self-sufficiency as a dominant principle in their economic system from

³⁵⁷ The British NGO Global Witness has played a prominent role in drawing attention to this issue. See Global Witness: A Rough Trade. The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan Conflict. London 1998.

³⁵⁸ Cf. LeBillon: Angola's Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, 1975-2000. In: African Affairs, No. 100, 2001 (pp. 55-80), p. 67.

the 1960s on. Food supply was secured through subsistence farming, both on farms administered by UNITA-members and civilians, either loyal to UNITA or forced to contribute to the insurgent distributional system. A strategy for the acquisition of military equipment was established by attacking the supply convoys of the enemy and defining the confiscation of supplies as the primary aim of the military strategy. An important factor ensuring the success of this strategy was the establishment of technical support bases. Captured weaponry, agricultural tools and other equipment were serviced and repaired for renewed use on these bases, of which UNITA presumably administered 30 in the late 1990s.³⁵⁹

Despite the importance of self-reliance as a prominent organizational principle, UNITA was, as most guerrilla movements, by far exclusively financed by internal efforts. External assistance was a central factor in the economic structure, and the initial support from China, Zambia and Tanzania was vital for UNITA's survival in the early years.³⁶⁰ In the late 1970s, a number of countries contributed to UNITA's external supply line, including Morocco, France, Saudi-Arabia, Congo-Zaire, Iran, Tunisia, Egypt, Senegal, Gabon and Sudan, and in the early 1980s, Togo and Côte d'Ivoire were also affiliated with this group of external backers.³⁶¹ Although UNITA had a range of external supporters at its disposal, the two primary external supporters were South Africa and the USA. While the Clark Amendment in 1976 abandoned further US support to UNITA, which had begun in the summer 1975, the Reagan-Administration accepted and indirectly encouraged South Africa's extensive involvement in the Angolan conflict. Savimbi explained that UNITA and South Africa agreed on a regular supply system in 1980, according to which UNITA submitted requests three months in advance of the delivery. Food, medicine, military equipment, spare parts and other commodities were brought to UNITA from South Africa by land via Namibia or delivered by airdrops, from 1978/79 to the late 1980s.³⁶² For the distribution of supplies to the troops scattered around the country, UNITA established a transportation system, the 'Savimbi Trail', with approximately 300 trucks carrying supplies northwards to the Benguela Railway.³⁶³ In the mid-1980s, South Africa's support to UNITA was estimated at US\$200 million annually.³⁶⁴ With the repeal of the Clark Amendment in 1985, US support to UNITA resumed and amounted to US\$15 million annually in 1986 and 1987, and increased to US\$30 million annually in 1988 and 1989.³⁶⁵ The Bush-Administration (1988-1992) continued to provide financial assistance to UNITA,

³⁵⁹ Cf. Potgieter: "Taking Aid from the Devil Himself." UNITA's Support Structures. In: Cilliers; Dietrich (eds.): *Angola's War Economy*, 2000 (pp. 255-273), pp. 257-263 and Bridgland: Jonas Savimbi, 1986, p. 89.

³⁶⁰ Cf. Potgieter: *Taking Aid*, 2000, pp. 256-257.

³⁶¹ Cf. Minter: *Apartheid's Contras*, 1994, p. 189, Bridgland: Jonas Savimbi, 1986, p. 322-325, p. 348 and Potgieter: *Taking Aid*, 2000, p. 260.

³⁶² Cf. Minter: *Apartheid's Contras*, 1994, pp. 189-191. South African supplies continued on a small scale from 1976-1979, and large scale aid presumably began in late 1978 or early 1979, and continued also in 1989.

³⁶³ Cf. Bridgland: Jonas Savimbi, 1989, p. 392, pp. 420-421, p. 523 and Minter: *Apartheid's Contras*, 1994, p. 190.

³⁶⁴ Cf. Potgieter: *Taking Aid*, 2000, p. 260.

³⁶⁵ Cf. De Beer; Gamba: *The Arms Dilemma*, 2000, p. 90, footnote 24 (from p. 79).

despite peace negotiations and preparations for the first elections in independent Angola in 1992.³⁶⁶

Throughout the 1980s, diplomatic activities regarding the political development in the region influenced UNITA's strategic choices and prompted a reorganization and diversification of UNITA's economic structure. Although a settlement on Namibian independence was not achieved until 1988, from the early 1980s on, UNITA's main external supporters focused their diplomatic activities on this issue. In this context, UNITA considered the loss of their southern supply line inevitable, and began to explore alternative routes. Congo-Zaire³⁶⁷ and Zambia became increasingly important as transit countries for French and later US support, and explained the location of an additional UNITA-supply base in Cazombo in Moxico-province in the mid-1980s. Another supply route began to operate from the north in the late 1980s, due to the geographical proximity to Congo-Zaire's port town Matadi. An additional element of UNITA's supply structure was the subcontracting of airborne deliveries to private corporations.³⁶⁸ The airborne component, however, played a minimal role in the 1980s, and South Africa remained the primary external backer. Nonetheless, UNITA's strategy of diversifying its supply routes provided a strategic advantage for the adaptation of UNITA's economic structure subsequent to the withdrawal of the main external backers in the early 1990s.

By the end of the 1980s, UNITA could rely on multiple supply routes, from the south, the north and the east, and on alternative means of transportation, by land and by air. Additionally to the reorganization and diversification of supply lines, an internal adjustment significantly influenced UNITA's economic structure in the 1980s. UNITA launched a business strategy and established an alternative economic system, parallel to external assistance, which emerged as the nucleus of UNITA's war economy in the 1990s. By 1979, the export of ivory, rhino horn, animal skins (leopard, antelope) and gold generated revenue for UNITA's war effort. Ivory and hardwood were exported to Namibia, and possibly to Zambia and Congo-Zaire, but also diamonds presumably contributed to UNITA's income already in the late 1970s.³⁶⁹ Despite insecurities about the level of UNITA's diamond involvement in the late 1970s, the diamond rich-provinces Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul became a primary target in UNITA's military

³⁶⁶ Lardner, Georg Jr.: How Lobbyist Briefed a Rebel Leader; Memos Prepared for Savimbi Detail Who's Who in Angola Aid Fight. In: The Washington Post, October 8, 1990, p. A21.

³⁶⁷ Due to frequent name-changes, Congo-Zaire and Congo-Brazzaville are used, as a matter of convenience, in order to avoid confusion.

³⁶⁸ On UNITA's diverse transportation routes in the 1980s, see Potgieter: Taking Aid, 2000, pp. 260-261, Minter: Apartheid's Contrasts, 1994, p. 190 and Peleman, Johan: The Logistics of Sanctions Busting: The Airborne Component. In: Cilliers; Dietrich (eds.): Angola's War Economy, 2000 (pp. 295-316), p. 296. Portugal and other NATO-countries channeled their efforts to assist UNITA through the northern Cabinda enclave, although further information on Portuguese support and contributions from NATO-countries was not encountered.

³⁶⁹ Cf. Bridgland: Jonas Savimbi, 1986, p. 358, Le Billon: Angola's Political Economy, 2001, p. 67, Dietrich, Christian: UNITA's Diamond Mining and Exporting Capacity. In: Cilliers; Dietrich (eds.): Angola's War Economy, 2000 (pp. 275-294), p. 276 and Le Billon: A Land Cursed By Its Wealth? Angola's War Economy 1975-99. Helsinki: UNU/WIDER 1999, p. 14. Although UNITA generated income from a number of resources, very little is known about the size of the profit and form of extraction.

strategy from 1983 on.³⁷⁰ UNITA aimed at distorting the MPLA government's diamond revenue by raiding and capturing equipment and diamonds from companies as well as *garimpeiros*, so-called unlicensed diamond diggers operating on a 'freelance-basis' in the Angolan diamond industry since the late 1970s. In the mid-1980s, UNITA directly exploited mines abandoned by commercial mining companies and 'taxed' *garimpeiros*.³⁷¹ How exactly UNITA exported diamonds and generated profits through a smuggling network in these early years, remains concealed. There were suggestions that South Africa did not serve as the center of UNITA's diamond trade, leading to speculations on the connections via Congo-Zaire and Zambia. Contrary to this version, Cilliers refers to reports of UNITA diamonds being brought from the mining areas in the northeast to Jamba by foot, and then most likely exported to the international diamond market via South Africa or Congo-Zaire.³⁷² Bridgland's observation of a British diamond merchant arriving by plane in Jamba in 1983 indicates that a strategy of flying foreign business partners into UNITA-bases, frequently applied in the 1990s, already existed at this early stage.³⁷³ From the early 1980s, UNITA fortified its diamond branch with specialized training of recruits for deployment in the diamond industry. An increasingly professionalized commercial strategy was evident also in UNITA's acquisition of special equipment, such as frogmen's suits to recover diamonds from deep rivers, purchased in Europe in 1986.³⁷⁴ These practices apparently resulted in increased profitability, as estimates of UNITA's diamond revenue increased from US\$4 million in 1984 to US\$14 million in 1989.³⁷⁵

³⁷⁰ One widely noted UNITA-attack on a commercial mine took place in 1984 in the mining town Cafunfo in Lunda Norte. UNITA kidnapped 77 Britons, Portuguese and Filipinos and had them march hundreds of miles through the bush before releasing them. The South African based diamond company De Beers, to whom the management of Angola's diamond mines was subcontracted in 1978, withdrew in 1985, as a result of the increasing threat of UNITA-attacks in the mining areas. De Beers involvement created a paradox situation for South Africa, which was involved commercially with the government and militarily and politically with the insurgents. On UNITA's strategy to create mayhem in the mining areas in the 1980s, see Bridgland: Jonas Savimbi, 1986, p. 508, p. 535 and p. 593, Dietrich, Christian: Inventory of Formal Diamond Mining in Angola. In: Cillies; Dietrich (eds.): Angola's War Economy, 2000 (pp. 141-172), p. 144 and Hodges: Angola from Afro-Stalinism, 2000, p. 149.

³⁷¹ Cf. Le Billon: Angola's Political Economy, 2001, p. 68.

³⁷² Bridgland referred to Savimbi's statement on unfavorable geographical conditions for diamond trade via South Africa, when the main mines were in the north. Hodges, however, noted that South African troops provided a link for UNITA's trade in ivory, timber and diamonds to the world market. Dietrich states that numerous South African diamond dealers were associated with the military. Additionally, American and Belgian diamond traders in Congo-Zaire worked with Mobutu. Cf. Bridgland: Jonas Savimbi, 1986, p. 509, Hodges: Angola From Afro-Stalinism, 2001, p. 152 and Dietrich: UNITA's Diamond Mining, 2000, p. 276.

³⁷³ Cf. Bridgland: Jonas Savimbi, 1986, p. 453. This would of course not be surprising, considering the frequent visits by foreign journalists to UNITA-controlled areas.

³⁷⁴ Cf. Ibid., pp. 593-594.

³⁷⁵ Cf. Dietrich: UNITA's Diamond Mining, 2000, p. 276. Due to lack of reliable information, the best evidence of the expansion of UNITA's diamond strategy is perhaps the decrease in government revenue, which Le Billon noted as a decrease from an estimated US\$221 million in 1981 to US\$33 million in 1986. Dietrich notes that the formal diamond production dropped from US\$64 million in 1984 to US\$15 million in 1986. These deviations indicate the existence of a large informal sector. Cf. Le Billon: Angola's Political Economy, 2001, p. 67 and Dietrich: Inventory of Formal Diamond Mining, 2000, p. 144.

UNITA's ability to infiltrate the Angolan diamond sector and advance to a major participant in the 1990s, benefited from geographical conditions as well as from the nature of the resource. Angola's known diamond deposits are located in the north-eastern regions mainly, but also in the central, eastern and south-eastern areas of the country (see map, appendix III). The highest diamond concentration is found in the Lunda provinces, Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul, and in the Cuango-valley in the north-east. Diamonds are found both in riverbeds, in the technical jargon *alluvial* deposits, and in volcanic pipes, so-called *kimberlite* deposits.³⁷⁶ While the exploitation of kimberlite mines requires a relative high level of investment, alluvial production is comparably cost-effective with surface mining or diving in rivers executed with minimal expensive machinery.³⁷⁷ The spatial distribution³⁷⁸ of alluvial deposits in Angola has been an obstacle to thorough government regulation, but is advantageous to insurgent infiltration of the diamond industry. In addition to these geographical conditions, the nature of the resource is beneficial to an insurgent war economy. Diamonds are indestructible and easily concealed and transported, qualities, which benefit smuggling activities. With a very high value concentrated in a small size, diamonds represent a convenient storage of wealth. When the UN introduced sanctions on UNITA bank accounts in 1997, the nature of the resource offered an alternative strategy for the storage of wealth, which allowed UNITA to avoid traceable bank accounts.³⁷⁹ The government's poor regulation of the diamond sector as well as UNITA's frequent attacks on mines in the 1980s, led to an increasingly militarized and lawless environment, in which multiple actors, such as local strongmen, migrant diggers and foreign entrepreneurs, formed a diverse industry prospering from clandestine and illegal activities. UNITA has been one of the main beneficiaries of this development, and in the late 1980s the extent of UNITA's involvement in the diamond sector was, according to one observer, on a "*quasi-industrial scale*."³⁸⁰ Under these conditions, UNITA expanded its commercial strategy in the early 1990s.

4.3.2. UNITA Expanding its Commercial Strategy

In the early 1990s, the political development in Angola became more inclined towards peace and in this reform-oriented environment, the government introduced new laws in an attempt to improve regulation and increase government output from the diamond sector. In December 1991, possession and sale of rough diamonds by unregistered individual diggers were legalized. State-run buying offices were set up through Endiama, a corporation representing government interests in the Angolan diamond

³⁷⁶ Kimberlite is volcanic crust shaped million of years ago, that have been pushed closer to the earth's surface through volcanic activity. Alluvial diamonds have been washed out of kimberlite pipes and are found in contemporary or ancient river systems. Cf. Dietrich: *Inventory of Formal Diamond Mining*, 2000, p. 142.

³⁷⁷ Cf. Global Witness: *A Rough Trade*, 1998.

³⁷⁸ Alluvial deposits are spread over a region of at least 300,000 km² in north-eastern Angola. Cf. Le Billon: *A Land Cursed by Its Wealth*, 1999, p. 13.

³⁷⁹ Cf. Le Billon: *Angola's Political Economy*, 2001, p. 67 and Fowler-Report, 2000, paragraph 105.

³⁸⁰ Le Billon: *Angola's Political Economy*, 2001, p. 67.

sector since 1981.³⁸¹ With this initiative, the government created an official method for the incorporation of illegally mined diamonds into the legal market, as officially registered buyers could now legally buy diamonds from unregistered miners. The new legislation was an incentive for prospective miners of various nationalities, who rushed to the diamond areas and established illicit mining as a central pillar of Angola's shadow economy. The legal reform was much to the benefit of UNITA, whose involvement in the diamond sector was endured. By acting as a political party, apparently participating actively in the preparations for elections, UNITA's commercial interests in the diamond industry appeared legitimate to many in the international community. While the MPLA relied on oil, UNITA used diamonds as a legitimate financial means of sustaining a political opposition.³⁸² In the early 1990s, UNITA emerged as a main actor in the illicit, or unofficial, market in a diamond industry subdivided into three sectors, overlapping with Lock's heuristic approach (see p. 10): the *formal sector* comprised of licensed diamond companies, which were registered with Endiama and operated mines; the *informal sector* operated through licensed buyers (*comptoirs*) purchasing diamonds from unlicensed diggers, such as garimpeiros, and the *illicit or criminal sector* including diamonds smuggled out of the country, mainly under UNITA-control, or commercialized through unlicensed buyers.³⁸³ The ability of licensed buyers to legally purchase diamonds from unlicensed (illicit) diggers, represented an opportunity for UNITA to access the informal sector, thus the informal and illicit sectors considerably overlapped. Gray areas also link the formal and informal sectors, as army commanders and politicians issue valid documents to foreign miners, not officially registered with the state. With the approval of corrupt state-representatives, such semi-legal enterprises gain access to the valuable Angolan diamond market.

When UNITA re-launched the war subsequent to the election in 1992, the mining areas were the strategic targets. UNITA successfully captured the most lucrative mines in the Cuango-valley and established vast control of the alluvial diamond production in the northeast, specifically around Dundo and Lucapa, which resulted in a UNITA "*quasi-monopoly*" on diamond exploitation from 1992-1994.³⁸⁴ UNITA's hegemony in the diamond industry continued until late 1997, when political changes in Congo-

³⁸¹ After independence in 1975, the Angolan diamond industry was organized through the state-owned company *Diamang* (Companhia de Diamantes de Angola), which then established a state monopoly on mines through *Endiama* (Empresa Nacional de Diamantes de Angola).

³⁸² The international community did not take a clear stand on this issue, but it was emphasized that UNITA would need a financial base, in order to function as a political party in Angola's multiparty system, and that the contenders therefore would have to reach an agreement on the access to the diamond resources. UNITA's military preponderance in the diamond areas throughout the 1990s forced the MPLA to negotiate the distribution of diamond resources with UNITA. After a number of secretive talks, without external intermediaries, a memorandum of understanding was signed in November 1996. Due to the continued fighting, however, UNITA failed in its attempts to legitimize its commercial interests. Cf. Hare, Paul: *Angola's Last Best Chance for Peace. An Insider's Account of the Peace Process*. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace 1998, pp. 124-126 and Dietrich: *UNITA's Diamond Mining*, 2000, p. 276 and p. 279.

³⁸³ Cf. De Boeck, Filip: *Garimpeiro Worlds: Digging, Dying & 'Hunting' for Diamonds in Angola*. In: *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 90, 2001 (pp. 549-562), p. 551, Dietrich: *Inventory of Formal Diamond Mining*, 2000, pp. 150-151 and Dietrich, Christian: *Power Struggles in the Diamond Fields*. In: Cilliers; Dietrich (eds.): *Angola's War Economy*, 2000 (pp. 173-194), p. 185.

³⁸⁴ Cf. Le Billon: *Angola's Political Economy*, 2001, p. 68 and Dietrich: *Power Struggles*, 2000, p. 174.

Brazzaville in June, and the fall of the long-time UNITA-ally President Mobutu Sese Seko in Congo-Zaire in May 1997, combined with a government offensive, forced the rebels to abandon lucrative mining areas in the Cuango-valley and in the north-east.³⁸⁵ The UN described UNITA's dominance in the Cuango-valley between 1992-1997 as *"the world's largest diamond smuggling operation."*³⁸⁶ After 1998 UNITA's diamond activities continued, presumably in the eastern Lundas, in the provinces Malanje, Bié, Cuanza Sul and Cuando Cubango, with Mavinga and Cazombo as epicenters, as well as in the southern areas of Congo-Zaire. The military losses in 1999, particularly Andulo and Bailundo, further deteriorated UNITA's direct control over mines, but the inability of the government to establish territorial control over Angola's vast areas, facilitated continued UNITA-mining activities.³⁸⁷ The UN recently reported that UNITA maintains control over mines scattered around the country, primarily in smaller locations. The provinces Uíge, Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul as well as the town Mavinga were listed as possible locations in 2000, while Uíge, Lunda Norte and Bié were mentioned in 2001.³⁸⁸ Due to these changes in geographical control over diamond areas after 1997, UNITA's access to diamond mines can be subdivided into two phases, firstly, 1992-1997 and secondly, 1998 to the present. The UN did, however, not impose sanctions on the purchase of UNITA diamonds until six months after UNITA had withdrawn from the most profitable mines, in June 1998. The international community has acknowledged its inability to respond adequately to the development of the Angolan conflict: *"Earlier implementation of these sanctions would have helped prevent or shorten the war; the long advance warning allowed UNITA to conceal its diamond operations and assets and gave the movement more time to rearm."*³⁸⁹ Despite the lack of specific information on UNITA's current diamond capacity, UNITA's continued access to diamonds, if not from mines, then from stockpiles, is not questioned.³⁹⁰

The estimates of UNITA's diamond output reveal the importance of the resource for their finances. Various sources note an annual output of US\$ 300-400million in 1993 and 1994, a peak of US\$ 600million annually between 1995-1997, with slightly reduced amounts in the subsequent years, with estimates at US\$ 100-300million annually between 1998-2000.³⁹¹ In comparison, UNITA's main external supporter, South Africa, provided US\$ 200million assistance annually in the mid-1980s, while US-assistance between 1986-1989 amounted to a total of US\$ 90million. The size of UNITA's profits

³⁸⁵ Cf. Dietrich: *Power Struggles*, 2000, p. 182 and Dietrich: *UNITA's Diamond Mining*, 2000, p. 280.

³⁸⁶ Final-Report 2000, paragraph 154. Based on an analysis of statistical information on the output of the formal Angolan diamond sector, Dietrich expresses doubts about whether the 'much cited' UNITA withdrawal from mining areas, actually did occur in 1997. Cf. Dietrich: *Inventory of Formal Diamond Mining*, 2000, p. 153.

³⁸⁷ Cf. Dietrich: *UNITA's Diamond Mining*, 2000, pp. 280-283.

³⁸⁸ Cf. Final-Report, 2000, paragraph 167 and 169, and Supplementary-Report, 2001, paragraph 180.

³⁸⁹ Final-Report, 2000, paragraph 165.

³⁹⁰ Cf. Final-Report, 2000, paragraph 172. UNITA is believed to maintain a stockpile of diamonds, the value of which remains unknown. Ibid., paragraph 167.

³⁹¹ This summary of approximate output is based on the comparison of the following sources: De Boeck: *Garimpeiro Worlds*, 2001, p. 558, Le Billon: *Angola's Political Economy*, 2001, p. 69, Hodges: *Angola from Afro-Stalinism*, 2001, pp. 150-151, Dietrich: *Inventory of Formal Diamond Mining*, 2000, p. 148, p. 151, and Dietrich: *UNITA's Diamond Mining*, 2000, p. 284. Estimates of UNITA's diamond production are generally extracted from a comparison of statistical information on Angolan diamond production both from the government and major diamond companies, such as De Beer.

from diamond trade is, however, unknown. Therefore, despite high estimates of production, the income from the diamond trade does not necessarily represent a more profitable financial base than external assistance. However, in comparison to external financial support, the reliance on internal resources implies that the insurgents experienced external dependencies of a different nature. This aspect will be further elaborated in chapter four.

UNITA's expanding control over diamond-rich areas in 1991 was accompanied by the establishment of an administrative system for the exploitation of mines. The workforce consisted mainly of *garimpeiros*, but UNITA-affiliates, either soldiers or people in UNITA-villages requisitioned to work in mines, worked at some locations.³⁹² During 1992, thousands of *garimpeiros* entered the diamond regions, among them a large number from Congo-Zaire, and estimates indicated an increase from 10,000 *garimpeiros* in Angola in 1991 to 50,000 in August 1992, with rapid daily increases.³⁹³ According to UN estimates, UNITA managed a workforce, primarily consisting of *garimpeiros* from Congo-Zaire, of 100,000 miners in 1996.³⁹⁴ For the entry of these *garimpeiro* 'guest workers' into Angola, UNITA established several border checkpoints, where the *garimpeiros* obtained a permit guaranteeing unhindered passage.³⁹⁵

The administration of mines in UNITA-controlled areas was either directly exercised by UNITA or, alternatively, by foreigners for whom UNITA provided military protection.³⁹⁶ In the UNITA-controlled mines, *garimpeiros* were taxed a share of their production, either in cash or in rough diamonds. Although UNITA attempted to concentrate *garimpeiros* in certain mines in order to exercise effective control of the workforce and increase the output, direct and thoroughly organized administration was not established. UNITA provided internal security, while the *garimpeiros* administered their own social organization in the settlement camps. With background in ethnic, regional and urban solidarity, the *garimpeiros* organized cooperative units, appointed a leading person, a patron, and distributed other administrative responsibilities in a hierarchic organization of the camps. Women were also present in the mining areas, frequently working as portables. So-called 'mining marriages' functioned as temporary 'cooperative economic units', in which women were responsible for the household, sometimes running a little business, and guarded the diamonds in the house when the husbands were working the mines. Although UNITA was responsible for internal security, the foreign *garimpeiros* were frequently employed to supervise and control the workforce. On the impact of UNITA's control of these camps, De Boeck concludes that

³⁹² Cf. Fowler-Report, 2000, paragraph 78 and De Boeck: *Garimpeiro Worlds*, 2001, p. 554.

³⁹³ Cf. Dietrich: *Power Struggles*, 2000, p. 174. In 1994 the number of Zairian diggers operating in the Lundas was estimated at 30,000, and in 1999 the government estimated the number of illegal diggers at 300,000. Cf. Le Billon: *Angola's Political Economy*, 2001, p. 70, footnote 64.

³⁹⁴ Cf. Final-Report, 2000, paragraph 157.

³⁹⁵ Cf. De Boeck: *Garimpeiros Worlds*, 2001, p. 554.

³⁹⁶ The subsequent review of the two forms of mining administration in UNITA-controlled areas, either operated by UNITA or by foreigners, is based on the following sources: Dietrich: *UNITA's Diamond Mining*, 2000, pp. 277-278, Dietrich: *Power Struggles*, 2000, pp. 174-175, and the Fowler-Report, 2000, paragraphs 78-79. On the social organization of the *garimpeiro* workforce and the influence of traditional culture in the northern diamond regions, see De Boeck: *Garimpeiro Worlds*, 2001 and De Boeck: *Postcolonialism, Power and Identity: Local and Global Perspectives from Zaire*. In: Werbner, Richard; Ranger, Terence: *Postcolonial Identities in Africa*. London & New Jersey: Zed Books 1996 (pp. 75-106).

“very quickly life in the diamond mining camps became better organised and more settled.”³⁹⁷ In addition, bartering came to an end and the diamond trade was monetised, i.e. ‘dollarization’. Garimpeiros were inspected and taxed during the washing process, when sediment is washed to isolate rough diamonds, and the washing location functioned as a focal point of control. To what extent garimpeiros managed to withhold diamonds from taxation is uncertain, but there were reports of indiscriminate punishment when attempts to hide diamonds were discovered.³⁹⁸ Due to the insecure environment in the mining areas, garimpeiros profited from the protection provided by UNITA. The alternative to UNITA ‘safe zones’ was the constant threat of attacks both from UNITA, MPLA and other violent groups such as local strongmen or police.

UNITA’s administration of the diamond extraction was linked to socio-cultural aspects of former long-distance trade between villages in present-day Angola and Congo-Zaire. These regional interconnections generated the development of a dynamic social structure with a mix of local and global, traditional and modern aspects. UNITA recognized the authority of the traditional titleholder in the Cafunfo mining area and called upon the titleholder to carry out protective rituals to ‘hide’ the mining town from air attacks by the MPLA. In the application of this strategy, UNITA was benefiting from the openness of the regional tradition, as the adjustment to external influences traditionally empowered the titleholder’s basis of authority.³⁹⁹ For the garimpeiros from Congo-Zaire, the Angolan diamond areas represented an opportunity for self-realization, an idea traditionally linked to being a hunter or a warrior. Crossing the border from Congo-Zaire to Angola to get involved in the diamond sector was linked to the imagination of being physically strong, enduring pain and gaining stamina.⁴⁰⁰ This influence of traditional beliefs on the ‘work ethic’ of garimpeiros benefited the UNITA-system of diamond extraction, as traditional beliefs offered an explanation for enduring the pain. Hence, traditional elements were influential also in stabilizing the functioning of the internal dimension of UNITA’s economic structure.

In joint operations with foreigners, UNITA did not rely on the inefficient taxation of garimpeiros, but established a formal, more transparent system of controlling the output. Foreign nationals were allowed access to Angola’s diamond riches under UNITA control by paying a fee to the movement.⁴⁰¹ While UNITA provided military protection, foreigners provided expertise and trained UNITA-personnel in the control and management of mines. The foreign entrepreneurs were responsible for investments (water pumps, earth moving equipment), which increased output while simultaneously reducing the financial risk for UNITA. The output from these jointly operated mines, with UNITA protecting, foreigners administering and garimpeiros digging, was split in five portions, of which garimpeiros received one in five bags, and UNITA and the foreigners two each.⁴⁰² One of the largest joint mining operations was the *Cuango Mining Operation*, run cooperatively by UNITA and foreign business partners. The *De*

³⁹⁷ De Boeck: *Garimpeiro Worlds*, 2001, p. 554.

³⁹⁸ Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 555.

³⁹⁹ Cf. De Boeck: *Postcolonialism, Power and Identity*, 1996, p. 78 and p. 86.

⁴⁰⁰ Cf. De Boeck: *Garimpeiro Worlds*, 2001, p. 560.

⁴⁰¹ The Fowler Commission referred to UNITA auctions, on which foreigners could bid on a permission to exploit mines in UNITA controlled territory. The sanctions regime presumably halted this practice, although it remains unclear whether such activities continue. Cf. Fowler-Report, 2000, paragraph 79.

⁴⁰² Cf. Dietrich: *UNITA’s Diamond Mining*, 2000, p. 278.

Decker brothers from South Africa were significant foreign collaborators in UNITA's mining operations. In addition to the mining, the De Decker brothers frequently operated as brokers for UNITA diamonds on the international diamond market.⁴⁰³ After 1997, foreign responsibility for the direct mining process inside Angola diminished, perhaps ceasing completely.

In the UNITA controlled mining areas, the threat or use of physical force functioned as a means of ensuring the discipline of the *garimpeiro* workforce. The militarization of the diamond areas was generally beneficial to local strongmen, the armed forces and the insurgents, since it enabled them to operate a system in which the commodity 'security' was exchanged for a share in the diamond production.⁴⁰⁴ The financial dependence on the *garimpeiro* workers, however, was an incentive to limit the arbitrary use of violence: "*Warring factions need garimpeiro labour to profit from diamond reserves, making severe mistreatment a financial liability.*"⁴⁰⁵ Following the government offensive in 1997 UNITA's patron-client relations with *garimpeiros* came under increasing pressure. The deteriorating UNITA control in the northern provinces did however not improve the security situation. Rather, the lack of territorial control by the Angolan state, i.e. the lack of policing and administration, facilitated further struggle for domination in the diamond areas, involving different factions, both the two main parties to the conflict and smaller groups of unknown origin.⁴⁰⁶ As a consequence of the deteriorating military situation, UNITA presumably lost its capacity to control a large workforce.⁴⁰⁷ There is no doubt, however, that during the 1990s "*UNITA's 'mining rights' were based on force majeure.*"⁴⁰⁸

The intensified competition for access to lucrative mining areas between the two main contesting parties, local warlords and foreign entrepreneurs in the Lunda provinces, led to a thriving informal economy. The expansion of the diamond sector in the 1990s, with an influx of migrant workers and foreign entrepreneurs, necessitated an increased supply of both mining equipment and consumer goods. In context of the increasing criminalization, a complex pattern of commercial alliances emerged. The group controlling the airport taxed goods arriving by air. When goods were transported from the airport to the commercial centers, the armed force or the warlord controlling the specific territory demanded a fee, for example a 10-15 percent tax to ensure safe passage through.⁴⁰⁹ Thus, *garimpeiros* were not only valuable as labor, but also as purchasing power, providing substantial income to UNITA through high retail prices and taxation.⁴¹⁰

During UNITA's hegemony in the diamond areas from 1992-1997, the primary organizational principle of UNITA's diamond structure was centralization. Diamonds

⁴⁰³ Cf. Final-Report, 2000, paragraphs, 155-161.

⁴⁰⁴ Cf. Dietrich: Power Struggles, 2000, p. 173.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 183.

⁴⁰⁶ Cf. Cilliers, Jakkie: Business & War in Angola. In: Review of African Political Economy, No. 90, 2001 (pp. 636-641), p. 636 and Dietrich: Power Struggles, 2000, pp. 182-183.

⁴⁰⁷ Cf. Final-Report, 2000, paragraph 168.

⁴⁰⁸ Final-Report, 2000, paragraph 154.

⁴⁰⁹ Cf. Dietrich: Power Struggles, 2000, pp. 183-184. The operation of the informal economy is detectable in statistical anomalies. For example, the town Saurimo in Lunda Sul reportedly received five times as much supplies as required according to population estimates.

⁴¹⁰ Cf. Dietrich: UNITA's Diamond Mining, 2000, p. 278.

were channeled into a centralized system under the oversight of Savimbi in close cooperation with the Secretary General Antonio Dembo, whose pivotal position within UNITA's diamond structure presumably consolidated in 1994/1995.⁴¹¹ UNITA's diamond ministry, the *Ministry of National Resources* (MIRNA), prepared the precious stones for sale or export.⁴¹² The town Luzamba in the Cuango-valley functioned as UNITA's diamond headquarters, until they were captured by government forces in January 1998. Andulo was an additional diamond center, located close to a valuable airstrip. Diamonds were brought to Luzamba and Andulo by plane, making the logistical infrastructure an important factor for the functioning of this system. The UN described air transport as "*an essential and irreplaceable lifeline for the supply to UNITA.*"⁴¹³ A prerequisite for the functioning of an airborne transportation system is the control of airstrips, and UNITA was in a particularly favorable situation until 1999, as the movement controlled a large airstrip in Andulo. In 2000 the UN reported on airdrops in UNITA territory, but further information on UNITA's access to airstrips in the subsequent years could not be established.⁴¹⁴ The centralized organization of UNITA's diamond administration benefited from the clustered geographical location of UNITA-controlled mines in the north-east, the foreign operation of the mines, which allowed a more effective control of the otherwise scattered *garimpeiros*, and 'relative peace' after 1994. The increasingly uprooted UNITA-control over diamond mines since 1997, however, facilitated the development of a "*diamond democracy.*"⁴¹⁵ The dispersion of UNITA-troops over a wide, increasingly contested area, discouraged a centralized supply system. Peripherally operating UNITA bands had to provide for their own needs, and Savimbi instructed officers to utilize diamonds for the survival of the troops.⁴¹⁶ Simultaneously, a continued centralized diamond structure was ensured by passing diamonds through the military command to the leadership.⁴¹⁷ Thus, in the 1990s UNITA's diamond collection system operated on three levels: *the centralized level* predominant until 1997; *the sub-level* dominated by the main commanders in UNITA's military regions using diamonds to acquire necessary supplies, and *the peripheral level* of UNITA 'bandits' infiltrating the *garimpeiro* market. The peripheral level served primarily individual economic motives, since the diamonds remained in private possession. On the two other levels, diamonds functioned as a means of exchange for the purchase of equipment and for the satisfaction of the basic needs of the UNITA-troops.

As the fundamental means of finance in UNITA's trading system, diamonds have been directly exchanged for material, such as weapons, ammunition, fuel, spare parts, food, uniforms and other equipment. Diamonds have also been sold in order to generate cash, in the case of which the purchase of equipment is conducted elsewhere. Hence, UNITA's strategy for the sale of diamonds has not necessarily overlapped with the strategy for purchase of material. Cross-border transportation of several million dollars in cash is, however, riskier than a direct diamonds-for-commodities-system of

⁴¹¹ Cf. Ibid., p. 291, footnote 5 (from p. 278).

⁴¹² Cf. Final-Report, 2000, paragraph 160.

⁴¹³ Cf. Fowler-Report, 2000, paragraph 164.

⁴¹⁴ Cf. Final-Report. 2000, paragraph 112.

⁴¹⁵ Dietrich: UNITA's Diamond Mining, 2000, p. 279.

⁴¹⁶ Cf. Ibid., pp. 279-280.

⁴¹⁷ Cf. Supplementary-Report, 2001, paragraph 181.

exchange, which UNITA apparently preferred.⁴¹⁸ The secretive and diverse nature of UNITA's exchange system has been the key to its economic success during the 1990s. As a "*master of disguise*"⁴¹⁹ UNITA cultivated a wide range of business contacts centered around the central functional logic of a "*plethora of options and diversity of routes (...) avoiding overreliance on any source or route.*"⁴²⁰ This diverse strategy complicated the task of hurting the insurgents economically, as numerous options were open to UNITA. Despite continued lack of information on the specifics of UNITA's trading system and its international business partners, the work of the UN Sanctions Commission on Angola, provided previously undetected insights into the operation of a clandestine, and globally interconnected insurgent trading network. Two operational spheres in UNITA's exchange system, an internal and an internal-external dimension, define the basic organization of UNITA's diverse trading system, to which we now turn.

The internal dimension of UNITA's exchange system comprised UNITA's practices on the domestic market in Angola, both in regard to the sale of diamonds and the procurement of supplies. UNITA's ability to operate on the internal diamond market was rooted in the lack of sufficient regulation allowing "*virtually anyone in Angola to possess, buy or sell diamonds within the country.*"⁴²¹ These liberal buying practices allowed regional and international companies involved in the Angolan diamond industry to comfortably deny any knowledge of the origin of the diamonds. During the 1990s, officially registered buying offices frequently relied on the tactic of buying diamonds from sub-contracted middlemen. The middlemen purchased diamonds from any source, thereby allowing registered buyers to deny the knowledge of origin. With the aim of maximizing profits in a competitive sector, the middlemen experienced a financial incentive to buy diamonds from anyone offering the valuable resource.⁴²² If one *comptoir* (buyer) would decline the purchase of a high-value diamond, such as those mined by UNITA, another buyer was allowed to profit. Shadowy practices benefited from the character of the market, the harsh competition and the intricate trading relations with lack of comprehensive regulation and transparency. When foreign diamond dealers, who registered with the government, purchased UNITA diamonds, either directly or disguised through middlemen, UNITA operated on the informal market. When unlicensed dealers acquired UNITA diamonds, these activities were part of the 'illicit' market.⁴²³ There is little clear evidence regarding UNITA's involvement on the internal market, although foreign companies have admitted to not knowing whether diamonds have originated from UNITA mines. In 2000, foreign buying corporations in Angola were closed, as the government monopolized the diamond

⁴¹⁸ Cf. Dietrich: UNITA's Diamond Mining, 2000, p. 287, p. 289, and Fowler-Report, 2000, paragraph 81.

⁴¹⁹ Potgieter: Taking Aid, 2000, p. 268.

⁴²⁰ Ibid., p. 264.

⁴²¹ Fowler-Report, 2000, paragraph 94.

⁴²² Cf. Dietrich: Power Struggles, 2000, p. 186 and Fowler-Report, 2000, paragraph 95. The stones collected by middlemen were then transported to Luanda where they were officially registered for export, making it impossible to trace diamonds originating from UNITA controlled mines. UNITA had already extracted its revenue before the stones were transported to Luanda.

⁴²³ Cf. Dietrich: Power Struggles, 2000, pp. 185-187. In the mid-1990s, it was claimed illegal to buy diamonds from UNITA under Angolan law. However, the 'legitimization' of UNITA's diamond operations, due to UNITA's apparent commitment to the Lusaka process, implied a lax implementation of this regulation.

buying practices in a joint operation of the *Sociedade de Comercialização de Diamantes* (SODIAM) and the *Angola Selling Corporation* (ASCORP). This monopolization appears, however, more as an instrument in the process of sustaining the functioning of the patrimonial state, by ensuring continued distribution of economic privileges to state representatives, rather than an instrument improving transparency in the diamond sector.⁴²⁴ Despite the new regulation, one option for UNITA involvement in the domestic diamond structure remained, for example, through middlemen providing the link to the formal structure.

UNITA's domestic exchange system also overlapped with the external trading links as foreign diamond traders frequently flew into UNITA-controlled areas by plane in order to participate on diamond auctions in UNITA's diamond centers Luzamba and Andulo. These practices presumably prospered from 1995, as the Lusaka Protocol ensured a new phase of 'relative peace' reducing the risk of flying. Diamonds sold on UNITA auctions were paid for either in cash, by transferring money to UNITA bank accounts in European or African countries, or directly exchanged for specific supplies. While auctions ceased as a consequence of military defeats, foreign diamond buyers may have sustained their links to UNITA through a courier.⁴²⁵

In regard to UNITA's access to necessary supplies, the prosperous informal market in the Lundas allowed UNITA to rely on a domestic procurement strategy, as UNITA-troops purchased necessities from local traders. One of UNITA's principal fuel sources was the domestic market, as UNITA purchased fuel from corrupt representatives of the state oil company Sonangol. The domestic source of petroleum became even more important after the fall of Mobutu in 1997, a previously substantial source of petroleum for UNITA.⁴²⁶ Equipped with sufficient liquidity, UNITA appears to have enjoyed open access to an unrestricted and criminalized marketplace inside Angola.

UNITA's armament strategy has also operated within the internal dimension. Since the foundation in the 1960s, UNITA continuously practiced the strategy of capturing arms from the enemy. In the 1990s, UNITA captured substantial quantities from the government. Legitimized by the sustained rebel activity in the country, the MPLA-government has invested large amounts of the voluminous, insufficiently documented oil revenues, in re-armament, making Angola one of the most militarized countries in Africa. By providing and sustaining a considerable internal source of arms, a potential target of UNITA robberies, the government indirectly contributed to the supply of war material to UNITA.⁴²⁷

In the internal-external dimension of UNITA's economic structure, i.e. the links between UNITA-controlled areas and external suppliers, diamonds functioned as a means of finance for the purchase of material. UNITA established direct trading relations to diamond cutters and their well-connected intermediaries, and organized a tender system operating in various third countries.⁴²⁸ Favored locations for transactions between UNITA and foreign businesspartners have included Burkina Faso, Congo-Zaire (until 1997), Rwanda (after 1998) and infrequently Côte d'Ivoire and Namibia.

⁴²⁴ Cf. Dietrich: *Power Struggles*, 2000, p. 186.

⁴²⁵ Cf. Dietrich: *UNITA's Diamond Mining*, 2000, p. 284-286 and Fowler-Report, 2000, paragraph 82.

⁴²⁶ Cf. Potgieter: *Taking Aid*, 2000, p. 270, and Fowler-Report, 2000, paragraphs 62-63 and 68.

⁴²⁷ Cf. Fowler-Report, 2000, paragraph 39, Hodges: *Angola from Afro-Stalinism*, 2001, pp. 63-65 and Potgieter: *Taking Aid*, 2000, p. 269.

⁴²⁸ Cf. Final-Report, 2000, paragraph 176-177 and Supplementary-Report, 2001, paragraph 178.

UNITA has also infiltrated the informal diamond networks in Congo-Zaire and South Africa.⁴²⁹ Due to lax controls within the international diamond industry, the global marketability of UNITA diamonds prevailed, despite the existence of a UN sanctions regime. Statistical anomalies, such as the extremely high value of diamonds imported to Antwerp from Zambia, as well as the high value of diamonds reported to be of Rwandan and Ugandan origin when they occurred on the Antwerp market, may be linked to the smuggling of UNITA diamonds, although these reports remain unconfirmed.⁴³⁰ Diamond exports from a number of African countries may therefore have been contaminated with diamonds produced by UNITA.⁴³¹ A complete examination of the various options of marketing Angolan diamonds on the international diamond market would therefore include an extensive study of the intricate trading networks in the region.⁴³²

The sustenance of UNITA's external trading system was guaranteed by continued access to safe havens for arms- and diamond-deals in 'friendly' states. A prerequisite for UNITA's economic success after the end of the Cold War was the willingness of private brokers to replace the function of former external allies and co-operate with UNITA as external suppliers.⁴³³ A central strategy in UNITA's external business relations is the reliance on direct personal contacts. The UN sanctions regime has increased the significance of this operational strategy, as secrecy has become even more necessary. As a tool for securing the loyalty of their external partners, UNITA used diamonds as rewards to friends and potentially new collaborators.⁴³⁴ An extensive number of countries and individuals susceptible operated as brokers on the supply of various commodities. The list of countries involved includes Congo-Zaire (until 1997), Brazzaville (until 1997), Gabon, Zambia, Burkina Faso, Uganda, South Africa, Rwanda, Togo, Ukraine and Bulgaria. These countries have supplied fuel, provided transit places for arms or storage of arms, provided end-user certificates, 'safe havens' for close relatives of the UNITA-leadership, supplied non-military commodities, issued false

⁴²⁹ Several buying offices are located along the border between Congo-Zaire and Angola, and international diamond companies, in particular De Beers, were involved in the diamond trade in this area. In South Africa, UNITA diamonds have been half-polished in order to conceal their origin. The diamonds can then be legally exported as South African diamonds. The diamond trade in South Africa has become increasingly important for UNITA (2000), as previous trading channels were exposed. Cf. Fowler-Report, 2000, paragraphs 82-84, Final-Report, 2000, paragraphs 85, 180-183.

⁴³⁰ Between February and May 2001, imports to Antwerp from Zambia were 20 times more valuable than the entire officially recorded diamond exports from Zambia between 1995-1998. Neither Rwanda nor Uganda have any known diamond deposits. These diamonds may, however, come from mines in Congo-Zaire, not necessarily Angola. Cf. Supplementary-Report, 2001, paragraph 215 and Final-Report, 2000, paragraph 192.

⁴³¹ The Diamond Office examining all imports into Antwerp has listed 15 countries, whose exports might fall into this category. Cf. Final-Report, 2000, paragraph 196.

⁴³² An indication of the interconnectedness of regional markets was the dynamic response to new regulations in Congo-Zaire in 1998, as Kabila attempted to nationalize the 'informal' diamond trade. In response, trading conditions in Brazzaville were relaxed and caused an exodus of traders from Congo-Zaire. Cf. De Boeck: *Garimpeiro Worlds*, 2001, p. 556.

⁴³³ Cf. Peleman: *The Logistics of Sanctions Busting*, 2000, p. 295. A link between former military involvement and business contacts during the 1990s was indicated by the revelation that one of the De Decker brothers was a former officer in the SADF, although whether he was deployed in Angola or not, could not be ascertained. Cf. Final-Report, 2000, paragraph 162.

⁴³⁴ Cf. Fowler-Report, 2000, paragraphs 99 and 131.

passports or supplied air transportation.⁴³⁵ The supply of fuel, however, increasingly became a problem for UNITA. In the mid-1990s, a strategy of stockpiling fuel was initiated, but the intensification of war in 1998 induced high consumption, and the problem prevailed. In 2001 the UN reported that UNITA offered pilots up to US\$ 100,000 per delivery.⁴³⁶ When UNITA re-adopted guerrilla strategies in 1998, the demand for heavy weaponry decreased, as did also the demand for fuel. The UN concluded that “*whatever reaches UNITA today, it is highly reduced compared to the period up to the end of 1999.*”⁴³⁷

From an interview with deserted UNITA officers, the UN gained insight into how an arms-for-diamonds-deal was brokered between UNITA and foreign business representatives.⁴³⁸ A number of contacts on the international weapons market operated as intermediaries between UNITA and the arms suppliers, i.e. governments. These middlemen presented their goods and prices to UNITA. With access to several brokers, UNITA chose the one with the best price to offer. In order to settle the price in diamonds, both the arms broker and UNITA would bring in their diamond experts to assess the value of UNITA’s diamonds. UNITA’s interaction with external trading partners thus functioned according to an economic rationale: through negotiations of prices and quantities, as well as the value of diamonds, trade deals were concluded. The functional logic of UNITA’s internal-external dimension was a rational profit-maximizing logic. Middlemen would provide transportation to UNITA-bases and organize additional education in the use of the equipment, if necessary. In consequence, UNITA did not interact with suppliers beyond the middlemen. The functioning of UNITA’s arms procurement strategy relied on the willingness of governments to supply arms without certain knowledge of the exact end-user. This ignorance of certain governments and the eagerness of individuals in the international community to act as intermediaries, guaranteed the functioning of UNITA’s procurement strategy for arms.⁴³⁹

Within UNITA’s internal organization, the responsibility of these external contacts was only shared between a handful UNITA-representatives. Central figures in the management of UNITA’s diamond sales are recognized as UNITA’s representative in Belgium Azevedo Kanganje, Rui Oliveira in Portugal and Marcial Moises Dechala ‘Karrica’, presumably in Burkina Faso.⁴⁴⁰ Karrica is said to be the external head of UNITA’s diamond ministry MIRNA with Joao Katende ‘Jo Prata’ as his closest partner.⁴⁴¹ Karrica and Jo Prata manage the extensive network of UNITA’s business partners, travel extensively, know all the key buyers, and “*without them UNITA’s*

⁴³⁵ See Fowler-Report, 2000; Final-Report, 2000; Supplementary-Report, 2001. For the procurement of arms, for example, UNITA relied on forged end-user certificates and a network of available arms brokers, who established the links to governments on behalf of UNITA. End-user certificates are required in international arms trade among states.

⁴³⁶ Cf. Supplementary-Report, 2001, paragraph 131 and Fowler-Report, 2000, paragraphs 60-61.

⁴³⁷ Final-Report, 2000, paragraph 19.

⁴³⁸ Cf. United Nations: ANGOLA – Film shown to Security Council by Ambassador Robert Fowler (Canada) January 18, 2000. Retrieved September 6, 2001 from www.un.org/news/dh/latest/fowlangola.htm

⁴³⁹ Cf. Fowler-Report, 2000, paragraph 51.

⁴⁴⁰ Cf. Supplementary-Report, 2001, paragraph 182.

⁴⁴¹ Cf. Fowler-Report, 2000, paragraphs 20 and 149 and the Final-Report, 2000, paragraph 174.

external diamond sales structure would be disrupted."⁴⁴² In 2001 Jo Prata was reportedly staying in Angola, with major responsibility for MIRNA in the interior. UNITA's diamond structure inside Angola has otherwise been tightly controlled by Savimbi personally. Savimbi practiced a strategy of giving family members responsibility for UNITA's diamond wealth, such as in Malange province, where Savimbi's brother-in-law Paulo Kalufele was the head of MIRNA.⁴⁴³ During the 1990s, a small number of influential individuals in the interior and a niche of powerful UNITA-members abroad controlled the administration of UNITA's diamond structure. This elitist structure further aggravated the turbulence over power and influence among UNITA-cadres.

Summary: UNITA's Economic Structure

Although UNITA benefited from generous external assistance in the 1980s, the parallel establishment of a commercial strategy emerged as a profitable financial base. Already in the 1970s, UNITA traded in various resources, but diamonds became the single most important resource in the 1980s. Both the nature of the resource (indestructible, easily concealed, transportable, high value concentration) and the geographical conditions of diamond existence in Angola (spatial distribution, riverbeds, minimal investment) were beneficial to the insurgent economy. UNITA established a system of exploitation based on a *garimpeiro* workforce and on cooperation with foreign mining operators. Within this system, UNITA was the central control instance (demanding taxes/fees) and the security provider (guaranteeing protection and sanctioning disobedience). UNITA's system of exchange functioned both on the domestic and the international level. A domestic procurement strategy benefited from the thriving informal and criminalized market in Angola. UNITA's territorial control allowed the insurgents to demand fees on transportation through 'their' territory. Although UNITA-soldiers were frequently involved in pillage, UNITA's war economy was not a bottom-up organized structure, but was dominated by a centralized structure. Savimbi preferred to give responsibility to family members and relied on a handful of influential individuals for the administration of the diamond structure. On various levels, both in the extraction of diamonds and in the interaction with *garimpeiros* and external trading partners, UNITA's economic structure was well-organized. On the international arena, UNITA sold diamonds through a tender system and established business relations with a number of middlemen, who obtained the requested material on behalf of UNITA. In order to gain access to 'safe havens' abroad, UNITA used diamonds to pay for loyalty. In sum, the main forms of UNITA's economic activity consisted of labor exploitation, monopolistic control of trade, and a diamond economy. The 'democratization' of this structure in the late 1990s, reflected upon the general deterioration of the UNITA-system.

⁴⁴² Final-Report, 2000, paragraph 174.

⁴⁴³ Cf. Fowler-Report, 2000, paragraph 118 and Supplementary-Report, 179. This may imply that regional heads of MIRNA exist.

5. Intertwinement of Political and Economic Structures

In the theoretical chapter, patrimonialism was defined as the main analytical approach to the analysis of the intertwinement⁴⁴⁴ of political and economic structures in an insurgent 'social order'. The applicability of patrimonialism to our object of analysis was justified with reference to the concept of quasi-state, according to which the organizational system of an insurgent movement can qualify as a quasi-state in terms of empirical and/or juridical statehood. In the UNITA 'social order', the provision of basic needs and the administration of hospitals, schools and churches in UNITA-controlled villages over an extended period of time, albeit on different levels of institutionalization, represented a form of empirical statehood. As a participant in negotiations on the future of the independent Angola in the mid-1970s, UNITA was accepted as a legitimate actor in Angolan politics also by external actors, and these diplomatic activities represented an alternative form of juridical statehood. Although UNITA was excluded from the 1988 Tripartite agreement in New York between South Africa, Cuba and Angola (i.e. MPLA), the perception of UNITA as a legitimate party to negotiations was strengthened in the intensive years of diplomacy between 1988-1991 and 1993-1994. Foreign governments distanced themselves from UNITA after the collapse of the election process in 1992, but UNITA's role as a legitimate political contender in Angola prevailed, a view which was supported also by the UN Under-Secretary General and Special Adviser on Africa Imbrahim Gambari, who defined the role of UNITA as being that of a "*valuable interlocutor*"⁴⁴⁵ in Angolan politics. The acceptance of UNITA's involvement in the diamond trade, evident in the weak implementation of laws and regulations improving transparency in the Angolan diamond market, implied an acceptance of UNITA's right to secure the funding of its political campaign. Thus, although UNITA does not fully qualify in terms of juridical statehood, in combination with the exercise of empirical statehood, UNITA qualifies as a quasi-state.

With the ability to transfer the concept of quasi-state to UNITA, the application of patrimonialism is justified in the context defined here. Patrimonialism was defined as the main framework for explaining the interconnection between political organization and economic activities in an insurgent 'social order'. In order to account for the external influences on an insurgent order, patrimonialism was supplemented by an 'open approach'. This adjustment was necessary due to doubts about the explanatory effectiveness of patrimonialism and the usefulness of this concept for the assessment of the impact of external factors on the internal structure of an insurgent system of organization. These considerations were included in the hypothesis on the hybridization of an insurgent 'social order', introduced in chapter 3.3. The task of this chapter is to summarize how the intertwinement of economic and political structures have

⁴⁴⁴ The term intertwinement generally expresses an intertwined state or condition. Intertwinement is here used to describe the close interaction between economic and political structures in patrimonialism, see chapter 3. Cf. The Oxford English Dictionary, 1989, Vol. VII, Hat – Intervacuum, keyword: intertwinement.

⁴⁴⁵ Press-Briefing on Angola by Under-Secretary-General Gambari. Retrieved April 18, 20002 from www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2002/gambaribrf.doc.htm

determined the functional logic of the UNITA 'social order' in context of external influences, and then test our conclusions on the hypothesis. To begin with, we ascertain the external influencing factors, in correspondence with the core objective of this paper.

In the empirical analysis above, the following external factors were linked to the UNITA 'social order': Foreign businesspartners, international organizations, national governments, relief agencies and the Angolan state. UNITA's links to external businessmen were particularly important in the 1990s as foreigners participated both in UNITA's system of exploitation and in the trading system. The interaction between UNITA and these external trading partners was based on the economic rationale of profit-maximization. 'Friendly' governments or government officials, who allowed UNITA to operate their business cartel in their country, were frequently compensated by rewards in diamonds and were thereby incorporated into UNITA's patrimonial system. UNITA's external business links were therefore a basic feature of the insurgents' economic structure. In contrast, international organizations have influenced the UNITA 'social order' only indirectly. The UN has on the one hand contributed to the perception of juridical statehood, as have national governments, by interacting with UNITA on the diplomatic level. On the other hand, the UN adopted sanctions against UNITA with increasing severity in 1993, 1997 and 1998, which increased the transaction costs of UNITA's diamond trade. International relief agencies have not supplied goods to UNITA's economic structure to any considerable extent, as they have been refused access to vast UNITA-controlled areas. The only exceptions have been some incidents of UNITA looting relief goods, but these have not emerged into a main insurgent strategy for the generation of income.⁴⁴⁶ In contrast, the Angolan state influenced the functioning of UNITA's 'social order' on various levels. Although the adoption of new laws for the Angolan diamond market in the early 1990s was aimed at generating more tax income by legalizing previously unregulated transactions, these regulations simultaneously improved the conditions under which UNITA could trade in diamonds. In addition, the widespread corruption among state officials resulted in UNITA having access to a domestic procurement strategy. In recent years, the Angolan government has exercised a growing pressure on UNITA's political structure, with a strategy aimed at uprooting UNITA's social base on the country-side. Civilians have been moved from rural areas into centralized camps for internally displaced persons, frequently operated by international relief agencies. In context of UNITA's already deteriorating relationship with civilians in the latter half of the 1990s, this government strategy made it even more difficult for UNITA to obtain food and other basic needs from the rural population. In regard to the determination of external influences on the insurgent 'social order', the Angolan state was recognized as an indirect partner, while external business-relations were a central pillar of UNITA's economic structure. UNITA's interaction with these external actors was based on the logic of profit-maximization.

⁴⁴⁶ International relief agencies were not explicitly examined as an external influencing factor in chapter 3, due to their limited access to UNITA-controlled areas. Since the cease-fire in April 2002, relief agencies are allowed access to previously inaccessible provinces in Angola, see for example reports by 'Doctors without borders' (Médecins sans Frontières), www.msf.org. On looting on relief goods, see HRW: Angola Unravels, 1999, pp. 58-59.

Prior to the expansion of UNITA's diamond involvement in the 1990s, the two main external supporters, South Africa and the USA, provided considerable financial assistance to the insurgent economy. The functional logic of UNITA's interaction with these external backers was defined by the context of the Cold War, i.e. a patron-client relation. In this system, UNITA was subordinated to the political interests of the patrons. When the USA in the early 1980s intensified its diplomatic efforts to reach a settlement on the question of Namibian independence, which, of course, would also include South Africa, UNITA expected these political interests over time to influence its links to the main external allies. As a counter-strategy in the early 1980s, UNITA began to diversify its supply lines and launched attacks on diamond mines. The infiltration of the diamond market thus rested upon the tactical consideration of achieving greater independence from external patrons.

The generous external assistance, or Cold War-patronage, primarily financed the re-mobilization of UNITA during the transition to independence and the subsequent stabilization of the UNITA quasi-state in southeastern Angola. The SADF-deployment also outweighed the military weakness of the insurgents. In spite of military preponderance, the main strategic advantage of UNITA's war was the management of a UNITA-system of organization. With links to local authorities, UNITA mobilized influential individuals as an integrated mechanism in the insurgent system of domination. Due to the specific nature of interaction between Ovimbundu traditions and Protestant institutions, the Protestant structures were also included in this system. A common interest between the insurgents and a range of influential individuals thus guaranteed the stabilization of the insurgent 'social order' in rural areas, i.e. the UNITA quasi-state. The societal infrastructure of schools, churches and health institutions ensured the supply of basic welfare services to the villagers. In return, villagers supplied UNITA with food, labor and loyalty. Hence, reciprocity was the main pillar of UNITA's civilian administration. Although the forced displacement of villagers strained the relationship between insurgents and civilians, the stability of the system was ensured by the link between UNITA and local authorities. Both the insurgent leadership and traditional authorities had a common interest in the continuation of UNITA's (neo-)patrimonial system of domination.⁴⁴⁷ Thus, a patrimonial logic stabilized the insurgent order.

On the basis of this stable system of organization, UNITA initiated a diamond strategy in the early 1980s. UNITA's diamond structure included training in mine work and the value assessment of precious stones. A UNITA-ministry of natural resources was set up in order to control the insurgent involvement in the diamond market. Villagers were only minimally integrated into the system of extraction, as primarily Congo-Zairian garimpeiros were exploited as labor. These 'foreign workers' were the fundamental pillar of UNITA's system of exploitation also when the insurgents expanded its involvement in the diamond industry in the early 1990s. The organization of this system of exploitation was similar to UNITA's political structure: the foreign garimpeiros established a form of social organization based on their traditional beliefs and norms of interaction. UNITA established links to traditional authorities in the Angola-Congolese border region, which proved beneficial to the administration of the

⁴⁴⁷ The use of patrimonialism as term of reference, despite the 'neo'-character of the UNITA-system of domination, was explained in chapter 3.2.2.

garimpeiros. UNITA was the primary security provider and control organ in this system and installed rules and principles for the garimpeiros to obey, including unconditional sanctioning of disobedient behavior. Both the traditional underpinning of this system of extraction, the mobilization of garimpeiro responsibility and UNITA's role as a security and control mechanism, resembled the organization of UNITA's system of domination. Hence, the experience with civilian administration influenced the administration of UNITA's economic structure. More so, the insurgent infiltration of the Angolan diamond market in the early 1980s was made possible by a stable system of patrimonial domination: the stability of UNITA's 'social order' was the prerequisite for the transfer of insurgent domination to the diamond regions.

Throughout the 1980s, UNITA's involvement in the diamond trade co-existed with a relatively stable political structure and financial assistance from external patrons. When the diamond strategy was intensified in the late 1980s/early 1990s, the income from the diamond trade initially guaranteed the continuation of the patrimonial logic, when external assistance terminated. UNITA adjusted the material base of its patrimonial system from external patronage to an internal economic structure. Simultaneously, the insurgents participated in high-stake negotiations on the future distribution of power and influence in Angolan politics. In this phase, UNITA was in the state of being both an insurgent movement and a political party, and as this process continued throughout the 1990s, UNITA simultaneously experienced increasing internal turbulence. The various material benefits enjoyed by UNITA cadres, such as education abroad, frequent international traveling, safe havens for their families and a life in abundance in Jamba, became a source of conflict. This conflict over the form of patrimonial distribution did not, however, immediately destabilize UNITA as an insurgent movement, as leading figures could be rapidly replaced within the context of the patrimonial system. Unsatisfied UNITA members could exchange the UNITA patrimonial logic with an entry into the neo-patrimonial system of the government, i.e. the two competing patrimonial systems in Angola ensured the continuation of a stable elite of well-off insurgents and army men. This logic was underlined by the ability of the government to 'buy' UNITA-representatives in the capital, explicitly observed in the creation of UNITA-R. Despite the turbulence among its central cadres, UNITA thus managed to sustain the patrimonial logic of its system of domination. While UNITA's internal organization was dominated by patrimonialism, the external links were dominated by interaction with international trading partners. Hence, two functional logics co-existed within UNITA's 'social order': on the one hand, the insurgents were interacting with international trading partners on the basis of a rational-economic logic. On the other hand, a relatively stable system of domination was organized in the interior, including both a village structure and a garimpeiro system of organization.

The patrimonial system of distributing economic benefits to central UNITA-representatives also incorporated a control mechanism, including spying and violent punishment, with which the emergence of any individual power base within UNITA was prevented. Violent coercion, as a means to securing obedience to the authority, was thus continuously used to stabilize the UNITA 'social order'. Traditional political ideology offered a justification for autocratic practices, and the use of violence did therefore not necessarily delegitimize UNITA as a system of domination. A direct link between the sustenance of UNITA's authority and traditional beliefs cannot be proved, as mentioned above. The logic of this argument, however, is contained also in De Boeck's analysis of the interdependence between central (national) and local rural authorities in Congo-Zaire. De Boeck conducted extensive field research in Congo-

Zaire and in the border areas to Angola between 1987-1994. He observed that traditional beliefs are incorporated into the political legitimacy of central authorities as a justification for the use of violence: *“The notion of ritualised legitimate use of nocturnal power as constitutive act related to the office of the traditional titleholder is thus subverted and successfully used to cover up acts of violence and unlawful coercion.”*⁴⁴⁸ While acknowledging the inability to support my study with field research, the analysis of the literature strongly suggests that UNITA has been able to rely on a similar form of disguise of its violent regime: the perversion of traditional elements was a functional mechanism in UNITA’s ‘social order’. Thus, physical force was not used primarily as means to achieving individual economic benefits, but instead functioned as an integrated mechanism in UNITA’s patrimonial system of domination. The primary focus on economic motives for violence in the economic approach to conflict studies, clearly expressed in Elwert’s elaboration on ‘markets of violence’ (see Ch. 2.1.), must thus be rejected in the case of UNITA’s ‘social order’.

Throughout the 1990s, however, the patrimonial logic previously ensuring the stability of the UNITA system of domination came under increasing pressure. The disruption to the functional logic of UNITA’s ‘social order’ emerged in context of changing external dependencies: the logic of external interactions was initially dominated by the Cold War system of patronage, but gradually, the nature of UNITA’s external dependencies changed. From being a client, UNITA emerged as a patron in its interaction with ‘friendly’ governments, while the relations with external businesspartners were based on a rational-economic logic. While the generous external assistance during the Cold War had not required considerations of economic sustainability, the administration of the diamond system did. The extraction of diamonds had to be shared with external trading partners and *garimpeiros*, who were integrated into UNITA’s economic structure. The principle of profit maximization underlying UNITA’s economic structure gradually challenged the functioning of the patrimonial logic. The competition for access to economic benefits within the UNITA ‘social order’ increased, as did also the potential for personal enrichment. The fragmentation process was accelerated by the ability of UNITA cadres to enter into another patrimonial system or to exploit individual access to the diamond riches. The economic rationale of profit-maximization thus disturbed the patrimonial logic and resulted in a hybridization of the insurgent social order. The hybridization of the UNITA ‘social order’ was initially limited to those elements involved in the external economic dimension, i.e. the leadership. Over time, however, the inability to administer the hybridization of the leadership-structure gradually affected the insurgent system of social organization. UNITA’s monopolistic domination of the diamond market in the 1990s also required the transference of administrative resources from UNITA’s political structure into the diamond system. The hybridization of the UNITA ‘social order’ therefore helps explaining the simultaneous disintegration of both UNITA’s political and economic structure. The increasing pressure on the patrimonial logic is recognized as the main explanatory variable for the inability to sustain the reproduction of the UNITA system of domination.

⁴⁴⁸ De Boeck, Filip: *Postcolonialism, Power and Identity: Local and Global Perspectives from Zaire*. In: Werbner, Richard; Ranger, Terence: *Postcolonial Identities in Africa*. London & New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd. 1996 (pp. 75-106), p. 81.

The erosion of UNITA's system of domination coincided with reports of frequent attacks on the backbone of the UNITA-village structure, local village chiefs and prominent traditional representatives, particularly in 1997. Increased use of violence, thus, corresponded with decreasing legitimacy and disruptions to the symbolic means of orientation. The use of physical force was aimed at enforcing consent in context of the destabilization of the system: The disruption of the patrimonial logic was compensated by violent coercion.

The initial prevalence of UNITA's civilian administration in the first half of the 1990s, underlined the functional logic inherent in this system: the system of insurgent domination was not based upon the diamond economy. On the contrary, the existence of a stable system of insurgent domination was the basis for an insurgent infiltration of the diamond market. The prevalence of the UNITA 'social order' was an indication of the persistence of the system.

6. Conclusion, Or How to Study War Economies

The inspiration for this study was drawn from the economic approach to conflict studies. Both constructive contributions and theoretical shortcomings within this approach were observed and influenced the formulation of the core analytical focus of this paper. The economic approach emphasizes the necessity to examine contemporary war economies within the context of global economic interconnection, in particular the increasing informalization of the world market. While contemplating the impact of economic factors on contemporary wars, political factors cannot be excluded, as leading scholars within the economic approach emphasize. The analytical focus should be on the interaction of economic and political agendas in order to account for the emergence of alternative socio-economic power arrangements. Beyond stating that war economies influence the development of alternative forms of social organization, however, the economic approach has not theorized substantially on this aspect. This paper has addressed this shortcoming both on a theoretical level, by developing a theoretical framework, and on an empirical level, by conducting a case study.

In this study, the war economy of an insurgent movement was conceptualized as a form of social organization, termed ‘social order’, comprising both a political system of authority and an economic structure. The core analytical question concerned the reciprocal influence of political and economic structures and how this reciprocity determines the internal functional logic of an insurgent system of organization. The two structures were approached using different theoretical frameworks. As a heuristic guide to the empirical analysis of the political structure, Weber’s classical sociology of domination was adapted to the analysis of an insurgent ‘social order’. In Weber’s theory, ideal typical categories are the scientific tool for comparing, testing and explaining empirical reality. In addition, insurgency-oriented studies were used to specify a matrix of questions on the foundation of legitimacy of insurgent movements. The theoretical framework for the analysis of the economic structure was based upon the economic approach to conflict studies. The analytical focus was on how insurgent movements mobilize internal resources and administer an external exchange system. The central concern within the economic approach is how economic activities influence conflict dynamism, such as insurgents’ strategic choices (mobility vs. territorial control), organizational patterns (top-down vs. bottom-up) and the coherence of an armed movement.

The concept of patrimonialism was adopted as an analytical tool for the conceptualization of the reciprocal influence of political and economic structures. By reviewing the concept of quasi-state, we established the viability of an alternative applicability of this term to an insurgent system of organization. Patrimonialism was supplemented with an ‘open’ approach, which allowed us to account for external influencing factors. Due to these external influences on the internal system of domination, structural heterogeneity was recognized as the central feature of an insurgent ‘social order’, which comprises two forms of logics: *The internal logic* emphasizing the organization and the sustenance of an insurgent order in its internal context, and *the external logic* comprising the interaction between this internally operating system and external factors. We then put forward the hypothesis that *the co-existence of an internal patrimonial logic and a rational economic logic of interaction with external factors, results in a hybridization of the insurgent ‘social order’*. Thus, the

hypothesis theorized on war economies in an international context. The main object of analysis was however the internal functional logic, but the analysis also comprised an explicitly defined interest in how external factors influence and possibly alter the internal structure of an insurgent 'social order'. The introduction of the hypothesis therefore ensured that both the internal and the external dimensions of contemporary war economies were included in the scope of our analysis.

From the empirical analysis of the UNITA 'social order' we recognized that external dependencies affected the functioning of the internal system, in accordance with the hypothesis. The changing nature of insurgent interaction with external actors corresponded with disruptions to the internal system of domination over time. As a client in a Cold War-patronage system, the stabilization of the patrimonial logic of UNITA's system of domination was financed with generous external assistance. When the external patronage eroded, the expansion of the diamond trade initially guaranteed the continuation of the patrimonial logic and thus, the reproduction of the insurgent 'social order'. The insurgent infiltration of the diamond market was explained by the necessity to 'feed' the patrimonial system. However, the diamond structure required considerations of economic sustainability as interactions with external trading partners were based on a rational economic logic. In response to the requirement of profit-maximization, the patrimonial logic of UNITA's 'social order' came under increasing pressure. Over time, the rational economic logic of the diamond trade disrupted the patrimonial logic. This hybridization of the UNITA 'social order' resulted in the destabilization of the UNITA system, with growing turbulence in the leadership structure due to increased competition for access to patrimonial benefits, and eventually caused the collapse of civilian administration in the late 1990s. Thus, the changing nature of external interaction gradually affected the functioning of the internal system of organization. This finding underlines the importance of examining insurgent systems of organization in context of external influences, as emphasized by the economic approach.

From the empirical study it was also recognized that a stable system of organization was an essential condition for the establishment of an insurgent economy. Violence was an integrated mechanism in this system, as means to enforcing coherence and stability. The deterioration of legitimacy and the symbolic means of orientation were compensated with increased use of violence

The results from the empirical study must now be assessed in context of the original theoretical motivation for the conduct of this study. The economic approach to conflict studies emerged as a response to the irrationality-argument, according to which contemporary conflicts are the result of natural disruptions to political and social environments, e.g. exponential population growth and resource scarcity. In contrast, the economic approach emphasizes that seemingly irrational developments may represent reconstituted systems, in which the political and economic interests of various actors are involved. In order to understand the logic of interaction in such systems, researchers must assess the possible positive effects of war, and particularly, the emerging economic opportunities in a conflict environment. The economic approach argues that the perpetuation of contemporary wars is linked to belligerents' individual economic agendas. Furthermore, the continuation of a violent status quo-situation is considered a prerequisite for the continued ability to reap economic benefits. Although the economic approach addresses important questions concerning the changing economic agendas in contemporary wars, an exclusive focus on belligerents' individual economic motives cannot explain the continuation of conflict. Greed cannot explain the stability of

systems of organization, since greed as such does not function as an organizational mechanism for the establishment of war economies and the perpetuation of war. Rather, any individual motive for greed can only be met by instrumentalizing a system of organization. With an actor-centered approach, any attempts by individuals to gain access to resources for their own exclusive objectives within a system of organization, are recognized. The analytical focus, however, must be on the social system of organization within which greed can be exploited, i.e. an insurgent system of domination.

From the analysis of UNITA's 'social order' we learned that both the establishment and the disruption of an insurgent system of organization could be examined in context of the functional mechanisms of a patrimonial logic. In order to understand the perpetuation of an insurgent form of social organization, the central research interest must be in the '*logic of reproduction*' within such systems. War economies cause the perpetuation of conflict when the system of insurgent domination is stabilized on the basis of a patrimonial logic. This study exemplified patrimonialism as the central analytical variable with which to examine the interaction of economic and political structures in contemporary war economies.

As an analytical concept, patrimonialism comprises the social mechanisms of a stable system of organization as both the existence of political structures and economic means are accounted for. Most importantly, the interconnection between political and economic structures is the main object of analysis. For the analysis of a patrimonial system, two main analytical categories are ascertained, firstly, the foundation of legitimacy, including the symbolic means of orientation, and secondly, the production of material means to ensure the financial basis of the system. The use of physical force is a further analytical component, but is per definition incorporated into the two other categories. The main focus must be on the societal system, within which these categories function. Thus, a prerequisite for further analysis of war economies is the conceptualization of war economies as a form of social organization. A comprehensive focus on the societal structures within which war economies exist must then be combined with a consideration of external influences. With such an approach, which includes both an in-depth consideration of societal structures in war-torn societies as well as the global context, a comprehensive examination of the functioning of contemporary war economies is attainable.

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
Abbreviations

AC	Africa Confidential
ASCORP	Angola Selling Corporation
BIG	Brigada de Informaçao Geral, UNITA intelligence agency on internal affairs
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
Clandestinidade	UNITA's Service for Clandestine Intelligence, external affairs
Diamang	Companhia de Diamantes de Angola
Endiama	Empresa Nacional de Diamantes de Angola.
FALA	Forças Armadas Libertação Angola The Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola.
FAPLA	Forças Armadas Populares Libertação de Angola (People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola).
FNLA	Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola, National Liberation Front of Angola
FAA	Forças Armadas de Angolanas (Angolan Armed Forces)
GRAE	Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio, The Revolutionary Angolan Government in Exile.
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
MIRNA	Ministry of National Resources, UNITA's diamond ministry
MONUA	Missão de Observação das Nações Unidas em Angola, The UN Observer Mission to Angola. Replaced UNAVEM III in 1997. MONUA withdrew from Angola 1999, as the United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA) was established.
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
MPLA-PT	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola-Partido do Trabalho (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola – Labour Party,). When the MPLA was transformed from a liberation movement to a political party in 1975, it was re-named MPLA-PT.
NGO	Non-governmental Organizations
OAU	Organization of African Unity
SADF	South African Defense Force
SODIAM	Sociedade de Commercialização de Diamantes
UN	United Nations
UNAVEM I	United Nations Angola Verification Mission: verified the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola ((1989-1991).
UNAVEM II	United Nations Angola Verification Mission: verified the peace arrangements agreed by the Angolan Government and UNITA, and the elections held in 1992 (1991-1995).
UNAVEM III	United Nations Angola Verification Mission: took over from UNAVEM II to help the parties restore peace and achieve national reconciliation (1995-1997).
UNDP	United Nations Development Program

UNEA	União Nacional dos Estudantes Angolanos
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
UPA	União das Populações de Angola, Union of Peoples of Angola.
UPNA	União das Populações do Norte de Angola, Union of the Peoples of Northern Angola

Appendix

APPENDIX I:



Map No. 3727 Rev. 2 UNITED NATIONS
October 1997 (Colour)

Department of Public Information
Cartographic Section

Source: UN Cartographic Section. www.un.org/Depts/Carthographic/map


APPENDIX II:



Source: Human Rights Watch: Angola Unravels. The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Protocoll. New York, Washington, London, Brussels: Human Rights Watch 1999.


APPENDIX III:

Areas of highest diamond concentration



Source: Cilliers, Jakkie; Dietrich, Christian (eds.): *Angola's War Economy. The Role of Oil and Diamonds*. Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies (ISS) 2000.

APPENDIX IV:



UNITA: The Election Results, 1992

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