

State-Formation and the Military in Pakistan

Reflections on the Armed Forces, their State
and some of their Competitors

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”We will always remain comited to the Nations Building.”

Road sign of the “Frontier Works Organization¹” on the way from Islamabad to Muree

1. Introduction

For more than forty years of the last century, the international system as well as the behavior of states was determined to a large extent by the rivalry between two superpowers and their allies. The end of this era stimulated speculation on what would follow. As far as the structure of the international system is concerned, many questions have been discussed under the banner of the “New World Order”, an expression made popular on the occasion of the Second Gulf War by U. S. President George Bush. President Bush thought of a post-cold war world with a consensus among all states about “peace and security, freedom and the rule of law”². The underlying assumption probably was that after decades of confrontation between east and west, the primary source of discord, conflict and waste of human resources had gone³. It was time for a change, to distribute the peace dividend in a fair manner.

Ten years later we must conclude that things have turned out a different way. The New World Order has not materialized (Jacobsen 1996). On the contrary, the ending of the Cold War has triggered an upsurge in violent conflicts, at least outside the OECD world (AKUF 2001). In some parts of the Third World⁴ enduring warfare and civil strife led to a total breakdown of legitimate authority, affecting not just (“failed”) states, but entire regions. As a result, the decay or even disintegration of states has become a new source of threat in international politics. In some cases, the weakness of legitimate authority has already provoked bloodshed, prompting the international community to step in to prevent further disarray in “complex political emergencies” (Cliffe/Luckham 1999, Gros 1996), with limited success.

¹ The FWO is one f the Pakistan Army’s paramilitary units. It was formed in the aftermath of the 1965 Kashmir war to build a Himalayan supply link between Pakistan and China. After completing this work, the FWO’s 10.000 employees remained committed to important nation-building task, e. g. constructing non-military and military roads, airfields, canals and dams (cf. Matthews 1994).

² President George Bush, State of the Union Speech, 29th January 1991, quoted from Freedman/Karsh (1993: xxix).

³ For a different interpretation of warfare since 1945, see Gantzel/Schwinghammer (2000).

⁴ The term “Third World” is, because it suggests a degree of uniformity in political forms that does not exist. However, states outside the OECD world share core characteristics – peripheral position in the international system, hybrid symbolic and social forms – which permit such a generalizing term.

Ten years after the end of the Cold War, the fate of Third World states and the international order in general seems as uncertain as more than 30 years ago, when the “political order of changing societies” was discovered for the first time as a key problem of world politics⁵. Things may even have deteriorated, because “failed states” are by far not the most serious danger. They pose a risk, but the risk is limited in space and time. Of much greater concern is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of ballistic missiles. At a time when nuclear war between major powers seems to be more unlikely than ever, some “rogue” states are considered to be all too ready to use these weapons, in case they can get hold of them. And rogue *states* are not the only problem: The proliferation of non-state actors has added to this predicament, the infamous Osama bin Laden and his “network” being the most prominent of them. Failed states, rogue states, belligerent and powerful non-state actors – a “new obscurity” seems to have taken hold of world politics⁶.

On a closer look, however, the picture is not all bleak and obscure. Although a just and peaceful world order has not materialized, a global consensus on how state and non-state actors could achieve such a new order seems to be under way. This consensus may not be very substantial right now, but international policymakers in east and west, in north and south, are beginning to agree on how states should be governed properly: They should have civil, not military rule; democracy, not dictatorship; they should include actors from civil society into the policy process; they should respect and protect human rights; they should promote free markets over state interference in economic processes; their governments should be accountable and not corrupt, they should adhere to fiscal discipline and avoid large deficits; and finally, they should favor mediation and restraint over aggressive or belligerent postures in their international relations.

As it is easy to see, most of these values and principles are rather old. What is new is that their world wide application is conceived not just as desirable, but even as essential for the behavior of states under global capitalism. The catchword for these arrangements is “good governance”, and it has become the buzzword for commentators and speechwriters around the globe. For the social sciences, the hardest part is to explain the gap between agreed principles and the actual behavior of states, and, possibly, to make suggestions on

⁵ Cf. Huntington (1968), and also Geertz (1963).

⁶ Jürgen Habermas (1989) introduced this concept to political discourse, initially referring to the exhaustion of the western welfare state. Against the backdrop of a world wide decline of faith in the state as the principal agent of development, Habermas’ critical assessment can be generalized to the developmental vision as such. New obscurity now hints to the lack of viable alternatives for former Third World developmental (or neo-patrimonial) states.

how to close that gap. Recent debates on “failed” and “terrorist” states indicate that some states are so badly that they pose a threat to peace. Hence, ten years after the end of the cold war, in our new world order (of) discourse, well-governed states stand against those which are governed badly.

This paper is about one of these states: Pakistan. The South Asian nation seems to be a case of blatant and persistent defiance of civil and democratic rule, of peace and good governance. In recent years more than ever, Pakistan has been fighting the emerging global consensus on numerous fronts: In May 1998, following its arch-rival India, the government of Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif conducted five nuclear tests, thereby adding a new sort of fuel to the already volatile geopolitical scenario of the region. One year later, Pakistan’s bid to capture the “Kargil” territory in the Indian part of the disputed territory of Kashmir brought the subcontinent on the brink of a major – and potentially nuclear – war. Even Pakistan’s long-time allies, the United States and China, withheld their support: Islamabad found itself isolated on the Kashmir conflict’s diplomatic front. Since then, Pakistan has repeatedly been censured for alleged support for violent non-state actors in Kashmir, Afghanistan and other places of the region. Concern has been raised about Pakistan’s commitment on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Arch-rival India even suggested to brand Pakistan a “terrorist state”. And finally, on October 12th 1999, Pakistan’s armed forces staged a military coup against the government of Nawaz Sharif, reacting in their own particular way to the Prime Minister’s sacking of General Pervez Musharraf, the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) and military leader who is regarded, coincidentally, as the mastermind of the Kargil conflict. Now Pakistan enters its 25th year of military rule in its 53-year history, and the tasks ahead are daunting. To name but a few trouble-spots: The fiscal deficit has reached an all-time high; economic growth has been strangled by post-nuclear sanctions and now hardly excels population growth; the NGO ‘Transparency International’ has ranked the bureaucracy amongst the most corrupt in the world for years; and, worst of all, destabilizing effects of the Islamabad-backed civil wars in neighboring Afghanistan and Jammu & Kashmir are palpable now in Pakistan’s society⁷.

So is Pakistan a “rogue” or “terrorist” state? Or, according to the revised terminology of the U. S. Department of State, a “state of concern”? The latter is most probably true. But for which reasons? Conventional wisdom holds that Pakistan’s basic problem is the

⁷ On Pakistan’s geo- and religio-political predicament, cf. Blank (1999), Rashid (2000) and Stern (2000). Rashid (1999) provides an excellent account on Pakistan’s involvement in the second phase of the Afghan civil war.

permanent involvement of its armed forces in internal affairs. Repeated military interference, one could assume, leads to bad governance. Recent developments, however, seem contradict this assertion. In the beginning, many people in Pakistan were not unhappy with the new military takeover., Najam Sethi, editor of a leading Pakistani weekly, welcomed the military take-over, calling it a military counter coup against a preceding “civilian coup” on behalf of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Interestingly, Mr. Sethi opined on that occasion that “democracy [is] not an end in itself.”⁸ And indeed, one can argue that Prime Minister Sharif’s government had brought state’s capabilities to a new low, and that he had a poor record on human rights and democracy as well. His rule resembled a “democratically elected dictatorship”: Cabinet and parliament were bypassed persistently, the Prime Minister preferred to rule through loyalists and members of his family. He showed no respect for the independence of the President, the Supreme Court, the press and – finally and fatefully – the army. This last move of Nawaz Sharif was somehow surprising, since he had relied heavily on the army in the months before the coup. The military’s involvement in daily civil administration had been deeper than in some times of military rule (Chengappa 1999a): Army officers were employed to conduct the census, to catch stray dogs, to construct non-military roads and to track down “ghost schools”⁹. They did all that on invitation of a civilian government which had been vested with the heaviest mandate in Pakistan’s history. Eventually Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif decided to let the army take control of the “Water and Power Development Authority” (WAPDA), a state-owned enterprise which suffers heavy losses due to an extraordinary degree of corruption.

After the military takeover, new puzzling findings have come into view. Paradoxically, the new military government under “Chief Executive” General Pervez Musharraf seems to be more eager than any of its – civilian and military – predecessors to pursue good governance targets. According to many observers, the men in khaki at least *try* to do the right things: the documentation of the economy (tax survey), the broadening of the tax base, an anti-corruption and accountability campaign, a crackdown on smugglers, the de-weaponization of society, and the devolution of power to the grass-roots level including a thirty-percent quota for woman in local parliaments. These are all part of the agenda of a military government which, surprisingly, has involved a number of non-governmental organizations in decision-making. To be sure: Pakistan’s current political set-up cannot be called a democracy, but it is not a military dictatorship either (Racine 2000). These findings raise new questions about the nature of military government. Can the army deliver

⁸ The Friday Times (Lahore), vol. 11, October 15th, 1999 (Editorial)

⁹ The term “ghost schools” refers to public educational institutions that exist only on paper.

better than civilians? Can the military, paradoxically, even find a way out of the trilemma of failures in civilianization, effective rule and democratization?

This paper cannot address all these questions, nor can it find conclusive answers to them. It will try a different approach. Taking a step back, it will try to contribute to a better understanding of Pakistan's state-formation process and the dialectics of military and civilian governance behind it. It is against this backdrop, the argument goes, that "good governance" blueprints (and their failure *in praxi*) should be analyzed, rather than ad hoc assumptions about the nature of civil and military regimes. Two variables are considered to be crucial to learn more about Pakistan's trajectory and its persistent defiance of civil and democratic rule: the political role of the military as a corporate actor and the recurrence of intra- and inter-state violence¹⁰.

First, I will try to highlight root causes for military-dominated state-formation, linking internal and external factors, domestic power struggle and war-making. In doing that, I will treat military interference, organized violence and war not as *external*, disruptive factors or intervening variables, but as integral constituents of a continuous process of state-formation. After having established why the military became the most important corporate actor in Pakistan's state-formation process, I will determine how Pakistan's armed forces and their "overdeveloped state" (Alavi 1979) tried to accommodate pressure arising from newly mobilized social forces and a more and more hostile international environment. I will argue that they did succeed only at the expense of the coherency, strength and autonomy of both the armed forces and the state apparatus as a whole. The current crisis presents itself in this context. Finally, I will explain why this does not mean that Pakistan needs to end up as a failed state. The military as the most powerful corporate actors might well be able to "redeploy" the state apparatus for the 21st century's competition of lean states (cf. Hibou 1999). In that last part of the paper I will return to the aforementioned concepts of global governance discourse.

¹⁰ The following arguments are tentative and just a first step in a long-term project on state dynamics in Pakistan. To some extent they are based on observations which were obtained during two field research stays in Pakistan (1999 and 2000). A first draft of this paper had been presented at the XVIIIth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Quebec City, 1-5 August, 2000. The author is indebted to Ayesha Siddiq-Agha (Islamabad), Dietrich Jung (Copenhagen), Joel S. Migdal, Thomas Lewis (both Seattle), Andreas Rieck, Klaus Schlichte, Peter Lock, Stephan Hensell and Karen Jaehrling (all Hamburg) for critical comments on earlier versions of the paper.

2. State and state-formation: concepts and research agendas

In this paper, I will use the notion *state-formation* to describe processes to which some authors refer as “state-building” or “state-making”. However commonplace they are, these notions tend to treat the development of a modern state as a linear, step-wise process with a clearly identifiable end. Also, the imageries of “building” and “making” have subjectivistic and voluntaristic overtones which blur the unidentifiable number of factors actually involved in this process. In order to avoid impasses of modernization theory, I will use the terms state-building or state-making only if identifiable state projects of specific actors are concerned.

States can be understood as agents as well as agencies (apparatuses). As such, they have two sides, a *material* and a *symbolic* side. The material sides, i. e. the actual shapes of institutions and policies, vary empirically to a large extent. In order to find out what states and individual or corporate actors “acting as states” actually do, and what they do not, I use a rather open definition. This definition is “realist” in as much as it tries to avoid unnecessary qualifications or dichotomies about what states *should* do. So the concept or definition of *state* (as agencies) used here is the following¹¹:

A state is a field of rules established by practices and understandings demarking clear boundaries – territorial boundaries as well as those separating the state from other parts of society.

All actors on this field can act “as states” and assume the role of the state as agent. The symbolic or normative side of the state is implied in this definition (“understandings”), and at least in principle, the talk about what the state should do or be like varies as much from case to case, or from region to region, as the material side. But since states are internationally (i. e. by other states) recognized actors, the various concepts people have in mind tend to revolve around a common core of understanding on what a “modern” – in the context of Third World countries: “imported” (Badie 1992) – state is or should be like.¹² In

¹¹ This definition was formulated by members of the International Research Group “State Dynamics” on the occasion of a joint workshop held with the “Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik” in Ebenhausen/Germany, autumn 1999. The members of the research group – Joel S. Migdal, Thomas Lewis (University of Washington), Jean-François Médard, François Prkic (Centre d’Etudes de l’Afrique Noire, Bordeaux), Beatrice Hibou, Jean-Luis Rocca, (Centre de Recherches en relations internationales, Paris), Klaus Schlichte and Boris Wilke (University of Hamburg) – used it as a provisional definition in their collaboration on processes of state-formation and transformation in non-OECD countries.

¹² This claim is certainly open to many challenges. However, one should not underestimate the part international law and the international system in general play in fortifying that core. Every sovereign state is

my view, the common core has been described most aptly by Max Weber (1980) in his ideal-type notion of the state as the political community capable to control the means of the legitimate use of physical violence. Weber also provides the normative context in which state-building and state-formation turn up: the long-term process of rationalization and the transformation of state power¹³.

Many authors have studied these phenomena, using different concepts for different aspects of basically the same social processes. At least three are relevant here: *Heide Gerstenberger* (1990) has reminded us that, historically, the essence of modern state-making is the political expropriation of rulers and power holders (*“Enteignung von Herrschaftsbesitz”*). To conceptualize state-making as the expropriation of means of power enables us to understand how, historically, the use of violence has been a precondition for the transformation of violence itself. To some extent, the power struggles among state builders had already been analyzed extensively by *Norbert Elias* (1976) as the “monopoly mechanism”. Elias insists that the monopolization of power is just one side of modern state-formation. Effective rule depends on particular mindsets of the ruled. There is a structural correspondence between forms of political domination and mental disposition of subjects. The concept of *“habitus”* provides this essential link between the coercive and the subjective sides of the civilizing process. Another attempt to establish a conceptual link between different types of government and the corresponding mindsets of rulers has been developed by *Michel Foucault*. In his late studies, he favored the concept of *“governmentality”* (Burchell 1991, Dean 1999) to look at how people think about governing themselves, governing others and being governed. Governmentality links the material development of government – files, knowledge about territory and population – to understandings about how to use this knowledge, for which ends and in which ways. Correspondingly, the ruled have their own idea about what the state should do for them and what they should do for the state.

Concepts like “expropriation of means of power”, “monopoly of the legitimate use of violence”, “habitus” and “governmentality” have all been developed against the backdrop of European state-formation. Using them here does not imply that state-formation in the

obliged to follow a set of minimal requirements and expectations as a pre-condition to be accepted as a player in the international arena.

¹³ A last conceptual remark: We can avoid rationalistic biases if we see notions like “bureaucracy”, “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical violence” or „legality of positive enactment“ as *ideals* in a double sense: methodologically for research, and empirically as symbolic and normative expressions and expectations. Methodologically, these notions function as “ideal-types” to measure the distance between the norm and empirical deviations.

Third World just echoes the European past¹⁴. Accordingly, although the paper's preoccupation with the control and use of violence follows some claims about the European experience (Tilly 1985, 1990; Hintze 1962), no claim of a rerun of the European experience is made here. The focus on core fields or functions of state domination is deliberate and in tune with literature on state failure and state decay (cf. Schlichte 1998). And given Pakistan's history, the linkage of war-making and state-making as developed by Charles Tilly appears to be a useful for understanding the Pakistan trajectory.

¹⁴ A comparative analysis of the divergent conditions of state-formation processes in Europe and South Asia can be found in Doornbos/Kaviraj (1997).

3. The formation of an “overdeveloped” state

The following pages focus on the role of the armed forces in Pakistan’s process of state-formation. The causes for Pakistan’s military-led state-formation will be presented in two dimensions. The primary structure is diachronic and will demonstrate the dynamics of state-military relations in Pakistan. Secondly, the causes the predominance of the military in Pakistani state-formation will be contrasted as *structural* (historic), *war-making* and *state-making* conditions. War-making and state-making are not identical with *external* and *internal* factors. Although it is commonplace, such a conception would obscure more than elucidate: No “external” factor (world market, globalization, migration, global culture, international law and ethics) can operate separate from its own “internal” manifestation, transformation. This is all the more true for the societies of the Third World, where hybrid social and political forms prevail. Nevertheless, it seems to be appropriate to differentiate between war-making and state-making because this dichotomy is vital to the common understanding of the military’s role in society. Military personnel are almost everywhere accepted as specialists in the exercise of violence directed to the *external* threats and enemies, and they are rejected if they exercise their power for political or economic ends. The structure of the argument enables us to identify a military spill-over from external to internal functions or a mixture of both aspects.

3.1. The demand for Pakistan and the historical foundations of state-formation

At least two aspects of Pakistan’s state-formation process have been exceptional right from the start: the importance of the symbolic side and its constituting “imaginary” (Castoriadis 1990) on the one hand, and the non-recognition of Pakistan’s territorial and symbolic boundaries, particularly by its close neighbor India, on the other hand. Both aspects had a lasting imprint and can be considered as historical and structural foundations of state-formation¹⁵. The dialectics of war- and state-making are crucial to understand Pakistan’s political history.

¹⁵ In an ethnographic study on local bureaucracy and discourses of corruption in India, Akhil Gupta (1995) has shown the usefulness of the concept “boundaries” for analyzing Third World state dynamics. What is peculiar about Pakistan, is that *both* symbolic and physical boundaries have been contested by internal *and* external challengers. This led to a particular imaginary of the Pakistani state, which has been analyzed by Ayesha Jalal (1995).

Since 1940, the “Pakistan Movement” had demanded a separate homeland for South Asia’s Muslim population. The rationale for its claim was provided by the “two nations theory”, which applied the principle of national self-determination to religious communities of the subcontinent: Hindus and Muslims, it was stated, were two nations which could not live together peacefully in one state. When the British left South Asia in 1947, they finally endorsed that theory and divided their heritage ethnographically into two states: Those provinces with a Muslim majority population were should form Pakistan, the rest would remain with India. Since the Muslim majority provinces were located in the East and the West of the British India, the new state was made up of two wings, which were at a distance of 1.800 kilometers: (West) Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and North-West Frontier Province in the West, and (East) Bengal in the East. Their only binding force was religion (Islam) and the shared belief that the Subcontinent’s Muslims needed a sovereign state to safeguard their interests and lifestyle. An *ideological state* (Hussain 1979) was born.

This leads us to a the second peculiarity of Pakistan’s state-formation. After partition, the two nations theory remained bitterly contested by the Indian leadership. Secularism had become India’s *raison d’être*, whereas the two nations theory was much of the same for Pakistan. For that reason, any discourse on Pakistan’s identity as a nation or a state refers – implicitly or explicitly – to its Indian counterpart. Pakistan “lives” *vis-à-vis* India. This ideological divide determines the hostile relations between the two successor states of the British Raj until the present day. Because India is more populous and more powerful in military terms, the Pakistan Army easily assumed, as we will see, a crucial role in defining and defending the nation and the state (cf. Khatak 1996).

The roots of the Indo-Pakistani antagonism must be traced back to colonial rule (Blinkenberg 1972, Ganguly 1986): The closer self-rule came, the more grew the feeling among the Muslim middle class that an independent India would be dominated by Hindu interests at the expense of other communities. Hindus dominated India’s freedom movement and its main organization, the “Indian National Congress”. Although the Congress had attracted many Muslims, too, it remained a predominantly Hindu organization. And since about three quarter of the subcontinent’s population were Hindu, this was unlikely to change much with further democratization. Thus, to safeguard their interests, middle class Muslims had founded the “All-India Muslim League”. Unlike the Congress Party, which had been transformed from an elitist organization into a mass movement, the Muslim League’s support base remained confined to the small educated middle class of the Muslim minority provinces in North and West India. This weakness not

just radicalized the Muslim League, it created a heavy burden for state-building, since the League's support base in the territories which constituted Pakistan was tenuous. Even after independence, support for the Pakistan idea and the new political entity came mainly from the migrated middle class of what was now India. Pakistan was not just an ideological state, it was also a *migrant state*¹⁶.

The apparatus upon which the migrant state could found its rule was comparatively strong. Pakistan inherited its share of one most the powerful colonial bureaucracies, which had been provided the "steel frame" for the British Raj. The British-Indian Army was a highly professional during organization with strong roots in Indian society (Noor ul Haq 1993). However, both civil and military bureaucracy were divided at the time of partition, creating more problems for Pakistan than for India. Both parts of the Pakistani state apparatus operated in a new, at times hostile, environment, since the majority of the officers, especially in the civil services, came from what was now India. At large, the state remained at a distance from society. A dualism of *state* and *society* was established¹⁷.

3.2. The formation of the state and its armed forces – war-making

From 1947 until the 1950s, Pakistan was a "new state" (Geertz 1963) in the real sense. Its territorial and non-territorial boundaries were contested by neighboring states – and by internal challengers: The local and rural population had little interest in the Pakistan idea. Some traditional rulers and strongmen in peripheral areas of what was now Pakistan tried to resist what they considered a foreign imposition of central rule. Regional pulls became a constant factor in Pakistan. As long as the Pakistani state was not territorially integrated and consolidated, and as long as local strongmen openly resisted political expropriation and a centralized monopoly of the legitimate use of violence, the boundaries between these challengers of central rule and the state resembled more *frontiers* than borders. According to the understanding of Pakistan's state builders, these challengers were not internal ones in the strict sense. In the 1970s and 80s, conflicts in Baluchistan and in Sindh escalated into civil wars¹⁸. In the case of East Pakistan, Indian forces intervened and turned a civil war into an international conflict, leading to the secession of East Pakistan which became Bangladesh (Sisson/Rose 1990). Each civil war put strains on the military, not just the

¹⁶ See Waseem (1994: 107-111) for this unique feature of Pakistani state-formation.

¹⁷ On this feature, which is common to many Third World states, cf. Migdal (1988).

¹⁸ For accounts on Pakistan's internal conflicts, cf. Amin (1988), Banuazizi/Weiner/Myron (1987) and Samad (1995).

secessionist conflict over Bangladesh. Designed to defend the nation, the armed forces had to use violence against compatriots. Consequently, the military leadership became actively involved in drawing the line between those Pakistanis who stood by the state and those who did not, i. e. between loyal and disloyal compatriots¹⁹.

The home front was not the only source of conflict. External relations with immediate neighbors, particularly India, remained strained. Although the British and their colonial apparatus presided over it, partition had not been peaceful. In order to meet the criteria of South Asia's post-colonial settlement, i. e. to live on the "right" side of the religio-political divide, more than 15 million people had to flee across the newly drawn border. In an atmosphere of distrust and fear, more than one million of them were killed in massacres, some of which were spontaneous, but others well-planned. At least in the border regions of the partitioned province of Punjab, almost every family was affected by the bloodshed. The religio-political divide between Hindus and Muslims, Indians and Pakistanis drew not just a political map, but those of individuals and families as well. Since the Punjabis constituted almost one fifty percent of West Pakistan's population and more than three quarters of the Pakistan Army, the bloodshed at the partition had a strong effect on army and state in Pakistan.

Secondly, the army's stake in defending the nation was accentuated by the Indo-Pakistani conflict over the former princely state Jammu & Kashmir. This territory belonged to the part of British India in which the colonial masters ruled indirectly through local intermediaries. At the time of partition, the rulers of these 500 semi-autonomous princely states had to opt for either India or Pakistan. In most cases, numerical superiority of either religious community, the religious affiliation of the ruler and the adjacency to either of the successor states coincided. The case was different in Jammu and Kashmir, where the majority of the population was Muslim, but the ruling Maharaja was a Hindu. Since this strategically important state was adjacent both to India and to Pakistan, both countries wanted to integrate Jammu and Kashmir into their territory. Their claims were reinforced by the contradicting imaginaries: For India, the integration of a Muslim majority province would give evidence to her claim to be a secular state; for Pakistan, such an outcome would have run against the two nations theory and the spirit of partition. As the Maharaja was unhappy with joining either of the successor states, the conflict escalated into the first all-out war between India and Pakistan, just two months after independence. As a result, Jammu and Kashmir was divided along the "line of control", giving India

¹⁹ For these and other practices of Pakistani military public relations work in and outside warfare, see Siddiqi (1996).

about two thirds of the territory and the bulk of the Muslim population, and Pakistan the remainder²⁰.

However, the conflict was far from resolved. Both countries fought two more wars for the disputed territory. This territorial dispute lies at the heart of both the Indo-Pakistani conflict and became the focal point for both state and military in Pakistan. Numerous cleavages overlap here: the territorial dispute over Kashmir, the two-nations theory and the religio-political divide. Defending the borders of Kashmir, including those effectively ruled by India, means defending the external and symbolic boundaries of the Pakistani state, even if this involves the direct or indirect use of force. War- and state-making converge. And as a vital national issue, the Kashmir question provided an entry point for the Pakistan Army into the national discourse about the nation and state of Pakistan. Until today, no political government can make any decision about Kashmir without explicit or implicit consent of the army.

In addition to regional pulls, bloodshed at partition and the initial phase of armed state-building, there is a fourth factor which favored a prominent role of the military: South Asia's inclusion in the map of the Cold War. After a major shift in U.S. foreign policy strategy in 1954, Pakistan turned into a key state of the American containment strategy. Pakistan became one of the largest recipients of U. S. economic and military aid and was seen, at least temporarily, as Washington's "most allied ally"²¹. The principal beneficiary of the U. S. aid was Pakistan's military, particularly the army and the air force. With U. S. assistance the Pakistan Army grew in size, morale and skills (Cloughley 1998: 36). Educational standards became higher than in popular civilian institutions (Matthews 1994: 327). Army officers easily adapted to world politics: Through their American counterparts, Pakistan's top military brass gained exclusive access to decision makers Washington's, bypassing civilian officers and elected politicians. They even became familiar with the western theories and political concepts of the time, which regarded the state – and under certain circumstances even the military – as the principal agent of political development (Shafqat 1997: 43; cf. Huntington 1968: 203). The military became an integral part of (West-) Pakistan's ruling "pro-state" alliance, which included the civil bureaucracy and the emergent bourgeoisie as well. The partners of the alliance had an interest in a strong state,

²⁰ For the Indo-Pakistani war on Kashmir, cf. Bose (1997), Cloughley (1999), Ganguly (1997) and Lamb (1991).

²¹ Conversely, Washington's influence on Pakistani politics grew steadily, ranging from military matters and economic policy measures to the personal level. Reportedly, U.S. officials had their say in all decisive policy issues, including the assignment of key positions in the federal government and administration (Alavi 1990: 25)

capable to push through a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence, and in close links to the United States. What emerged in the 1950s was basically a double conversion of interests and subsequent acculturation of elites: within Pakistan and between Pakistan and the United States (Alavi 1998, Gardezi 1998). This double conversion of interests, which became blurred temporarily in the 1960s when the USA and Pakistan clashed on the China policy, provided the foundation for the “pro-state” alliance²².

However, it is important to note that although military men were on key positions in the government and foreign policy was virtually in army’s hand, the military role in day-to-day political affairs was rather limited at that time (Cloughley 1998: 52; cf. Khan 1967: 81). And although military officers acquired some assets in Pakistan’s emerging economy, the military’s share in trade and production was still moderate at that time. Paradoxically, it was in aftermath of Z. B. Bhutto’s nationalization policy that the military’s rise to an active economic player took shape (Cloughley 1998: 251).

3.3. The formation of the state and its armed forces: state-making

In order to make the state-formation process more transparent, I will make use of three arguments which describe basically the same phenomena, albeit in different languages²³. Treating them as Pakistan-specific middle range theories, I have arranged them in an ascending line of complexity: The “*migrant state*” model describes best the starting point of Pakistani state-formation, and so and it has already been mentioned as a historical foundation. The “*overdeveloped state*” thesis provides the best account for Pakistan’s temporary consolidation as a peripheral capitalist state. And, finally, if we think about Pakistan as a “*state of martial law*” (Jalal 1990), we will be able to understand the crisis of the state which led to its transformation which will be outlined in the next chapter.

The core of the “**migrant state**” thesis has already been mentioned. The supporters of the Pakistan idea belonged almost exclusively to the urban Muslim middle classes of those territories of North and Central which remained with the Indian Union. They came to the

²² This is not to deny that, despite its “pro-state” stance, this alliance relied heavily on informal networks and personal interdependencies, fostered by marriage policy and other forms of power consolidation (Duncan 1989: 52). However, the state apparatus provided the principal source of wealth for these classes.

²³ I will not account for critical discussions or appraisals of the arguments here. Rather I will make use of what I conceive as their core argument, maybe even against the authors’ intentions. Hence, speaking about “limits” of the approaches does not indicate a comprehensive critique. For reasons of convenience, the three arguments will be presented in a diachronic order. This does not indicate, however, that “in real life” the migrant state had been followed by the overdeveloped state by the state of martial law.

Muslim majority provinces which became Pakistan as *Muhajirs* (refugees), and found themselves in an environment which was much more backward in terms of social and political development. Although Muhajirs managed to acquire an outstanding position in business and public administration, they remained isolated as politicians, acting in a political landscape which was dominated by powerful regional and rural actors. The Pakistan Muslim League, successor to the All-India Muslim League, could not count on a strong party infrastructure there. The educated and urbanized Muslim League leadership was forced to strike compromises with landlords and feudal bosses of regional parties, many of whom were, if ever, merely lukewarm supporters of the Pakistani state²⁴. Since their life worlds had barely been touched by colonial rule, they found it difficult to adapt swiftly to a new governmentality. They had no particular interest in establishing a modern state and a centralized monopoly of the legitimate use of violence. So this mission was left to the state whose functionaries were, to a large extent, migrants.

The early death of Pakistan's "father of the nation" (Quaid-i-Azam), Mohammad Ali Jinnah, made the footing of these migrants even more tenuous. When the charismatic President of the Muslim League and first Governor-General of Pakistan died in 1948, he left a void in the Muslim League's and in Pakistan's political elite. It is a popular interpretation of Pakistan's political history to cite Jinnah's early death as one of the main causes for Pakistan's failure in democratization. A close reading of the "migrant state" argument stands against this argument: Jinnah was at best a half-hearted democrat²⁵, and the Muhajirs in general had no interest in a democratic political form in which feudal "anti-state" forces would prevail thanks to their sheer numerical superiority (Waseem 1994: 106). In an attempt to thwart centrifugal tendencies of feudal forces from the outset, the Muhajirs-dominated political and administrative elite fell back on so-called vice-regal colonial practices. Similar to colonial rule, political power was concentrated in the office of the Governor-General, who monopolized the decision-making process and persistently bypassed Prime Minister, cabinet and legislative assembly. Out in the field offices, he could rely on the Deputy Commissioner of the District who acted directly under his

²⁴ Even in (West-) Pakistan largest province, the Punjab, the Pakistan Movement had to rely on local intermediaries with hierocratic charisma who owed their position to colonial divide and rule policies. As Gilmartin (1988: 226-233) has argued convincingly, this had a lasting imprint on how Pakistanis think of nation, state, community and citizenship.

²⁵ On the political life of Pakistan's father figure, cf. Wolpert (1984) and Jalal (1985).

authority. Hence, many scholars trace the origins of Pakistan's authoritarianism back to this continuity of colonial administrative practices under Jinnah and his direct successors²⁶.

Pakistan's political predicament cannot be reduced to the lack of skillful leadership or to organizational matters: It has a class dimension. As a class of traders, industrialists and civil servants, the Muhajirs needed a functioning state apparatus which was able to maintain the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence and give some degree of predictability to social and economic life. However, even the bureaucracy, unlike its Indian counterpart, could not simply carry on with the "job already done" in the colonial era, since the "steel frame" had been rather fragile in those at large indirectly administered territories which were now part of Pakistan. Lacking a political party network and an experienced civil service, the government's writ was tenuous, particularly in rural areas. For this reason, the Muhajirs needed the collaboration of other segments of society. The Punjabi leadership, who represented almost fifty per cent of West-Pakistan's population, was the best partner available. Punjabis were strong in the countryside, strong in business and, most importantly, they dominated the army, being joined there by the Pathans. Both Pathans and Punjabis had assumed the *habitus* of "martial races" under British rule. Since they had experience inside colonial apparatus, they shared many features of the Muhajirs' governmentality. That made them ideal partners for the Muhajirs, who were regarded not as a martial race, but as "sissy".

Since both were "sons of the soil", local people, the incorporation of Punjabis and Pathans already transcends the "migrant state" model, leading the "**overdeveloped state**" model²⁷. This model is crucial to learn more about the social basis of the state, to comprehend how the military as a corporate actor entered the political arena, and why the state was able to become and remain strong in a hostile environment. Before army officers reached higher echelons of the state apparatus, politician-turned bureaucrats had been actually in charge of running the country. Democracy was held in abeyance. Vital and far-reaching decisions, such as the U.S.-Pakistan Military alliance and economic policy strategy, had been taken by top bureaucrats (Kapur 1991). Already in the 1950s the bureaucrats came under fire from politicians and the masses. Particularly politicians from East Pakistan, where the majority of Pakistan's population lived, were at odds with economic and foreign policy designs which undoubtedly patronized development in *West*

²⁶ On vice-regalism, cf. Sayeed (1996: Chapter 10) and Talbot (1998: 54ff. and 132f.). See also Ahmed (1997), Alavi (1983) and Barlas (1995).

²⁷ Since the bulk of refugees had come over the new border of divided Punjab, not all Punjabis were local people in the strict sense. However, thanks to shared language and culture, the refugees among them accommodated quickly to their new environment.

Pakistan. Against this backdrop, a “civilian coup” was staged in 1955, to be followed by a military take-over in 1958, the beginning of the era of Field Marshall Ayub Khan. The coups must be classified as veto- and guardian coups (cf. Huntington 1968: 219-237): As the spearhead of the ruling West Pakistani power coalition, the top civilian and military leaders intervened in order to thwart a possible “takeover” by predominantly East Pakistani forces, which could be described at the same time as democratic, pro-society, anti-state and anti-military.

Ayub Khan’s coup also stands for a critical juncture of the intra-elite power struggle: Military officers grew from a junior partners of civilian bureaucrats to guardians of the state. The army personnel acquired a peculiar governmentality, which can be found until the present day: According to this worldview, army interventions in state affairs are pertinent to keep the state apparatus working smoothly. Since politicians are narrow-minded, the masses uneducated and many of the civil servants corrupt, the men in uniform have to step in from time to time in order to safeguard Pakistan’s economic and social development: People have to be led, since they cannot take care of themselves, and they have to be led by the army, because Pakistan’s politicians are too corrupt and selfish. This implies an exceptional role for Pakistan’s army in state-formation²⁸. In line with this reasoning, army recruits were taught that Pakistan’s geopolitical position calls for an outstanding role of what is perceived as its strategic “core area” and industrial “heartland”: the Punjab. Since, coincidentally, about three quarter of all army soldiers come from just five districts in Punjab and neighboring North-West Frontier Province, the call for soldier’s mission to defend the nation falls on futile ground (Cohen 1984: 44, 115). It hardly needs to be mentioned that this position is sustained by war-making factors described in the preceding section. Army’s and Pakistan’s *raison d’être* overlap: Ayub’s coup safeguarded a strong state apparatus, capable to keep the monopoly of the legitimate use of force at least in core regions. By and large, the state remains at a distance from society, and is therefore “overdeveloped” in relation to society, to use Alavi’s words.

The overdeveloped state became the most important actor in Ayub’s “developmental decades”. In close cooperation with international governmental and non-governmental actors, Pakistan’s top bureaucrats and military officers pursued a strategy of export-oriented growth, championing Pakistan’s early integration into the world economy. However, this policy was only halfway successful. *Spatially*, growth was concentrated on

²⁸ This attitude is well illustrated in the autobiographic accounts of Field Marshall Ayub Khan (cf. 1967: 57, 77) and General K. M. Arif (cf. 1995: 410). According to Samuel P. Huntington (1968: 251), the Field Marshall “came close to filling the role of a Solon or Lycurgus or ‘Great Legislator’ on the Platonic or Rousseauian model.”

core areas in Punjab and in Sindh's capital Karachi; *socially*, an alliance of top bureaucrats, military leaders, a few landlords and some 22 bourgeois families were the main beneficiaries of the economy's expansion (Alavi 1983; Gardezi/Rashid 1983). The masses remained excluded from the political field as well. Indirect democracy was introduced by local election of 80,000 "basic democrats", who participated in local district affairs and elected, or rather acclaimed, the President (Ayub). The scheme sought to provide a popular basis for Ayub's regime and to broaden and limit the social basis of the state at the same time. However, "partial mobilization" (Jalal 1990: 304) was not successful: At the end of the 1960s, the overdeveloped state's detachment from society and the mass population's exclusion from economic growth led to social unrest and to a severe crisis of the state.

The dimension of this crisis and its "solution" cannot be explained sufficiently by the "overdeveloped state" model: Neither can it account for the violent reaction of the political and military class, nor does it sufficiently elucidate the role of the military in state-formation. It provides neither the link between state and society, nor for the underlying motives of governance. For which ends and by which means does the state try to extract resources from society? A convincing answer to this question can be obtained from Ayesha Jalal's (1990) work. She argues that, right from the beginning, Pakistan's state-formation process had been guided by defense matters. Defense spending not just posed a tremendous financial burden on Pakistan's "**state of martial law**", accounting for the largest part of the budget for decades; more importantly, the underlying motives for state *growth* in general have been dictated by the necessity to expand the defense budget, in order to match the Indian military capacity. Inasmuch as military officers have been involved in decision-making and, more importantly, in securing links to international financial players from the beginning, Ayesha Jalal's notion that a "political economy of defense" provides the basis for Pakistan's superstructure has much plausibility. One could argue that the basic law guiding Pakistan's political economy has been to be ready for war. And not just that: The failure of civilians agencies to provide internal peace prosperity prompted the army the early state-building interventions, army's reaction to the Lahore religiously motivated riots of 1953 being a good example: After restoring law and order, the army did simply not leave the scene but extended martial law for several weeks in order to make Punjab's capital a cleaner and brighter city (Cloughley 1998: 43; Siddiqi 1996: 26). The army action was celebrated by the local population and the national press, establishing for the first time a firm link between (internal) war-making, state-building and good governance²⁹.

²⁹ In his intriguing narrative of the Lahore riots, Brigadier (Retd.) A. R. Siddiqi (1996: 36) states: "The '53 Martial Law for the armed forces had been a giant exercise in statecraft and showmanship. The military emerged as the most dominant and versatile forces in the country (West Pakistan)."

As a mentality, or a *dispositif*, the state of martial law has been in place from day one. But it became dominant at the end of the initial phase of state-formation, leading to the first transformation of the overdeveloped state. The first military takeover in 1958 had been a move to consolidate the state. However, when the degree of “Punjabization”³⁰ and exclusion of large parts of the East Pakistani population triggered, first, an autonomy movement, and then a civil war, it was not the question of consolidating an overdeveloped, detached state any more; it was the question of crushing a resistance movement with sheer and brutal military force and employing troops against those compatriots which were now considered just hostile “elements” (Siddiqi 1996: 155-181). Whereas in the 1950s and early 1960s, the overdeveloped state had been able to transform war-making (as a means of expropriation of power) into a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence, and to establish a certain degree of governmental predictability, the martial law state disclosed that the consolidation of the overdeveloped state had failed. The state fell back into war-making in the literal sense. Force had to be used to protect the ruling elite, blurring the boundaries between legal and illegal, and bearing a new governmentality.

³⁰ In ethnic terms, the temporary consolidation of the Pakistani state went hand in hand with “Punjabisation” of the polity. The leaders in bureaucracy, military leadership and among the landlords were now mainly of Punjabi origin, with Muhajirs and Pathans as junior partners.

4. State dynamics: The transformation of an overdeveloped state

The dimension of the transformation came to full display after East Pakistan's war of secession. From the height of its esteem in the 1965, when they fought the second Kashmir war against India, the military's image had become more and more dismal. Finally, the Bangladesh war was lost on two fronts: First the military leadership lost war of words for the right ideology and governmentality against the East Pakistan opposition, necessitating the resort to arms against its own citizens. And back in its war-making camp, it was defeated by internal (East Bengal) and external (India) adversaries. Also, the U. S.–Pakistani military cooperation had proved worthless when it came to India and Kashmir. And with the amputation of the Eastern wing, Pakistan's bold stand to provide a homeland for all Muslims of the subcontinent, the two nation theory of the migrant state, had lost all credibility.

However, the defeat of the all-powerful army could have provided a good opportunity to establish a fresh set of rules for the state field. For the first time in Pakistan's history, the political field was open to politicians and – to some extent – to the people of Pakistan. And there was a chance to break the Punjabi hegemony in the West, because the Pakistan's new ruler, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was a Sindhi with widespread support in all provinces. Moreover, his "Pakistan People's Party" was much stronger than previous parties, both in organization and appeal. Bhutto took power as President and Civil Martial Law Administrator in 1972 and, one year later, he became Prime Minister under a new constitution, vested with all necessary authority to govern the country³¹. And indeed, Bhutto's rule brought a transformation of Pakistan's rules of the game, a new populist style of governance, a new governmentality. Bhutto favored a much more active role of the state in relation to society and to its subjects. Through "deliberate use of state power" and "planned state intervention" Bhutto sought to reshape the economic and political landscape of Pakistan (Shafqat 1997: 125) More important than his new policies was his new political style: In stark contrast to Ayub's elitist approach, Bhutto reached out to the masses, aroused their feelings, and attempted to re-shape and to discipline their minds and bodies (cf. Shafqat 1997: 130, 136). Through the principle of "lateral entry" to bureaucracy he tried to break the Punjabi and Muhajir domination and, concomitantly, the anti-society *esprit de corps* in higher echelons of the state (Kennedy 1987). In reaction to newly mobilized social forces instigating widespread popular protest, Bhutto tried to balance

³¹ On Z. A. Bhutto's rule, cf. Burki (1988) and Wolpert (1993).

social disparities and enhance the state capabilities in the economic sphere. The state nationalized heavy industry and banking services, it monopolized investment activity and other key economic decisions. All these measures could be understood as an attempt to broaden the social basis and, possibly, deepen the reach of the state. To assure the separation of military and civilian powers, Bhutto introduced the para-military Federal Security Service, which acted under the Prime Ministers authority. Just like the principal of lateral entry, para-military forces were used by Bhutto to enhance his personal control over the political process. Using “dirty tricks” in pursuit of “politics of survival” (Migdal 1988), key governmental positions were filled with loyalists, the military service was cleansed, party dissidents and potential critics were thrown out of office and terrorized. His attempt to broaden the basis of the state turned into a weakening of the state’s basis and its apparatus. Instead of broadening and deepening the state, Bhutto endangered its fundamental pillars. The bureaucracy became highly politicized, large parts of the army antagonized, and the business community resented the nationalization of heavy industry and banking services.

Strategically speaking, Bhutto’s biggest mistake was to carry his attempt to keep the military out only half-way: In his brutal suppression of labor unrest and language riots, and even more in his campaign of political expropriation against the Baluchistan autonomy movement, which escalated into a civil war from 1973 to 1977, Bhutto had to employ the army again. Again, war-making brought the army back to state-making (Siddiqi 1996: 229). And in July 1977, a political stalemate between Prime Minister and a strong opposition force was broken by a military *coup d’état*, led by the Chief of the Army Staff, General Zia ul-Haq. Bhutto’s policies posed a threat both to the power of Pakistan’s old ruling alliance and to the integrity of the state itself. In line with the political economy of defense, the military considered it as its duty to perform the role as guardian of the state. It was the fourth military coup in Pakistan’s history, and again the military claimed that it was forced to intervene in order to save the country from further disarray, maybe even form all-out civil war (Arif 1995: 72). The attempt to develop stronger bonds between state and society and to transform an autocratic overdeveloped state had failed.

General Zia ul-Haq stayed in office as Chief Martial Law Administrator and President until his deadly plane crash on August 11th, 1988³². He established what many consider as the first genuine military rule, imposing draconian punishments against opposing political activists, and letting army men assuming responsibilities in key departments of the civil

³² On the Zia era, see Arif (1995), Burki/Baxter (1991) and Hyman (1988).

administration and in key sectors of the economy as well. Pakistan witnessed a far-reaching transformation of state and society. According to the military leadership, the army was forced by Bhutto's legacy of a weakened civil administration to take direct responsibility for governing the state. For the "pro-state" forces, Bhutto's populist handling of pressures arising from social mobilization had exposed the dangers of democracy. The state apparatus had to be defended against pressures from society. After restoring law and order, the army re-established the power of the civil bureaucrats, though this time they were *junior* partners. In effect, Zia secured the army's hegemony within the state apparatus and in society in general. No other political or societal actor could challenge it (Kapur 1991: 182). Many (retired) army officials were posted at higher levels of administration, and some military institutions even assumed first and foremost civilian tasks. Retired officers also assumed upper positions in state enterprises and in profitable sectors of the (legal and illegal) economy. All in all, about ten per cent of all top governmental and business posts are taken by retired army officers (Duncan 1989: 282). Zia established a dense network of key administrative and business position holders, a "vertical" network of businessmen of his favor, one of them being the upcoming Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (Duncan 1989: 94; Burki 1991: 103ff.). The objective of this network approach was to lend legitimacy to his dictatorship, and to trigger economic growth: As in the 1950s, the state sidelined the attempt to generate growth by putting into place a new class of capitalists. However, this time the governmental rules did not follow the developmental state logic. Pakistan's economy was opened to all sorts of – legal and illegal – international markets, which provided for much of the boom of the 1980s.

Boundaries between state and society, internal and external business of the state, between state-making and war-making, were blurred at large. Take the "Inter Services Intelligence" (ISI): Both civilian and military officers work for the ISI, which had initially been founded as a foreign secret service after the First Kashmir War in 1949. Under Zia's rule, the ISI assumed the role of an all-powerful agency with the capability to act almost unchallenged inside Pakistan. The political cell of the ISI infiltrated political parties and manipulated the political process, even under democratic rule (Chengappa 2000). At the same time, the ISI played a crucial role in Afghanistan's civil war (Yousaf/Adkin 1992). Pakistan's status as a frontline state had tremendous repercussions for its political economy (of defense). U. S. governmental agencies supplied huge sums of military and economic aid, initiating a war boom throughout Pakistan. The flow of military and economic aid and, also, the arms and drugs pipeline through Pakistan provided multiple opportunities for diverting money into the pockets of (military and civilian) state officials and businessmen, making war profits a major source of enrichment in the Zia era (Kantha 1999). The

informal economy grew at high rates, reaching about one third of the formal economy (Hyman 1988: 94).

Pakistan had to pay a heavy price for the war boom. Since the economy's expansion relied almost entirely on army power, the military's share in the national budget rose steadily to more than quarter at the end of Zia's rule. At the same time, public investment in education and development came to new lows. Z. A. Bhutto had tried to *expand* the state vertically and horizontally, attaining the contrary in many respects. Zia accepted the state's unwilling *retreat* from some of his functions. As far as the administration of violence is concerned, the fighting in Afghanistan had a serious fallout on the home front: The proliferation small arms and illicit drugs led to the establishment of a "Kalashnikov culture" in and around the economic powerhouse Karachi³³, and also in other parts of the country. The smugglers and transport Mafia, religious and non-religious non-state actors were provided with military hardware for several years of insurgency and terror.

It is important to note that Zia's military rule differed in many respects from the previous ones. The military rose to the most powerful political and economic actor in Pakistan. Its involvement in daily administration was deeper, state-making and war-making converged more than ever. As far as governmentality is concerned, there was the new role of Islam: As a legacy of Bhutto's rule, Zia and his generals were forced to control pressures from a highly politicized and mobilized society. In order to reach out to and regain control of his subjects, Zia attempted to re-write Pakistan's self-understanding as a political entity from a Muslim to an Islamic state. Pakistan's people had to be good citizens *and* faithful Muslims, with the state ensuring the application of secular as well as holy rules. Islamization was as a means to re-establish and potentially broaden (Malik 1989) the state's writ on a society which always been indifferent to westernized concepts, even if they were in proto-Islamic shape like the two nations theory. Non-state actors who had hitherto opposed Pakistan's state project, such as the ulema (clergy), became part of the ruling coalition, or they were at least used by it³⁴. Like in other fields, it became more and more difficult to differentiate between state- and non-state actors. Finally, although the military as a corporate actor was more unchallenged than ever, the deep and broad involvement in governance began to cause rifts inside the military. The army pushed Air Force and Navy even more into the background of political and military decision-making. Some agencies, such as the ISI or the Military Intelligence (MI), assumed an independent

³³ A comprehensive account of the Karachi problem can be obtained from Malik (1997, 1998).

³⁴ On islamic revivelist opposed to the idea of the Pakistani state, see Nasr (1994, 1996).

but outstanding role in both fields, war- and state-making (Chengappa 1999a; Kartha 1999).

Despite some modest experiences with democracy in the mid-80s, it is doubtful whether Zia had any plan to end his tenure (Arif 1995: 252). So it was up to his still mysterious deadly plane crash on August 11th, 1988 to change the rules of the game. His successor as Chief of the Army Staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg, preferred to hand over to power to the civilians. He probably anticipated that with the U. S. and Soviet involvement in the Afghan war coming to an end, the *raison d'être* of America's support would disappear. International support for war-making would die under the conditions of the New World Order, so it was time for the military to step down. It is debatable whether what followed, the two governments of Benazir Bhutto (1988-90, 1993-96) and Nawaz Sharif (1990-93, 1996-99), can be regarded as transition from military to civilian rule or even as an era of democratization (cf. Rais 1997, Rizvi 1998, Shafqat 1998). Elections were held several times, reasonably fair ones even, and civil society and the public sphere gained a good deal of breathing space. However, although there was a succession of democratically elected governments, this was not due to democratic change in the strict sense. No government survived its term, all were dismissed by the President, presumably on behalf of the army. At least *prima facie*, these dismissals were perfectly legal, because the (non-elected) President did have these powers under the 8th amendment to the constitution, which provided some kind of arbiter role for the Head of State. Corruption and inefficiency were among the reasons cited as justifications for the dismissals, and everybody knew that these allegations were not unfounded: Politicians and bureaucrats were corrupt, inefficient, and sometimes political processes remind of racket rule more than of good governance³⁵.

On the other hand, these (true) allegations echoed well-known statist military governmentality. For good reasons, since the generals remained kingmakers and arbiters in Pakistan's longest period of democratic rule, not the Presidents. The governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif had to work under tutelage of the army. The army's guardian role was half-way institutionalized in the 8th amendment, allowing the armed forces to preside over Pakistan's state-formation process. And they did more than just preside over: from time to time, they became heavily engaged in the business of the state, sometimes on invitation of the government, and many times against the will of elected

³⁵ Summing up ten years of democratic rule, Saeed Shafqat (1998: 287) has argued that "democratization has strengthened the paternalistic model of administration rather than constitutional government". Against the backdrop of a lack of inner-party democracy and an almost dysfunctional parliament, decentralization and further feudalization of the state seem to be the most important outcomes of Pakistan's longest experiment with democracy. Both tendencies do not fit well into the military's statist and centralistic designs.

politicians who fell victim to ISI manipulation (Chengappa 1999a, 2000; Shafqat 1997). Through welfare trusts, public and private enterprises, all established or expanded under Zia, they had their share in documented and undocumented businesses, adding to the blurring of boundaries between state and non-state, politics and business, public and private (Karthi 1999).

5. State decay or redeployment of the state?

Hence, there is compelling evidence suggesting – once again – state decay or state failure in Pakistan. The full dimension of the Pakistan predicament has been aptly described by Stephen Cohen (1984: 18) some time ago:

“Pakistan present nuclear program [...] and the maintenance of a twenty-division army may be justifiable in strategic terms, but the leadership of Pakistan has no idea whether such effort may not destroy the state [...] without a shot being fired”.

Since then, things have turned from bad to worse: Nuclear weapons have been tested, the fiscal crisis has worsened and state capabilities have come down. Worst of it all, the proliferation of small arms and belligerent non-state actors makes it much more likely that the state could be destroyed with many, many shots being fired. Cohen argues forcefully that there are no easy answers in Pakistan. Given the current geopolitical conditions in South Asia, large shares of military expenditure are not surprising. And given the fact that war- and state-making have been converging numerous times, creating internal dynamics and constraints of their own, we must assume that South Asian peace alone would just be a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for resolving the trilemma of failures in civilianization, effective rule and democratization mentioned in the introductory chapter. We have to reconsider the dialectics of war- and state-making to find way out for Pakistan. I will do that on the following pages, providing a tentative and speculative sketch.

The preceding chapters have shown that, right from the start, state-making and war-making were daunting tasks. The people in charge – bureaucrats on the one side, army officers on the other – were at great pains in protecting and dominating the state field against adversaries from in and outside the official borders. Internally, they had to confine their effort to some “core” state: secure the most essential rules inside narrowly drawn boundaries; externally, they had to prepare for war, since Pakistan’s territorial status (if we include – as we must, following official ideology – Jammu and Kashmir) was not clearly determined. More importantly, external and internal matters were mixed right from the start, giving the army a key state-building role.

The state apparatus became both overcharged and overdeveloped in relation to civil society. The groups acting on the state field used their position to create a capitalist dynamic and even a capitalist class, which became their ally. No wonder, the bureaucrats used their position to their own profit, thereby creating “corruption”. Additionally, they built up ties to the emergent capitalist class and to the rural champions, the landlords.

However, this attempt to build up a viable economy and a stable political framework failed, since it was at odds with popular sentiment, particularly in East Pakistan. At this juncture, the army intervened openly, “in order to prevent further disarray”, if we follow their governmentality. Bearing in mind that the state apparatus had always been crucial as an economic asset, it is of no great surprise that the army, albeit very slowly, gained a very prominent role in the economy. But until Z. A. Bhutto’s reign, there was no need for the military to interfere directly into civilian affairs. Military rule was an arbiter job. Now, under Bhutto, the economic assets were found to be in danger, because the state had begun to crumble as a result of Z. A. Bhutto’s attempt to broaden it. The military – in order to secure its own survival – took control of vital parts of the economic flows within and without the state. Actions inside the state field became even more crucial economically, since the bulk of Pakistan’s imported boom passed or originated there.

In contrast to Ayub’s era, the generals did not have any design of a developmental state in mind. They did not even take much care to implement the most essential rules, as gun culture and widespread political violence demonstrate. One could argue that state decay, if we use this expression, had begun under Bhutto and *continued* under military rule. When they handed over the *Reststate* to the civilian actors, the generals could count on constitutional and non-constitutional safeguards guaranteeing access to the commanding heights in case of emergency. Besides, they monopolized the key foreign policy issues and kept the control over the military budget. The civilian governments worked under tutelage of the army. And politicians continued what they had learned under Zia ul-Haq: They treated the state apparatus as an economic asset, subverting the rules used on this field to their own favor: “dirty tricks” secured their survival. The undocumented economy, established by Zia’s martial law state in the 1980s, took root all over Pakistan and provided them sources of enrichment, despite a shrinking fiscal basis of the state. Although the military as a corporate actor also made its bargain, it had to rely on state income. No state, no military. Therefore, the diminishing fiscal basis of the state and the became a case in point for military takeover, since it threatened the professional and corporate interests of the military (cf. Rizvi 1998). And there were even more important reasons. After having been on collision course with almost every powerful state actor, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif took on the army, trying to create more rifts in their ranks. He managed to take control of the ISI, prompting a struggle between government-controlled ISI and army-controlled Military Intelligence (MI). The clash between ISI and MI which preceded the military takeover of 1999 indicates a new degree of intra-military divisions (Chengappa 1999b).

So what will the men in khaki do this time? Their main policies have been cited at the beginning: tax survey and reform, accountability campaign, crackdown on smugglers, de-weaponization of society, and devolution of power. De-weaponization, tax reform and crackdown on smugglers are all attempts to strengthen core functions the state apparatus: administration of violence, extraction capability and the implementation of rules. Given the country's history of military-led state-formation, it is not very surprising that the army takes on this task. More interesting are accountability and devolution of power. Accountability suits fine to army governmentality. Given the widespread disillusionment with politicians and bureaucrats, it lends some legitimacy. The same could be true of the devolution of power, which is a catchy good governance slogan as well. On a closer look³⁶, the proposals under considerations at the time of writing are surprising. They will provide democracy below the province level for the first time. The Deputy Commissioner, who has hitherto worked under the supervision of the government, would be replaced by an elected chief mayor. This would not just mean a strengthening of the grass roots level, but a complete break with the tradition of vice-regalism and the overdeveloped, martial law state. The new state would not be detached any more, but more or less firmly anchored in society.

One can only speculate about motives for this move. Considered as different parts of one strategy, accountability and devolution of power could constitute a declaration of war against both political parties and bureaucrats. Political parties would come under pressure from below, and they would lose their status as (weak) mediators between state and society. Elections being held on a non-party basis, the feudally-dominated parties would lose their financial backbone. Given the fact that bureaucrats are targeted firmly by the accountability campaign, the military would be left as the sole strong corporate actor on the state's field.

But there are also some economic aspects in recent moves. The army's involvement in civil affairs could be interpreted as an attempt to rescue the more profitable parts of the state and the economy. The Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), controlled by army officers, is a good example. Currently, they are also taking control of the railways. The privatization of these and other state-managed enterprises would not just make the state "leaner", but enable key military actors to gain from such transactions. In the long run, state decay could be restricted to those regions which are of no importance

³⁶ Cf. Devolution of Power & Responsibility. Establishing the Foundation of Democracy: District Government, Summery. Government of Pakistan, National Reconstruction Bureau, 24th March, 2000, Islamabad.

for Pakistan's economy and to those state functions which are remains of the "overdeveloped" developmental state. "State decay" would turn into downsizing or "redeployment" of the state. But in order to get there and to bring down the highly unprofitable share of military expenditures, the army would have to transform itself at least partially into a civilian actor (Ahmed 1999). 30.000 soldiers running WAPDA could be seen as a starting point. However, it is rather uncertain whether profitable enterprises and a lean state would be able to trigger economic growth big enough to "feed" the less profitable parts of economy and society.

So there is no easy solution in sight for the Pakistan predicament. What does all this tell us about the aforementioned concepts of good governance and the New World Order? The good governance *discourse* is palpable even in Pakistan, producing strange alliances, such as between the current military government and some NGOs. Considering that many NGOs are financed from abroad, the overdeveloped and migrant state argument has sustained its validity in a rather strange way. Given the army's history as guardian of the state, it should be of no surprise that they are in charge of redeploying Pakistan. Success, however, is not guaranteed, and "anti-state" forces are waiting.

6. Epilogue

This paper has been drafted in summer 2000, an earlier version of it in autumn 1999. The latter had to be revised because, at the very moment of its first (and last) presentation, it had become outdated. The night before, General Pervez Musharraf's had assumed power and put an end to Pakistan's longest experiment with civilian rule. This is just another indicator of how fast things tend to change in Pakistan. One factor, however, remains constant: the military's involvement in running the government. The public's reaction to it, however, fluctuates. Initially, military takeovers have been welcomed by a substantial part of the Pakistani public. As every military regime promises to do no more than to prepare the ground for real and true democracy, people tend to give them the benefit of the doubt. But after some time, when the army tightened its grip on society, with no sign of an early return into the barracks, the mood soured, opposition movements turned up and onto the street.

The current military regime is no exception to this rule. In the first instant many people cheered the army, or at least showed sighs of relief that an increasingly authoritarian government had been ousted. Even more, the perception among many liberal Pakistanis was that this time the Generals were doing the right things. But now, sooner than under previous military regimes, many erstwhile supporters of the military "counter coup" have become critical, disappointed, maybe disillusioned. They have seen the military government backing down on almost every issue it had promised to challenge: The government's anti-corruption drive faced strong criticism because military officers and the judiciary were (unofficially) exempted from it, "to prevent state collapse"; the government backed down on regulating and controlling religious schools alleged to train the militants who now also strike inside Pakistan due to reasons of "national security"; the same applies to the crackdown on smugglers and other traders unwilling to cooperate with the tax authorities³⁷. In the last months, even the local government reform earned harsh criticism. A journal initially supportive of the governments plans sees them as part of a plan to establish an authoritarian presidential form of government, quite similar to Field Marshal Ayub Khan's military regime³⁸. If implemented, it is claimed, the plans would carry the country away from parliamentary democracy to an executive-centered political system. As

³⁷ The Friday Times (Lahore), September 8th, 2000, Editorial "The political economy of corruption" (<www.thefridaytimes.com/front.htm>)

³⁸ The Friday Times (Lahore), October 13th, 2000, Opinion, "Confrontation or capitulation in 2001?" (<www.thefridaytimes.com/ejaz.htm>); see also The Friday Times (Lahore), Aug. 25th, 2000, Editorial "Politics by other means" (<www.thefridaytimes.com/front.htm>)

the military's grip on society tightens, many doubt that the military regime would comply with the three-year deadline the Supreme Court has imposed for the return to civil and democratic rule. But many observers find this period too long anyway. For them it is a matter of fact now that Pakistan's dictator has become "useless"³⁹.

Many critics are right. The government did back down many issues. At the same time, the army's involvement has become deeper than before. As announced, army monitoring teams were employed at many levels of bureaucracy to examine the "performance, integrity, behavior and responsiveness" of the personnel⁴⁰. As under previous military regimes, the political decision-making has been monopolized by an inner army circle, comprising of the Chief of the Army Staff (General Musharraf), the ISI and MI chiefs, the nine Corps Commanders and some other staff officers⁴¹. Two Provincial Governors have resigned from their posts because of repeated interference into their political affairs by the regional Corps Commanders. The outstanding role of the nine Corps Commanders and the army staff officers is not restricted to provincial affairs. For similar reasons, some federal ministers have left the cabinet. Hence, there are many indicators of prolonged military rule.

On a closer look, however, some arguments of the critics tell as much about the (govern-) mentalities of the criticizers as about the policies of the criticized. This applies not just to calls for an earlier return to democratic rule, but in particular to those (domestic and international) critics who lament the military regime's "performance". The latter term denotes an peculiar understanding of politics very much in line with good governance discourse. However, politics is still as much about *power* as about performance or good will of the political personnel. In this regard, by the way, the political field does not differ much from other societal fields: Just like any other CEO, Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf has to reconcile different, often contradicting, goals and interests: those of his company (Pakistan), which need not to identical with those of his workers (citizens); those of his branch (army), which may conflict with those of other branches (bureaucracy, judiciary, parliament); those of his inner circle (his fellow Generals), which are surely at odds with those of other networks and peer groups; and, maybe, the General has even some strictly personal goals (e. g. reputation as a national leader). And just like anybody, he is working under circumstances which are not of his own making, fighting against

³⁹ The Economist (London), Oct. 14th, 2000

⁴⁰ Dawn (Karachi), Sep. 28th, 2000 (<www.dawn.com/2000/09/28/top3.htm>)

⁴¹ The News (Lahore), Oct. 20th, 2000 (<www.jang-group.com/thenews/oct2000-daily/20-10-2000/main/main3.htm>)

competitors who have at their disposal huge sums of capital, of all sorts: economic, social, cultural, even symbolic.

Given these natural constraints and the actual resistance his policies met from different societal actors (clergy, traders, bureaucrats), General Pervez Musharraf's "politics of survival" have been quite unspectacular. Their limited success hint at the firmness of resistance he faces from competitors. Whether these competitors are more sympathetic than the current regime will remain a matter of controversy. There are good arguments to support the "Alliance for Restoration of Democracy" (ARD), an all-party alliance which tries to topple the military regime⁴². One can even cite historical experience: Yes, by interfering into the political process right from the beginning and by intimidating politicians the military in Pakistan *did* create the very mess (weak political institutions) it is now (as ever) trying clean up (Zaidi 1999); and, for sure, military rule is not the solution to Pakistan's predicament, to the trilemma of failures in civilianization, effective rule and democratization; it is part of the problem. But this could be rendered academic in near future, because, as has been stated in a totally different context, "the truth does not explain much" (Cartwright 1983: 72). In politics, as in life in general, it is *timing* that is most crucial. And for now, it can be no matter of controversy that Pakistan is facing not just a crisis of democratic rule or of good governance, but a crisis of the state. There seems to be too much at stake right now to wait for a political actor capable of pursuing all targets: civilianization, democratization and good governance. And just as some people in Pakistan still await the introduction of interest-free banking, observers inside *and* outside Pakistan seem to wait for political actors who do not pursue their own – particular – interests. Everybody knows, they will not show up, even after the army's return to the barracks.

⁴² Cf. The Friday Times (Lahore), Nov. 17th, 2000, Opinion, "PML-PPP alliance must be supported" (<www.thefridaytimes.com/ejaz.htm>)

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