Forced Migration and Armed Conflict

An Analytical Framework

and a Case Study of Refugee-Warriors in Guinea

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Abstract

This paper deals with the phenomenon of militarised refugee camps and settlements. Firstly an analytical framework drawing on Norbert Elias' sociological theory is established. Society is understood as the interplay of political, economic and symbolic reproduction. Contradictions in these three dimensions form the background of organised armed conflict. Using the formula of "self-perpetuation of warfare", the author shows that massive violence and consequent flight sharpen existing contradictions. Flight represents the exclusion of certain groups from political, economic and symbolic systems of reproduction in the home country. Processes of marginalisation are frequently repeated in the host country. Exclusion and marginalisation produce motivations to engage in armed conflict. Yet motivations need to be complemented by organisational capacities of armed actors in order to translate into actual fighting. The author argues that certain characteristics of refugee situations support the organisational capacities of rebel groups. The framework is applied in a case study of the refugee crisis in Guinea.

Secondly, it is shown that the problem of militarised refugee populations is concentrated in a few countries in Africa and the Middle East. Then the author examines the impact of humanitarian aid and the host state in the cases of Israel/Palestine and the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa. Humanitarian aid may significantly increase capacities of rebel groups but tends to be a minor factor. The decisive variable is the host state. The analysis links the phenomenon of refugee-warriors to a common characteristic of the host states: instability and heavy informalisation of politics. In the quest for power, host state actors try to increase their power resources by establishing alliances with armed refugee actors. Countries in which refugee-warriors can become active are typically those where the ruling regime faces strong opposition, where political structures are authoritarian and competition for power is hardly institutionalised, and where informal political structures extend into the security sector.

Introduction

In 1994, faced with an advancing guerrilla movement made up of second and third generation refugees, the Rwandan regime initiated massacres of the country's ethnic Tutsi population that were to go down in history as the third genocide of the 20th century. Within less than three months, some 800,000 civilians were killed. The government troops were eventually forced to retreat and took with them some two million civilian refugees. Among the roughly one million refugees who fled to eastern Zaire were numerous government officials as well as between 50,000 and 65,000 remaining members of the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* (FAR) and the *Interahamwe* militia, the main perpetrators of the genocide (Emizet 2000:165).[1] They immediately regrouped in the vast refugee camps in the border region and soon started carrying out cross-border attacks on Rwanda. In the camps openly controlled by militia, humanitarian assistance became the main source of revenue within the insurgents' economy, benefiting them both by ensuring supplies and controlling the civilian refugee population. Due to the unwillingness and incapability of the Zairian government and the international community to intervene, the new Rwandan army and an allied Zairian rebel group invaded the country's eastern Kivu provinces in 1996, closing down the refugee camps and triggering a conflict that two years later took on an extended regional dimension, involving at least five states.

The events in eastern Zaire triggered severe criticism of humanitarian refugee aid (Luttwak 1999, cf. Macrae 1998), criticism which has to be seen in the context of a parallel shift of scholarly attention to the causes of war. For most of the Cold War period, the concept of proxy wars which explained armed warfare within or among Third World states as results of the international bipolar order had been dominant. When wars on the periphery did not come to an end after the fall of the Iron Curtain, but new ones broke out instead (Rabehl 2000:10), old and new paradigms stressing internal dynamics received attention. One of the most successful new approaches now firmly established in scholarly discourse was introduced by Jean/Rufin's "*Economie des guerres civiles*" (1999, first published 1996). Jean/Rufin strongly emphasised the importance of external sources of revenue, particularly "humanitarian sanctuaries", for rebel movements. Their approach stressed the political

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[1] Official refugee figures stood at 1.2 million, but the real figure was probably somewhere between 800,000 and 900,000 (Adelmann 1998:61). As for the armed elements, Emizet (2000:165) estimated figures of 20,000 to 25,000 FAR soldiers and 30,000 to 40,000 Interahamwe. Including those who actively participated in the genocide and held posts in the church and the goverment, Waal estimated the number of *genocidaires* in Zaire at 120,000 to 150,000 (Waal 1997:211). The then-UN envoy to Rwanda estimated that 60 to 70 percent of the "refugees" in Zaire refused to return "because they would face charges in Rwanda for the genocide" (quoted in Boutroue 1998:Annex Chronology). The latter figure seems to include the family members of those personally involved in the killings.

roots of war but inspired scholars to regard war as an economic order, i.e. to consider economic reasons responsible for the continuation of war (cf. Lock 2000, cf. Collier 2000, cf. Keen 2000).

Criticism of refugee assistance ranged from a mere recognition of the dilemma, i.e. the fact that it enables civilians to stay alive *and* sustains combatant organisations (Barber 1997) to claims of refugee aid being "the most destructive" form of international intervention, as it intrinsically prolonged conflicts (Luttwak 1999:41f). Luttwak argued that wars end because the combatants and their civilian basis are exhausted, and that exhaustion is prevented by refugee aid. According to him, handouts and medical care not only supply rebel organisations, but do as well maintain sectarian identities in the long run, as no need arises for integration or accommodation of opposing interest. Barber (1997:12) additionally stressed the instrumentality of instigating massive population displacements in order to attract humanitarian support, thus identifying aid as an actual incentive for violence. Others, in contrast, considered humanitarian assistance a rather negligible factor in contemporary war economies (cf. Shearer 2000). Despite differing conclusions, all of these approaches reduce the role refugees played in a given conflict to humanitarian assistance, or at best to the way in which humanitarian assistance contributed to a more diversified war economy.

The focus on humanitarian assistance is understandable and legitimate. Humanitarianism is the primary international response to armed conflict within Third World states, and its legitimacy depends on the question whether aid indeed prolongs conflict and provides incentives for violence. The emphasis on the economics of war has led scholars such as Barber (1997) and Luttwak (1999) to consider refugee aid the basic reason for refugee involvement in armed warfare, an assumption which deserves further scrutiny. The question is why refugees become armed actors in conflicts. This again translates into a set of subquestions. What motivates refugees to fight in wars? Which forces create these motivations? Are these forces at work in the home country, in the host country, or both? How do motivations translate into action, i.e. actual fighting? What significance does refugee assistance have for the creation and maintenance of combat capabilities? To what extent are humanitarian organisations responsible? What is the role of the host country and the host state, and which host country characteristics increase the probability that refugees engage in armed conflict? Which of these factors, i.e. refugee motivations, humanitarian aid, and the host country, is the most important? And finally, what are the implications of these reflections for international refugee assistance?

Attempts have been made to analyse the issue of refugees and wars from a perspective that centres on refugees rather than war economies. Opitz (1988:42-52) already noted that refu-

gees are produced by identifiable social forces rather than being a by-product of war, and that there is a connection to processes of state- and nation-building. Zolberg et al. (1989), introducing the notion of "refugee-warriors", hypothesised that the reasons for which people become refugees also explain why they engage in cross-border violence (ibid:229). Rather than stressing factors that account for material means of combat, Zolberg et al. thus emphasised "root causes" motivating individuals to engage in violence. The most elaborate "framework for exploring the political and security context of refugee populated areas" so far, put forward by Karen Jacobsen (2000), emphasised conditions in the host country. Jacobsen rightly insisted that "refugees are not passive victims, but are political actors, with their own sets of interests and strategies which transform the RPA [Refugee Populated Area, F.G.]" (ibid:18), and that "before embarking on the search for solutions, it is helpful to develop a political understanding" (ibid:20) of the transformation the affected host polities are undergoing. She inductively develops two sets of variables. The first one refers to the situation prior to the refugee influx, and consists of the categories of domestic political and economic relations, regional geopolitics and national security concerns, and past and present relations between the host government and humanitarian actors. The second one refers to features of the influx, summarised as settlement patterns, incurred socio-political and economic changes, and security problems, particularly the presence of refugee-warriors. She lists categories useful in guiding an analysis, but the framework remains fragmentary and little systematic in nature, not least because it lacks a theoretical underpinning. It remains unclear whether and how the categories are logically interrelated, whether there is a hierarchy of factors, and which are the key dynamics driving the violence.

Adelmann (1998) similarly analyses "refugee-warriors" as a specific phenomenon to be distinguished from intra-state insurrectional groups (ibid:51), i.e. essentially unrelated to general dynamics of war. While acknowledging the importance of home country dynamics, specifically those preventing a return of the refugees, he attributes primary responsibility to the international community and the host state. Both are blamed for not offering alternative, non-violent solutions to the refugees' plight and tolerating the refugees' cross-border activities.[2] Adelmann considers the insecure political and economic status as the immediate source of refugee motivations, while host states are held responsible for tolerating refugees' cross-border activities (ibid:63f). He concludes that further research is necessary to explain why host states allow these activities.

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[2] The alternative solution Adelmann (1998) has in mind is that the international community arranges for resettlement to (mostly Western) third countries. As large-scale resettlement has historically been an exception and is thus empirically of minor relevance, I will not further explore that argument. This decision does not mean that resettlement was not a potential solution to the problem.

The above-mentioned publications establish categories that could guide an analysis and provide initial ideas of the factors that could inform an answer to the questions formulated above. Further theoretical reflections are necessary to integrate these so far disparate approaches and to separate factors of minor importance from the most relevant ones. The topic suggests an analysis grounded in theoretical considerations on war. Such an approach could link the issue of refugee involvement in wars to general causes of war and thus allow systematically exploring the issue. It should further facilitate an analysis of refugee involvement in war in the home country and in the host country within the same framework. Recent scientific approaches to war propose to separate the reasons for which a war began from those perpetuating it. Refugees become actors once violent confrontations have turned them into refugees.[3] If refugees play a role in conflict, this role should thus be regarded as a perpetuating rather than an initiating factor. In theoretical terms, in war segments of a society formerly able to co-operate to a certain extent relate inherently conflictive to each other. That is, wars create a violent societal order further perpetuating armed conflict (cf. Siegelberg 1994:192). This widely acknowledged general tendency of war to become self-perpetuating has so far been mainly explored by war economy analysts, which is the main reason why so much emphasis has been put on humanitarian aid. Further attempts have been made to expose the dynamics of other dimensions as well (on the psychological dimension cf. Waldmann 2000). Some authors consider displacement, or social uprooting, to be an important aspect, as it produces motivations to engage in armed struggle (on Sierra Leone cf. Muana 1997).

Adopting this perspective, we can establish the hypothesis that refugees are a manifestation of self-perpetuation, i.e. that war re-creates its own social bases and thus stabilises a societal order of war. Root causes for refugee involvement in war can be attributed to dynamics in the home country producing refugees and preventing their repatriation (cf. Zolberg et al. 1989). Host country conditions add to or reinforce these root causes (cf. Adelmann 1998, Jacobsen 2000). Host country politics (cf. Adelmann 1998) and humanitarian aid (cf. Barber 1997) are decisive for allowing root causes to translate into organised conflict. The reasons for which host country political forces tolerate cross-border operations from their territory are an important cause of refugee involvement in that type of violence (cf. Adelmann 1998, Rufin 1999:20).

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[3] Most of the world's refugees fled because of wars. "Individuals continue to flee countries which engage in the persecution of political opponents and deny freedom of speech and assembly, but their numbers – when placed against the world-wide figures of refugee flows – currently remain small" (Weiner 1996:23). Large-scale pogroms and massacres, other important producers of refugees, most often occur in situations of war, though not necessarily. As I argue that the dynamics behind large-scale massacres etc. in "peaceful" times are akin to those of war, i.e. perceived political enemies are eliminated by violent means, it can be justified to analyse involvement of these refugees in combat from the same perspective as that applied to war refugees.

A concurring hypothesis deserving equal consideration is that flight constitutes a breach with the order of war, as people become geographically dissociated with the core of that order. For instance, a prominent war economy analysis states that in the absence of humanitarian aid flight represents a drain on the combatants' resources (Rufin 1999:30). Put differently, refugees are one of the factors that contribute to ending wars.

The first chapter of the present paper lays down an analytical framework. It establishes terms serving as tools in analysis and shows in an abstract manner how refugees integrate into an order of war, i.e. which home and host country dynamics create root causes, and how root causes can translate into combat capabilities. On the one hand, it is intended to guide future case studies concerned with the matter, while on the other hand, its abstract form shall help to explain in the most general way why refugees become actors in wars.

Firstly, a theory of war and the methodology associated with it, the "grammar of war" (cf. Siegelberg 1994, Jung 1995), are briefly presented. These general reflections on the causal origin of war form the background of subsequent reflections on how war re-creates causes explaining its persistence. They are followed by considerations on what constitutes an order of war. Following Jung's methodology (Jung 1995) as further developed by Stuvøy (2002), I propose to analyse a societal order as a configuration of political, economic and symbolic modes of reproduction.

I then present an abstract description of the societal order of refugees, i.e. their political, economic and symbolic reproduction, and thereby clarify how the terms established can be applied in an analysis of that order. The "grammar of war" explained before is a methodological tool allowing to structure causes of war. It inspired the model of the refugee order, as the elements it identifies as leading to war should re-appear in the refugee order as elements perpetuating war. In addition to preparing an analysis, the model establishes "refugees" as a social category with political, economic and symbolic commonalities and thereby justifies generalisations about them. Summarising essentials of the refugee societal order, the chapter closes by presenting an abstract scheme of refugee armies.

While chapter one aims at explaining the phenomenon in most general terms, chapter two presents empirical evidence. Its objective is to examine in detail two specific factors conditioning the societal order of refugees and potentially accounting for the phenomenon of refugee-warriors, i.e. the host country and humanitarian aid. The chapter starts by defining militarised refugee populations and militarised refugee camps in order to come to terms with the object of analysis. Then, in what amounts to a preliminary examination, the empirical relevance of the phenomenon is explored. That section seeks to investigate how widespread the problem is, i.e. how often refugees engage in what type of political violence and where the phenomenon is concentrated. The available statistics are as well em-

ployed to support the reflections presented in chapter one. In essence, 2.1 serves to identify a cluster of particularly affected host countries.

The second section seeks to link the phenomenon to a common characteristic of these host countries: weak state power and pronounced informalisation or personalisation of politics. It analyses informal links between refugee insurgents and host country forces in two notable cases of militarised refugee populations: the refugee crises in the Middle East and in the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa. These links and the interests behind them seem to be decisive in explaining why host country forces tolerate refugee insurgents.

In the subsequent section, the role of humanitarian aid and humanitarian actors will be assessed. Refugee-warriors stimulate so much interest primarily because of the link to humanitarian aid, and that aspect therefore deserves further scrutiny. The section starts by presenting the historical evolution of the humanitarian system's perception of the problem. I will then compare the contribution humanitarian aid made to war in two notable cases and present how humanitarian organisations assessed their role and responded to the problem. Another briefly presented case demonstrates recent changes in the self-assessment of humanitarian agencies and consequent changes in reactions.

The approach established in chapter one not only allows to establish qualified hypotheses on the causes of the militarisation of refugee camps. It first and foremost constitutes a basis for the comparative study of refugees' roles in wars. As an illustration of the framework and a test for its viability, a case study will be presented subsequently.

In autumn 2000, heavy fighting erupted in the border region of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, primarily on the Guinean side. An alliance of Liberian government paramilitaries, Sierra Leonean *Revolutionary United Front* (RUF) rebels, and Guinean dissidents calling themselves the *Union des Forces Démocratiques de Guinée* (UFDG) had invaded Guinea from Sierra Leone and Liberia (cf. ICG 2002). The Liberian and Sierra Leonean elements seemed to be the dominant force in the alliance (ibid:4). The invaders were repelled in early 2001. At that time, Guinea had one of the world's highest concentrations of refugees relative to its population.[4] The wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone had produced massive population displacements during the 1990s. The refugee camps hosting Liberians had for about a decade been widely suspected of harbouring rebels hostile to the Liberian government. During the confrontations, both Guinean civilians and security forces massively and systematically targeted refugees, in the peaceful capital as well as in the embattled border region. This short description indicates that the two dimensions the framework aims to analyse, i.e. cross-border violence and internal war involving refugees, seem to have been

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[4] Only Jordan and Gaza/Westbank had higher concentrations of refugees, while that in Lebanon was roughly equal to that in Guinea.

present in the Guinean case. Yet Guinea has in the past conveniently been described as a place where large numbers of refugees took up strikingly harmonious relationships with the local population. Considering the massive violence, we are now tempted to assume that tensions did not arise all of a sudden, but had been building up for some time. These few features already suggest that the Guinean situation might constitute an instructive case study, as it allows examining peaceful coexistence, internal strife, and trans-border violence. Yet the case has so far attracted little scholarly attention, arguably due to the fact that the region's wars have generally received little international attention until the end of the 1990s, and that Guinea's regime pursued an extremely isolationist policy until 1984, which prevented the emergence of regional experts familiar with the country.

Field research for this study was conducted from March to September 2002 in the capital Conakry, the Kissidougou region hosting Sierra Leonean refugees, and the N'zérékoré region hosting Liberian refugees. Methodically, research comprised three basic sets: press analysis, trend-line interviews, and semi-structured qualitative interviews aimed at collecting further information the framework suggested to be relevant.

Although local newspapers often publish little more than rumours they are important primary sources in that they allow to explore governmental rhetoric and to develop an understanding of how a certain situation is perceived within a given society. This is clearly the case where a vibrant and free press exists, but also applies, to a lesser extent, to regions where the press is state-controlled, as was the case in Guinea up to the second half of the 1990s. Official declarations of policies often differ remarkably little from public opinion.[5] In societies with strong authoritarian structures such as the Guinean one, state propaganda is quite likely to influence the people's opinion on a certain matter. Analysis of the private press suggested that public opinion concerning the refugees was indeed strongly influenced by the regime's stance. The date of newspaper issues to be examined was chosen according to relevant events, such as international conferences concerned with the region's wars etc.

The trend line interviews follow a methodology drawn from Klingebiel et al. (2000). They aim at collecting perceptions of the situation, particularly with regard to when and why the quality of neighbourliness was considered to have improved or deteriorated. Results are prone to distortion, as the perception of a situation may change in retrospect. Press analysis was partly aimed at making up for that deficit. Essentially, the first two sets of the research work were intended to obtain a "superficial" understanding of the situation, i.e. of how the situation was perceived, while the latter aimed at gathering further information on underlying structures and background data. Interviews were generally conducted in English and

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[5] For instance, not only do the different Guinean opposition parties formulate essentially the same policies, but similar views are regularly expressed in presidential speeches as well.

French. Interlocutors were usually identified and approached through existing forms of organisation, for instance traditional structures at village level or more "modern" forms such as refugee women groups in the camps and NGOs etc. This approach resulted in a bias towards urban, educated interview partners. Nonetheless, as the methodology is qualitative rather than quantitative, and as it was possible to conduct several interviews with individuals of a rather traditional background, translation being provided by educated locals, this bias is likely to have resulted in rather negligible distortions. A relative bias in favour of educated interview partners can be further justified by the importance that population segment has for armed warfare. Almost universally, sustained fighting is organised by educated elites (cf. Jung et al. 2003). Tensions on lower levels of society may lead to sporadic outbursts of violence, but are unlikely to transform into all-out war in the absence of elite organisation.

Initially, some of the interviews were recorded, but this was quickly abandoned as it became clear that interlocutors preferred talking without being recorded. Generally, finding interview partners was problematic. Within Guinea, the leading role assumed by the government during the attacks on refugees is well known, and there is little interest on the part of the authorities in any investigation concerned with the matter. Following pertinent guidelines on the protection of sources in sensitive situations, all interviews have been anonymised (cf. Bliss/Schönhuth 2002). As I could not establish contacts to the authorities that would have allowed me to be told anything but the official (published) version, I decided to keep a distance from government officials. When contacting interview partners, the topic of the study was usually introduced as "the impact of the refugee influx on social relations" or "on the economy". Research thus involved some degree of deception. In order not to compromise my research or people I was in contact with even further, I decided to minimise contact to UNHCR as well. UNHCR had declared from the beginning that it could not support any research on the background of the 2000/2001 fighting, and was indeed quite secretive regarding information considered sensitive.[6] Other humanitarian organisations however were more willing to provide information and considerably facilitated contact to refugees in the camps.

The case study begins with the origins of the regional crisis, i.e. with the war in Liberia, but its emphasis is clearly on Guinea. First, the background of the Liberian war is presented briefly. I will then show how and why refugee flows were produced, and how they relate to causes of conflict. The same procedure will afterwards be applied to the case of Sierra Leone.

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[6] As turned out later, relations between UNHCR and the Guinean government were very strained because of the militarisation of the Kouankan refugee camp, negotiations were at a critical stage, and UNHCR was probably wary that information provided to outsiders could further undermine its position.

The analysis will then turn to Guinea. In order to develop a deeper understanding of the political situation within which the population movements took place, I will describe concisely the country's main relevant features. Subsequently, the sub-regional alliances and their connections with insurgent and refugee groups are presented, focussing on Guinea's position. Thereby, Guinea's attitude towards the militarisation of refugee camps is explained. The following section, directly concerned with the militarisation, will deal with the character of that phenomenon and particularly the way humanitarian organisations and the international community reacted to it.

The second part on refugee-related tensions inside Guinea introduces the issue by giving a rather broad overview describing the dominant Guinean perceptions of refugees, of how refugees "behaved", how they changed life in Guinea, and of how these perceptions changed over time. I will then proceed to analyse the impact the refugee influx had on the national political scene and on the economy in the following two sections. In particular, political and economic contradictions in Guinea relating to the refugee influx will be presented. Of course, in a society where political and economic power are hardly differentiated, this distinction is rather analytical and in part artificial. Yet there were several economic effects at the grass roots level which the state was relatively immune to. The analysis of economic effects is structured along social strata for reasons of differing potentials for action. The following section reflects on the link between refuge and identity as it manifested itself in the region. It seeks to explore to what extent and why refugees expressed sectarian identities.

Subsequently, instances of refugee-related violence in Guinea will be analysed in the light of the findings reached so far. A conclusion summarising why refugees in Guinea became involved in violence will complete the case study.

The paper will close with a general conclusion on the reasons why refugees become involved in armed warfare. The way in which war creates new causes of war should become apparent by using the "grammar of war", yet the latter has so far been employed to explain the genesis of war in the first place. In this paper, it has guided the analysis of the societal order of refugees. As the method allows incorporating and structuring a maximum amount of information, it will be employed to systematically summarise the findings of this study. Finally, implications for the international community derived from these reflections will be presented.

Having conceptualised the topic as outlined above, a vast amount of literature is potentially relevant. This includes theoretical considerations on wars and war economies, as well as the literature on the wars in the West-African sub-region and on Guinea in particular. Another area is the field of "refugee studies", which has generated immense amounts of litera-

ture, predominantly case studies, several of which are relevant as well. A third area is the humanitarian literature, often issued by human rights groups or humanitarian agencies. This latter category is usually rather descriptive in nature and strongly influenced by humanitarian values and institutional interests, but relies on fairly well-functioning information systems and often provides information not available from other sources.

As far as the first complex is concerned, the "Hamburger Ansatz" so far is the most comprehensive theoretic approach to causes of war. Its perspective on the genesis of war provides a background to this analysis. As a supplement, war economy analyses will be incorporated. The literature on the wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone is extensive and allows for in depth-studies, while that on Guinea in general and on the refugee crisis in particular is rather limited, with a relatively high percentage being issued by human rights groups. In contrast, the potentially relevant "refugee studies" literature is too extensive for full research, and it was only possible to take into account studies directly concerned with phenomena of violence. Much of this literature is also "grey" and semi-public, and it can be assumed that some publications exist which were not accessible to me.

Finally, the scope of analysis needs to be precisely confined and essential terms have to be defined. The primary interest of this paper is refugee involvement in war, war being defined as continuous mass violence involving at least one state as an actor and at least two actors exhibiting some degree of military strategy (AKUF 2002:10). At some instances, it will however be necessary to reflect on less organised and therefore less continuous and strategic forms of mass violence, as causes of these may be similar to those of war and the violence may in fact be a prelude to or occur in a context of war. As this paper is concerned with refugee armies, long-distance migrants to western countries are excluded from the analysis. These rarely organise into armed groups,[7] although individual *diaspora* elements may assume important roles in contemporary wars. The study is thus confined to refugees displaced within Third World regions, and particularly to those displaced to a neighbouring state. The category of Third World states can be justified by a characteristic these states share, the simultaneous existence of traditional, personal and modern, abstract forms of *Vergesellschaftung* (cf. Siegelberg 1994:112f, Jung et al. 2003:10f). As will be demonstrated in 2.1, the phenomenon of refugee warriors is concentrated in Africa and the Middle East, regions which are characterised by comparatively strong personal structures. The paper thus focuses on these regions and is of particular relevance for these. Interna-

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[7] The US-supported "bay of pigs"-invasion of Cuban exiles and the Portuguese-led invasion of Paris-based exiles into Guinea's capital in 1970 are notable exceptions. The alliances between these host states and foreign insurgents show similarities to the trans-border links analysed in 2.2. which I consider to be of great importance to the phenomenon of refugee-warriors. In fact, aligning with foreign, essentially informally organised actors was a key component of Western counterinsurgency strategies.

tional humanitarian law defines refugees as people who have left their country of origin out of a well-founded fear of persecution. Legally, refugees who take up arms in order to carry out subversive activities in their home countries should lose their refugee status, but in fact they rarely do. Clearly, a restriction of the term "refugee" to unarmed persons is not possible within the design of this study, and the term will therefore be employed in a more conventional sense and designate those who have crossed an international border because of real threats to their physical integrity. Much of this paper focuses on the social characteristics of refugees, and occasionally I will refer to internally displaced persons (IDP) as well, who share many of these characteristics, but the emphasis is on internationally displaced people. When designating the direction of that international displacement, the terms home state and sending state as well as the terms host state and receiving state are used interchangeably in this paper.

1 Refugees and Self-Sustaining Warfare

Existing studies on the phenomenon of refugee-warriors have yielded first results, but are little systematic as they lack a theoretical underpinning. So far, approaches focussing on the reasons of flight or living conditions in the host country as "root causes" or on humanitarian assistance as fuelling war economies stand disparately side by side. Here, I argue that the phenomenon of refugees in wars can be analysed as a self-perpetuation of warfare. That is, refugees can be an integral part of a societal order of war. This societal order will be analysed by means of the *Hamburger Ansatz*, a theoretic approach primarily concerned with the dynamics leading to armed warfare (cf. Siegelberg 1994, Jung 1995, Schlichte 1996), because it is the most elaborate and comprehensive theory on the causes of war. The associated methodology, the "grammar of war", allows incorporating and structuring a maximum amount of information and should therefore enable integrating so far disparate approaches.

In Hamburger perspective, a process of modernisation, i.e. the replacement of personal modes of *Vergesellschaftung* by abstract ones,[8] is transforming traditional social settings and can be regarded as the most general cause of wars. This process of modernisation creates opportunities for some groups and threatens the social status of others. The balance of power within as well as between states is disturbed, as social orders become anachronistic, new actors can come into play, and, consequently, *contradictions* build up – contradictions which can make it seem rational for leaders to apply force, either in order to maintain the *status quo*, to overcome it, or to restore a *status quo ante*. The modernisation theoretical considerations provide the background to the following reflections rather than being the centrepiece, as I argue that war itself is the immediate cause of new contradictions which are at the heart of the continuation of warfare. I retain some of the theory's terms to serve as tools in the analysis and one fundamental assumption derived from theoretical reflection: at the core of armed conflicts are objective contradictions. They are objective in the sense that they can be rationalised according to the modern (originally western) notion of opposed interests. These interests can be analytically separated into political, material, and

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[8] The term personal relations as employed here includes face-to-face relations but is not restricted to them. It essentially designates a structuring principle characterized by social organization around persons or personified forces (e.g. gods and ghosts). "Wird […] von einem Strukturprinzip personaler Beziehungen gesprochen, sind diese nicht mit sogenannten face-to-face relations, also direkten Interaktionsbeziehungen, gleichzusetzen [...]. Personale Beziehungen können, müssen aber keine persönlichen Beziehungen sein. Der personale Charakter traditionaler Gesellschaften geht weniger aus tatsächlichen persönlichen Kontakten der in ihnen vergesellschafteten Menschen hervor, denn aus der Vergewisserung über die eigene Gesellschaftlichkeit durch einen Panthenon von Personifikationen. [... Es sind, F.G.] Personenkonstellationen und nicht abstrakte Begriffe und Strukturen, welche die sozialen Machtverhältnisse traditionaler Gesellschaften repräsentieren" (Jung 1995:158).

ideal interests. When war has commenced, a societal system is established in which contradictions are no longer processed peacefully. The concern of this paper is to examine how that system is sustained.

Conventionally, Hamburger studies explaining the genesis of war analyse the transformation of contradictions into war using a four-stage model, the "grammar of war" (cf. Siegelberg 1994:167-193). It is intended to reconstruct logically how contradictions are processed when leading to war. Using the same model it should also be possible to observe the processes through which war sustains itself. *Put differently, here it is argued that the elements that initially cause war are continuously re-created during war.* As the methodology allows for integrating a maximum amount of information into one single framework (cf. Jung et al. 2003:10), it will be employed to finally structure the findings of this study in what is akin to a "grammar of self-sustaining war" focussing on refugees. Here, I will shortly outline the "grammar of war" as it is conventionally employed.

On the first stage, "contradiction", societal contrasts are assembled. Contradictions can analytically be separated into political, economic and symbolic/ideological differences. The second stage, "crisis", designates the difference between objective (analytical) contradictions and subjective reasons. Contradictions only become causal factors when realised and acted upon by actors. The paradigms, world views, systems of symbols etc. the relevant actors use to interpret their situation and which enable them to perceive it as "critical" have to be identified. As analysts, we have to understand the specific rationale specific actors base their actions on. Culturally distinct conceptions of good and evil as well as particular historical precedents which the actors perceive as analogous to the actual situation are important components when analysing the rationalisation of violence. The third stage, "conflict", deals with the translation of perceptions into actions. Strictly speaking, it is a process of escalation. In our model, "conflict" means the mobilisation of combat capacities. This takes place on three different levels: the organisational, the economic, and the mental. Members have to be recruited into relatively stable forms of organisation. Economic processes sustaining the organisation and its military capacities have to be organised. Mental conflict capacities are acquired by legitimising the killing of opponents. The creation of the perception that the opponent constituted a direct threat to livelihood and physical integrity is a typical way of acquiring mental combat capacities (cf. Rösel 1997). Developments at the "conflict" stage often make the difference between repeated but sporadic and weakly organised acts of violence and war. The fourth stage, "war", is marked by the beginning of continuous mass violence involving at least two strategically proceeding organised actors, one of them being a state. War can resolve contradictions by overcoming anachronistic social orders and be a moment of progressive and necessary change. Often, however, it subsequently reshapes the causes that have led to its outbreak in the

first place, thus creating new causes perpetuating warfare. Then, paradoxically, war can become a relatively stable societal order.

Central to the following argument is Elias' notion of a societal order as the configuration of elementary functions every society has to assure, i.e. its political, economic and symbolic reproduction (cf. Elias 1983, cf. Jung 1995:89-95). Political reproduction is defined as the control of violence, material reproduction as assuring economic subsistence, and symbolic reproduction as the provision of means of orientation (*Orientierungsmittel*) (Jung 1995:91). A societal order of internal war is characterised by the existence of at least two systems of reproduction with a high degree of autonomy, i.e. the warring parties. These two systems, however, are not entirely separate but form a configuration (cf. Elias 1991:139-146). They are related antagonistically, the link typically being constituted by competition for the same sources of revenue and the commonly claimed centre of political authority, the state. Concerning refugees, the order exhibits three tendencies: the exclusion from a home country system of reproduction, partial integration into and selective exclusion from host country systems of reproduction, and partial integration into an alternative, insurgent order. Dynamics shaping the system include the processes in the home country producing refugees on the one hand, and processes in the host country reproducing a refugee social entity and furthering its political and economic organisation. That point is further elaborated in the following sections.

Conventionally, in Hamburger studies, the society analysed is that within the borders of an internationally recognised state. Drawing from concepts so far employed to analyse the transformation of a peaceful society to a war society, Stuvøy (2002) adapted the associated terms to make sense of the order of an insurgent non-state entity. In the present context, the phenomena of refugee movements, refugee involvement in cross-border violence or in fighting in the host country suggest a focus on the trans-national character of societal links. The *Hamburger Ansatz* is open to such a perspective as it conceives society as world society, i.e. states cannot be considered actors with clear-cut boundaries. Third World regions are characterised by the simultaneous existence of modern, bureaucratic and traditional, personal modes of government. The former constitute the state as an impersonal, distinguishable entity and allow for conceptualising international politics as relations between states. Yet these are often only weakly institutionalised in the developing world. Personal power relations regularly complement or overshadow bureaucratic administration as means of governance. Rather than being an impersonal body of domination, the state apparatus itself can be considered a resource competed for by various personalised political networks

(cf. Jackson 1990, Reno 1998), the dominant one constituting the *regime*.[9] As for the extension and composition of these networks, national frontiers are of limited importance (cf. Reno 1998:10). *Put differently, international political relations in the Third World to a substantial extent are personal international relations.*[10] This has obvious implications for the way in which refugees can become embroiled in politico-economic conflicts. When conceptualising the matter as one of trans-nationally organised politico-economic networks, cross-border violence and internal conflict in the host country involving refugees can be analysed within the same framework.

That is, refugee-related violence must be analysed in the context of the (trans-national) societal environment it occurs in. I propose to employ terms derived from modernisation theory to analyse how refugees react in a given societal environment. As stated above, societal links can be distinguished using the distinction between modern and traditional modes of *Vergesellschaftung*. On the political level, the distinction corresponds to the idealtypical difference between legal-bureaucratic forms of administration and patrimonial forms of rule (cf. Weber 1976:124). Refugees will try to improve their social status in the host country. Upward social mobility in Third World countries often is closely connected to employment in the public sector. Under conditions of bureaucratic rule, employment is dependent on qualification (ibid:127). The staff is free from personal loyalty to the ruler, administers according to legal-rational principles (*sachliche Amtspflicht*) and receives regular salaries (ibid:126f). Under patrimonial conditions, integration into the administration is dependent on personal loyalty to the ruler, while the ruler has to confer reciprocal privileges to his staff (ibid:130-133). As the control of the use of force is considered to be the core of politics, stabilisation of military authority is a key aspect of rule, and the most important resource refugee-warriors can offer to rulers is violence, that aspect needs further consideration. A key patrimonial strategy to consolidate military authority has historically been to rely on strangers ("*Stammfremde*" and "*Religionsfremde*") because these are most likely to totally depend on the ruler and have few opportunities to establish relations with his rivals (Weber 1956:595-598).

Economically, the distinction translates into that between market transactions and subsistence reproduction (cf. Marx 1987:49-70). Idealtypically, refugees can integrate into host

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[9] In this paper, the term is not employed in its classical sense, i.e. a military regime, a democratic one etc. Here, it is defined as the elite network governing a given country, yet it is broader than the term government as the *regime* includes those military, economic or other elites integral to the organisation of state authority.

[10] Bayart's (1993) notion of a trans-national African hegemonic bloc deeply divided into factions competing for power and economic opportunities is an excellent attempt to put the phenomenon into theoretical perspective. As he demonstrates, the emergence of the hegemonic bloc is intrinsically linked to modernisation processes, yet, at least for the time being, it is primarily structured according to the personal/traditional principle.

country systems of economic reproduction by selling their labour or commodities (possibly acquired in the home country and thus constituting trans-border links), or enter into traditional mechanisms of land distribution which allow them to engage in subsistence farming.

On the symbolical level, the distinction corresponds to that between amendable codified law as the basis of *Wertrationalität* and *zweckrational* defined interests on the one hand and a subjectively ontological *Wertrationalität* based on customary norms on the other (cf. Jung 1995:130-134+143-146). Codified law is based on the entity of the state, i.e. national law is exercised within a state territory and international law essentially regulates relations between states. Idealtypical modern in-groups expressing a common identity, no matter whether located within a state territory or stretching across boundaries, base that identity on common *zweckrationale* interests of the individuals constituting it. Concerning refugees, this means they can integrate into host country groups by virtue of common individual interests. Traditional in-groups are subjectively based on custom and experienced as being naturally united through consanguinity, a common history and common fate (cf. Weber 1976:130, ibid. 2001:168). Typically, a belief in common descend constitutes the personal principle unifying the group. The notion of group rights and a group interest is closely connected to the notion of an organic community of common fate. Customary worldviews may stretch across international boundaries while not necessarily being accepted on the whole state territory. That is, refugees may integrate into host country communities by virtue of a shared belief in a common fate and/or a common group interest. Host communities thus reinforced may regard refugees a resource strengthening the in-group in domestic or local conflicts (cf. Harrell-Bond 1986:336).

When it comes to explaining political alliances of host country forces with refugee actors I consider political interests in power accumulation, or, from a regime point of view security, to be decisive.[11] Yet, the three dimensions are closely interwoven. Political authority has to be ideologically legitimised and underpinned by economic resources. Same as rivalries for economic opportunities, the struggle for internal symbolic hegemony is directly linked to power struggles between elites, between clientelistic networks, between segments

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[11] The notion of "security" may be useful to capture regime motivations for actions in the fields of both internal and external relations. Security can be conceptualised as military security, economic security and cultural self-determination. Generally, in Third World states, security is primarily internal security. Given that state and regime are hardly differentiated in strongly personalised political settings, governments there tend to equate security with regime security (cf. Ayoob 1995:7-9). Military power is thus essentially a safeguard against internal rivals, the most important unit of economic accumulation is the regime rather than the national economy, and cultural threats take on the form of threats to a regime's ideological basis. We can assume that regimes try to defend or maximise their control of military, economic and ideological power resources. This is obviously the case in domestic power struggles, yet these often have transnational repercussions. Analysis in chapter 2.2 suggests that in a Third World context, foreign regimes are primarily considered a threat because they are perceived as strengthening domestic rivals or as weakening the regime in place.

of the population, and between states. As I will argue, refugee-warriors are most likely to become a security problem when the character of relations between host country forces and collective refugee actors approaches the informal, personal edge of the continuum, while strategic, *zweckrationale* interests in accumulation or preservation of acutely threatened power motivate establishing such relations. I will later demonstrate in detail how and why these links are established (see 2.2).

In the following section I will explore how refugees are integrated into an order of war. By doing so, I will also show how refugees relate to causes of war. The presentation of the societal order is structured according to the three elementary functions which analytically structure the war system. The system of reproduction is not static but subject to transformations as captured in the "grammar of war". The following description shall take account of that dynamic character by presenting the build-up of contradictions and the creation of armed refugee organisations as two interrelated but separate developments.

1.1 Refugees and Political Reproduction

In reference to Elias, the political is functionally defined, i.e. the control of the use of force is at the heart of politics (cf. Jung 1995:91). The entity within which the exercise of violence is subject to internal control is called *unit of survival (Überlebenseinheit)* (cf. Elias 1983). Political contradictions can become manifest in a variety of ways. In the present case, one dimension is particularly important: the contradiction between those included in a unit of survival having significant control over the means of violence in a given territory, and those excluded. Historically, i.e. before the war, the contradiction did not necessarily exist, or its effects were mitigated. Those individuals and collective entities now excluded once enjoyed the protection of the state, nowadays the typical unit of survival.

The outbreak of internal war can usually be traced back to contradictions based on differences concerning access to privatised public goods (patronage). Access is closely connected to holding or being withheld posts in the government and the administration (cf. Schlichte 1998). In the course of the war contradictions between those included and those excluded are sharpened, as the most essential public good, security, is privatised, or at least the circle of people benefiting from generalised security is severely restricted (Reno 2000:46f). Refugees typically have lost access to the provision of security, i.e. neither the state nor customary or new, war-typical institutions (warlord armies, protection rackets etc.) can or want to guarantee security to a degree deemed acceptable by the population. Most contemporary internal wars are characterised by high levels of violence against civilians, creating a new contradiction between those relatively secure and those constantly threatened. That violence is often strategi-   strategically employed by elites. Violence is

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a decisive moment in societal reconfiguration and frequently serves identifiable interests. The depopulation of an area in an attempt to get rid of (often ethnically defined) groups perceived as sympathetic to the adversary indeed is a major cause of contemporary refugee movements. However, flight is not necessarily intended, and violence can be explained as politically instrumental in several ways. It destroys social structures which could be co-opted by the enemy or could serve as a base for local resistance,[12] and provokes civilians whose bases of economic and political reproduction was destroyed to seek the ruler's personal favour in order to be granted security (Reno 2000:46f). Irrespective of the motives, generalised violence sharpens societal contradictions, i.e. it transforms into contradictions between those "elevated above the law" and those "falling below it" (Keen 2000:31), or more generally into those included and those excluded. Flight is then a turning point at which these distinctions find their geographical expression.

The use of force does not remain as unstructured as a generalisation of violence implies. It tends to build clusters, or, put differently, people who have lost access to basic security will either die or will reorganise themselves in order to establish security.[13]

We can distinguish three ways in which people try to re-establish security: by creating their own militias, by becoming affiliated with one of the warring parties, or by seeking the protection of a foreign state. These solutions are not mutually exclusive and may even coincide. If the option of seeking the protection of a foreign state is not realised or complemented by one of the other solutions, the contradiction finds an organisational expression and transforms into one between different actors – refugee warriors and their opponents – competing for control over people, territory, economic opportunities etc. The contradiction then translates into conflict between different clusters of authority.

Internally displaced persons (IDP) share essential features with refugees yet have not demanded the protection of a foreign state. In order to re-establish security, IDP have to either seek the protection of one of the existing warring parties or set up their own militias which most likely become party to the conflict. Warring parties may seek such an affiliation because it allows them to control the civilian population and, in some cases, to exploit

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[12] In internal wars, the difference between civilian and military structures is blurred. Civilian structures may serve as channels for communication, provide material resources and provide hiding places for combatants.

[13] In a study on political mobilisation of refugees in Central America taking into account political, economic and symbolic motives, Hammond identified the feeling of being threatened as the most important motivation for establishing political organisations (Hammond 1993). Similarly, the Sierra Leonena Kamajor militia which became a major actor in the country's civil war first was established as a defence force of displaced civilians (Muana 1997).

IDP labour.[14] Whether this option is viable is essentially a question of resources linking the civilian population to the main actors. These resources are partly symbolic in nature, i.e. when the population has effectively become divided into clearly demarcated blocks during the build-up and the course of war, IDP are likely to become affiliated with one of the warring parties, this being the most cost-effective way to become secure.[15] Yet these symbolic resources have to be complemented by material resources which the warring parties must mobilise. Freedom from direct violence is of little use when material conditions are equally life-threatening. Material resources supporting IDP are regularly provided by the international community, while local actors exercise control on the spot. Governments, who can market resources such as state sovereignty not available to insurgents,[16] have a relative advantage: control over IDP-camps largely is a government affair.[17] In contrast, rebel groups tend to rely on refugee camps, which are supported to a greater extent by the international community and control over which is often *not* challenged by another actor, i.e. the host government.

Refugees have demanded the protection of another state, an authority not necessarily directly involved in the conflict. Flight may constitute an exit option enabling people to be protected without having to resort to one of the parties in conflict or to constitute militia which become party to the conflict. The exit option allows re-establishing a livelihood in a new social setting. That is, flight may represent a breach with the order of war, effectively weakening its dynamics.

Yet, upon arrival in the host country the contradiction between nationals and refugees is created. Although refugees might and often do become informally integrated, they are almost never formally considered legitimate inhabitants of the host country.[18] By host gov-

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[14] Relations between armed actors and civilians do not need to be harmonious, but even slavery-like relations most often confer notable security. The situation in Sudan may be an example (cf. Stewart/Samman 2001:175).

[15] These symbolic resources can be understood as *social* capital, i.e. values that demand solidarity (cf. Hunout et al 2003). When people feel that they "belong to" an insurgent group for certain (e.g. ethnic) reasons, this constitutes social capital. State leaders may nevertheless feel that these people are part of the nation, which equally constitutes social capital.

[16] On sovereignty as a resource cf. Reno 1998:18-24, 2000.

[17] As humanitarian organisations increasingly delivered into rebel-held territories since the 1990s, that tendency has become less pronounced.

[18] This constitutes an important deviation from experiences in patrimonial Europe. Then, the civilian population was probably even more than nowadays the main target of violence, but people fleeing were most often considered **an asset** by neighbouring rulers. Today, there is considerable evidence that in many respects, Third World countries are under-populated. The debate on regional integration in order to compensate for small domestic markets perfectly illustrates the point. Natural population growth has the disadvantage that children need considerable investment before they become productive. At current population growth rates of 2 to 3 percent, investment per child almost automatically becomes too small for these to engage in modern, entrepreneurial economies successfully, while overall investment in children still represents a considerable constraint on adults' ability to invest in economic activities. Apparently, growth through refugee immigration has some advantages compared to natural growth. Yet, in political econo-

ernments and refugees alike, exile is considered a temporary condition, after which "normal" life in the home country will resume. Refugees are, however, subject to the host government. In their perspective, they find themselves at the bottom of the social ladder, the political side being only one aspect. Refugees often feel that the exclusive political structure of the home country is reproduced in the host country (cf. Malkki 1995:116-119). Governments are hardly inclined to spend their patronage on people politically marginal, and will instead try to profit from humanitarian resources and occasionally from refugee labour. Even where cultural links to the host population exist, rural refugees most often do not form an integral part of the local communities, which are usually organised on a village level. In order to integrate, refugees usually enter a hierarchical patron-client relationship with locals (cf. Harrell-Bond 1986:352-354).[19] Even when integrated in such a way for decades (and in many instances for generations), refugees typically constitute a social category apart, situated at the end of the hierarchy structuring indigenous groupings. But even this status is threatened, as they are continually considered outsiders, and might face expulsion in case of intensifying political conflict. In essence, the refugee status represents a substantial demotion compared to habitual life as far as access to patronage, political authorities and participation in (local) decision-making are concerned. Refugees will try to improve their social position in the host country. The more social ascendancy is blocked, the more expectations remain centred on return to the home country and the resumption of habitual life.[20] This often seems to depend on political change in the country of origin, change which is already pursued by violent means. Refugees may therefore consider supporting one of the warring parties an appropriate response to their situation.

So far, the analysis has focused on contradictions, i.e. the sharpening of an excluded-included divide, and the partial integration into host country political reproduction tending to uphold that divide. Yet in order to translate into violent conflict, contradictions have to translate into organisational capacities. Typical refugee situations facilitate establishing and maintaining rebel organisations. The institution of the refugee camp itself is a major causal factor. Typically, traditional power holders lose authority in refugee situations, as the foundations of that authority are unravelled (cf. Harrell-Bond 1986:259). Camps usu-

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mies which largely centre on competition for patronage, additional people are rationally perceived a liability. The contemporary challenges to integration are therefore totally different from those in times of patrimonial Europe. Rather than the humanitarian system (cf. Luttwak 1997) it is the nature of contemporary Third World political economies which is the main hindrance to absorption of refugees into their host states' societies.

[19] That relationship is as much political as it is economic. The national patron binds the refugee, guarantees the refugee's social integrity to the host community, and the relationship thus constitutes a means of control. At the same time, the patron is the vehicle allowing refugees to integrate into local mechanisms of land distribution.

[20] The difference between Palestinians in Lebanon (cf. Nasrallah 1997) and in Jordan (cf. Viorst 1989) perfectly illustrates this point.

ally have their own local administration being run by refugees.[21] Armed factions are often well represented or control this camp administration, or they assume informal positions of influence in camps. They do so because they are often the best-organised authority representing the refugee population, although threats of violence often compensate for a lack of legitimacy. The organisational capacities these groups demonstrate often make them the primary partners of humanitarian organisations for the distribution of supplies during the emergency phase. When the host government does not take action against the rebels, they acquire a position hard to challenge later on (cf. Jacobsen 2000). Humanitarian organisations are likely to give in to threats of violence, rather than to withdraw. Humanitarian resources are often helpful in extending insurgents' contacts and control far beyond the camps, as access to dispersed self-settling refugees is facilitated through humanitarian efforts. Furthermore, refugee camps are an ideal environment for recruitment and mobilisation. As camps concentrate large numbers of people habitually living in rather small communities dispersed over a wider territory, access to and communication with these people is drastically facilitated. In turn, refugees interested in recruitment find it much easier to contact the armed parties. Not least, secure rear bases which refugee camps can provide are important for sustaining a combatant organisation.

In order for refugee camps to be a secure rear base enabling refugee insurgents to stabilise organisationally, the host country government has to tolerate the rebels' activity (Adelmann 1998, Rufin 1999:20). Refugee camps further organisational capacities of insurgents, but camps are structures relatively easy to control for host governments (cf. Harrell-Bond 1986:9, cf. Malkki 1995). In most cases, host governments could thus prevent refugee warrior organisations from being consolidated on their territory. Refugee-warriors will try to evolve from their vulnerable status and establish a sort of patron-client relationship. Rulers are valued patrons as they command important resources related to internationally recognised sovereignty. Occasionally, host country dissidents may be more promising patrons. The nature of political, economic, ideological or ethnic trans-border links established before the refugee influx may make relations with the opposition more likely than relations with the government. Yet the government is usually stronger than its rivals. Links to oppositional forces are likely to complicate refugee conditions, e.g. provoke restrictions on movement. Refugees who become a relevant threat to the established regime are likely to face expulsion. Links to opposition actors therefore tend to be unsustainable and are rare.

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[21] These camp administrations provide an interlocutor for humanitarian bodies and host state authorities. They are established whenever host state authorities allow for an independent refugee representation. Particularly in the Middle East this has not been the case. In these cases, informal refugee bodies often provide an interlocutor.

In case an opposition is strong enough to keep a regime in check, refugees may nevertheless be a valued resource for opposition forces trying to raise their profile.

In order to be appreciated as clients, refugees have to offer benefits to patrons. The most important resource they can offer is violence. Regimes presiding over countries with an already strongly de-institutionalised security sector are most likely to integrate refugees into their security apparatus. Integrating refugees presents advantages over integrating nationals, as their weak standing in the host country makes them depend on the ruler and they are unlikely to turn against him. Refugees may be integrated in order to police border areas, weaken a neighbour perceived as threatening, serve as a reserve force, or be directly employed against domestic dissidents (see 2.2).

Despite the institution of the camp furthering the political organisation of refugees, in the absence of links to host country national or local elites, refugees remain weak actors. Although multiple political, economic and symbolic contradictions may separate nationals and refugees, refugee situations rarely lead to armed confrontations between nationals and refugees (see 2.1) because the latter are too weak to engage in confrontations. Refugees will usually rather starve to death than acquire means of subsistence by force,[22] and when hostilities take place it is usually in the form of weakly organised, sporadic clashes. Changing the situation in the home country by means of violence is a more realistic solution to refugees' problems than confrontations with nationals. The possibility to maintain combatant organisations largely depends on links with the host country government, yet these links make it unlikely that these fighting capacities are employed to combat local groups. Hostilities will occur on a greater scale only when links established with elites empower refugees to fight national groups. This is typically the case when refugee groups are employed to administer a peripheral region on behalf of a weak government.[23] Generally, refugees need relations with host country forces in order to become strong enough to engage in political confrontations against the home country as well as in the host country.

As has been argued, refugees flee because of violence which either directly or indirectly, i.e. through the destruction of means of material reproduction, "created an actual or imagined environment of complete physical insecurity" (Bariagaber 1995:219). That violence is partly politically and – as will be shown in the following section - economically instrumental to the perpetrators, and often the flight of its victims is intended. Yet flight of its adversaries not only relieves one party of political and economic threats to its position, but also sharpens societal contradictions, i.e. constitutes a geographically manifested included-

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[22] Harrell-Bond provides some accounts (cf. Harrell-Bond 1986:118f).
[23] The situations in the Pakistani Sindh province and in the Gambella region of Ethiopia, where the Sudan's People Liberation Army (SPLA) had been employed to informally control the autochthon population, are examples.

excluded divide. This sharpening of contradictions furthers the cohesion of the fleeing party. Furthermore, the prospect of political and economical organisation abroad strengthens its organisational capacities. That is, flight also furthers the aims of the weaker, fleeing combatant organisation, and may be in its immediate interest. Hence, not all refugee flows can be attributed to actual violence against civilians. Where the advantages of exile, i.e. the fact that flight and particularly the concentration of people in refugee camps reinforce organisational capacities of insurgent groups, are recognised by elites, the latter may encourage or even organise the flight of their basis.

Such flight typically takes place in an environment of real or imagined relative insecurity. Techniques used by armed actors to promote the emigration of their own social basis are generally less violent than those used against opponents. They consist of raising fear of the enemy, of promising security, and in some cases of direct pressure.[24] Such an organised emigration seems to depend on several factors. Firstly, links between elites and their basis have to be relatively strong. Elites may feel some kind of responsibility for their basis, or at least feel that loss of civil support would diminish their strength. In turn, the civilian population must retain some kind of confidence in its leaders and feel connected to them to follow them into exile. Secondly, the fleeing armed group must be relatively weak or on the retreat in its home country. Its organisational network is in danger, and control of the population will be lost, while eventually that population might become accustomed to alternative rulers. Thirdly, it can count on a sympathetic reception in a neighbouring country, as hiding in a familiar environment is still easier than challenging a foreign government determined to control armed elements among the refugee population.

1.2   Refugees and Material Reproduction

The economy of Third World societies is characterised by the simultaneous existence of two qualitatively different modes of reproduction: subsistence production and market-oriented commodity production. In most Third World states, the majority of the population lives in rural settings. Particularly in Africa and the Middle East, the rural population essentially ensures material reproduction through subsistence agriculture and livestock farming, with only small portions of the produce being marketed. In Latin America and large parts of Asia, agriculture is comparatively more capitalised, land tenure is more concentrated and rural wage labour relations are consequently more pronounced, although subsistence production is often still crucial. Even where subsistence production is dominant, the modern economy has had large impacts on rural material reproduction. Profits accruing to

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[24] The flight of Palestinians during and after the war of 1948 and the flight of Rwandan Hutu in 1994 are illustrative cases.

elites from world market transactions (and international development cooperation) are re-distributed downwards through clientage networks, and have become an integral part of rural economic reproduction.

Immediate pre-war and war situations are characterised by a cutback of patronage networks, motivated by elites' interests in optimising the cost-benefit ratio of the network (Reno 1998:15-44). This process may take place on both an economic and a security level. The first dimension refers to a minimisation of cost, i.e. excluding less important elites from access to patronage and dissolving relatively expensive and unrewarding services such as education and health (cf. Reno 1998:22). The second one refers to the destruction of sources of revenue of little use to rulers in order to prevent resources from being used to mobilise resistance and in order to make civilians depend on the ruler's patronage (cf. Reno 2000:47). Minimisation of costs implies a sharpening of intra-elite contradictions and is directly related to the outbreak of war. Frequently, it is elites excluded from patronage networks in the process of cost cutting who mobilise an armed opposition (Keen 2000:24). Yet, the most important sharpening of economic contradictions concerning the ordinary population is associated with the withdrawal of security. Once armed confrontations have begun, both sides will try to undermine the economic basis of the enemy and try to mobilise additional revenue. Pillage is one of several possible means, but the monopolisation of trade connections through chasing away or assassinating rivals, the acquisition of land and territories by expulsing its inhabitants, and the recrudescence of slavery-like labour relations basically follow the same logic (cf. Keen 2000:29f). The ensuing economic transformations imply gains for a few and losses for the majority. Those who lose, lose a position in trade, access to revenue accumulation, state patronage and, at the bottom of the socio-economic order, the land ensuring their subsistence. They will then populate refugee camps, try to become winners, try to change the economic order of war, or do all this at once. The point to be made here is that violence to a large extent is economically instrumental while sharpening societal contradictions, i.e. creating an excluded-included divide on the economic level similar to that on the political level. The resulting economic order inherently uproots civilians and incites them to either try to change that order (likely by violent means), to successfully integrate into it, thereby perpetuating the cycle of violence, and/or escape from it.

As has been demonstrated, the circumstances under which flight occurs are inextricably linked to economic losses. Flight then implies further losses, as outward migration demands the mobilisation of revenue. Armed groupings are likely to demand passage money on their way and, ultimately, exit money on the border. Upon arrival, an asset transfer to locals in the host country is characteristic for refugee situations (Duffield 1994). Often, refugees have to sell what is left of their belongings. Locals benefit, as they can ac-

quire household items, agricultural tools and other goods much cheaper than they would be on the local market. Refugees are very often partly compensated later through humanitarian programmes, but that compensation is restricted to the most basic items, e.g. essential agricultural tools. Essentially, a contradiction in the host country between those owning capital goods and those only able to sell their labour is created.

Material reproduction in the receiving country is essentially achieved in four different ways: dependence on humanitarian rents, traditional agrarian subsistence production, modern agrarian wage labour, and (mostly urban) informal sector activities. Employment in the formal sector and criminality are additional but less central ways to ensure subsistence.

Firstly, concerning humanitarian aid, despite many deficiencies the international humanitarian system represents a fairly effective and reliable source of support hardly imaginable only 50 years ago. There are essentially two types of refugee assistance: handouts of essential goods, and development assistance aimed at promoting self-sufficiency. If host country conditions are conducive to economic integration, handouts tend to be phased out rapidly and humanitarian organisations shift to development assistance (cf. UNHCR 2001a:1-12).[25] The discussion about humanitarian refugee aid in war economies has focussed on handouts, while other, entrepreneurial forms of economic reproduction have been grossly neglected, although these frequently seem to fund voluntary contributions to insurgents or may even be taxed by these.[26]

Refugee income and particularly humanitarian resources may be acquired by insurgents by looting refugee camps and villages, but non-violent ways to appropriate handouts seem to be much more important. Handouts are distributed in various ways. Nowadays, NGOs delivering supplies to registered individuals or heads of families is the standard practice, but organisational structures of the refugees, be it customary ones or those established by rebel groups, are still employed for purposes of distribution. The latter way of distribution offers the best opportunities for a diversion of aid. Armed movements distributing humanitarian aid acquire positions as patrons. Aid then empowers these actors and confers to them a degree of legitimacy. Even in the best of cases, distribution through third parties on the basis of individual registration, these actors can still profit, either by registering combatants as refugees, through support by registered family members, or through taxation of civilian

[25] For instance, in some localities in Guinea food aid was phased out after less than a year after arrival.
[26] As the issue has been neglected so far, there is little firm evidence. The Palestinian case (cf. Viorst 1989), observations by Malkki (1995) and Harrell-Bond (1986:61) as well as the situation in Guinea-Bissau's unassisted refugee villages inhabited by Senegalese indicate that refugee resources supporting insurgents are not necessarily derived from humanitarian aid. In the Senegalese case, the refugee villages were of great strategic importance to the rebels frequently retreating there. The insurgents seemed to be hosted and cared for by civilian relatives (Evans, pers. comm.), thus received resources, but occasionally reciprocated by providing doe meat and fruits acquired in Senegal to the villagers (Evans 2003:16).

refugees. Generally, refugee figures are estimated to be more or less grossly inflated, and comparatively mobile members of armed movements are able to apply several times for registration. Humanitarian organisations regularly try to start re-registration exercises. At times, these are obstructed by threats or actual violence by armed actors. As many civilian refugees profit from being registered several times as well, the ability to obstruct a re-registration exercise confers legitimacy to these very actors. Yet, handouts typically consist of items of little value, and even in the case of grossly inflated figures, the overall value of diverted goods most likely is small (Shearer 2000). For humanitarian assistance to be militarily significant, armed movements have to control distribution at the highest stage, or they have to be organisationally strong enough to establish a comprehensive system of taxation of refugees.[27] The latter is effectively a matter of the legitimacy of these rebel groups and their ability to coerce, the latter being strongly dependent on the attitude of the host state. If revenues are acquired by taxing refugees, it is of little importance whether refugees ensure their subsistence through handouts or economic activity: in both cases, the surplus that can accrue to combatants is rather small. In essence, humanitarian aid can and often does further the organisational capacities of insurgents. Yet, the mere fact that refugees can enjoy security allowing them to stay alive and engage in economic activities may similarly sustain combatant organisations.

Humanitarian aid to refugees is largely a rural affair,[28] and generally the rural population in Third World countries is the poorest segment of these societies. The rent accruing to refugees may cause jealousy and locals may demand that they be served equally (cf. Harrell-Bond 1986:24, Klingebiel et al. 2000). In order to attract aid, locals may – often effectively - put pressure on refugees, e.g. prevent them from leaving the camps or rob them, possibly sparking clashes. Social distance between refugees and locals as well as the perception that the local population is negatively affected by the refugees' presence increase the probability of such attitudes.[29] These situations require sensitive handling by humanitarian organisations, yet we cannot consider them an expression of manifest societal contradictions, as ultimately the rent accruing to locals is dependent on the presence of the refugees and the former therefore have or develop an interest in the latter's continued stay. However, as

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[27] For example, Rwandan armed Hutu elements in Zaire taxed both humanitarian and other revenues (Reyntjens 1999:19). Fully self-sufficient refugees may be similarly be taxed (on the Burundian Hutu refugees in Tanzania cf. Malkki 1995:130).

[28] For reasons of cost reduction, only few refugees falling into the designated category of "urban refugees" are entitled to UNHCR assistance in cities. The category includes only those refugees of urban background judged to be unable to integrate into rural life. As well, host governments frequently ban refugees from cities and confine them to camp areas.

[29] Social distance can be defined as the absence of social capital, i.e. the absence of values demanding solidarity (cf. Hunout et al 2003).

humanitarian organisations often cannot transfer refugees to alternative sites, locals have considerable leverage.

Secondly, most refugees engage in agriculture, either being self-sufficient or complementing humanitarian assistance with their own produce. Refugees engaging in subsistence farming usually have to negotiate access to land with locals.[30] Cultural similarities considerably facilitate negotiations, but are not necessary and frequently not sufficient for being granted land. Frequently, locals' material interests are furthered by temporarily allocating land to refugees. Humanitarian organisations regularly assume the position of an intermediary, offering the local population benefits in exchange for granting the refugees access to land. Alternatively or complementarily, locals may allocate undeveloped land to have it cleared by refugees and then retake it (cf. Harrell-Bond 1986:157f, Black/Sessay 1997). Locals generally maintain control over land resources. Refugees may resent locals' attitudes and the position they assume in relations with them, which regularly is an effective social demotion. Refugees are however unlikely to confront those they directly have to relate with because of interdependencies and their lack of conflict capacities. Instead, they might increase fighting capacities of local groups they are aligning with, thus becoming involved in and catalysing conflict between domestic actors (cf. Harrell-Bond 1986:336). In these cases, refugees typically are allocated undeveloped land claimed not only by their patrons but by neighbouring groups as well. As the community granting the land–rather than the refugees–thereby consolidates the land claim, this can exacerbate latent tensions. Concerning other interests of locals, a refugee influx regularly leads to an upsurge in demand and consequently higher prices for essential goods. Two numerically important strata of the population - peasants and traders - profit. Rather than creating land pressure disadvantaging locals, the refugee presence can thus benefit peasant interests.

Generally, rural integration, particularly into systems of subsistence production, is best possible where cultural similarities are pronounced. This is most likely the case in regions bordering the home country. At the same time, contact to rebel groups is particularly easy in these regions, and refugees often voluntarily supply shelter to armed groups retreating across the border. In other cases, guerrillas cross the border to plunder refugee villages. Consequently there is a dilemma: Where integration into the receiving country and its economy is most likely, the support of armed movements through refugee resources is also most likely.[31] In order *not to support* a war economy it may be logical to relocate refugees

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[30] As well, the state may allocate land, but this typically seems to be the case in remote, sparsely populated regions, were land conflicts are least likely to arise. As well, local authorities often mediate between refugees and nationals, but tend to let the latter decide (cf. Harrell-Bond 1986:157f).

[31] The situations on the Senegalese-Guinean (Bissau) border (cf. Evans 2003) and in Guinea are examples.

into the interior of a receiving country, where they are more likely to relate uneasily to the local population and to depend on humanitarian handouts.

Thirdly, refugees engage in agrarian wage labour.[32] Capacities for the integration of strangers into traditional systems of land distribution are limited, particularly where land ownership is concentrated and agriculture is relatively capitalised, and flight creates what Marx called the "*doppelt freien Arbeiter*" and considered a precondition for capitalist economic activity (Marx 1987:183+742). Refugees are typically free from traditional personal relations of dependency governing the use of their labour, and they are free from the means necessary to ensure their subsistence. Consequently, a refugee influx regularly leads to a sharp increase in rural wage labour relations. They are often employed by local small-scale farmers, but also by plantation holders. These rural wage labour relations tend to be informal, legal protection is precarious, traditional rules of behaviour are less binding where strangers are concerned, and degrees of exploitation tend to be high. The contradiction is thus a modern one between capital and labour, yet it tends to be mitigated because of interdependency. The modern contradiction may combine with the traditional one, and both may be mutually reinforcing. Competition for jobs may cause hostility between national rural labourers and refugees. The competition may however be mitigated, as refugee demand for goods often creates a demand for additional labour.

The fourth way in which significant numbers of refugees try to ensure their subsistence is work in the urban, informal sector. Generally, this sector is in no way an island of free market forces but is strongly protected by informal means, e.g. ethnic relations and political connections (Altmann 1991:10). If ethnic or other connections allow for it, refugees may be able to integrate into the sector, possibly increasing conflicts between domestic actors.[33] Often, they have to confine themselves to a few niches and are likely to face political or other sanctions if they do not.[34] Typically, the informal sector agents rivalling with refugees are those who have little (organised) power themselves. A lack of organisational capacities on both sides implies that rivalries will not transform into organised conflict. Refugees may have advantages in some sectors, e.g. they may bring with them re-

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[32] Refugees may as well engage in non-agrarian wage labour and these labour relations do have much in common with those described in this paragraph, but as most refugee camps are situated in rather remote, rural regions, agrarian labour dominates. Arrangements such as in Lebanon, where refugee camps were deliberately put up near cities in order to provide labour for factories (cf. Hudson 1997) seem to be an exception.

[33] This seems to be the case with Pashtun drug trafficking networks operating in the Pakistani-Afghan border area (cf. Gantzel/Schwinghammer 1995:R210f).

[34] For instance, Harrell-Bond (1986:339) attributed the growing tendency of confining refugees in Sudan to camps to the threat these posed to networks controlling the informal commercial sector. Similarly, competition for the control of informal trade apparently constituted the background to the closure of Kenya's coastal refugee camps and the relocation of refugees to the Dadaab and Kakuma areas (cf. Crisp 2000:62f).

quired skills which are in short supply in the receiving country. Then they may be able to dominate some little competitive segments of the informal sector. A sector refugees typically are well positioned in is cross-border trade with the home country. Host country interests very often have considerable difficulties to penetrate the home country war economy, and the connections refugees have can make them an attractive partner for nationals. Interests in trade may explain alliances between host country elites and refugee insurgents. That cross-border trade typically integrates into the war economy, as insurgents may directly conduct trade or tax activities of civilian refugees (cf. Harrell-Bond 1986:120). In essence, violence is unlikely to arise as a result of informal sector competition between nationals and refugees, as nationals have other, more effective means to promote their interests.

Fifthly, refugees may partake in economic reproduction in the formal sector of a host country. This is essentially a long-term development, as exceptionally few refugees will integrate into the sector. The public sector, by far the most important employer for skilled labour in most Third World countries, is often a vehicle for distributing patronage, and refugees consequently have few chances to integrate. Humanitarian efforts considerably increase the possibility for refugees, as compared to locals, to receive education. Where conventional ways to realise self-sufficiency are blocked, for instance if refugees do not get sufficient access to land, humanitarian organisations may emphasise education as a way of becoming self-sufficient. Long-term refugee populations may become better educated on average than nationals,[35] be consequently perceived as privileged and may face hostility. Even where refugees succeed to integrate, they may continue to seek employment in their home countries, particularly when in the host country opposition to foreigners being employed in the formal sector is pronounced and their status appears insecure.[36] They may thus opt for supporting an armed return, reasoning that they would be rewarded with a public sector position in their home country.

Finally, crime as a way of reproduction is important because it is likely to become a focal point of resentment against refugees and most likely the immediate cause of clashes (Mehler 2000:38f). The humanitarian system generally does not perform too badly, and it is no exception that refugees are materially better off than the locals, and have better access to medical care and schooling. But it only provides for basic care, and refugee situations

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[35] Rwandan refugees in Uganda and Palestinian refugees are examples.

[36] In contrast to refugees in Uganda, Palestinians in high-ranking positions in Middle Eastern host countries did not support armed groups because of their vulnerable status but rather because of a nationalist ideology particularly pronounced among modern elites and strongly supported by the host countries. Yet, as will be shown later, the imposition of that ideology is closely connected to the societal transformations refugee existence represents, including the institution of refugee camps and education provided by humanitarian organisations.

offer few perspectives for the people to improve their social status. Refugees usually dispose of little material, social and cultural capital in exile,[37] and consequently conventional ways to improve their situation are blocked or at least less open to them. This social anomie typically coincides with a breakdown of mechanisms of social control.[38] That breakdown is represented by the erosion of customary authority in refugee situations and a lack of norms prescribing how to relate to the new neighbours. Crime against locals is not necessarily socially sanctioned within the refugee community. Crime may be adopted as a fairly accessible–and in situations of war fairly established and therefore obvious–means of improving ones economic situation. Yet, crime rarely leads to persistent violent conflict between locals and refugees, but rather to sporadic clashes in which locals prevail. Locals are usually better protected by security forces.[39] Where the state fails to organise security, people organise it themselves. In regions where a monopoly on the use of force does not exist, locals have the same opportunities to acquire weapons as armed elements among the refugee population, and should the need arise a market for weapons will develop. Local militias usually have advantages over foreign ones. Being more familiar with the territory and the people, they are able to monitor activities in their territory. Where divisions between locals and refugees are pronounced, the refugees' movements can often be effectively controlled.[40] In extreme cases, locals or state authorities may confine refugees to camps or even expel them. In contrast, crime can become endemic and may resemble low-level conflict where local groups and refugee elements engage in crime together.[41] Refugees may have ethnic or other ties to locals, who in turn may have little common ground with other domestic groups. Refugees then can import crime, as they come from an environment in which they have "learned" that it is often an effective way to fulfil aspirations

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[37] Material capital means capital in the conventional sense, i.e. accumulated values. Here, social capital designates contacts that can be employed for economic purposes, while cultural capital means the know-how necessary to engage successfully in economic activities in a given socio-cultural environment.

[38] The term social anomie as employed here designates a situation in which aspirations do not correspond with means necessary to fulfil aspirations (cf. Durkheim 1990, Merton 1979).

[39] As in Sudan, for instance, authorities may react drastically and indiscriminately arrest large numbers of refugees (cf. Harrell-Bond 1986:62). Such arrests do not conform with Western standards of human rights, but are nevertheless often effective against crime.

[40] The difference between the situation in the Dadaab- (see footnote below) and in the Kakuma-area of Kenya is most interesting. Although sharing the effective absence of state control with Dadaab, in contrast to the situation there, in Kakuma locals rarely fall victim to criminal acts by refugees, while refugees are frequently robbed by locals or other refugees (Crisp 2000). The main difference between the two localities seems to be that the social distance between the Sudanese refugees and locals is considerable in Kakuma, while in Dadaab, refugees and locals of Somali ethnicity intermingle.

[41] As is the case in the area of the Somali-populated Dadaab-camps in Kenya (cf. Crisp 2000) and–less drastically–in the Kagera-region in Tanzania (cf. Klingebiel et al. 2000).

and in which a market for weapons has already been developed.[42] These market connections can then be extended into the refugee-populated area.

1.3   Refugees and Symbolic Reproduction

As means of symbolic reproduction we designate those paradigms, world views, systems of thought etc. through which people analyse, interpret and experience their livelihoods (cf. Jung 1995:99f). These means of symbolic reproduction are collective and make possible a commonly shared understanding of a given situation. In conflicts, symbolic reproduction conventionally appears as ideology. Rather than causing conflicts, ideologies serve as a means to express contradictions situated in the other dimensions of societal reproduction (cf. Siegelberg 1994). That does not mean that symbolic reproduction is irrelevant. The difference in worldviews etc. may explain why sharp economic and political contradictions lead to war in one case but do not in the other. Finally, it is means of symbolic reproduction which actors use to interpret their situation and enable them to conclude that violence must or should be employed to change the status quo (or to oppose changes in it). Yet symbolic reproduction is not static. Although it is assumed to be changing rather slowly compared to the other two dimensions of societal reproduction, immediately before and during situations of armed conflict, changes (situated on the "conflict" stage of the grammar of war) occur. It is particularly these changes as related to refugee situations which I intend to analyse here.

Scholarly perceptions that conflicts are increasingly or overwhelmingly structured along ethnic lines (cf. Wimmer 1995:464) have given rise to the concept of "ethnic conflict" in the 1990s. As Münkler (2002:16) has observed, contemporary conflicts are, beside other concerns, motivated by a combination of ethno-cultural considerations and convictions commonly regarded as ideology. I propose not to consider the two as totally distinct, and suggest to focus on the interplay between the two dimensions. In some cases the analytical distinction may be useful, but here it is their common function of political mobilisation which is of interest.[43] Ethnic ideologies are very often combined with a kind of class consciousness centring on the perception that the in-group was economically and politically marginalized or was threatened to become so in the near future (cf. Wimmer 1995).

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[42] As Cloward (1979) has pointed out, people from social environments where crime is ripe and is therefore easily "learned" are more likely to respond with crime to an anomic situation than others.

[43] Anderson (1993:20) strongly advocates to maintain that distinction. Yet he also recognised "daß sich seit dem Zeiten Weltkrieg jede erfolgreiche Revolution in *nationalen* Begriffen definiert" (ibid:12). Symbols of the revolution have become national symbols and vice versa.

In studies on nationalism and ethnicity, Benedict Anderson's concept of "imagined communities" (1993), which for the first time presented a fully subjectivist theory of nationalism, has become one of the most prominent approaches. Its strength is that it analyses the concept of nation as a symbolic order existing in the mind. These symbols may have their origins in past times, but may as well have been created more recently, i.e. during the era of nationalism. In phases of nationalist agitation, ancient sets of symbols are restructured and symbols are reinterpreted. Although an illusion of historical continuity is thus created by the nationalists, nations and other politicised "imagined communities" are relatively recent innovations not relying on historical continuity (on ethnic groups cf. Elwert 1989).

In traditional settings, the in-group tends to be narrowly defined. Household, kinship, caste, and village are examples of institutions uniting people in the belief that they have a common identity. It was the destruction of these localised in-groups and the authority structures they where embedded in which largely accounted for the rise of nationalism in Europe (cf. Siegelberg 2000:25). Similarly, the rise of ethnicity in the Third World has been analysed as a result of colonially induced modernisation, particularly of the imposition of statehood, the extension of the monetarised economy and urbanisation (Elwert 1989). In Anderson's theory, the categories of social mobility (Anderson 1993:55-63) and mass communication (ibid:44-54) assume a key position. Social mobility is understood as both horizontal geographical mobility and vertical social mobility. Upward vertical social mobility dislodged individuals from their traditional communities and the structures of authority they were embedded in. It enabled people to question the customary order as much as it pushed them to search for new systems of symbols to base their lives on. Greater geographical mobility then brought these people together, let them experience new lifestyles, discover similarities, and develop the idea of a common fate and identity (cf. Anderson 1993:62-63+82). These ideas were communicated through newly emerging media of mass communication (ibid: 44-54) and found a receptive environment as the customary order increasingly appeared anachronistic. Correspondingly, contemporary protagonists of ethnic ideologies and organizers of ethnic pressure groups emanate from the middle class (Wimmer 1995:470). It is particularly people who had access to modern education and who occupy or occupied posts in the public sector (or the churches) that redefine cultural symbols and mobilise on ethnic grounds.

Forced migration directly causes the destruction of traditional communities. People habitually living in rather small communities are then propelled into refugee camps assembling thousands and often tens of thousands of individuals from different regions and social backgrounds. Many of them had to flee or were expelled because of their group identity, and contacts and communication in refugee camps makes them experience that they indeed do have a common fate. Flight and its cir-   cumstances become symbols through which

the community is imagined. In the extreme, an ethnic identity which by and large was as-cribed to them by others, i.e. "the enemy", is appropriated as a valid self-identification.[44] Flight has the effect of levelling traditional stratifications: strongly differentiated people become refugees, have to deal with the same problems and tend to adopt similar strategies of survival, while the importance of the traditional social standing is diminished. Accord-ingly, the vertical social mobility associated with flight is primarily downward social mo-bility. It can nevertheless be as effective as upward mobility in creating a common identity. Refugees in general and particularly those confined to camps have diminished opportuni-ties to adopt the conventionally employed techniques to improve their livelihoods. Even for the many self-sufficient refugees whose lives objectively do not differ much from what they could expect in their home countries, this loss of perspective is often felt as a social and economic degradation in itself. Economic living conditions thus help to explain the emergence or strengthening of an ethnic or class consciousness or a combination of the two.[45] Under these circumstances, a "refugee" identity often symbolises a degree of up-ward social mobility and becomes part of the wider group identity, particularly because international "refugee" protection turns the identity into a valuable resource. International protection offers a legal status in the host country and symbolises international recognition of the group's plight (cf. Malkki 1995, Peteet 1997:36f).

In order to spread, communal symbols have to be communicated to receptive masses. So-cial levelling in refugee camps is not absolute, and modernised elites, the typical carriers of political ideologies, often formally or informally assume an outstanding position in camps.[46] Most often, they are the ones who represent the refugees in the camp institutions and organise the part of refugee life left to these institutions. Camp leadership positions are

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[44] The Burundian "Hutu" refugees in Tanzania who fled the massacres instigated by the regime since 1972 indeed seemed to be strongly regionally oriented before they became refugees. "People from very differ-ent regions of Burundi who had had little to do with each other prior to 1972 were thrown together in ex-ile with a strong consciousness that they were there because of something they all had in common, their Hutuness" (Malkki 1995:102). "[T]he Hutu refugees in the camp located their identities within their dis-placement extracting meaning and power from the interstitial social location they inhabited. Instead of losing their collective identity, this is where and how they made it" (ibid:16).

[45] The camp refugees studied by Malkki maintained that "Hutu" is a synonym for "servant". This notion which emerged in the camp equated the situation in Tanzania to that in Burundi. The refugees faced se-vere restrictions on mobility, therefore had to continue to live on agriculture and were acutely aware of the fact that the export earning of the produce they had to sell to the state marketing boards, as well as the taxes they had to pay, were accruing to a political elite which seemed – despite rhetoric to the contrary - to have no intention to integrate them politically or socially (Malkki 1995:116-119).

[46] In the camp studied by Malkki (1995) in 1985/86, the "Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu" (PALIPE-HUTU) had a very strong position although the camp had been economically self-sufficient for about ten years, was administered by the Tanzanian government, and the PALIPEHUTU faced repression from the Tanzanian authorities. The PALIPEHUTU's armed wing "Forces nationales de libération" (FNL) is the second largest rebel group in the Burundian internal war which started in 1993. It is important to note that had the Tanzanian government maintained its stance against the PALIPEHUTU, the FNL could not have become an active military force.

instrumental in propagating ideologies, and when leadership positions are assumed by members of rebel groups, no matter whether belonging to a military or a civilian wing, the opportunities these positions offer to communicate with the refugee population will be used to further rebel aims. Ideological discourses confer legitimacy to armed groups and have direct implications for two interrelated dimensions power: power over the refugee community on the one hand, and consequent power to challenge the home country government on the other. The refugees' group identity regularly includes the definition of the sending state as "home", and the notion of a group interest unites civilians and combatants in the belief of having a common fate to be realised in the home country. The opportunity for political agitators to communicate with masses they could hardly have reached before strongly depends on the institution of the camp.[47] Refugee self-help groups, distribution centres for dispersed refugees etc. may serve communication purposes as well, yet these institutions only provide limited occasions for agitation.

Malkki's (1995) comparison of urban, (illegally) self-settling refugees and those amassed in an isolated camp strongly suggests that social isolation and the blocking of upward social mobility are decisive in shaping an ethnic consciousness. Idiosyncratic discourses logically complement social isolation. Blocking upward social mobility prevents developments which enforce pragmatic identity management and which could ultimately lead to integration into the host society. As has been pointed out, the informal sector in Third World states is protected by and structured through informal relations often bound to ethnicity. Under these circumstances idiosyncratic discourses are a hindrance to economic improvement, and offer no realistic solution to typical refugee problems. If we can generalise from Malkki's (1995) and Schrijvers' (1999:324-329) findings, refugees try to overcome obstacles imposed by identity-based informal structures through identity switching. Often refugees do have cultural similarities to people in the receiving country and they can pretend to belong to that national group. Both authors also observed the adoption of a new religion as a means to integrate socio-economically into the host society. In that process, the foreign identity may become less opportune and less frequently used, and may even be given up in the end.

1.4   Implications for the Social Order of Refugee-Warriors

In the three preceding sections, the societal order of refugees has been analysed as characterised by three tendencies: the exclusion from a home country system of reproduction,

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[47] Unsurprisingly, the PALIPEHUTU advocated that all refugees should be settled in camps, as the urban self-settlers (see below) overwhelmingly rejected their agitation.

partial integration into a host country system of reproduction tending to reproduce the included-excluded divide, and partial reintegration into an alternative insurgent order. The latter partly compensates for exclusivist tendencies in the former two. In lieu of a preliminary conclusion, subsequently I shortly summarise how the alternative system of a refugee army is organised.

Refugee insurgents, i.e. non-state actors, exercise political authority over refugee agglomerations, typically refugee camps. Political links to refugee villages may exist, but these are often weaker. These refugee agglomerations are typically extraterritorial, i.e. not situated within the territory that is fought for. This implies that the insurgents' political authority is not or hardly subject to competition with the home state. If it is not challenged by the host state, it can unfold essentially unhindered. Authority is exercised informally and/or formally through camp administrations, the latter option indicating a higher degree of legitimacy. Sources of legitimacy are the promise of furthering refugees' interests in the host country, symbolic resources linking combatants and civilians, and patronage, i.e. providing social services or obstructing humanitarian efforts aimed at reducing the official refugee figure. Coercive capacities may and often do compensate for a lack of legitimacy. Refugee camps and villages sustain the organisation's manpower by providing a reservoir for voluntary or forced recruitment.

Economically, refugee-warriors are sustained by looting or directly diverting supplies, taxing refugee income and supplies, and contributions from economically successful refugees. Revenues accruing from refugee supplies and subsistence income are typically small and will primarily be used to support the organisation's staff, particularly its combatants. That is, humanitarian resources destined for the refugee masses are redistributed upwards. Refugee-warriors cultivating legitimacy by organising social services need contributions from wealthy refugees and/or alternative sources of income. A lack of humanitarian assistance may increase pressure on insurgents to negotiate with civilian refugees in order to receive support.[48] As unassisted refugee villages are prone to economic breakdown in case of looting and that would deprive rebels of strategically important rear bases, rebels might compensate civilian refugees for providing shelter and food to retreating fighters.

Refugee-warriors achieve symbolic reproduction through a group identity linking the refugee population and the combatants. This wider group identity is strengthened in refugee

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[48] However, reciprocal relations between rebels and civilians on the Senegalese-Guinea-Bissauan border apparently are not only conditioned by a lack of humanitarian assistance, but perhaps more importantly by family links between combatants and civilians (Evans, pers. comm.).

situations, supporting the notion of a common fate of civilians and combatants. As the group identity includes definitions of "home", it unites the two in the belief of furthering a common interest in a return under inclusive conditions in the home country.

2   Host States, Humanitarian Assistance, and Refugees in Arms

In chapter one, a comprehensive approach to the phenomenon of refugees in arms has been outlined. The chapter put strong emphasis on the creation of contradictions and presented in most general terms how these translate into the conflict-stage of the "grammar of war", i.e. combat capabilities. The present chapter represents a deepening of that second complex. It is intended to examine in detail the role of two important variables, the host country and humanitarian aid, for the creation of fighting capabilities. The importance of host country actors has been mentioned several times in chapter one, suggesting to further explore it. As the role of humanitarian assistance has the greatest implications for international refugee policies and therefore is at the centre of the discussion about refugee-warriors, it equally deserves closer scrutiny.

Section 2.1 presents empirical data on whom refugees fight most frequently, i.e. against whom combat capabilities are mobilised, and where this is the case, i.e. which host countries are particularly vulnerable to refugee-warriors' activities. In 2.1, frequent constellations of actors and particularly affected countries are identified. It prepares section 2.2 concerned with the mechanisms through which refugee insurgents can acquire combat capabilities. These mechanisms are investigated by a detailed analysis of two cases identified as being of outstanding importance. The analysis in section 2.2 centres on the concept of trans-national political networks outlined in 1.1, and shows why an integration of refugees into host country networks took place and how it affected domestic and cross-border security. In 2.3, the issue of the impact of refugee assistance on wars is introduced by a brief reflection on how the issue has historically been perceived by humanitarian organisations. Subsequently, the impact humanitarian aid had in the two cases already investigated from a different perspective in the preceding section is analysed. These two cases are particularly instructive because of the varying impact of humanitarian aid.

Before exploring the phenomenon of refugees in arms in further detail, it is useful to define what constitutes a militarised refugee population or a militarised refugee camp. Zolberg et al. define "refugee-warrior communities" as "not merely a passive group of dependent refugees, but […,] highly conscious refugee communities with a political leadership structure and armed sections engaged in warfare for a political objective" (Zolberg et al. 1989:275). The political structure linking civilians and combatants is decisive and the notion of "refugee-warrior communities" also applies where military and civilian facilities are separated (ibid:276f). Lischer's definition is similar, but stresses economic and social links less relevant to Zolberg et al.. "Militarization [of refugee populations, F.G.] describes non-civilian attributes of refugee-populated   areas, including inflow of weapons, military

training and recruitment. Militarization also includes actions of refugees and/or exiles who engage in non-civilian activity outside the refugee camp, yet who depend on assistance from refugees or international organisations.[49] Refugees or exiles who store arms and train outside the camps, yet return to the camp for food, medical assistance, and family visits, create a militarized refugee population. It follows that demilitarization entails the delinking of the refugee populated area from military actors and military activity and respect by all parties (i.e. refugees, receiving state government, and any external intervenors) for international law relating to the protection of refugees" (Lischer 2000:3). According to these definitions, refugee camps are militarised where they host and supply militarised refugee populations, regardless whether the camp actually includes military facilities or not.[50] It seems however appropriate to emphasise a factor only implicit in the above definitions. A few combatants visiting family members do not create militarised refugee populations; combatants have to enter the refugee-populated area in question regularly and in proportions suggesting that a presence in that area is part of the insurgents' strategy.

2.1 Refugees in Arms: Empirical Evidence

This section is intended to gather data on refugee involvement in armed conflict. As scholars concerned with cross-border incursions of refugee-warriors have reached diametrically opposed conclusions and little has been systematically explored so far,[51] a comprehensive history of the phenomenon cannot be established at this stage. In contrast, concerning involvement of refugee-warriors in fighting in the host country, comparatively reliable data covering an extended time period, i.e. 1945 to 1992, could be gathered.

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[49] "The term exiles refers to people, including soldiers and war criminals, who left their country of origin but who do not qualify for refugee status. Exiles and refugees may live indistinguishably in camps, as they did in Zaire after the exodus from Rwanda" (Lischer 2000:Footnote 9). Because of the connection between exiles and refugees (apparent in the quotation), in this paper exiles have been included in the category of refugees.

[50] This contradicts UNHCR's position according to which the problem can be solved through physical separation of military and civilian structures (Zolberg et al. 1989:277). Zolberg et al. consider such a separation to have been the rule rather than the exception, but as the military and civilian facilities had strong political, economic and social links (ibid:276f), the civilian ones have to be regarded equally militarised.

[51] For example, Shawcross claims that "in the eighties [the militarisation of refugee camps, F.G.] had been the exception […]. In the nineties, it became commonplace" (Shawcross 2000:378). In contrast, Rufin postulates a drastic reduction of "humanitarian sanctuaries" in the 1990s (Rufin 1999:26f). A third position, that of continuity, is assumed by Barber (1997) and Luttwak (1999). All these claims are characterised by methodological flaws. Shawcross, primarily occupied with the situation in the 1990s, presents a rather superficial analysis of the situation in the previous decade. Rufin, Barber and Luttwak base their claim on too small and consequently questionable samples. Changes in a few high-profile refugee crises are strongly reflected in Rufin's judgement. Barber and Luttwak, in turn, highlight continuity in a few high-profile crises, e.g. Palestine and the Great Lakes Region.

Gantzel/Schwinghammer (1995) delivered brief, systematic descriptions of all instances of political violence 1945 to 1992 that qualify as wars as defined above. They aim at identifying the social bases of the warring parties, but as refugees conventionally have not been considered a distinct social basis in wars, refugee involvement in fighting in the home country is not fully reported in the publication. In contrast, direct foreign involvement in internal wars is highly conspicuous and generally regarded a significant aspect. Refugee involvement in fighting in the host country has thus mostly been reported in Gantzel/Schwinghammer (1995). In all, they have identified 142 cases of internal warfare, including combinations of internal and international war. Apparently, only in nine of these, refugees fought within the host polity. As most of the world's states have received refugees during the period in question, the conventional wisdom that a refugee influx destabilises receiving countries seems rather unfounded, or, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the destabilisation appears to have been a minor one.

In four of these cases, refugees fought for the host government: In Costa Rica's war in 1948, Nicaraguan exiles and government troops fought the *Legion del Caribe*, and in Uganda's war in 1978-1979, Rwandan and Sudanese refugees fought together with the Idi Amin government against several rebel groups and Tanzania.[52] In a later Ugandan war (1981-1992), Rwandan refugees supported the government of Yoweri Museveni, who had succeeded to conquer much of the country in 1986. In the war in Sierra Leone (1991-2002), Liberian refugees organised in the rebel *United Liberation Movement* (ULIMO) supported the government in fighting the *Revolutionary United Front,* a force which had close ties to a Liberian guerilla rivalling the ULIMO.

In four wars refugees fought against the host country government. In the Mulelist uprising in Zaire in 1963-1966, Rwandan Tutsi refugees aligned with the insurgents. In the Ugandan war in 1978-1979, Rwandan Tutsi refugees fought not only for the government, but as well alongside Museveni's rebel *Front for National Salvation*, as they did during the first phase of the war, when Museveni's *National Resistance Army* fought against the Obote regime (1981-1986).[53] The only case in which refugees were a largely independent, main actor challenging a government was the "Black September" war 1970-1971, pitting the Jordanian state against Palestinian resistance groups.

In a further three cases, refugees' position was somewhat ambiguous. In the Lebanese war (1975-1990), the *Palestine Liberation Organisation* (PLO) fought against the forces inter-

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[52] The Ugandan wars are the only ones frequently referred to in the literature on the subject in which the participation of foreign refugees in internal war was not mentioned or only mentioned in the description of another war, the one in Rwanda (1990-1994) in Gantzel/Schwinghammer (cf. 1995:R89). On Amin's security apparatus cf. Harrell-Bond 1986:36f, Mamdani 2001:167f.
[53] Gantzel/Schwinghammer (1995:R100) subdivided the war into two phases.

nationally recognised as government, but the term government is relative in a situation of acute state decay. In fact, Palestinians initially supported and received support from Sunni forces integrated into the country's government prior to the war. As an opposition qualify leftist internal forces, with which the Palestinians were more closely allied. During the course of war, factionalism increased and the PLO became an independent actor fighting several Lebanese militias. Secondly, the *Muhajir Quaumi Movement* (MQM) active in Pakistan's Sindh province is mainly made up of refugees and their descendents who fled contemporary India after the partition of the country in 1947. They became the majority in the Sindh and came to dominate the regional administration and economy. Since 1986, they have been fighting against "indigenous" Sindhi forces organised in the *Jiye Sind Mahaz* and against Pashtun networks made up of Pakistanis and Afghan refugees active in transport and drug trafficking. Intervention of the Pakistani state has pitted all these groupings against regular forces at times, although the Muhajirs were and to a lesser extent still are influential with the central government.[54] Finally, Kuomintang-groups who fled China at the end of the 1940s are the core of some of the warlord armies operating in Burma's war (ongoing since 1948), i.e. of the *Shan United Army* and the *Thai Revolutionary Council*. These have been allied with the government at times and with rebels at others, but are essentially fighting for their own benefit and particularly for the control of areas of poppy production.

Several of these refugee groups have not only engaged in fighting in the host country, but in cross-border attacks on the home country as well. In the cases of Sierra Leone, Jordan, Uganda (1981-1992) and Lebanon, both types occurred simultaneously. In the Costa Rican case, cross-border attacks followed shortly after refugees had been fighting for the government. It is not clear whether the Kuomintang-groups and the Zairian Tutsi supporting the Mulelists attacked their home countries as well, and the MQM is the only organisation which certainly not fought against the (former) home country. The two phenomena thus appear to significantly correlate.[55]

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[54] It was due to particular circumstances that these refugees could acquire capacities allowing them to effectively challenge local groups and even the central government. In the beginning, the *Muhajir* ("refugees") were employed by the central government according to the patrimonial principle of using strangers for purposes of political control. Being Pakistani nationals and a relatively modernised segment of the population, the *Muhajir* were able to independently secure their influential position and eventually became so strong that they represented a challenge to the central government (cf. Wilke 2000, cf. Wilke/Friederichs 2003).

[55] That correlation would be even more striking if we included the two most important cases of refugee involvement in fighting in the host country that occurred after the publication of Gantzel/Schwinghammer (1995). Rwandan Hutu militias supporting Zaire's president Mobutu in the mid-1990s as well attacked their home state. Similarly, the *Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy* in Guinea supported their host country government in the fighting in 2000/2001 and staged attacks on Liberia.

Generally, refugees rarely engage in war in the host country, while the same is not sure concerning attacks against the home state. The most elaborate quantitative study on refugee involvement in political violence (Lischer 2000; 2001) allows gaining a deeper understanding of the phenomenon. In the context of this paper, refugee involvement in wars, either in the home or in the host country, is the main concern. Yet, because of a possible link of war to less intense and less persistent violence, non-war violence is briefly examined here, too. The link I have in mind is that root causes may be similar and the primary difference between the two may be that the latter lacks organisation.

In Lischer's analysis covering the time span 1987 to 1998, frequency, persistence, intensity, and type of political violence are measured.[56] Types of violence are

> 1) *"attacks between the sending state and the refugees"*,
>
> 2) *"attacks between the receiving state and the refugees"*,
>
> 3) *"Ethnic or factional violence among the refugees"*,
>
> 4) *"Internal violence within the receiving state" due to refugees*
>
> 5) *refugee-related "interstate war or unilateral intervention" (Lischer 2000:4).*

The fourth category reaches extremely low values and is statistically negligible. Although incidents of this type are likely to be underreported (ibid:15), these extremely low values seem to confirm my thesis laid down in chapter one of locals having other means than violence to impose their interests, while refugees are usually too weak to engage in violence against host country communities. The fifth category reaches low, but significant values (ibid.). Several of these cases represent an escalation of the low-scale interstate hostility which often stands at the outset of an integration of refugee combatants into a host state's security sector, i.e. it is most likely to occur where refugee-warriors are employed to police a border area or weaken the sending state.

Violence between refugees and the sending state is most common, followed by violence between refugees and the receiving state and factional violence among refugees (ibid:15). The first category exhibits the greatest intensity and persistence of violence, and was slightly increasing as a proportion of all violence in the second half of the 1990s (ibid.). Violence between refugees and the receiving state tends to occur in the form of small-scale and short-lived skirmishes and riots, often when refugees protest their conditions or in the context of *refoulement* (forcible repatriation) by the receiving state (ibid:16). Factional violence among refugees is usually localised and does not spread widely (ibid.). It seems to

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[56] Frequency was measured as the number of refugees (i.e. the total case-load, not only those armed) involved in political violence. Persistence was measured as the number of years during which violence was reported. Intensity was "measured by casualty figures and narrative descriptions" (Lischer 2000:4) of the incidents.

occur particularly where contradictions originating in the home country and entailed by the war divide the refugee population, i.e. rivalling warring parties have their respective social bases among different segments of the refugee population.

Lischer's data show considerable variations between different refugee situations. "In most years, over one hundred states host refugees, yet 95% of all violence usually takes place in fewer than fifteen states" (Lischer 2000:2). In total, among the 156 states hosting refugees, 55 hosting refugees from 41 countries were affected at least during one year from 1987-1998, while only ten host states reported violence for more than half of the twelve years studied (ibid:11). That figure indicates that violence involving refugees tends to be sporadic and the host state tends to rapidly (re-)impose control. It is a few states that deviate from the rule. "In persistence, as well as frequency, African states are over-represented, both as receiving states and refugee groups" (ibid:11). "Whereas African states accounted for 47% of affected receiving states in 1987, they accounted for 70% and 60% of the states impacted in 1997 and 1998, respectively" (ibid:2).[57] Numbers of refugee groups and receiving states affected by violence have remained relatively constant, but there has been a slight increase in both categories since the mid-1990s (ibid:8+17). According to Lischer's data, of the nine refugee groups involved in persistent and intense violence (ibid:13), six were involved in cross-border attacks on the home country government during the period 1987 to 1998 (ibid:22-24). These were Palestinians (in Gaza/Westbank), Rwandans (in Zaire and Uganda), Afghans (in Pakistan), Sudanese (in Ethiopia and Uganda) and Liberians (in Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire).[58] All of these refugee groups and most of the host states (i.e. except Uganda) were as well affected by other types of refugee-related violence,[59] indicating that there may be a causal link between the different types of violence.

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[57] That trend cannot be explained by Africa's disproportionate share of refugees (Lischer 2000:14).

[58] As has been said above, Liberians in Sierra Leone engaged as well in cross-border attacks. More importantly, complementing Lischer's data with other sources, eight of the nine groups seem to have engaged in cross-border violence, a figure that even more drastically underlines the importance of that type of violence relative to other types. The refugee populations which Lischer does not recognise as having been involved in cross-border attacks are Burmese (in Thailand and Bangladesh), Sierra Leoneans (in Guinea and Liberia), and Mozambicans (in Zambia and Zimbabwe). In the Burmese and probably in the Sierra Leonean case, refugees were involved in cross-border attacks against the home country government. Only in the Mozambican case Lischer's judgement can be fully confirmed. Lischer lists Burmese refugees in Thailand as being subject to violence carried out by the Burmese military and Burma-based rebel groups on the one hand, and by Thai security forces on the other. In fact, Burmese guerrillas were allowed to operate from Thailand for a long time, and the actual persistent violence the Thai military employs against refugees is a legacy of that period (cf. Adelmann 1998). Concerning the Sierra Leonean case, one camp in Liberia has been shelled by the Sierra Leone government. The Liberian government headed by Charles Taylor was closely connected to the RUF and supported cross-border activity, and it is likely that this camp served as an RUF-base.

[59] Lischer does not list Uganda as involved in other types of violence, although Rwandan refugees supported the government in fighting Ugandan rebels.

From the above, we can draw a preliminary conclusion. While cross-border violence is the most intense and persistent type of violence, the bulk of incidents is concentrated in a few host countries, repeatedly involving the same refugee groups. At least since the end of the Cold War,[60] this type of violence is concentrated in Africa, while Israel/Palestine and Afghanistan/Pakistan are strongholds as well. Violence between refugees and the receiving state largely takes on the form of small-scale skirmishes. These skirmishes represent a minor destabilisation of receiving countries through refugee influx only, as the state most often easily prevails. There have been few incidents in which a refugee army challenges a host government, and mostly it has been in alliance with influential domestic groups. Refugees can also ally with host governments and thereby strengthen them. Furthermore, the different types of violence may be interrelated, but so far statistics remain inconclusive on that point.

In addition to the question whether there is a link between the different types of violence and of what kind it is, further questions remain unanswered. Considering the small number of cases of profound militarisation of refugee populations, "[t]he real puzzle is why refugee situations […] so *rarely* lead to violence" (Lischer 2000:1). Furthermore, the regional concentration of the problem needs to be explained. Scholars largely agree that the host state has a decisive role in preventing or allowing cross-border attacks (ibid:18f, Adelmann 1998, Rufin 1999:20). The question then is why receiving states are unwilling or incapable to prevent cross-border attacks.

2.2 Host States, Refugees and Trans-national Political Networks

Except in a few cases,[61] host states should be capable of blocking the movement of foreign irregulars and by constantly doing so demilitarise refugee camps. As cross-border activity is likely to lead to international tensions, host states can be expected to prevent irregulars operating from their territory. Host states can be expected to act even more decisively against armed actors posing a threat to the regime. Even weak states are strongest in their repressive capacities (Nuscheler 1995:338), and, from a security point of view, refugee camps do have the advantage that they allow for relatively close supervision (cf. Harrell-Bond 1986:9, Malkki 1995). A host state which is determined to control refugee-warriors is likely to require all refugees to be camp residents. It may establish the camps at a "rea-

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[60] The first year evaluated in Lischer's (2000) study is 1987, when Cold War patronage had already begun to decline as a result of a relaxation of tensions between East and West. As that patronage was the most important consequence of the Cold War for the Third World, we can consider Lischer's study as covering a post-Cold War time span.

[61] Exceptions are states that have historically been extremely weak, i.e. where not even a semblance of control over the territory could be established, such as in Birma/Myanmar.

sonable distance", i.e. some 50 km, from the border. Regularly occurring movement of armed forces over this distance is likely to be detected. Rebels are usually not strong enough to fight two armies, and have a particular disadvantage when fighting one that is familiar with a territory to which the irregulars are alien. Host states can and often do restrict the movement of refugees, in extreme cases sealing off entire refugee camps more or less temporarily. Host states may also resort to an expulsion of refugees they feel unable to control, as Tanzania did with Rwandan refugees.[62] Surely, host states often cannot prevent every single incident, but they usually can prevent cross-border activities from occurring regularly.

I argue that the answer to the questions raised above – the question of a link between the forms of violence and why particular host states fail to control refugee-warriors - lies within the personalisation or informalisation of the affected polities. Both Africa and the Middle East are regions characterised by a profound personalisation of politics. When central authority is weak while competition for power and revenues is intense and little regulated, refugees are most likely to become involved in host country political conflicts by aligning with one of its political networks. Rational interests in accumulation of power and material resources motivate these alliances. The networks competing for power are or become trans-nationally organised. When refugee groupings become involved in power struggles in the host country, the political connections established in that process enable them to pursue their objectives concerning the home country, using bases in the receiving country. The problem of militarised refugee populations should therefore be analysed from a theoretical perspective of personal political trans-border networks as has been briefly presented in 1.1. In order to validate my claim, I will subsequently outline how the crises in Israel/Palestine and in the Great Lakes region, the most persistent and salient cases, would have to be analysed from that perspective.

2.2.1 Palestinian Refugees and their Host States

The war of the *Palestine Liberation Organisation* (PLO) and other Palestinian resistance groups against Israel began in 1968.[63] The main external base of the PLO at that time was

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[62] This option is relatively rarely realised, arguably due to international pressure. Yet, where regimes perceive their security to be at stake, they will ignore international criticism unless the international (humanitarian) community provides resources which make up for the security threat.

[63] Previously, a long period of consolidation of PLO authority, related to the emergence of Palestinian nationalism, had taken place. This process occurred within a context of refugee existence. Initially, Palestinian resistance was weak and organised around the traditional holders of authority, the heads of some notable families. These could maintain their authority for some time, but lost legitimacy in the context of urbanisation as the camps developed into cities (cf. Viorst 1989:24f). Two new social groups emerged. The first one is a refugee middle class, mainly made up of *United Nations Relief and Works Agency*

Jordan, from where it carried out cross-border raids and artillery attacks against Israel. Jordan was opposed to the attacks for two reasons. Firstly, it feared retaliatory attacks from Israel, and secondly, King Hussein's long-term strategy was the integration of the refugee population into his realm. The development of his sparsely populated desert kingdom and particularly of the Jordan valley largely depended on Palestinian labour, and the territorial claim to the West Bank would be considered illegitimate if Palestinians were not considered Jordanians. But Hussein, backed by "a small soldiery of backward bedouin" (Bailey 1984:134) felt too weak to confront the Palestinians. Palestinians became amalgamated with internal forces in two areas of political competition in Jordan. In the first one, the lines were drawn between Palestinian and Bedouin patronage networks. A substantial proportion of "indigenous" Jordanians were of Palestinian ethnicity.[64] These were integrated into the administration and patronage system of the state, but viewed the Palestinian cause with sympathy. Palestinian military officers often colluded with the PLO (Bailey 1989:35-42). In the second one, "conservative" social forces opposed "progressive" ones. In the wake of independence, ideologies of socialist-inspired Arab nationalism had thrived in the region, leading to the fall of several of the traditional leaders. The Jordanian opposition, some of the regime's bureaucrats and the PLO subscribed to Arab nationalism, a threat against which Hussein had to defend his throne. The nationalists were backed by the leaders of Egypt and Syria defending the ideological legitimacy of their rule. Egypt's "Arab-socialist" President Nasser had himself toppled a traditional ruler, while in Syria socialist Baath ideology had fulfilled a key role in stabilising political authority in an initially tumultuous post-colonial political situation. Egypt and Syria, fearing an unnecessary confrontation with Israel, prevented PLO-activity against Israel from their territory. Yet they endorsed it in Jordan which was the regional symbol for the persistence of traditional rule. Yet Egypt's and Syria's interference was hardly a matter of support for Arab nationalism per se. The channels for support were of a personal nature, with the Egyptian President backing Arafat and his Fatah, and Syria backing the leaders of smaller PLO factions to whom President Assad had personal links.

(UNRWA) employees and UNRWA-schooled elites active in business and administration of Arab countries. These owed their social status to their existence as Palestinian refugees and developed a nationalist ideology. The second was a proletarianised population, who were propelled into the labour market in often insecure jobs. These two strata combined in the resistance. The institution of the refugee camp enabled a close relationship. Social services in the camps organised by the PLO were a vehicle of communication between elites and the populace, as was the education system organised by UNRWA. UNRWA schools were considered to be the best in the Arab world, and the younger Palestinian population is almost universally literate (ibid. 54). The actual form of Palestinian resistance, inextricably linked to the war and its persistence, has to be analysed as being born out of the socio-economic transformations the camp population underwent.

[64] No reliable statistics exist, and figures in the literature vary considerably. According to UNRWA calculations, some 50% of Jordanians were Palestinian, while refugees constituted about a third of the total population.

King Hussein's rule 1968 to 1970 was characterised by careful balancing. Rejecting Arab nationalism outright would have meant to risk an alienation of the PLO and its internal supporters in top positions in the Jordanian military and the bureaucracy, thus strengthening the opposition and possibly leading to his overthrow. He opted for a "moderate hostility" (Bailey 1984:5) towards Israel. While rhetorically backing the PLO and Arab nationalism, he tried to restrain their activities. This led to increasing confrontation with the PLO, particularly its Syrian-backed "radical" factions. When Hussein realised that legitimacy could not be gained through appeasement and the "radicals" started advocating regime change openly, he undertook to consolidate his authority over the military apparatus and sidelined pro-PLO officers. In September 1970, the Jordanian military started attacking PLO positions, and by July 1971, it had regained control over the country. Even a comparatively weak military like the Jordanian one was thus able to rapidly combat one of the world's best-organised guerrillas. The PLO was expelled and fled to Lebanon. Jordan has since ceased to be a base for the PLO. Generous US-assistance allowed Hussein to extend his patronage system, while at the same time *mise en valeur* of Palestinian labour translated into exceptionally high GDP growth. The Palestinian population has become well integrated into Jordan. Even PLO representatives doubted that any of them would opt for repatriation if they were offered the opportunity (Viorst 1989:115).[65]

Like Hussein, Lebanon's mainstream political elite feared retaliation by Israel and was little inclined to let the Palestinian guerrilla operate from its territory. In order to prevent cross-border activity and in response to national businessmen interested in cheap labour, refugee camps had been established around Lebanon's cities rather than in the border region (cf. Hudson 1997:250). Nonetheless, comparatively strong discrimination against Palestinians in Lebanon had made its refugee population extremely receptive to the guerrilla appeal (Shiblak 1997:267), and the Fatah-militia (which later became the dominant PLO-faction) launched its first-ever attack on Israel from Lebanon in January 1965. To appreciate the significance of a subsequent shift in Lebanon's internal balance of power, it is important to note that until 1968, the Lebanese military was largely successful in preventing further attacks (Hudson 1997:251). After the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967, Arab nationalism witnessed an upsurge in Lebanon as it did in other countries of the region, and public opinion shifted in favour of the Palestinians and the PLO.[66] Yet support to the Palestinians followed somewhat sectarian lines, a tendency which would increase later on. Particularly the Sunni and to a slightly lesser extent the Druze community supported the Palestinians, while support was least common among the Shiite and the Maronite Christian communities

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[65] The situation may have changed somewhat during the last ten years.

[66] In a 1969 survey of public opinion, some 46% expressed "complete support" and another 40% "reserved support" for Palestinian guerrilla activities from Lebanon (Brynen 1990:208).

(Hudson 1997:247). Increasing support for the combatants from both Lebanese and Palestinians and external pressure from Egypt and Syria put a strain on the military's ability to suppress guerrilla activities. As the state got weaker, the PLO accumulated power. In 1969, armed confrontations between the guerrilla and the military erupted. The army surrounded the camps and the PLO took control within them (Brynen 1990:208). But due to political constraints, the military had to negotiate a settlement with the Palestinians and was forced to recognise the PLO as an interlocutor.

The influx of guerrillas from Jordan in 1971 further strengthened the PLO while "the Palestinian movement catalyzed the growth of Lebanese opposition forces" (Brynen 1990:209). At the same time, conflict within the regime increased. In Lebanon's political system, elites of the politically important groups of Maronites, Shiites, Sunnis and Druze were integrated. These operated their respective patronage systems. Transformations in Lebanon's economy had undermined the socio-economic balance underlying the system, and rivalry between the groups became increasingly intense (cf. Jung 1995:213-221). Two areas of political competition partly converged in Lebanon, giving the PLO the opportunity to dock on to one side in the conflict. The first area was the conflict between the patronage networks. Lebanese Sunnis and Druze viewed the cause of the overwhelmingly Sunni Palestinians with sympathy and advocated to give them free rein in their operations against Israel. The Palestinian struggle and its nationalist ideology represented a symbolic resource furthering the political interests of Lebanese Sunnis and Druze. In order to legitimise a change in the distribution of political power in their favour, they advocated the idea of a Muslim-Arab state, connoting pan-Arab ideas, while the Christian Maronites held on to the idea of the traditional Lebanese emirate (Jung 1995:217). The second area of conflict between "conservative" and "progressive" forces partly reflected the divide between the patronage networks. The emerging leftist opposition, united in the pan-Arab and socialist *Lebanese National Movement* (LNM) was particularly strong among Lebanese Sunnis. It aligned with the Palestinians, who provided them with protection against state repression (Brynen 1990:209). In turn, the LNM strengthened the PLO; in 1973, the Lebanese military was forced to abandon its first offensive on PLO-positions since 1969, as a result of political lobbying by the LNM and neighbouring Arab states.

Meanwhile, it became increasingly difficult for the Sunni elite to control its clientele. In the process of modernisation, they lost the unconditional loyalty of the Qabadayat, the militias which they had traditionally used to back their rule. The PLO stepped in to patronise several of these militias, many of whom were or became adherents of Arab nationalism (Jung 1995:221). Conservative politicians and their militias became increasingly apprehensive of the Palestinian influence on Lebanon's balance of power, and an attack by these on Palestinians in Beirut in April 1975 "pro-   vided the spark that ignited the Lebanese

civil war" (Brynen 1990:209). Initially, fighting took place mainly between rightist militias and the LNM, while the PLO refrained from major involvement. This policy came to an end when the Christian militia attacked the refugee camps in east Beirut in January 1976. During the internal war, factionalism increased and the PLO lost most of its internal supporters, but due to the collapse of state authority it could control parts of Lebanon and continue its attacks on Israel. The PLO had to leave Lebanon after the second Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. While the PLO headquarter was transferred to Tunis, the centre of Palestinian guerrilla activity has since moved to Gaza and the West Bank. There, the PLO and more recently Hamas are still the "fish in the sea" of the civilian population. They thus have some space to manoeuvre, regardless whether Israel or the Palestinian Authority was in nominal control.

2.2.2 Refugees and their Host States in the Great Lakes Region

Apart from the Middle East, the refugee crisis in the Great Lakes region of Africa has become the major point of reference in the discussion on militarised refugee populations. As in the Middle East, the region has a longstanding history of refugee-warriors. My analysis of events will therefore begin with the decolonisation period.

In 1959, the monarchist rule of an ethnic Tutsi minority in Rwanda was toppled by the *Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation Hutu* (PARMEHUTU), an organisation assembling the ethnic Hutu subjects.[67] In the process, several massacres of Tutsi occurred, and by the time of internationally recognised independence of Rwanda in 1962, between 40 and 70 percent of the Tutsi population had fled the country (Reed 1996:481). In exile, monarchist Tutsi organised for a return to the *status quo ante*, and between 1961 and 1966, they carried out at least ten raids into Rwanda (ibid.). Uganda appeared to have been insignificant as a base for these operations. The protestant Ugandan president Obote was quite reserved towards the catholic Tutsi, and actively turned against them in the late 1960s, suspecting them of supporting the catholic opposition Democratic Party (Meeren 1996:261). Tolerating their military organisation would thus have run counter to his political interests. Burundi was the main base for military incursions into Rwanda. Political power in Burundi was organised similarly to colonial Rwanda. The Tutsi monarchy had succeeded to maintain its hold on power, but faced strong Hutu opposition. Developments in Rwanda threatened the legitimising ideology underlying the system, and Burundi was interested in a return to the *status quo ante*. A more important motivation for supporting the Rwandan guerrilla was that "Tutsi Rwandan refugees were largely welcomed […] as a reserve force

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[67] Rwanda was still under colonial rule, but the Belgian colonial power exercised indirect rule over the population, employing the structures of the Tutsi monarchy.

against Hutu insurrection" (Meeren 1996:263). They were considered reliable allies of the Burundian military because of their hardened stance against the Hutu (ibid.). In 1966, Tutsi military officers toppled the monarchy. For the new "republican" rulers, the overthrow of the Tutsi monarchy in Rwanda did not constitute a threat to the ideological basis of rule, while the Rwandan Tutsi forces in Burundi posed a threat because of their affiliation with the king. After an agreement on border security between the two states shortly after the coup, the monarchists were militarily defeated and ceased to be a security problem.

Rwandans became politically important in Uganda during the rule of Idi Amin Dada (1971-1980). Compensating for his lack of legitimacy, Amin strengthened his security apparatus by recruiting Sudanese and Rwandans. Attempts were made to integrate the refugees by patronising the Tutsi King, Mwami Kigeri (Mamdani 2001:167). Yet the younger refugee generation, alienated from traditional structures and aspiring to belong to the middle class,[68] could not be integrated in that way. As refugees were discriminated concerning employment in the formal sector, upward social mobility was largely blocked. In the mid-1970s, the Ugandan intellectual and former state employee Yoweri Museveni recruited two refugee intellectuals, Fred Rugyema and Paul Kagame, into his rebel *Front for National Salvation* (FRONASA). The FRONASA was supported by Tanzania. Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere had been on good terms with the former Ugandan President Milton Obote, who, like Nyerere, symbolised a version of African socialism. The Idi Amin coup against Obote had been interpreted by Tanzania as an attempt by the former colonial power of both states, Great Britain, to undermine African socialism and re-establish British influence. "When FRONASA moved into Uganda behind Tanzanian forces in the Amin-war of 1979, Museveni began a mass recruitment that included Banyarwanda [Rwandan and Ugandan speakers of Kinyarwanda, Rwanda's *lingua franca*, F.G.]" (Mamdani 2001:168). Following the re-instatement of Obote in 1980, Museveni was initially appointed Minister of Defence, but he quickly broke with the president and returned to the bush, leading a new guerrilla war. Unrelenting repression by Obote against Ugandan and Rwandan Banyarwanda alike resulted in more of them joining Museveni's *National Resistance Army* (NRA). Eventually in 1986, when the NRA took power, at least 3,000 of the 14,000 NRA-soldiers were of Rwandan origin (Prunier 1993:125). By the time, self-identification of the refugees as Ugandans was strong, and Museveni promised to offer naturalisation to those who had been in the country for at least ten years. In the process of legitimacy consolidation, Museveni came under increasing pressure from elites he had to (or chose to) co-

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[68] UNHCR had made a great effort to provide education to the refugee population, as rural integration had proved extremely difficult. In Ugandan society, the feeling that refugees were privileged over the national population became widespread, to an extent that education became considered the main criterion distinguishing Ugandan nationals speaking Kinyarwanda from the refugees (Mamdani 2001:165).

operate with. The prominent position Ugandans assumed in his government threatened to discredit his regime as foreign occupation. Gradually, Rwandans were removed from positions of influence, and at the same time were excluded from benefiting from land reform. Both the refugee elite, educated youths and the rural population segment were consequently alienated from the regime. In 1987, the *Rwandan Patriotic Front* (RPF) was created by the Rwandan soldiers in the NRA. In 1990, the RPF started invading Rwanda from Uganda. The invasion was actively supported by the Ugandan government, which regarded an "armed repatriation" as a relief from internal pressure (Mamdani 2001:183f).

Facing defeat by the RPF, the Rwandan regime retreated to Zaire in 1994, taking with them about one million civilian Hutu. They arrived in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, both having a substantial population of Rwandan origin.

In North Kivu, these were the Banyamasisi, mostly of Hutu ethnicity, while the Banyamulenge of South Kivu where Tutsi in the majority. Both groups' identity was based on the Kinyarwanda-language and their region of residence, rather than on ethnicity (Mandani 2001:235). The Banyamasisi constituted the majority of the population in some North Kivu localities, notably in Masisi, and had been in conflict with other local groups over access to land. All over Kivu, tensions had risen since the late 1980s in the context of democratisation, as the question who was to be considered a Congolese citizen and could therefore be attributed citizen rights was intensely discussed. In the process, the Banyamulenge and Banyamasisi communities were split along the Hutu-Tutsi divide. Zaire's president Mobutu protected the land claims of the Banyamasisi, who had benefited greatly from the "Zairinisation" of arable land Mobutu had undertaken in the 1970s. Concurrently, the situation in South Kivu turned against the Banyamulenge, who increasingly had reason to fear being stripped of citizen rights. In the context of a divide-and-rule strategy by Mobutu, all Tutsi, including those from North Kivu came to be defined as Banyamulenge, and at the same time, a trans-regional Hutu identity became manifest. Since 1988, Mobutu and the allied Rwandan government materially supported the establishment of an organisation uniting the Hutu in both provinces. In response, Tutsi elites undertook to organise the Tutsi-population across Kivu. As the situation of the Tutsi deteriorated, several chose to join the RPF in their war in Rwanda. "By the middle of the 1990s, not only were Hutu and Tutsi organised across localities in Congo [Zaire, F.G.], but Hutu and Tutsi associations crossed state boundaries and began to function as regional networks" (Mamdani 2001:252).

When the refugees arrived, their militia started supporting the Zairian Hutu against other local groups. These groups, led by local politicians, defied central authority, and posed a greater threat to Mobutu's rule than the refugee irregulars (cf. Reno 1998:148-151). In fact, the latter were regarded a friendly force, while the RPF victory in Rwanda was considered

an extension of British-American influence in the region. Mobutu, who like the former Rwandan regime had historically been strongly supported by France, had to fear that extension. "With the large numbers of people of Rwandan ancestry who had ethnic ties to the RPF, the RPF victory in Rwanda posed a threat of weakening the hold of Mobutu and his associates over Kivu. Mobutu thus instigated violence among refugees, the local population, and potential separatist politicians in Kivu, as he had done earlier" (Reno 1998:164). The Hutu militias were instrumental in a presidential divide-and-rule strategy aimed at "disrupting opponents' attempts to organise rather than trying to control them directly" (Reno 1998:149). Some of the local politicians allied with the Rwandans in their struggle against local rivals, as did Mobutu in his struggle to remain the sovereign of Zaire. Additionally, the Rwandan Hutu in Zaire were backed by Burundian Hutu refugee-warriors from the internal war there which started in 1993. The alliance between Mobutu and the Hutu extremists seems to have been a fairly constant one (Reno 1998:147-181), although Mobutu often changed sides, inciting the different groups at different times to seek presidential favours. He thereby temporarily created the impression of having given up supporting the refugee irregulars,[69] but on the whole not only aided the Hutu extremists in acquiring arms (USCR 1996:74), but allegedly paid for these arms as well (Reno 1998:186). *Big Men* rivalling Mobutu worked towards an expulsion of the refugees, but failed to prevail. As a consequence of their important position in Mobutu's strategy, the Hutu militias could continuously carry out cross-border incursions into Rwanda and–less intensely–into Burundi.

In 1996, the new Rwandan regime invaded Zaire in alliance with local groups, particularly the Banyamulenge. It closed down the refugee camps and triggered the return of 600,000 to 700,000 refugees, while at least 200,000, including a considerable number of Hutu extremists, fled further into Zaire (USCR 1998:62). Zairian rebels and the Rwandan army continued to pursue them, massacring an unknown number of civilians and extremists in the process (Emizet 2000:163,[70] cf. Reyntjens 1999:100-120). Hutu extremists have continued to attack Rwanda since and the immediate aftermath of the invasion witnessed an

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[69] We should not exaggerate the importance of a short-lived action of Mobutu's *Division Speciale Presidentielle* (DSP) against the Hutu militia (cf. Reyntjens 1999:18), as the DSP always maintained close links to the Hutu militias (Reno 1998:165). In various accounts of the events, one sentence seems to be repeated in different versions over and over again: "In August [1996, F.G.], Rwandan and Zairian officials reiterated their earlier agreements that camps should close one by one to facilitate rapid, organized repatriation. Zaire again pledged to […] disarm soldiers and militia based in the camps. Zairian officials again did not fulfill the agreement" (USCR 1997:105). For a detailed account of the many twists and turns in the configuration of political alliances cf. Reyntjens 1999.

[70] Emizet alleges that some 230,000 Rwandan Hutu were massacred, yet the figure remains questionable. Of the 200,000 Rwandans remaining in Zaire according to official estimates, 185,000 were repatriated later on according to UNHCR (Flüchtlinge 1998:8).

upsurge in fighting in Rwanda as the rebels had fewer opportunities to retreat into safe territory, but they have been severely weakened and Rwanda has greatly stabilised.

The rebel alliance initially supported by Rwanda overthrew the Mobutu-regime in 1997. Subsequently, the alliance split and relations with Rwanda turned hostile. The Hutu extremists became supported by the new regime as part of a strategy similar to that of Mobutu, i.e. disrupting opponents' attempts to organise. In a context of advanced state decay, they have become a largely autonomous actor. Some 8,000 to 20,000 armed Hutu extremists still exercise some degree of control over parts of Kivu and terrorise the local population (cf. FAZ 16.07.2005).

As the analysis of these two refugee situations has shown, in weakly integrated polities which are internally structured by rivalling personal networks rather than impersonal bureaucracies, refugees can become a domestic and trans-border security problem by aligning with host country forces. In the two cases analysed, refugees repeatedly furthered interests of host country groups in two dimensions of societal reproduction, i.e. refugees were instrumental for groups trying to establish symbolic and politico-military hegemony.[71] Two mechanisms serving to establish alliances between refugees and host country groups can be distinguished.

Firstly, strategic interests of host country groups and refugees largely explain the alliances. In the Great Lakes region, refugee-warriors were integrated in classical patrimonial fashion, i.e. rulers relied militarily (partly) on outsiders because these are most likely to depend on their patron. Where not only military but symbolic hegemony was an objective of the ruler, rather than being total strangers or *Stammfremde* (Weber, see 1.1.), the refugees usually belonged to the in-group which was the power base of the ruler. The (perceived) primary challenge to the ruler in these cases seemed to be other in-groups, with whom the refugees were unlikely to establish relations. Relations between host country insurgents and refugee-warriors, i.e. between the LNM and the PLO as well as between the NRA and Rwandans, shared the characteristics of a strategic alliance and mutual protection with the patrimonial mode. In the Great Lakes region, the hierarchy in relations between refugees and rulers or opposition groups tended to privilege indigenous forces, i.e. the refugees were essentially a means of these forces to achieve or maintain political control in the host country. LNM-PLO relations lacked such a hierarchy, and in PLO-Qabadayat relations, that hierarchy was even inverted, i.e. the refugee elites temporarily became patrons of domestic

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[71] If economic factors played a role, these could hardly be captured. In the cases analysed, the refugees' alliances with local groups generally appeared not to be conditioned by economic incentives for the latter. Particularly in the Great Lakes region, the refugees tended to constitute a drain on revenue of host country patrons. Where economic motives played a salient role, i.e. in PLO-Qabadayat relations, the refugees became patrons of domestic groups.

groups. This was due to particular circumstances, i.e. a relatively weak opposition aligning with an exceptionally strong refugee army receiving much international support and thus able to mobilise revenue inaccessible to the domestic actors.

Secondly, in contrast, particularly in the Middle East and partly in the Great Lakes region, refugees integrated by virtue of being considered to belong to national (i.e. Arab), ethnic or religious groups stretching across boundaries. That kind of integration is not dependent on strategic considerations, but rather based on a belief in a common culture and destiny. This type of integration facilitates diffusion into the host society, which in turn mitigates contradictions and reduces conflict risks. Yet, when communal lines overlap with lines of political conflict, refugees are likely to become involved in power disputes. Local groups associated with the refugees will consider the increase in their numerical strength a power resource, and rivalling groups are likely to be apprehensive of the refugees and mobilise against them. Communal links stretching across boundaries facilitate alliances between nationals and refugees, yet these alliances will increase potentials of conflict only when complemented by strategic interests.

The link between different types of refugee-related violence appears to be a common causal origin, i.e. domestic groups enable refugees to acquire combat capabilities. These combat capabilities are most likely to be employed against the home state, as refugees frequently constitute a mere reserve force not employed in domestic fighting, and one of the considerations rulers take into account when tolerating cross-border attacks is the threat to symbolic hegemony represented by neighbouring states.[72] Combat capabilities thus acquired may be employed in various ways in the host country depending on specific constellations of interests, which may be the reason why that link is hard to prove inductively by establishing statistics, while a deductive approach as employed here seems to be more promising.

2.3   The International Humanitarian Community and Militarised Refugee Camps

The scope of this section is restricted to the role of the UN's humanitarian agencies in strengthening refugee-warriors.[73] In order to capture the international political dynamics within which the humanitarian system and its response to the problem developed, a brief

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[72] For instance, the fall of Obote threatened Tanzanian President Nyerere's symbolic base of power, as it seemed to undermine African socialism and national independence. Similarly, the fall of the Hutu-regime in Rwanda symbolised the relegation of rulers of the *Francophonie* to the benefit of Anglo-Saxon supported ones.

[73] Incorporating NGOs in the analysis would unnecessarily increase the complexity of the matter. The restriction to UN agencies can be justified by the important co-ordinating role these agencies assume and by the fact that they frequently are the major source of revenues for NGOs charged with implementing relief.

historical overview introduces the matter. Subsequently, two cases of humanitarian assistance under conditions of militarised refugee populations are analysed. That analysis is structured into three parts: the importance of humanitarian aid to the insurgents relative to other sources of revenue, the humanitarian organisations' self-assessment of their impact on the conflict and their attitude towards the militarisation of refugees, and a closing assessment of the respective role of humanitarian aid and humanitarian actors in the conflict. The cases of Rwandan refugee-warriors in Zaire and Palestinians have been chosen because these represent two of the most important points of reference in the discussion, while the impact humanitarian aid actually had on the creation or maintenance of material combat capacities differed strongly. The Rwandan case further is particularly relevant because it entailed a significant change in the self-assessment of the *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees* (UNHCR), the main UN body organising refugee assistance.

The problem that humanitarian assistance could further combat capabilities of refugees had been recognised early on. It was a major issue in diplomatic quarrels between the West and the Soviet Union when solutions to the European refugee crisis were discussed in the aftermath of World War II. The diplomatic dispute resulted in Paragraph 2 of the UNHCR statute stating that "the work of the High Commissioner shall be of an entirely non-political character; it shall be humanitarian and social" (Sugino 1998).

 When UNHCR was finally established as of 1 January 1951, its mandate was to ensure the protection of refugees. Furthermore, it was charged with finding durable solutions to refugee crises, which were summed up as repatriation, reintegration (in the host country) and (third country) resettlement. Protection was defined as legal protection while the provision of physical security remained a responsibility of the host state (cf. Crisp 2000:612). In fact, "the main focus of the international humanitarian response has been to emphasize physical (biological) assistance [i.e. provision of food and medical supplies, F.G.] at the expense of physical protection and human rights" (Jacobsen 1999:9). The provision of material assistance legitimated a humanitarian presence and met few political obstacles. Finally humanitarian institutional interests built up around the provision of supplies.

UNHCR became active in the Third World's refugee crises in a context of intense Cold War rivalry after the mandate confining its activities to Europe had been amended in 1967. In the three decades to follow, humanitarian organisations came to regard militarised refugee populations as something normal (Jacobsen 2000:4). During the 1960s, in most internal wars leftist and anti-colonial groups fought pro-Western governments (Rufin 1999:23). Host governments were often unwilling to disarm anti-colonial fighters among the refugees, and humanitarian organisations arranged the delivery of supplies with the combatants. As the practices aroused little international criticism, the problem developed some-

what unnoticed. During the 1970s, the patterns of war changed, and in the 1980s, internal wars were mainly fought between governments supported by the Soviets and rebels supported by the West (Rufin 1999:23). The importance of refugee aid for insurgents increased in significance when the West chose to employ humanitarian aid to influence the outcome of power struggles in the Third World.[74] Western states exerted considerable influence on UNHCR's operations. The US have consistently been the most important donor, and Western states financed most of UNHCR's budget (Zolberg et al. 1989:272).

During the Cold War, the concept of proxy wars dominated intellectual discourse on the causes of war. Instead of recognising their activities as a mechanism through which East-West tensions translated into fighting capabilities for Third World actors, humanitarian organisations considered their contribution to the system as insignificant. Cold War patrons did not need the humanitarian organisations in order to support their clients, and they would have acted as they did even in the absence of humanitarian agencies, it was argued. Being "political" was equated with pronouncing criticism on the policies that caused refugee movements, while providing humanitarian aid, even where substantial amounts were diverted to combatants, was considered "non-political" (Sugino 1998:47). The humanitarian organisations' self-assessment as non-political and uninvolved in the dynamics of war must be explained with the build-up of humanitarian institutional interests. Humanitarian organisations in the field had little power to change the situation, and ultimately only had the option to withdraw or to stay. As they were not accountable to the refugees' home country, they chose to stay.

During the 1990s, two contradictory tendencies emerged. On the one hand, the notions of "impartiality" and "neutrality" were introduced and increasingly emphasised. On the other, the new concept of a "right to relief" (Waal 1997:198), to be imposed through military "humanitarian interventions" was advocated (ibid:179, cf. Mundo 1992, cf. Kumin 1995). This shift in humanitarian policy was marked by Sadako Ogata assuming office as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in early 1991. Ogata's vision was to increase effectiveness and reach of humanitarian efforts of UNHCR. On the one hand, her decisive stance

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[74] As Zolberg et al. state, particularly before the 1980s, the US defined a refugee primarily "as someone who was escaping a communist regime" (Zolberg et al. 1989:275). The most important points of reference for the deliberate use of humanitarian aid to support Western clients are the situation on the Thai-Cambodian border (cf. Robinson 2000, Reynell 1989) and on the Pakistani-Afghan border (cf. Martin 2000:74). "Humanitarian" Cold War aid surely had a great impact on the Afghan and Cambodian conflicts, but Cold War dynamics cannot be held solely responsible for the problem. Regional and institutional humanitarian dynamics were always of great importance, and the wider international community (including non-Western states) influenced humanitarian policy outcomes. For example, the Palestinians continuously received humanitarian support (largely funded by Western states (Hudson 1997:249)), although Israel was the main Western client in the region. Similarly, refugees and refugee-warriors in Southern Africa were continuously supported (cf. Zolberg et al. 1989:273+276), although South Africa presented itself as a staunchly anti-communist country.

has resulted in greatly increased access to humanitarian resources for people in need. It was her who established the precedent of UNHCR becoming involved in humanitarian assistance to IDPs (cf. Urquhart 2005). On the other hand, the policy shift resulted in an increased emphasis on physical "biological" assistance and increased vulnerability to abuse of humanitarian resources.

UNHCR became involved in a military intervention for the first time in Yugoslavia in early 1992. Inevitably, the two contradictory concepts clashed as UNHCR became part of the international community's strategy against the Yugoslavian government (cf. Cunliffe/Pugh 1997). However, this signified little change in the character of relations between humanitarian organisations and national combatants. UNHCR had to negotiate deliveries with national forces exercising power on the spot that received or diverted supplies. Most refugee populations were not militarised, but where they were, the international forces did not separate civilians from combatants (cf. Lischer 1999).[75] The Yugoslavian experience is important primarily because it seemed to establish a "right to relief" imposed through international interventions and not dependent on the use of humanitarian resources for civilian purposes only. This provided UNHCR with a precedent employed to blame the international community for not having honoured its "obligations" when not intervening in Zaire in the mid-1990s. After severe criticism in the aftermath of the crisis in Zaire, part of which threatened the very legitimacy of humanitarian aid in general (Macrae 1998), UNHCR officially maintained its position concerning a "right to relief", and continued to advocate military humanitarian interventions were conditions are not conducive. It held on to the necessity to strike deals with irregulars in order to deliver supplies, and has not presented further guidelines on how to deal with combatants' presence in camps in case the host state is not willing to disarm refugees.[76]

Internally, however, UNHCR seems to have moved towards considering withdrawal a viable option. Starting in December 1996, shortly after the Zairian experience, UNHCR withdrew completely from a refugee site for the first time on the grounds that "the humanitarian and non-political nature of the camp had been compromised" (USCR 1998:145). The refugee site in question was the Atrush camp in northern Iraq, which hosted some 15,000 refugees and was controlled by the Turkish rebel group *Partiya Karkeren Kurdi-*

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[75] Refugee camps were not militarised because segments of the former regular army of Yugoslavia confronted each other in the war. These segments conscripted all males capable of fighting into their forces, and the distinction between soldiers and civilians was more pronounced than in most internal wars. As an exception to the rule, camps of a breakaway Bosnian faction and of Kosovars were militarised (Lischer 1999).

[76] UNHCR's manual for emergencies (UNHCR 2001a) does not discuss to what extent and under what circumstances such deals can be justified, but urged to avoid the impression that the UN recognised the irregulars.

stan (PKK). As in Zaire, there was no state able or willing to separate combatants from civilians, and the camp posed an evident threat to both the home state's and local (Northern Iraqi) security. Two months before the withdrawal, fighting had restarted involving Iraqi Kurdish rebels and the Turkish military on the one side and the PKK on the other.[77]

That withdrawal has remained an exception, and UNHCR has since tried to strike a balance between the imperatives of providing relief and avoiding abuse of relief for purposes of combat. Analysis of the impact of refugee assistance on combat capabilities is therefore still relevant. The following two sections analyse the role of refugee assistance and the UN's humanitarian organisations in two cases of heavily militarised refugee populations: the refugee crises in the Middle East and the one in the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa.

2.3.1 *Humanitarian Assistance to Palestinian Refugees*

The most long-standing refugee crisis in which humanitarian aid was continuously provided is the crisis in the Middle East. The *United Nations Relief and Works Agency* (UN-RWA) was established as of 1 January 1950 by the UN General Assembly as a special body solely occupied with Palestinian refugees and mandated "to carry out direct relief and works programmes in collaboration with local governments" (http://www.un.org/unrwa/overview/qa.html:16.03.04). UNRWA is neither charged with refugee protection nor with the search for durable solutions. Solutions were defined by the UN General Assembly and restricted to the options of repatriation or compensation (UNGA Res. 194 (III) (1949)).

UNRWA's activities essentially consisted of the development of camp infrastructures and educational facilities, the provision of items of basic necessity and support towards self-sufficiency. UNRWA traditionally put strong emphasis on the provision of education in order to enable Palestinians to make a living. The Palestinian guerilla and most Arab host governments rejected "development" activities aimed at achieving self-sufficiency, as they feared that these would lead to an integration of the refugees and consequently to a solution of the crisis not involving Israeli concessions (Viorst 1989:36f). Notwithstanding the guerrilla's rejection of "development", Palestinians developed coping mechanisms and effectively integrated economically and, where conditions were conducive, socially into their new environment.[78] Living standards in most camps rose considerably above those in

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[77] On the situation in northern Iraq cf. USCR 1998:145.

[78] In Jordan, development efforts could be supported by UNRWA with silent approval from King Hussein, who however publicly maintained that he did not intend to deprive the PLO of its constituency by inte-

traditional Palestine.[79] UNRWA operated the best schools in the Arab world, and Palestinians became the possibly best and most universally educated population in the region (ibid:54).[80] Being forced to adopt austerity measures because the mostly Western donors reduced their financial contributions, UNRWA terminated the general distribution of supplies in 1982 and restricted it to a few hardship cases. In 2004, 5.7 percent of registered refugees still received direct supplies (http://www.un.org/unrwa/overview/p05.html:16.03.04). Since the first *intifada* began in 1987, UNRWA has redirected resources to the health sector, where wounded Palestinians were treated. It further assumed an observing role, forcing Israel's soldiers to exercise restraint upon their missions in the camps, and mediated between the two sides (Viorst 1989:20-24).[81]

Generally, the position the PLO assumed in the camps was an informal one. Neither Israel nor Arab host states were inclined to allow a political-administrative organisation of the camp population. UNRWA, whose staff is mostly made up of Palestinians,[82] and Palestinian NGOs were the main channels through which the PLO could communicate informally with the civilian population. Particularly in Syria and Egypt, PLO factions were clients of the respective regimes employed to administer the camps informally on behalf of the governments. In the weaker Jordanian and Lebanese states, PLO factions temporarily controlled the camps independently from the governments. The PLO profited from UNRWA through supplies its combatants received as refugees, through wages its members employed by the agency earned, and through usage of facilities such as schools for their purposes.[83] The PLO could further strengthen its legitimacy by demonstrating an ability to obstruct registration exercises aimed at reducing the inflated numbers of refugees. It had, however, no direct role in providing supplies, and diversions do not seem to have been an important issue.[84] The PLO taxed refugees in some camps, but a substantial part of the

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grating them. More recently, UNRWA has strengthened the development component in the whole of its area of operation, primarily through micro-credit schemes, although the PLO still resents these activities.

[79] Conditions were worst in Gaza and Lebanon. In Gaza living standards rose only slowly and slightly (Viorst 1989:42), as was probably the case in Lebanon as well (cf. ibid:67f).

[80] Educational levels of Palestinians dropped during the 1990s (Hudson 1997:239).

[81] These activities were supported by the UN Secretary General. A resolution on the issue was vetoed by the US because of a passage relating to other aspects. As the monitoring activities were not criticised, UNRWA continued them (Viorst 1989:15).

[82] In contrast, the leadership of UNRWA is exclusively made up of Western expatriates.

[83] In at least one case were this became known, UNRWA reacted effectively against the abuse of its facility by closing the school and only reopening it upon assurances that these activities would be stopped. Moreover, Israel has ordered the schools in the Occupied Territories to be closed for extended periods, either as a punitive measure or to prevent them from providing points of assembly (Viorst 1989:15f).

[84] The time of the Lebanese internal war may be an exception, but little information is available on the extent of diversions. During that war, UNRWA negotiated the delivery of supplies with the different warring factions, who apparently received part of the supplies in return. Humanitarian aid was used for supplying combatants and humanitarian installations were partly used militarily, but other sources of income were far more important to the guerilla (cf. Virost 1989:67).

refugees' income was generated outside the humanitarian economy, often in Israel. Rather than profiting from resources destined for refugees, the PLO spent considerable sums on the refugees. In its quest for legitimacy, the PLO invested in the provision of social services. At times the PLO had an enormous budget possibly larger than that of the state of Lebanon (Hudson 1997:254). These revenues accrued from sympathetic Arab governments and the Palestinian diaspora which, due to their education, occupied high-ranking positions in the administrations of Arab states. Humanitarian aid may have become more important to the PLO since it lost many of its Arab supporters and diaspora Palestinians got expelled from Kuwait and Saudi-Arabia because of the PLO's pro-Saddam position in the early 1990s. It however still disposes of alternative sources of income, and its weakness seems to have led to a change in tactics (and increased willingness to compromise), rather than a breakdown of the resistance.

Relations between UNRWA and the stakeholders–the PLO, the host governments, and donors–were uneasy at times: the PLO and Arab states criticised the agency for not supplying enough assistance and for its development activities, while Israel blamed it with supporting the Palestinian resistance. Western donors, in turn, urged UNRWA to put greater emphasis on achieving self-sufficiency (cf. Zolberg et al. 1989:273).[85] Yet precisely because it had to cooperate with Israel and depended on Western donors, UNRWA was highly conscious about the political implications of its work already at a time when the connection between humanitarian aid and war rarely bothered humanitarian organisations (cf. Viorst 1989:9f). UNRWA officials were more inclined than humanitarian organisations in other parts of the world to admit that their activities had political implications (ibid.), but actively sought to remain impartial, which was defined as being acceptable to all the stakeholders. The definition did neither entail turning a blind eye to Israeli human rights violations nor to Palestinian abuses of humanitarian resources. Balancing between different imperatives–delivering supplies, developing infrastructures, promoting self-sufficiency, and monitoring the human rights situation–UNRWA considered its activities as furthering stability.

That perspective seems to be more convincing than the position that UNRWA prolonged conflict. The yardstick by which UNRWA's impact can be measured is that it remained acceptable to all the stakeholders, as all of these estimated that UNRWA was more beneficial than detrimental to their interests (Viorst 1989:12). UNRWA strongly invested in the development of infrastructure such as water supply, sewerage systems, electricity etc., i.e.

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[85] Arguably, achieving self-sufficiency and thus relieving Israel from pressure was a major reason for Western donors to support UNRWA (Zolberg et al. 1989:273). UNRWA supported self-sufficiency were it could, but as these projects are dependent on the participation of the refugees, they were a minor aspect of UNRWA's activities.

activities that would otherwise have to be carried out by the host states. Concerning Israel, that would have meant a drain on resources, probably to the detriment of military expenditures. Israel frequently criticised UNRWA and regularly succeeded to remove officials it estimated to be too critical of Israels's policies (Viorst 1989:16), but never realised its threats of expelling the agency although it could have done so (Viorst 1989:44f). After all, UNRWA did not pose an obstacle to Israel's military activity. Israel was free to take military action against the camps or to put camps under curfew where it could (i.e. particularly in the Occupied Territories), which it often did. Israel also, certainly not forgetting its strategic objectives, regularly allowed supplies to be delivered after a period of curfew.

Clearly, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has its roots in the unique circumstances of state building in Israel. Humanitarian assistance had an impact on dynamics of the conflict, but on the whole appears as a minor factor. Rather than humanitarian aid funding combat capabilities, the institution of the camp and UNRWA's educational system seem to have had the clearest impact on the conflict. These entailed the emergence of an educated refugee middle class, decisive for the emergence of Palestinian nationalism and the imposition of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians. Although the resistance was strengthened, it is debatable whether the form it took actually prolonged the war. During the first decades of Israel's coming into existence, its government had continuously complained that Palestinian resistance was too divided to present an interlocutor in peace negotiations. Difficult to measure but probably important to maintaining the Palestinians' moral was the psychological impact of UNRWA's presence, which was equated with international recognition of and support for the Palestinians' cause - which it at least partly was (cf. Viorst 1989:33+38). After all, UNRWA was politically established by actors feeling that the Palestinians should receive some kind of compensation and international support (ibid.). That means as well that UNRWA's presence was politically motivated, and its activities, though essentially humanitarian, cannot be separated from the international community's political response to the Middle Eastern conflict. Consequently, UNRWA could not have withdrawn even if its leadership had ever intended to do so, as it had a clear mandate from the UN General Assembly. More importantly, the Palestinian resistance would have had the international political support crucial to its strength even in the absence of humanitarian aid. Considering that most refugees became self-supporting by themselves, and integrated where conditions were conducive as they were in Jordan, the accusation that UNRWA prevented a solution to the conflict by rewarding a refusal to integrate with high living standards (Luttwak 1999:42) is unfounded. Taking into account the situation in Lebanon and in the Occupied Territories, it is naïve to assume that in the absence of UNRWA, Palestinians would have simply "integrated" and ceased to exist as a group or several groups with vested interests in political change in Israel.

Considering the importance of host country political dynamics presented in 2.2 and the minor impact humanitarian aid had on the PLO's combat capabilities, the Middle Eastern case is ill-suited for developing a critique of humanitarian aid. The situation in Zairian Kivu subsequently analysed is different in that respect.

2.3.2   Humanitarian Refugee Assistance in Kivu (Zaire/DR Congo)

The mass exodus of 800,000 to 1.2 million Hutu refugees into Zaire commenced in July 1994. Among these were about 50,000 to 65,000 armed extremists (Emizet 2000:165) and some 70,000 to 85,000 civilians who had participated in the genocide (Waal 1997:211). Assuming that many of the "refugees" were essentially motivated to go into exile by a desire to follow family members trying to evade charges of genocide, a substantial proportion of the camps' population and probably the majority would not have legally qualified for refugee status (cf. statement of the UN-envoy to Rwanda, quoted in Boutroue 1998:Annex Chronology). During the next months, the extremist former Rwandan government asserted their control over the camps, and by the end of the year they had established a tight grip on them. Humanitarian aid greatly contributed to the stabilisation of the extremists' organisation, thus increasing their fighting power and allowing them to control the refugee population. Large amounts of supplies were diverted or robbed, and the extremists levelled an additional tax of 15 percent on the rations the refugees received (Waal 1997:205). The other resources they disposed of were military hardware and assets taken with them when they fled, properties looted from Zairians, and support from Zairian president Mobutu. As time went by, refugees and combatants increasingly engaged in trade of natural resources acquired in the surrounding jungle, such as doe meat and charcoal. It is likely that the Hutu forces would have stepped up plundering the local population in the absence of humanitarian aid, as they have done since the termination of refugee assistance. The revenues thus gained would have allowed the extremists to continue their struggle on a lower scale, but not to control the civilian population. This control is important as it conferred a degree of legitimacy to the extremists, increased their weight in negotiations with international agencies, and the camp population provided human shields.

The camps presented a clear security threat on several fronts. Immediately upon their arrival in Kivu, the extremists continued the genocide, now targeting Zairian Tutsi. Additionally, in an attempt to create an ethnically pure "Hutuland" around Masisi (North Kivu), they fought other local militias and occasionally regular military units commanded by local elites. Thirdly, they increasingly staged incursions into Rwanda. Fourthly, they established links with Burundian rebels, and the camps became an important rear base as well as a centre for the procurement of weapons for these rebels. Fifthly, the extremists intimidated

refugees who were willing to return and robbed, threatened and killed humanitarian personnel.[86]

Humanitarian interests worked as a filter through which the problem was communicated to the outside world. There is an abundance of assertions that the extremists' influence "has created unusual security problems for refugees and relief agencies", exemplified by UNHCR's statement that "intimidation and harassment of refugees wishing to repatriate is the main security concern in the camps" (USCR 1996:74). Nonetheless, UNHCR was aware of the wider security implications and these were intensely discussed internally (Boutroue 1998:28). Divisions within UNHCR evolved around the question whether a rapid and massive or a gradual repatriation over several years should be aimed at. Proponents of the first option, particularly UNHCR Goma (North Kivu), stressed Zairian and regional stability, while those opting for the latter were motivated either by a concern for Rwandan stability, by mistrust over the evolution of the Rwandan polity, i.e. a fear of Hutu being massacred (Boutroue 1998), or by humanitarian interests in providing relief (Waal 1997).

The position that UNHCR's assistance to the refugees promoted Rwandan stability by not forcing the extremists back into their country of origin (cf. Boutroue 1998:28) as well as the fear for the safety of returnees was partly conditioned by Rwanda's intransigent stance. Rwanda continuously declared that it wanted the refugees back but did little to promote voluntary return, prompting suspicion whether it was indeed interested in their repatriation.[87] The confusion was largely caused by conflicting views within the Rwandan regime on how to react to the threat of the Kivu camps (Boutroue 1998:17). Clearly, the Rwandan regime was not so much interested in a return of se refugees *per se*, but in a solution to the

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[86] In the fighting involving Zairian Tutsi and the other militia in Kivu, 6,000 to 40,000 people died between 1993 and 1996 (USCR 1997:105). During the first half of 1996 alone, the extremists staged 98 incursions into Rwanda (ibid:84). Some 4.000 people died in the camps due to violence, including acts of banditry (ibid:104). 1994 to 1996, 28 UNHCR staff were killed, died or went missing (Flüchtlinge 1998:31), several of them when the Rwandan army invaded in 1996. Additionally, a high number of NGO employees was killed.

[87] Rwanda did not allow spontaneous returnees in, but only those arriving in UNHCR convoys. Border entry points and facilities established to receive returnees were considered inadequate for massive return but the Rwandan government refused to increase capacities. Furthermore, the government cooperated only reluctantly and partially in information campaigns aimed at educating refugees about conditions in Rwanda and in organising cross-border visits. Only in September 1995, Rwanda gave assurances to UNHCR of unhindered access to returnees. These attitudes can partly be explained by security interests and a–well founded–mistrust of the international community. In fact, return was much easier for refugees in UNHCR convoys, while the procedures involved allowed for better screening of the refugees. The Rwandan authorities were probably right in their assessment that refugees returning on their own did so to evade screening. It can be further be argued that Rwanda was completely justified in forbidding cross-border visits, as those sent into Rwanda to check the situation there were hand-picked by the extremists (Adelmann 1998). It appears that in contrast to UNHCR, the Rwandan government had realised that voluntary return was an unlikely option, and did little to realise it.

threat the Hutu extremists posed. This order of priorities caused concern within UNHCR for the safety of returnees. UNHCR Rwanda, the division in closest contact with the Rwandan authorities, estimated that the first priority for the government was return from Burundi, followed by return from Tanzania, while return from Zaire ranked least. It argued against repatriation because of a concern for Rwandan stability (ibid:28). It seems that the Rwandan regime as a whole came to consider the Kivu camps an intolerable threat to security in late 1995 only, and from then on definitely preferred a return of the refugees to their presence in Kivu.

Due to conflicting interpretations of the crisis, UNHCR failed to establish a coherent policy on repatriation (Boutroue 1998). Nevertheless, UNHCR has fairly consistently advocated voluntary repatriation and organised the first return convoy in August 1994. A concern for regional stability accounts for that policy. "In other circumstances, UNHCR would not have encouraged a return movement" (Boutroue 1998:27) as the human rights situation in Rwanda was considered unsatisfying. Officials however decided that it was not intolerable.[88] Several initiatives have been taken to encourage voluntary repatriation.

UNHCR argued that the main hindrance to repatriation were intimidation and extremist propaganda. It thereby legitimised its adherence to the concept of voluntary repatriation, although it was clear that a substantial portion of the refugees was not prepared to return under an RPF government.[89] UNHCR regularly called on the Zairian government to separate combatants from civilians, but with little effect. Prime Minister Kengo, a political rival of President Mobutu, was considered co-operative, but Mobutu remained the head of the armed forces. UNHCR started calling for an international military intervention in October 1994 with the objective of increasing security for humanitarian personnel. The call has been regularly repeated since, but with little response from the international community. UNHCR was totally aware that no international force with a robust mandate would be deployed, but unrealistically hoped that an intervention force would undermine the extremists' position (Boutroue 1998:58). In fact, the only thing an intervention would have brought about was security for humanitarian personnel, thus furthering their institutional interests in providing relief, which can be regarded the ultimate reason for the prominence of the idea.[90] Clearly, UNHCR could not have carried out a separation of combatants and

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[88] Those who returned did not suffer systematic, state-sponsored violence. "Tens of thousands of uprooted Hutu returned to their homes (in 1995, F.G.) without any serious incident. Authorities screened returnees and reportedly detained about 2 percent of them on suspicion of genocide or other crimes" (USCR 1996:61).

[89] The UN envoy to Rwanda stated that "even if 30 or 40 percent of the refugees came back, that would be a big success […] the remainder won't come back anyway because they would face charges in Rwanda for the genocide" (quoted in Boutroue 1998:Annex Chronology).

[90] Boutroue does not specify how humanitarian organisations thought an international force with an obviously restricted mandate could bring about stability. Shortly after the Somali experience, it was at best na-

civilians on its own. UNHCR staff who attempted to expel a known *génocidaire* from a camp in Tanzania in 1994 were rescued by the Tanzanian police in the very last minute. It is no surprise that the possibility to exclude extremists from refugee status was discussed in late 1996 only. As a measure within their capacity UNHCR hired, i.e. paid and equipped, 1,500 Zairian elite troops in 1995 to police the Kivu camps. The elite troops were under the command of President Mobutu and openly colluded with the extremists. Crime became less endemic, humanitarian personnel became less threatened, and relief could be distributed in a more rational manner, but the position of the extremists remained essentially unchallenged.

In addition to searching for security back up, UNHCR took further initiatives to promote repatriation. The organisation tried to create economic incentives for return by urging the government to close the camps and forbid refugees to engage in economic activities, but again with little effect.[91] At great risk to their lives, UNHCR and NGO staff distributed leaflets condemning the extremists' power and providing information on the situation inside Rwanda. Yet given the militias' influence, these measures could have little effect. Nonetheless, a few hundred people repatriated daily from the end of 1994, with numbers going up to 1,600 a day as the December 1995 deadline for a repatriation pronounced by the Prime Minister (see below) approached (Boutroue 1998). For most of the time, UNHCR refrained from advocating a relocation of camps close to the border because it believed this would send a wrong signal to the refugees, rendering their presence permanent. A relocation away from the border was further considered as not promoting cross-border security and as further endangering stability in Kivu. The extremists could move freely in Zaire and could thus reach the border from localities far inside Kivu.

In a marked shift indicating the divisions within UNHCR and the resulting inconsistency, the agency started to promote relocation deeper into Zaire and integration for a quarter to a third of the refugees in February 1996. This was prompted by the assumptions that return was not feasible for many refugees and that local integration would lead to the refugees developing civilian structures (Boutroue 1998). As the situation in Kivu and Burundi dete-

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ïve to assume that the international community was prepared to fight a war–and this is what separating combatants from civilians would have meant–against at least 50,000 combatants in a jungle environment. The call for an intervention can thus be considered a pretext for continuing humanitarian activities and putting the blame for its abuse on the international community. If realised, proposals the international community made, such as the one from the US that an international "force would work with the extremist for their mutual humanitarian interests" (Waal 1997:209), would only have perpetuated the problem (ibid., USCR 1997:107). As the intervention would only have protected humanitarian activities and as the relevant members of the UN Security Council had made clear that a force would be withdrawn should it become involved in major fighting, an international presence would not even have promoted stability inside Kivu.

[91] It is intriguing to note that UNHCR pressed for such action to be taken, while phasing out food assistance was not seriously considered.

riorated, i.e. centrifugal rather than integrative tendencies prevailed, that perspective was unlikely to materialise.[92] In fact, the right to voluntary return took priority over the principle of not supplying–in this case genocidal–irregular forces.

Important segments of UNHCR, particularly UNHCR Goma, advocated a more aggressive approach to repatriation, which however did not become official policy. When Prime Minister Kengo wa Dondo expelled some 15,000 refugees in August 1995 in an attempt to weaken Mobutu, this was welcomed by many UNHCR staff as a liberation rather than a forced return.[93] High-ranking UNHCR officials internally stated that "forceful return was the only option" and that "UNHCR should step back and close its eyes while it happened and then assist once the refugees had returned" (Boutroue 1998:66). Their position however did not become UNHCR policy. Officially, UNHCR vigorously denounced the expulsion. When Kengo subsequently announced that all camps would be closed by 31 December 1995 UNHCR unconventionally did not protest against the deadline which they regarded as encouraging voluntary return. Yet UNHCR did not feel obliged to respect it neither. The deadline was lifted by Mobutu in late November 1995. Breaking new ground, the director of UNHCR's Division of Internal Protection (DIP), a unit traditionally promoting voluntary return, introduced the notion of an "imposed return" in February 1996 (ibid:31). The idea gained acceptance later in the year, but did not become official policy. Equally in early 1996, the idea of cutting supplies was discussed. It was dismissed because many regarded it too drastic a measure, and because it was argued that it would trigger a destabilising movement into the Masisi "Hutuland" rather than a return to Rwanda (ibid:31f), an argument which is debatable.[94] Taking global UNHCR policy into account, a withdrawal from Kivu and an early termination of supplies would have jeopardised High Commissioner Ogata's project of increasing scope and reach of UNHCR's humanitarian efforts.

Although *Medecins Sans Frontieres* (MSF) and the *International Rescue Committee* (IRC),[95] two of the most experienced NGOs, left Zaire in 1995 in protest over the extremists' control of the camps, UNHCR did not seriously consider withdrawing or cutting supplies for most of the time. In public statements it justified that decision with the argument that the refugees were in such a dire condition that relief had to be provided and that vast

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[92] Ironically, the deterioration of the security situation was one of the factors pushing UNHCR to change its policy and promote integration.

[93] The expulsion was halted a few days later on the order of Mobutu.

[94] Most likely, the armed extremists would indeed have remained in Kivu and terrorised the local non-Hutu population, as they do nowadays. Yet the resources gained through plunder would not have enabled them to maintain control over the civilian refugee population. Faced with the choice between starvation in Masisi and relief in Rwanda, most civilians would probably have chosen to return. The problem constituted by the militias would thus have been rendered easier to control. Yet the situation would most likely not have turned for the better, as their was no strong political actor determined to control the Hutu militias.

[95] MSF France already withdrew in November 1994.

numbers of civilians would not have survived without it (cf. Wilkinson 1998:9f).[96] This argument was at least deceptive. Conditions were indeed dire during the first months of the refugee influx, and death rates were relatively high. After a cholera epidemic had been contained in September 1994, conditions improved markedly. The refugees were cared for quite well by African standards, and probably from early 1995 on most would have survived for about a month without assistance, time enough to repatriate by foot (Waal 1997:206f). UNHCR took into consideration a withdrawal after Rwanda invaded in November 1996,[97] when in the ensuing chaos, humanitarian supplies were abused to attract and massacre those dispersed, but eventually decided to stay (Wilkinson 1998:12). This move can be regarded as justified. The Rwandan offensive had apparently largely succeeded in weakening the extremists' control over the civilian population. Many could be repatriated out of the camps established by the extremists upon their withdrawal further into Zaire. It is very likely that many of the 185,000 people repatriated during the fighting would have been massacred if the humanitarian organisations had withdrawn.[98]

It is remarkable that senior UNHCR officials advocated extremely unconventional measures when faced with the exceptional situation in Zaire–i.e. an especially complicated security situation involving three states and several local armed actors, including a particularly strong and well organised refugee army–and that regional security considerations influenced the response. Yet processes of institutional learning were slow and on the whole, UNHCR responded with rather traditional concepts, for instance by insisting that return be voluntary and by lobbying for an international intervention which it knew would neither prevent the security situation in Kivu from deteriorating further nor overcome the power of the extremists. UNHCR's priorities were providing relief to the refugees and getting security allowing to provide relief. There was a tendency for UNHCR to interpret events in a way which would allow them to continue business as usual, i.e. by regarding their activities as actually promoting stability in Rwanda and partly as well in Kivu.

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[96] As has been stated above, a political consideration, i.e. the assumption that UNHCR's activities promoted regional and Rwandan stability, influenced that decision. Much of the criticism of UNHCR is due to the failure to communicate which considerations determined its policy.

[97] Humanitarian organisations seemed to be surprised by this development, as is exemplified by USCR's statement that the "repatriation occurred under circumstances virtually no one had foreseen" (USCR 1997:105). However, the development clearly had been predictable, as the situation in Kivu deteriorated almost steadily, and Rwanda had declared its intention to intervene if the situation did not improve at latest in February 1996. Reyntjens confirms that the Rwandan intervention was foreseeable (Reyntjens 1999:51-53). However, humanitarian organisations were equally surprised about the good condition the returnees were in upon their arrival in Rwanda (Waal 1997:210, cf. URSC 1998).

[98] The invasion was motivated by a desire to destroy the refugee camps rather than a desire to repatriate the refugees (Boutroue 1998:77). The events in late 1996/early 1997 indeed indicate that the Rwandan regime, once able to fight the extremists directly, was little inclined to let the refugees return. The forces attacked from the east, forcing the refugees deeper into Zaire. It was only when local militias blocked them from proceeding further that the refugees turned the other way.

In retrospective, UNHCR would have done better had it adopted a more aggressive approach towards repatriation early on, which would have included the early termination of the distribution of supplies. It could have done so on the grounds that that Rwanda was safe for return, that many of the Kivu camp population were not refugees in the legal sense but exiles trying to evade charges of genocide, that these exiles were the principal reason for which refugees did not repatriate, and that the large-scale diversion of humanitarian supplies strengthened these actors. Concerning safety in Rwanda, contradicting assessments of UNHCR officials of the time proved wrong. Contrary to what UNHCR Rwanda expected (cf. Boutroue 1998:28), there was no "bloodshed" when 600,000 to 700,000 refugees returned following the invasion of the RPA into Kivu. The authorities at the border were indeed overwhelmed, but ordered the refugees to register in their home locality instead of blocking their return. A further 185,000 refugees could be repatriated by air by UNHCR during the fighting, again without major incidents. There is however a dilemma: Humanitarian assistance had the greatest impact on the extremists' capacities during the early stages of the refugee crises, as it facilitated their reorganisation. At that time, many civilian refugees were in a dire condition, a cholera epidemic ravaged, and a termination of supplies would have resulted in civilian deaths on a large scale. Such a decision would have severely compromised UNHCR and neither could nor should be expected. UNHCR could however have adopted a strategy prioritising repatriation after the epidemic had been contained in September 1994. Less than three months after the crises had begun, the termination of supplies might still have had a significant impact on the extremists' attempts to consolidate their organisation. As time went by, humanitarian assistance became less central to the extremists, and it is in doubt whether a withdrawal of humanitarian organisations would still have had a significant impact on the situation.

Yet UNHCR missed other opportunities to end the–in itself intolerable–situation of supplying camps controlled by a genocidal force that attacked their home country as well as groups in the host country. The latest point in time when UNHCR should have decided to withdraw from Kivu would have been towards the end of 1995. Then, there could be little doubt that the Rwandan regime indeed preferred a return of the refugees to their presence in Kivu, and prospects for the security for the refugees as well as for stability were more promising in Rwanda than in Kivu. UNHCR had received assurances of unhindered access to the returnees and it could thus reasonably expect to be able to monitor their human rights situation. UNHCR assistance in Rwanda but not in Kivu would have been an incentive for return. Kengo's December 1995 deadline would have provided an opportunity for the organised phasing out of relief in Kivu, increasing incentives for return.

Notwithstanding, it is in doubt whether a withdrawal at that point in time would have changed the situation in Kivu. The situation   as it was in 2005–8,000 to 20,000 armed

Hutu extremists controlling parts of Kivu–is closely related to the situation of acute state decay catalysed by the Rwandan invasion of 1996. Yet given the political dynamics behind the crises–particularly the strategy of President Mobutu–it is likely that the situation today would not be too different had humanitarian organisations withdrawn earlier. The extremists would have resisted return at all costs. Finally, the Rwandan invasion seems to have done more to reduce the extremists' strength than a withdrawal of humanitarian organisations could have. Before the invasion, the figure of armed Hutu forces stood between 50,000 and 65,000 (Emizet 2000:165). The threat these forces posed would quite likely have provoked a Rwandan invasion even if the civilian refugees had been repatriated.

Notwithstanding, amid subsequent strong criticism of UNHCR, the organisation has changed its policy. "The recent refugee crises have led UNHCR to major rethinking of the concept of repatriation" and "withdrawal or non-involvement from the start are [now, F.G.] options" (Boutroue 1998:82f).

3 Case Study: Refugee Migration in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea

Since the 1990s, Liberia and Sierra Leone have been the scene of protracted conflict and the centre of sub-regional instability. The wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, characterised by many observers as being among the most brutal ones in recent history (cf. AI 2001:1) have produced large population movements. In Sierra Leone alone, more than half of its 4.5 million strong population have either sought refuge or have been internally displaced (Cholet 2003:105). Up to the late 1990s, the wars had been largely ignored by the international community, but they witnessed substantial sub-regional involvement. War refugees came to play a crucial role in this trans-national political context. The following case study examines the role refugees played in trans-border violence and internal strife in Guinea. It seeks an answer to the question why refugees became involved in violence. While the focus will be on the situation in Guinea, the background the countries of origin provided will be analysed in line with the framework presented in chapter one.

3.1 Country of Origin: Liberia

3.1.1 Background of the War

The origins of the war in Liberia can be traced back to the social distortions created by the antagonism between the ruling elite of Liberians of American descent and indigenous groups (cf. Schlichte 1992). For almost 160 years, Americo-Liberians and their assimilated allies dominated political, social, and economic life. A military coup by Sergeant Samuel K. Doe on 12 April 1980 brought an indigenous Liberian to the heights of political power for the first time. The overthrow was largely welcomed by the population, but support soon faded as Doe started to concentrate power within his own ethnic group, the Krahn. These made up some five percent of the country's population (Schlichte 1992:85). "Progressive" Americo-Liberians and non-Krahn-figures from the indigenous population, notably ethnic Mano and Gio,[99] who initially backed the overthrow of the former regime were increasingly replaced or simply killed. Political competition became intense, and as the Liberian elites rivalling for power based their claims on ethnic followings, the political landscape and the military got thoroughly ethnicised during the 1980s.

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[99] The Gio are as well referred to as "Dan". In order to avoid confusion I will exclusively use the more frequently applied term Gio.

The alienation of "progressive" elements and non-Krahn natives was more important to subsequent developments than the displacement of the *ancien regime*. The "progressives" had been instrumental in weakening the last Americo-Liberian President William Tolbert. One of them was Charles Taylor, son of an Americo-Liberian and a native Gola woman and chairman of the *Union of Liberian Students in the Americas* (ULAA). After his studies, Taylor became director of the General Services Agency, a government procurement body. He was a protégé of Corporal (later General) Thomas Quiwonkpa, a Gio from Nimba County and commander of the *Armed Forces of Liberia* (AFL). Taylor fled to the US in 1984 to avoid prosecution for embezzlement but (after escaping from prison while awaiting extradition) rejoined Quiwonkpa in Côte d'Ivoire.[100] Quiwonpa had left Liberia in 1983 amid a power struggle with Doe and subsequent attempts by the latter to oust him from his position. Several other Nimba County-based political figures joined them in exile, notably representatives of the Gio and Mano ethnic groups.

Doe's Krahn-clique privileged elites from the Mandingo ethnic group. The latter's extensive trade connections in the region as well as their politically weak status as a minority of Muslim immigrants made them an attractive ally (Reno 1998:92). Many of the Liberian Mandingo are descendants of migrant traders who had established themselves in the Forest Region of Guinea before proceeding to contemporary Liberia. These Forest Mandingo developed a certain autonomy and separate ethnic identity from those in the Mandingo heartland in Upper Guinea. They are divided into several sub-groups, of which the Konia or Konianké, with a stronghold in the Macenta and Beyla provinces of Guinea, are particularly important in the context of this paper. During Sekou Touré's rule of terror 1958-1984 that caused about one third of the population to flee Guinea, the emigration of Guinean Mandingos–mostly from the Konianké sub-group–to Liberia increased. They mingled with the Mandingo already present there, reinforcing and strengthening the informal ties of the Liberian Mandingo to the Konianké (and Guinean officials (Reno 1998:92)). The Mandingo refugees in Guinea are frequently considered Guinean returnees, even though many do not consider themselves Guineans. In Liberia and to a lesser extent in Guinea's Forest Region, tensions were latent between the Mandingo traders and the "indigenous" groups (cf. Richards 1995:154f).[101] The traditional agrarian community is characterised by a profound attachment to the soil and an economic mode of production that is based on reciprocity and the conservation of the social entity. By contrast, the idealtypical merchant is

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[100] The corruption charges have to be seen as an opportunity to get rid of expensive clients rather than an attempt to strengthen accountability. Anyway, if extradited, Taylor would have been „more likely to have met an untimely end than stand a fair trial" (Richards 1995:165).

[101] Relations between the groups in Sierra Leone were not trouble-free either, but tensions did not escalate. Richards explains the difference with a comparatively advanced diffusion of Mandingo values into Sierra Leonean society (Richards 1995:155f).

characterised by a high degree of mobility and the quest for profit. In traditional societies, the merchant is almost universally regarded with contempt (cf. Jung 1995:138), and cleavages between agrarian and trading communities are widespread in modernising societies.

Rigged elections in 1985 confirmed Samuel Doe as President, but sealed the hostility of non-Krahn peoples towards the regime. Particularly the peoples of Nimba County considered Jackson F. Doe, a Gio and ally of Quiwonkpa, to be the true winner of the elections. On 12 November 1985, Thomas Quiwonkpa staged an attempted coup–some call it an invasion from Sierra Leone–backed by Gio and Mano elements in the increasingly Krahn-dominated AFL. Its failure resulted in the execution of Quiwonkpa and undiscriminating campaigns of repression by the AFL against the suspected supporters of the coup plotters, i.e. Mano and Gio in Monrovia and the civilian population of Nimba. Between 600 and 1,500 people are said to have died in the massacres. Heavy repression continued the following years (Schlichte 1992:105). Gio and Mano, soldiers as well as civilians, fled for Côte d'Ivoire. It was mainly among these that Charles Taylor, supported by Côte d'Ivoire, Libya and Burkina Faso, recruited his roughly 150 combatants. On 24 December 1989 his *National Patriotic Front of Liberia* (NPFL) invaded Nimba County from Côte d'Ivoire.

3.1.2   Refugees, Interests and Strategies in the Liberian Civil War

Following the invasion, Samuel Doe declared that "he would transform Nimba County into an empty land, where even ants would not live" (Damme 1999:37). Relentless campaigns by his army against civilians in Nimba County sent waves of refugees to Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea and quickly filled the ranks of Taylor's forces with new recruits (Ruiz 1992:5).[102] The NPFL advanced rapidly and occupied Buchanan, Liberia's second biggest town, in late May 1990. In the beginning of July, it entered the suburbs of the capital, but was prevented from conquering it by a sub-regional military intervention.

This sub-regional intervention and its motivations are of utmost importance to an understanding of the configuration of interests and actors conditioning opportunities for refugee-warriors. Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Libya and France supported the NPFL rebellion. The support of Côte d'Ivoire is most often explained by personal animosities. A step-daughter of its President Houphouët-Boigny was married to Adolphus B. Tolbert, the son of the former Liberian President. Tolbert junior was killed by order of Samuel Doe. Around 1985, a foster sister of Tolbert's widow became the wife of Blaise Compaoré, then the second most important political figure of Burkina Faso and its President after a palace

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[102] By late March 1990, some 97,000 people, mostly Mano and Gio, had fled to Guinea and similar numbers had left for Côte d'Ivoire (Damme 1999:38).

coup in 1987. However, in traditional social settings in general and in African politics in particular, personal relations are inseparable from economic and political relations, and the former often serve to stabilise the latter (cf. Jung 1995:134-147).

The longstanding rivalry between French and Anglo-Saxon spheres of influence goes a long way in explaining the alliances. A Taylor leadership would almost certainly have redirected trade flows towards Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso. This would have meant a relative increase in French influence in the region. Côte d'Ivoire had always maintained its close ties with its former colonial power and Burkina Faso had re-established them after Compaoré's coup. Indeed, the two countries rapidly profited from their alliance with Taylor, as "French and Ivoirian-based Lebanese commercial interests have been important in supplying the NPFL (and perhaps the RUF also) with credit and access to equipment, in return for business concessions in minerals and tropical forest products" (Richards 1995:143). Furthermore, Compaoré was deeply involved in arms-against-diamonds deals with the NPFL. For Libya, the desire to extend its influence into sub-Saharan Africa, especially to a country that symbolised American influence in Africa like no other, played a crucial role in strategic considerations.

Generally, the *Economic Community of West African States'* (ECOWAS) "language of economic integration reflected an underlying concern for regional and regime security" (Clapham 1994:77). These concerns culminated in a military intervention by the *ECOWAS Cease Fire Monitoring Group* (ECOMOG) in the Liberian war (ibid.). The driving force behind the ECOMOG intervention was Nigeria, which has no common border with Liberia. The reason for its engagement was connected to the long-standing rivalry with Côte d'Ivoire for hegemonic status in the sub-region, but the decisive factor were interests in regime sovereignty. Côte d'Ivoire and France had supported the Biafra-secessionists in Nigeria's civil war 1967-1970. This experience had broadened the parameters of Nigeria's definition of national security. It would have established a precedent deemed unacceptable if Taylor came into power with the support of mercenaries from neighbouring states and the complicity of France (Inegbedion 1994:222-225/ Körner 1996:100-104+112f/ ICG 2002:2). Similar calculations account for the engagement of the other ECOMOG-supporting states (see below), among whom Guinea temporarily was the second most important contributor.[103]

On 24 August 1990 the first 5,000 ECOMOG troops, 500 of which were Guinean, were deployed to Monrovia. Until 1996, Taylor exercised kind of control about some 60 to 80 per cent of the country, called "Taylorland" by outside observers and "Greater Liberia" by

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[103] Nonetheless, Nigeria totally dominated the ECOMOG operation and covered 80 to 90 percent of its costs.

Taylor (Montclos 1999). The ECOMOG, together with the AFL and several irregulars,[104] secured Monrovia and its environs. The NPFL initially enjoyed considerable support and indeed remained the most representative of the armed factions. Notwithstanding, it engaged in gross human rights abuses. One of its principal targets were ethnic Krahn, who were targeted to revenge the atrocities of the AFL and as a strategy to build support among other ethnic groups alienated by Doe. Krahn civilians and soldiers of the disintegrating AFL fled massively, primarily to Sierra Leone. The other principal target of the NPFL was the Mandingo community. On the one hand, violence against rural traders aimed at profiting from the latent peasant-trader tensions. On the other hand, violence against Mandingo was an important moment in the reorganisation of the war economy of "Taylorland". The anti-trader violence largely was directed against "a rather different stratum of Mandingo trading interests in the sub-region - namely large-scale traders from the Senegal and Upper Niger basins", referred to as *Maranka* in Sierra Leone (Richards 1995:156). "Allegedly, Maranka interests control[ed] an important share of the unofficial diamond trade from Sierra Leone. Although firm evidence is in short supply, it is estimated that diamonds account for about a third of all Sierra Leone's GDP [...]. The [17 major, F.G.] unofficial dealers are presumed to handle the greater part of the 30-40 per cent of Sierra Leone's diamond wealth that is smuggled each year, much of it […] through Monrovia. [...] Supposedly, much of this wealth found its way through networks linking Monrovia, Conakry and Dakar to Europe and the Middle East" (ibid.).

"Areas under Taylor's control were […] a domain organized through selective access to rights to profit rather than by rule over a specific territory. NPFL attacks on Liberian Mandingo [... represented an, F.G.] ambitious attempt to replace a vulnerable minority group and foreign traders as intermediaries and directly conduct commerce for the benefit of NPFL fighters" (Reno 1998:98). By late 1990, trade in several Lofa County towns was directly controlled by the NPFL (ibid:97). Generally, in Taylorland, "[t]he few travellers who could move freely were Gio and Mano people, overwhelmingly supporters of the NPFL, who soon acquired control of local trade" (Ellis 1999:89). As a consequence of Taylor's "warlord politics" (Reno 1998), many Mandingo fled, most of them to Guinea. The reasons for their flight were the loss of physical security and the expropriation of their basis of material reproduction.

Generally, the major reason for flight was the destruction of the rural and urban economy as a result of looting and other forms of violence carried out by all of the armed factions. The substantial insertion of the Liberian war economy into the world market, centred on

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[104] The main irregular armed actors were the NPFL, the *Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia* (INPFL), the two *United Liberation Movement* (ULIMO) factions, the *Liberian Peace Council* (LPC) and the *Lofa Defence Force* (LDF).

externally financed log and diamond production in enclaves, obliterated the warring factions from the need to build consensus in exchange for resources (Reno 1998:38f). Additionally, destroying local self-help capacities forced people to depend on the faction leaders' patronage. These phenomena and the associated incentives for undiscriminating violence against civilians (Reno 2000:55) have been comparatively more accentuated in Sierra Leone. This is important for explaining the difference in the insurgents' respective social basis. In Liberia, looting was relatively focused and tended to be directed against the imagined enemy, i.e. certain ethnic groups. "Taylor was shrewd enough to seek the support of clan chiefs and other local leaders where possible, so that daily life continued with some degree of normality in much of his territory after the disruption caused by the first months of the war" (Ellis 1999:91). Members of a potentially hostile ethnic group could be looted with impunity. This mode of looting further exacerbated ethnic cleavages and uprooted large numbers of people, increasing the number of potential recruits for Taylor's opponents. The support Taylor was able to mobilise up to his resignation in August 2003 especially in Bong and Nimba Counties (ICG 2002:21) indicates that it was possible to keep looting relatively targeted. This seems surprising as most fighters were not paid and consequently highly undisciplined. Yet Taylor's control over access to arms, his charismatic qualities and an effective surveillance system allowed him to somewhat effectively control his troops.

3.1.3 Host Country: Sierra Leone

In the beginning of the war, most Liberian refugees fled for Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire. This pattern changed as the NPFL forces approached Monrovia in late May 1990. Already in mid June, 20,000 refugees had arrived in Sierra Leone, and by September their number had increased to more than 125,000 (Ruiz 1992:22). These refugees mostly came from outside the heartland of Taylor's rebellion, i.e. they belonged to groups perceived as hostile to the NPFL. Many had been subject to abuses by the NPFL and the disintegrating AFL. A substantial number of the refugees were former AFL soldiers fearing revenge upon their imminent defeat.

On 23 March 1991, the *Revolutionary United Front* (RUF), a Sierra Leonean rebel force supported by Taylor and reinforced by NPFL-combatants, entered Sierra Leone from Liberia. Contacts between Taylor and RUF-leaders dated back to pre-war times, at least to mid-1989 (Abdullah 1997:67). Taylor's backing of the invasion into Sierra Leone was motivated by security concerns and economic interests. Extending "political control across international boundaries by co-opting and further politicizing cross-border networks" (Reno 1998:114) was intended to sabotage the Sierra Leonean contribution to ECOMOG. Sec-

ondly, the alliance increased Taylor's control of cross-border trade. Already before the invasion "NPFL fighters and Sierra Leonean [had, F.G.] collaborated in […] clandestine trade, which deprived the Sierra Leonean government of revenue and armed the NPFL. But the involvement of [government, F.G.] officials in the trade blocked NPFL designs to gain direct access to Sierra Leone's wealth" (Reno 1998:123).

The invasion seemed to confirm the Sierra Leonean government's perception of the refugee influx as a major threat to social, economic, and, most important, political stability (Ruiz 1992:22). The Sierra Leonean border town of Zimmi, where about 65,000 Liberian refugees had put up a camp, served as a base for the RUF rebels (Wiedensohler 1992:159). This prompted allegations that the NPFL had infiltrated the camp.[105] The invasion sparked some anti-Liberian resentment in Sierra Leone, and many refugees accused of smuggling weapons or otherwise supporting the invasion were arrested and often manhandled (ibid.). On the other hand, the Sierra Leonean government found useful allies in certain refugee groups.

Since May 1991, Roosevelt Johnson, Minister for Rural Development under Doe, had recruited refugees in Sierra Leone, predominantly Krahn from the former AFL, and founded the *United Liberation Movement* (ULIMO). The Guinea-based Mandingo *Movement for the Redemption of Liberian Moslems* (MRLM) headed by Al Hadji Kromah, a former Minister of Information, joined the ULIMO soon after. The ULIMO was thus essentially composed of beneficiaries of the *ancien regime*, who had lost their power and status due to the war in Liberia. The extension of the war into Sierra Leone by a group close to Taylor threatened to render their already volatile situation even more precarious. From the moment of its creation, the ULIMO fought together with the *Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces* (RSLMF) against the RUF. They were supported by bilaterally deployed contingents from Nigeria and Guinea. The ULIMO became a major ally of ECOMOG. Power struggles between the two ULIMO wings led to a split in a Sierra Leone-based Krahn faction, the ULIMO-J under Roosevelt Johnson, and a Guinea-based Mandingo faction, the ULIMO-K of Al Hadji Kromah in 1994. The divide had actually been present before, and both factions had considerable organisational autonomy. When Liberia transcended into war again after a semblance of peace between 1996 and 2000, lines of conflict followed those previously established. The *Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy* (LURD) were founded in February 2000 and had their organisational roots in the ULIMO factions (ICG 2002). In early 2003, the Krahn-faction split from the LURD and became subsequently known as *Movement for Democracy in Liberia* (MODEL).

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[105] The Waterloo camp close to Freetown had also been suspected by several refugees interviewed during the research to have been infiltrated.

3.2 Country of Origin: Sierra Leone

3.2.1 Background of the War

Compared to Liberia, where war had been preceded by a decade of ethnicisation of politics and the military resulting in rather clearly demarcated boundaries between political interest groups, the outbreak of the war in Sierra Leone occurred in a less structured environment of political competition. This is important to an understanding of the specific social bases of the warring factions. In Liberia, ten years of increased ethnic agitation had marked group boundaries and structured the lines of conflict. In military-governed Sierra Leone the ethnicisation of politics was less advanced. The military had deteriorated rather than become ethnicised, as politicians relied on loosely organised gangs for repression. "The rapid rate of regime turn-over [... then F.G.] made it difficult for some of the ethnic interests that were already building up around state leaders to consolidate their grip on power" (Bangura 1997:145).

The RUF had its origins in early left-wing student movements that had become closely related to youths of a stratum of society often referred to as "lumpen proletariat": marginalised and semi-literate individuals of urban and rural background, socialised within a semi-criminal and often violent environment. An increasing informalisation in the allocation of state revenues and a corresponding retrenchment of the state from the provision of public services during the 1980s entailed the growth of this population segment. Student representatives had been instrumental in establishing contacts with Libya, organising military training and creating the RUF, but quickly lost control over the movement. The "insurgency force from Liberia was composed of three distinct groups: those who had acquired military training in Libya – predominantly urban lumpens – and had seen action with the NPFL as combatants; a second group of Sierra Leoneans, resident in Liberia, mostly lumpens; and a third group of hard core NPFL fighters from Liberia, on loan to the RUF" (Abdullah 1997:68). In 1992, the military leader Foday Sankoh, who belonged to the "lumpen" segment of the RUF recruited by the students,[106] took control and ordered the execution of the remaining two students in the RUF leadership (Abdullah 1997).[107] The war and the way in which violence was perpetrated then reproduced the uprising's own social basis.

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[106] Foday Sankoh had been an army Corporal who had been jailed and retired for alleged involvement in a coup attempt in 1970. He then worked as a photographer and later became associated with a student movement, but was himself said to have had a rather troubled educational history (Abdullah 1997).

[107] The social composition of the RUF is still a point of considerable debate. Richards (1996) has argued that "excluded intellectuals" were an important segment within the RUF even after Sankoh took control. He has been strongly criticised by the Sierra Leonean intellectuals cited above.

3.2.2 Strategies, Tactics of Warfare and Re-production of a Social Basis

In the beginning, the RUF tried to present the struggle as an uprising of the Mende ethnic group, hoping for a similar overreaction like that of Doe in Liberia to fill up its ranks (Richards 1995:139). Although there was much confusion on the part of the government about how to interpret the rebellion, this strategy finally failed. Instead of ordering the expected repression, panicking representatives of the administration and the RSLMF simply left Mende-areas, leaving them to the RUF and exposing the local population to their abuses (ibid:149).

The first targets of the RUF were government representatives, mostly subaltern employees of the administration in rural areas as well as "traditional" authorities. Yet the RUF strategy went beyond destroying the organisational structures of the incumbent regime, aiming instead at destroying any form of conventional social cohesion.[108] Looting was systematically accompanied by murders, rapes, abductions, mutilations and the burning down of fields and villages. Atrocities were generally carried out without regard for ethnic or religious affiliations (HRW 1998:12). Most victims were subsistence farmers, miners and small merchants (ibid:13). Nevertheless, a focus on men of voting and fighting age could be observed, as they were to be discouraged from supporting to the government. The vast majority of victims were men between sixteen and forty five (ibid.). The destruction of existing social structures and means of economic reproduction served several purposes. Firstly, the uprooting made new recruits available, particularly from among those who could not return to their villages because they had been forced to commit atrocities against their communities. Secondly, IDP flows into government-held territory were systematically created to put a strain on the government's resources. Thirdly, local structures could no longer be controlled by the government or serve as a basis for local resistance, and fourthly, the regime's economic base was undermined as taxes could no longer be collected and government soldiers had fewer opportunities to loot.

The RUF's conduct was mirrored by the regular army. Particularly from 1991 to 1995, government troops seemed more occupied with looting than with fighting the insurgents (Keen 2000:29). Often, it could not even be established whether it had been the army or the rebels who were responsible for an attack. The army thus contributed to the atomisation of social structures. The social basis for the continuation of warfare created by both sides was a "lumpenised" population, disintegrated from their communities. Often, youths joined one of the parties for individual reasons, i.e. economic gain or revenge against those suspected

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[108] Abdullah (1997) holds that the attitude towards civilians was subject to discussion within the RUF leadership early on, and that the violence was actively encouraged by Foday Sankoh. Massive human rights abuses thus appear to have been part of a deliberate strategy.

of being responsible for the killing of their relatives. The rudimentary cohesion of the combatant organisations, illustrated by instances of cooperation between the army and the rebels for purposes of looting (and in the military coup 1997), is directly related to the preponderance of individual motives on the side of their fighters (cf. Keen 2000).

This assessment has to be qualified for one armed party which assumed outstanding importance later on, the Kamajor. When the RUF established "control" over the Mende-areas, many fled their abuses into IDP-camps in government-held territory. These camps came under attack by the RUF (and probably the army as well). The Kamajor militia was established by the IDP in order to re-establish security. It was comparatively homogeneous, reinforcing its cohesion by drawing on ethnic symbols of the Mende, and had substantial support from the displaced civilians. Faced with an unreliable army, President Kabbah equipped them with modern weapons after his election victory in 1996. The Kamajor became an elite paramilitary unit and the main military supporter of the President (cf. Muana 1997).

Concerning the net effect of refugee movements on the Sierra Leonean war economy, the flight of civilians constituted a loss of potential rebel resources that could not be substituted with refugee aid. The RUF was reported to have tried to recruit refugee in the Katkama camp (Milner 2005:150), but never succeeded to exert meaningful influence in the refugee camps in Guinea. Several refugees interviewed by the author told that they fled to avoid forced conscription or forced mining. Undisciplined looting, including that of miners, and subsequent flight diminished the rebels' economic base. The importance of slave labour to the RUF economy probably indicated the losses brought about by flight,[109] as slavery generally is associated with a scarcity of available labour (Marx 1987:792-802). Slave labour is a relatively unproductive form of exploitation. The pool of working slaves regularly empties and has to be refilled. Faced with a scarcity of human resources, RUF attacks on and abductions from refugee camps in Guinea increased in 1999 (http:\\www.hrw.org/press/1999/may/guinea530.htm:03.01.02). In the late 1990s, the RUF increasingly called on refugees to return. Many of those who returned were later forced to mine (AI 2001:26f). Apart from a need for manpower, the prospect of profiting from humanitarian aid is likely to have accounted for the RUF-attempts to bring people back into its territory, indicating how little they could profit from humanitarian aid in Guinea. Likewise after the peace accord of 1999, control over people in RUF territory would have strengthened the position of the RUF in any subsequent negotiations, which was avoided by enabling civilians to stay abroad.

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[109] In interviews, several refugees referred to slavery as an important or the dominant mode of production. Cf. also UN 1998 and AI 2001:25.

The failure of the RUF to establish itself in the refugee camps can be explained by a lack of rebel legitimacy on the one hand, and the attitude of the Guinean state on the other. The RUF enjoyed little legitimacy, as refugees overwhelmingly blamed their plight on the rebels. While entering the rebel force offered some individual gain, the RUF was not considered to be expressing any civilian interests. The absence of any ethnic or religious ideology connecting rebels and civilians contributed to that perception. At the same time, Guinea's aggressive attitude towards the RUF increased the "transaction costs" of a diversion of humanitarian aid. "Unlike the situation in Liberia [...], infiltration of the camps by AFRC/RUF members is not known to have happened to a large extent.[110] Suspected AFRC/RUF members have reportedly turned up in small numbers, and have been identified by the refugees and handed over to the Guinean authorities" (HRW 1998:29). In the context of the invasion in 2000, the Guinean authorities ordered the Massakoundou camp, four kilometres away from the important town of Kissidougou, to be closed. It suspected that the camp hosting mostly Sierra Leonean refugees had been infiltrated by the RUF (Milner 2005:155). There is little evidence that this was indeed the case, yet the camp understandably was a cause of concern to the authorities. During the fighting, the RUF had taken the nearby town of Yende and had been advancing on Kissidougou. Given precarious governmental control over the area, the camp was indeed a potential hiding place for RUF rebels.

3.3   Host Country: Republic of Guinea

3.3.1   General Background

Guinea was the first French colony in Africa to gain independence in 1958. It was the sole colony that refused to join the "Communauté Française". The postcolonial foreign policy of its first President Ahmed Sékou Touré was isolationist and the defence of independence was central to the ideological legitimisation of one of the most repressive regimes Africa ever witnessed. Sékou Touré, an ethnic Mandingo,[111] established a totalitarian system built on his personal control of every aspect of economic and political life. Undiscriminating campaigns against potential opponents, at times directed against the Peul ethnic group as a whole, were a regular feature of political life (cf. Condé 1972, cf. Kaké 1987). About two million Guineans, roughly one third of the population, fled the country during Touré's rule.

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[110] The *Armed Forces Revolutionary Council* (AFRC) was a short-lived military government of Sierra Leone that had conducted a military coup in collaboration with the RUF in 1997.

[111] The ethnic group is called *Malinké* in Guinea. In order to avoid confusion, I will continue to employ the Anglo-Liberian term Mandingo.

In colonial times an important exporter of agricultural produce, the country's economy was restructured around the mining sector, especially bauxite. Although blessed with abundant natural and mineral resources making it a potential middle income country (Devey 1997), at the end of Touré's presidency the economy was devastated and agricultural production in the formal sector had virtually ceased. The combination of extreme repression and poverty earned Guinea the reputation of Africa's Albania. After Touré's death in 1984, Colonel (later General) Lansana Conté seized power in a coup. He opened up the country to the outside world and privatised the economy. Due to donor pressure, the political system was partly democratised in the early 1990s, but elections held so far were neither free nor fair and repression is ongoing. An increase in international development assistance (reflected in a sharp rise in foreign debt) and increasing possibilities for self-enrichment of the elite stimulated some economic growth in the Conté era,[112] yet three times Guinea came last in the World Bank's *Human Development Index* (HDI) chart in the 1990s. The political economy of contemporary Guinea is characterised by the use of political power to secure economic opportunities for the President, his family and some cronies. Economic reproduction of the elite is based on the exploitation of the country's natural and mineral resources, (monopolised) import of consumer goods and involvement in illicit international trade in diamonds and weapons.[113]

The influx of refugees beginning in late 1989 coincided with an accelerated process of social change incurred by the altered political parameters. Refugees entered a socio-economic environment less developed than that of their home countries. Compared to Liberia and Sierra Leone, Guinea was virtually virgin territory concerning the provision of social and material infrastructures and the market economy. Politically, the influx took place in the context of a highly personalised and de-institutionalised state structure. At the height of the refugee crisis in late 1998, official statistics showed 739,318 refugees in Guinea (RdG 1999:7), roughly ten percent of the population, making it one of the countries with the highest proportion of refugees among its population worldwide.[114] Although UNHCR statistics are known to have been grossly inflated and real figures were probably closer to half or even a third of that, in some districts close to the border the population effectively doubled, tripled or even quadrupled. In Guinean public opinion, the effects of

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[112] In Guinean Francs, annual GDP growth averaged 4 to 5 percent. In US Dollars, GDP growth was close to or below population growth (author's calculations, based on Hemstedt 1991-1998, Wegemund 1999, EIU figures).

[113] "A mid-level functionary in the agriculture ministry, who worked in conjunction with European arms dealers, was responsible for issuing 80 per cent of the documentation for illicit arms fuelling West Africa's regional war in the 1990's. Could this have taken place without the involvement, or at least the complicity of Guinea's security forces? Almost certainly not. At least one source has pointed to a former senior figure in the ministry of defence" (ICG 2005:16).

[114] Only Jordan and Gaza/Westbank had a higher proportion of refugees among their populations, while in Lebanon, the proportion was roughly equal to that of Guinea.

broader changes in the political economy are frequently confused with those of the refugee influx. In the following sections, the entry of refugees into given international, national and local relations and conflict-related aspects of this will be examined in more detail.

3.3.2 *Guinea, Regional Relations, and the Refugees*

Traditionally, Guinea regarded interference from colonial powers and particularly from France a major threat to regime security. France and Guinea had cut relations after independence and only loosely re-established them after 1977. In many ways, Guinea continued to define national security as the containment of French influence (cf. ICG 2002:11), and has privileged relations to the US. A Portuguese-lead invasion by diaspora dissidents of Conakry in 1970, which almost succeeded to replace the regime, seemed to confirm the perception of a neo-colonialist threat.[115] The event constitutes an important point of reference in the thinking of the political elite and is condemned across party lines. The prevention of regime change engineered by (former) colonial powers in the region is regarded as a move with direct relevance for Guinean (regime) sovereignty. The uprising in Liberia lead by Charles Taylor was considered a French attempt to increase France's influence in the region, and was probably taken as an indication for the existence of a French plan to gain full control over the Mount Nimba iron ore project.

Eight weeks before the war started, Guinea's President Lansana Conté had signed an agreement with Liberia for the joint exploitation of the Mount Nimba iron ore deposits located on both sides of the border. The iron ore should be transported by train to the Liberian town of Buchanan, from where it would be exported overseas. Taylor's invasion suddenly rendered these plans obsolete, and in the long run threatened to relinquish control over the Liberian share of the project to a France-Taylor alliance.[116] However, after it became clear that Doe could not be kept in power, a quick victory of Taylor would have served the economic interests of Guinea, as this would have allowed the exploitation of the ore. If the Mount Nimba project played a role in Guinea's decision (as is often supposed (Körner 1996:166-168)) its political rather than its economic implications would have been crucial.

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[115] The invasion was motivated by the Guinean support for the anti-colonial rebels in Guinea-Bissau.
[116] The French public *Bureau des Recherches Géologiques et Minières* (BRGM) had taken over organising the project. It was represented in the *Nimba International Mining Company* (NIMCO) consortium, whose other stakeholders were the *African Mining Company of Liberia* (AMCL), the *Liberian Mining Company* (LIMINCO) and the Guinean *Société Mifergui-Nimba*. The AMCL was controlled by Americo-Liberian interests close to Taylor, while the LIMINCO majority share was state-held, i.e. under control of the Doe regime (Körner 1996:167). A victory of Taylor would have meant that he – and by extension France - had dominated the project.

An economic interest in influencing developments in Liberia, however, was created because of Taylor's destruction of Mandingo trading networks and his links with Côte d'Ivoire, which undermined Guinea's position in regional trade. Guinea was widely assumed to be an important transit country for goods smuggled into and from Liberia and Sierra Leone (cf. Richards 1995). Guinea's primary interest concerning its southern neighbours therefore was to prevent Charles Taylor and in extension Foday Sankoh from acceding to power. Any faction or government opposed to the NPFL and the RUF was consequently supported.

When the ECOMOG troops intervened in Liberia, the *United Liberation Movement* (ULIMO) became their most important irregular partner. The Guinean army was affiliated particularly with its Mandingo faction lead by Al Hadji Kromah. In order to explain that alliance, a brief reflection on Guinean political history is necessary.

The ethnic Soussou Lansana Conté inherited a security system from Sékou Touré that was strongly de-institutionalised. The army was in bad shape and deprived of weapons, while several special paramilitary units and "civilian" militias assumed security functions. This had alienated the military from the regime, and after his coup d'état Conté undertook to strengthen the army to establish a support base. However, he found the army to be unreliable. A first coup attempt allegedly instigated by the Touré family in 1985 resulted from power struggles in the transition period rather than from widespread discontent within the army. It was nevertheless important because of its consequences for the national political landscape and its regional implications. The coup was interpreted as a Mandingo attempt to return to the status quo ante. It was followed by a government-instigated pogrom against Mandingo civilians and a purge against Mandingo in the army. This alienated the Mandingo from the government.[117] Many Mandingo soldiers fled to Liberia, where they established links with the interest groups that later created the ULIMO. Conté became increasingly suspicious of his army.[118] The threat it posed was countered by returning to old pat-

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[117] President Conté delivered a public speech to his supporters, famous for his appraisal "Wo fata" ("You have well done" in Soussou), after scores of Mandingo civilians had been killed, their property looted and their businesses destroyed. Conté resorted to patronising Mandingo elites in the 1990s and has overcome much Mandingo resentment, but some mutual mistrust remains.

[118] A speech by Conté delivered to his officers in 2000 clearly expresses his apprehension of the army and deserves to be quoted in length. "Je ne veux pas me mettre à citer tout ce que vous avez fait de 1958 jusqu'à nos jours. Car chacun de nous le connaît. [...] Dieu m'a donné la chance avec vous de diriger un pays. [...] Ce que vous êtes déjà, c'est pas petit. [...] Quand il [un soldat F.G.] l'est [un officier F.G.], il faut qu'il défende d'abord son rang d'officier qui n'est pas à négliger dans tous les Etats, il faut que vous vous respectiez. [...] Ce qu'Il [Dieu F.G.] ne te donne pas, tu ne pourras jamais l'avoir. En cherchant trop à l'avoir, Il te fait perdre même ce que tu as. Qu'est-ce que tu as de plus cher dans le monde, c'est la vie. Si tu cherches trop loin, c'est la vie là que tu perds" (Le Républicain 10.01.2000).

terns of fragmenting the security sector, relying on special units,[119] civilian militias and the ULIMO or LURD respectively. A second coup attempt in 1996 indicated discontent and serious splits within the army (Docking 1999). Following the coup attempt, a substantial number of soldiers fled to Liberia, where they allegedly allied with Taylor.

Faced with a discontent army, politicised ethnicity, and armed dissidents in neighbouring countries, Conté had to neutralise several threats. Firstly, the Guinean Mandingo dissidents in the ULIMO-K had to be prevented from taking into consideration an armed return to Guinea. Secondly, an alliance of Mandingo opposition forces with the ULIMO-K had to be discouraged.[120] Thirdly, safeguards against an alliance between dissatisfied elements in the army and the dissidents that had fled in 1996 had to be established (ICG 2002:4). Since the early days of the war in Liberia, rumours of a possible invasion of those elements supported by Taylor circulated. Fourthly, the exposure of regular soldiers to high-risk situations had to be minimised, as the interventions in neighbouring states constituted a main reason for their dissatisfaction (Docking 1999:2). Conté responded to these threats in accordance with his general approach to regime stability: co-optation (cf. Barry 2000) supported by divide-and-rule tactics and fragmentation of the security sector. Aligning with the ULIMO-K effectively neutralised the threat the Mandingo opposition posed in exile and at home. The ULIMO-K depended on the President's goodwill and was therefore unlikely to turn against him.[121] Furthermore, the ULIMO-K could serve as a spearhead in operations against the NPFL and patrol borders, thus freeing the Guinean army from dangerous and arduous tasks. ULIMO-K/LURD fighters could be expected to defend the President in case of a cross-border invasion or an internal coup (as the ULIMO-J later did in Sierra Leone), as their political (and physical) survival depended on Conté. In this respect, the LURD did not disappoint the government. "The over 500 LURD fighters in Guinea played a key role in repulsing the Taylor-backed forces" (ICG 2002:5) that invaded

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[119] Particularly the 1,600 men-strong Presidential Guard, almost exclusively made up of members of the President's ethnic group, the Soussou.

[120] There was a clear and present danger that political competition in Guinea could turn (more) violent and that refugees would become involved in fighting. In 1991, probably several hundred Mandingo died in riots and massacres related to communal elections in N'zérékoré prefecture close to the Liberian border (Interviews in Conakry 17.04.02 and 08.06.02, cf. Hemstedt 1992). The Mandingo community perceived the violence as state-sponsored. The government strongly warned that "under no circumstances should a refugee become involved in the internal political affairs of Guinea" (quoted from Ruiz 1992:21).

[121] Nevertheless, the alliance was not always an easy one. In 1993, allegedly, 500 members and supporters of ULIMO-K were arrested by the Guinean army (Hemstedt 1994:107). Several smaller arrests were reported in the following years as well, allegedly for looting. During the fighting 2000/2001 there were confrontations of *Volontaires* (a youth militia created by the government when the war started) and regular soldiers with LURD forces in Guéckédou in February 2001. The destruction of Guéckédou is widely believed to have been caused by an army attempt to dislodge the LURD rebels. According to the official version, an attack by *Union des Forces Démocratiques Guinéennes* (UFDG)-rebels, the Guinean element in the invasion, caused the destruction. It seems that a *Volontaires* attempt to prevent the unpaid LURD from looting sparked the fighting.

in September 2000. Indeed, it was mainly LURD combatants and the freshly recruited "*Volontaires*"-youth militia who fought at the front while the Guinean army provided helicopter and artillery support (ibid.).

Interests in regime security, rather than economic interests appear to have been the decisive factor for Guinea's alliance with Liberian irregulars. It is subject to discussion whether Guinea profited economically from its military engagement, including support to the ULIMO-K, or whether this represented additional costs only.[122] The Guinean military and their rebel allies were deeply involved in cross-border trade in the Forest Region (cf. Grovogui 1996:33). However, the war economy of the ULIMO was considered relatively disorganised and of little profit (Montclos 1999:234f). Support to the LURD after the invasion in 2000/2001 seems to have been essentially politically motivated. The LURD's economy was even weaker than the ULIMO's. The leadership had banned diamond mining, fearing it could split the movement (ICG 2002:7). Reno's (2002) analysis of the Liberian war economy suggests that the LURD could not have mobilised the resources to overthrow Taylor on their own. Consequently, Guinean support to the rebels appears to have been a costly rather than an immediately rewarding affair. As well, the LURD's choice of leader–Sékou Dammateh Conneh–suggests that the organisation financially depended on Guinea. His wife, Ayesha Conneh, was the top spiritual adviser to Conté, and assistance to the LURD was channelled through her business network (ICG 2002:10).[123] This is not to say that economic motives were irrelevant for the support of the ULIMO and LURD. The Guinean support to the rebels cannot be considered separate from attempts to preserve a regional economic network involving Liberian and Sierra Leonean elites. Guinea had a special interest in preventing Sierra Leonean elites involved in diamond smuggling form being replaced.[124] In this case, the force trying to replace them was supported by the prime enemy of the LURD, the NPFL and the Taylor government respectively.

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[122] The Guinean government claimed to have had additional military expenses of 81.61 billion Guinean Francs from 1990 to 1998, or 9.06777 billion per year as a consequence of its regional engagement (RdG 1999:25). The total amount roughly equals 90,247,000 US dollars (Author's calculations, foreign exchange rates which form the basis of these calculations are from Hemstedt 1991-1998 and Wegemund 1999). The calculations put forward by the government are highly questionable. If we accept the figure, it means that Guinea must have realised profits between 14 and 7 million US dollars annually (depending on the exchange rate) from its regional engagement, which is possible but in no way certain.

[123] Ayesha Conneh was a small-scale market woman when she foretold the coup attempt of 1996. Afterwards, she became the top advisor of Conté and an important business woman. Her husband had never been involved in politics before he was made chairman of the LURD military leadership (ICG 2002:10).

[124] "Guinean export of diamonds has [...] been way above production: 533,000 carats in 1997, while domestic production was estimated at 205,000 carats. The difference was [...] believed to have emanated from Sierra Leone" (Davies 2000:360f). Direct contacts between Sierra Leonean government officials and Guinean authorities as well as the Guinean contingent in Sierra Leone seem to have been the most important channels for diamond trade.

The military alliance with the ULIMO-K was complemented by patronising the Forest Mandingo on the one hand and the refugees on the other. A political divide between the Konia, the main Forest Mandingo sub-group with the closest relations to Liberian Mandingo, and the Upper Guinea Mandingo was furthered through patronage politics. The Konia ethnic sub-group is represented in the political party *Alliance National du Progrès* (ANP) rather than in the Mandingo *Rassemblement du Peuple Guinéen* (RPG). ANP-representatives are almost exclusively Konia.[125] The ANP constitutes a "parti satellite", i.e. it is integrated into the regime's patronage network and supports the President.[126] The opposition neither seems to have tried to establish relations with the refugees nor with the ULIMO,[127] and it is unlikely that it would have succeeded if it had. Referring to African hospitality, the government had welcomed the refugees. Local authorities frequently intervened informally in disputes with locals in favour of the refugees. Guinean humanitarian personnel overwhelmingly regarded the refugees as supporters of the President, and refugees by and large seemed to have appreciated the regime.

The situation changed drastically following the invasion from Liberia and Sierra Leone in September 2000. Along the Guinean border with Sierra Leone and Liberia, a series of seemingly coordinated attacks had occurred (Milner 2005:148). The Forest Region, at its nearest point some 600 kilometres away from the capital, was a major field of combat. There, the objective of the attackers appeared to be destroying the LURD rear bases and exploit the region's resources. Yet, the towns of Forecariah and Kindia, both located at some 100 kilometres from the capital, were as well targets of major RUF offensives. The offensive on Kindia most likely had Conakry as its final target (ICG 2002:4), and Conté had reason to believe that RUF-combatants posing as refugees had already infiltrated the capital. The government then initiated a pogrom against the refugees.[128] Refugees fled the capital or sheltered by the thousands in front of the Sierra Leonean embassy. Thus assembled they could easily be controlled.

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[125] Interview with a political analyst and journalist in Conakry, 08.06.02

[126] The official results of the blatantly rigged legislative elections of June 2002 were: 85 seats to Conté's PUP (Parti de l'Unité et du Progrès), 20 seats to the Peul-dominated opposition UPR (Union du Progrès et du Renouveau), 3 seats to the opposition UPG (Union pour le Progrès en Guinée), which has its constituency among the minorities of the Forest Region, 3 seats went to the "satellite" PDG-RDA (Parti Démocratique de la Guinée-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, formerly Sékou Touré's united party), 1 seat to the "satellite" PUD (Parti de l'Unité et du Développement), and 2 seats for the ANP, which seems a lot given that the party represents an absolute minority that is numerically strong in two Forest localities only. The RPG boycotted the elections.

[127] None of the interviews I conducted with opposition politicians suggested that they had considered the refugees useful supporters.

[128] McGovern (2002) considered the need to have a common enemy and a scapegoat for Guinea's crisis as the main motives for which the government targeted the refugees. I attribute much higher importance to a perceived security threat. It was well known to President Conté that in an earlier attack on the Sierra Leonean capital, RUF infiltrators had opened a second front in the city when their forces attacked the outskirts.

3.3.3 Refugee Camps, the Humanitarian System and the International Community

Prior to September 2000, roughly 20 per cent of the refugees in Guinea lived in designated camps, some 25 percent in refugee villages, and the rest lived in refugee quarters of Guinean villages or cohabitated with locals in villages and towns (Damme 1999:49-52). All in all, there were an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 camps or refugee villages harbouring refugees.[129] This settlement pattern led to logistical problems concerning the registration process, the distribution of assistance, and the control of the refugee population. Refugee figures were grossly inflated, and although humanitarian organisations controlled distribution and gave rations directly to heads of families, combatants may have profited from the supplies. Before 2001, most refugee settlements in Guinea were less than 50 km away from the border.

The ULIMO-K/LURD was the only rebel force in Guinea to which refugee settlements were strategically important. Yet, Kamajor forces were occasionally present in camps of Sierra Leonean refugees, particularly in the Massakoundou camp near Kissidougou (Milner 2005:147). Sierra Leonean government troops and Kamajor once retreated in large numbers into Guinean refugee camps. UNHCR created a separate facility, the Kaloko camp, where these forces were concentrated.[130] There they could regroup and re-enter Sierra Leone, but this was a minor event in the war. Occasionally, NPFL (Suma 2001:7) and RUF fighters were sheltered by and reposed with refugee relatives in Guinea,[131] but the literature and field research suggested that rear bases in Guinea were neither secure nor important for these forces. A large-scale infiltration of refugee camps by armed factions hostile to the Guinean government never occurred. The invaders who attacked Guinea in 2000 entered from Liberia and Sierra Leone, but did not operate out of the refugee camps. Nevertheless, several reports indicate that the invading forces were guided by people known to the local population as refugees.

The ULIMO-K of Al Hadji Kromah is alleged to have recruited among urban refugees in N'zérékoré town, rather than in the camps (Milner 2005:173, footnote 5). Yet, the refugee camp of Daro (12,000 inhabitants) south of Macenta was reported to have been an important ULIMO-K rear base.[132] Militarily of far greater importance was Macenta town, where the regional headquarter of the Guinean army was located. In these very facilities, the ULIMO-K and later the LURD established their military headquarters. Two quarters of Macenta, Mohamed V and Patrice Lumumba, were considered ULIMO-K/LURD terri-

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[129] Interview with humanitarian aid worker, 15.06.02
[130] Interview in Conakry 11.06.02.
[131] Interview in Conakry, 08.04.02
[132] Interview with senior humanitarian staff in Conakry, 04.06.02

tory.[133] The protected forest reserves, like Ziama close to Macenta and Daro, were widely suspected to serve as training grounds. Alternatively, the Guinean government had established a training centre for the ULIMO-K in a military base in Kankan in Upper Guinea, some 200 km air distance away from the border.[134] During the fighting in 2000/2001, most refugee camps were destroyed.[135] In February 2001, UNHCR undertook the biggest ever relocation of refugees to places further away from the border. Liberian refugees were transferred to the Kouankan and Kola camps,[136] administered from N'zérékoré, while Sierra Leonean refugees were relocated to the more westerly Albadariah sub-prefecture, administered from Kissidougou. Most of the refugees from Daro were relocated to Kouankan (21,000 inhabitants in June 2002), some 50 km air distance away from the border. Depending on the quality of the vehicle, the distance between Kouankan and the Liberian border can be covered in two to four hours. Of the internationally assisted refugee camps, Kouankan became the most important LURD base, but the bulk of combatants was with the Guinean military in Macenta. Only a few rebels stayed with their families in Kola, although the camp was located at a mere 35 km air distance from the border.[137] Many refugees were still self-settled in small villages in the Forest Region, and some of these were alleged to haven given refuge to the insurgents as well. Since the relocation, only refugees registered in the official camps received assistance.

The most important military function of the refugee camps was to provide a reservoir for forcible and voluntary recruitment.[138] When the LURD was founded in early 2000, its Guinean wing recruited mainly among the refugees and particularly among those who had been with the ULIMO before.[139] Combatants sheltered in the camps and received assis-

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[133] A quarter of N'zérékoré was as well reported to host a considerable number of LURD combatants. Yet their presence their was in no way comparable to that in Macenta. The local prefect of N'zérékoré was reportedly vigorously opposed to letting the town become an important LURD base.

[134] The base was closed in 1997 when Charles Taylor became President of Liberia.

[135] Most often, refugees were warned of an immediate attack and fled the camps, which were destroyed afterwards. Some camps are known to have been destroyed by civilians from the surrounding villages, but the invaders as well as the Guinean army are thought to have engaged in demolitions, as all of them perceived the camps as a security threat.

[136] Kola camp received the first convoy of refugees on 6 August 2001. It remained the smallest camp, hosting some 6,000 refugees. In 2002, an additional camp (Lainé) was established.

[137] I came across several youths in the camp wearing red bandanas, a fairly reliable sign for LURD membership. These seemed to have arrived individually, as unlike Kouankan, no entries of LURD units were reported. In contrast to Kouankan, LURD fighters in Kola were generally not wearing uniforms.

[138] Although forced recruitment could take place in the camps, flight was more of a drain on the combatants' resources than they were able to recover from humanitarian aid. The LURD realised short-term profits from flight by forcing people to buy exit passes, and failing to produce such a pass, the Guinean army would return refugees at the border. Yet few males of fighting age were allowed to buy the passes (MSF 2002:18), indicating that most of those who actually arrived in the camps were lost to the rebels.

[139] Al Hadji Kromah, drawing from his ULIMO forces, was one of the main founders of the LURD, but quickly lost control over its Guinean wing (ICG 2002). In the Liberian presidential elections of October 2005, Kromah and Sekou Conneh were presidential candidates of two rivalling parties.

tance as registered refugees,[140] but the support Guinea provided in its military facilities most likely was more substantial. The LURD presence in Kouankan seemed to be small compared to that in Macenta town.[141] Most combatants seemed to stay in the camp for short periods only, using it for recovery and recruitment. However, a LURD training base was reported to exist some five kilometres south of the camp, indicating that the site was used to shelter a probably rather small number of trainees.

During the refugee crisis caused by the first Liberian war 1989-1996, UNHCR largely turned a blind eye to the abuse of its facilities.[142] At least since 1995, UNHCR requested a relocation of the refugee camps away from the border. The exposure of the refugees to cross-border raids, particularly in the "Languette" near Guéckédou, rather than the militarisation of the camps seems to have been the motive. Attacks on refugees by the RUF sharply increased in the late 1990s, prompting UNHCR to put renewed emphasis on relocation. Some 14,000 Sierra Leonean refugees were relocated in July 1999. Financial constraints of UNHCR and objections to relocation by the Guinean government as well as the refugees prevented the continuation of the exercise (AI 2001a:40). Refugees were relatively well integrated in the Forest Region. Economically and socially, staying close to the border was attractive despite limited security there. The government preferred to have the refugees confined to a remote, politically rather insignificant region (Damme 1999:37).[143] Refugees were least likely to cause discontent in a culturally familiar environment, and the ULIMO benefited from camps close to the border. UNHCR and human rights organisations were thus the only ones calling for relocation. The government was little inclined to compromise, and UNHCR decided to continue its work under the given conditions. However, a large-scale relocation of the camps would not have put an end to the ULIMO/LURD presence, as even distances of 50 km (Kouankan) or 200 km (Kankan) are no obstacle to cross-border activities when irregulars can move freely. The main advantage of a relocation would thus have been to put an end to the exposure to cross-border raids

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[140] From 1997 to 2000, only a small number of "vulnerable" Liberian refugees received assistance, and consequently humanitarian aid cannot have supported the creation of the LURD.

[141] It is impossible to give an estimate of the number of combatants. Refugees referred to entries of LURD units comprising 10 to 15 soldiers as "arrivals in large numbers", indicating that the overall presence of combatants may have been rather small. The ICG estimated the total number of LURD fighters in Guinea at 500 in 2000 (ICG 2002:5), but they gained strength since.

[142] It seems that before the Kivu experience, militarisation of refugee camps was much less a cause for concern for UNHCR than it is nowadays. A recent report (Milner 2005) suggests that during the first Liberian war 1989-1996, camps were not militarised. My sources suggested otherwise, particularly concerning the Daro camp.

[143] While the three other geographical areas are ethnically more homogeneous and support their respective candidates, a common Forest identity among the minorities is still in the making. The *Union pour le Progrès en Guinée* (UPG), headed by Jean-Marie Doré, tries to present itself as representing the interests of the Forest Region, but is continually hampered by the weak cohesion of the region.

and a consequential decrease of the small contribution looted humanitarian aid made to the Sierra Leonean war economy.

After 2000, the militarisation of the refugee camps became a matter of concern for humanitarian organisations (AI 2001:40). During the fighting in Guinea most refugee camps were destroyed and the remaining ones were declared closed on the initiative of the government.[144] It however later allowed UNHCR to maintain the Kouankan camp and relocate part of the refugees there. The relocation in early 2001 allowed for reviewing the refugee policy. Although the principal aim of the relocation was to ensure security of the refugees, the demilitarisation of the camps as well was a major motive. Refugees were segregated in different camps according to nationality, ethnicity, and religion. The separation was explained with reference to camp security and tensions among the different refugee groups.[145] Liberian refugees were separated with the aim of creating one camp mainly composed of Muslims/Mandingo and their allies. This seemed to be motivated by the desire to strengthen security inside the camps as there were tensions within the Liberian refugee population. Approximately 85 to 90 per cent of the Kouankan population were Muslims, about 45 per cent of the inhabitants were Mandingo, and another 35 per cent were composed of ethnic Gbandi, thought to be allied with the LURD (ICG 2002:10). In comparison, an estimated 85 per cent of the Kola population were Christians, 85 per cent belonged to ethnic groups regarded as close to Taylor like the Loma, Kissi and Kpelle, and only some 15 per cent were Mandingo.[146] 27 percent of the Kola inhabitants were not relocated from the combat zone but from the Kouankan camp (UNHCR control sheet: Statistiques provisoires des réfugiés relocalisés, October 2001). In fact, UNHCR concentrated the LURD-problem in one of the camps, in Kouankan. The fact that Kola did not become militarised, despite its location closer to the border, indicates that UNHCR was at least partly successful. Yet, as Kouankan became increasingly militarised, UNHCR considered closing the camp and relocating its population to Kola in August 2001. The plan was not realised, and it seems unlikely that it would have solved the problem of militarisation.

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[144] The Guinean government tried to pressurize the refugees to return and initially did not allow an evacuation of refuges out of the combat zone. Only reluctantly it indicated sites the refugees could be relocated to in early 2001. In turn, a greater share of the humanitarian program was allocated to Guineans in the refugee populated area. Still, UNHCR allegedly had to bribe its way through the Guinean authorities (Interviews in Kissidougou, 20.05.02, N'zérékoré, 23.05.02).

[145] UNHCR insisted on separate camps for Liberians and Sierra Leoneans, although the capacities in the Liberian camps were insufficient and Sierra Leonean camps became populated below capacity. My research could not substantiate the claim of significant tensions between the two groups, but the LURD posed a relatively greater threat to Sierra Leonean refugees whom it had targeted for looting during the fighting 2000/2001.

[146] All figures are estimates obtained in an oral interview in N'zérékoré, 28.05.02, and may differ from UNHCR statistics. Yet, because of a lack of resources, UNHCR statistics of the refugee population were not too reliable neither (Milner 2005:175, footnote 26).

Modelled on the Kivu experience, UNHCR financed the presence of a small Guinean security force in the camps, the *Brigades Mixtes* (BMS) made up of police and gendarmerie personnel.[147] One of its aims was "to maintain the civilian and humanitarian character of the camps" (UNHCR Guinea Briefing Note, December 2001). UNHCR repeatedly complained to the Guinean authorities that the force did nothing to prevent combatants from entering the camp and did little to stop forced recruitment. UNHCR informed the authorities when people had been abducted and tried to get them returned but was rarely successful.[148] In 2003, two Royal Canadian Mounted Police officers were deployed on the initiative of UNHCR to train the BMS. Results regarding the militarisation of refugee camps were anything but impressive (cf. Milner 2005:158). Generally, UNHCR decided to treat the problems with the authorities confidentially, and did not publicise its criticism of the government. In the background, difficult negotiations were going on. In 2002, UNHCR actually threatened to entirely withdraw from Kouankan camp if the situation did not improve (Milner 2005:152). Although the situation hardly changed for the better, UNHCR did not realise that threat. It should be added that UNHCR received little backing from the international community in its quest to demilitarise the camps.

Until the late 1990s, the international community largely left a solution to the regional crisis to ECOWAS, and thereby implicitly supported the alliances of the ECOMOG-states with Liberian irregulars. Since then, the international community has refocused on the region, largely on the initiative of Washington.[149] The US increasingly stepped up pressure against Liberia, while France continued to support Taylor and advocated sanctions against Guinea (ICG 2002:25).[150]

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[147] It was concluded between UNHCR and the authorities that one BMS officer be deployed per 1,000 refugees. They were supported by roughly three times as many unarmed refugee volunteers.

[148] In one instance in mid-2002, two boys that had already been taken to Liberia and a girl abducted to serve the LURD in Macenta were returned. In another instance where humanitarian personnel witnessed an abduction they successfully persuaded the security guards not to allow the combatants to leave the camp with their victims. Yet, UNHCR was unable to prevent large-scale forced recruitment in early 2002. Around May 2002, refugees in Kouankan staged a demonstration against forced recruitment.

[149] Most likely, it was a concern for US interests in Guinea that prompted the engagement. Washington lost its economic interests in Liberia under Doe (Clapham 1994:74), and had shown no initiative to recover them. Guinea has considerable economic potential, and the US are the leading foreign investor. In a report prepared for USAID, Guinea was regarded as the "dernier homme debout" (Docking 1999:17) in an unstable region and regime stability as a goal in itself, as no alternatives to authoritarian rule were deemed realistic (ibid:30-37). Given that the President is critically ill, the "uncertainty of Conté's succession raises profound uncertainty for Guinea's future. The army holds the power and will likely decide, but Conté has deliberately not groomed a successor. A fight is likely, one that Taylor would be likely to exploit if still in power" (ICG 2002:24). It may be this concern which motivated the US engagement.

[150] Although Taylor is internationally portrayed as the region's "bad guy", both sides have moral arguments for their actions. "In many was, political conditions in Liberia and Guinea are similar. [...] Conté's human rights record is in some ways worse than Taylor's, and his regime is slightly more oppressive. Guinea encouraged gross human rights abuses against refugees in 2000-2001, and the army has shown blatant disregard for civilians bombarding towns in Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. [...] Despite much more foreign support, and many natural resources, Guineans remain desperately poor, in contrast to its President's

After the 2000 invasion, the US have – via the private military consulting company *Military and Professional Resources Inc.* (MPRI) - provided "non-lethal assistance" to some 800 Guinean troops, leading some observers to conclude that the US used Guinea to support the LURD in order to put a strain on Taylor's resources (ICG 2002:22). The US never publicly condemned the LURD insurgency. State Department officials nevertheless held that the training was provided in order to increase capacities of the national army so that it could secure the border on its own, and that a continuation of the program was predicated on a cut of support for the LURD (HRW 2002:13).[151] Eventually, the program was continued without Guinean support for the LURD being cut, and the trained battalion was deployed to the interior of Guinea and not to the border region.

The US position dominated in the UN Security Council, and on the whole pressure against Liberia increased, while criticism of Guinea was merely formal. A Security Council statement on the events in 2000/2001 "expressed serious concern over reports that external military support was provided to the rebel groups [attacking Guinea, F.G.]" and "called on all states, particularly Liberia, to refrain from providing any such military support and from any act that might contribute to further destabilization [...]". "The Council also called on all states in the region to prevent armed individuals from using their national territory to prepare and commit attacks in neighbouring countries", "demand[ed] an immediate halt to [...] the infiltration of displaced persons camps by armed elements" and "reaffirm[ed] the need to respect the civilian character of refugee camps" (UNSC 2000a). Concerning the government-instigated pogroms against refugees, the "Council expressed deep appreciation to the Government of Guinea for hosting a large number of refugees. It pronounced itself concerned by the growing hostile attitude among the local population towards refugees, and urged Guinea's government to take urgent measures to discourage the propagation of such anti-refugee feelings." Guinea's is unlikely to have attributed any importance to the statement.[152]

The Security Council resolution 1343 of March 2001 imposed sanctions on Liberia. It had been prepared for some time,[153] but its passing clearly took place in the context of the invasion into Guinea. It blamed Liberia for regional instability, but stressed the need for a

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[151] wealth. [...] Conté's democratic legitimacy is even lower than Taylor's, having blatantly rigged elections in 1993 and 1998. The opposition has no right of public assembly, and security forces have gunned down such gatherings and student demonstrations on several occasions" (ICG 2002:23f).

[151] Given the US interest in Guinean stability and the fact that the LURD presence in Guinea is not regarded as helpful by US diplomats, the explanation seems plausible.

[152] Contrary to Security Council resolutions, statements do not enter the body of international law and are mere recommendations. The governmental newspaper published the essential sequences except the one concerning the civilian character of refugee camps in correct French translation and clearly treated the statement as a solidarity address (Horoya 23-26.12.2000).

[153] The US publicly threatened to impose sanctions on Liberia for the first time in July 2000.

regional environment supporting peace. Paragraph 4 demanded "that all States in the region take action to prevent armed individuals or groups from using their territory to prepare and commit attacks on neighbouring countries and refrain from any action that might lead to further destabilization of the situation on the borders between Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone". Guinea's violation of that paragraph did not trigger any international condemnation. On the contrary, on 8 October 2001, the UN General Assembly voted Guinea into the Security Council. Its election was almost universally endorsed.[154]

3.4 Domestic Aspects

This chapter analyses the impact of the refugee influx on relations on the national and local level, i.e. it is akin to an "impact assessment" identifying the winners and losers of incurred social change. It is particularly aimed at explaining the widespread participation of Guinean civilians in the pogroms against refugees in 2000. Focussing on tensions between the groups, I will introduce the matter by presenting how Guineans and refugees perceived each other and what reactions were informed by these perceptions. This section is mainly based on verbal statements and presents evidence gathered from the trend line interviews and press analysis. After that, the background of tensions, understood primarily as political and economic contradictions, will be analysed.

3.4.1 Violence and Images of Refugees and Guineans

The self-image of Guinea is that of the world's most refugee-friendly country. Guineans are convinced of having reacted with exceptional or even unprecedented hospitality to the refugee influx. There is some truth to this claim. When the war in Liberia started, large parts of the Forest Region were inaccessible and aid organisations had tremendous difficulties to provide aid. During the first months refugees essentially relied on locals, who claimed to have felt pity for the refugees as well as an (ethnically based) obligation to help. The local population suffered adverse effects, as household density increased, (surface) water quality decreased, wells became exploited above capacity and food stocks melted away. Yet, the situation was not as exceptional as it might seem. Host populations regularly react with pity to refugee influxes, and refugees often have to rely on the capacities of the local population during the first months (UNHCR 2001a). At the time of research, the reaction of Guineans to the crisis was clouded in myths, and a foreign observer could

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[154] From the outset, Guinea had been one of the two candidates for two vacant seats which were supposed to go to Africa (indicating strong support for Guinea within Africa), and with 173 affirmative votes of 177 valid ballots its result scored highest of all four candidates voted into the Council that day (http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/567/97/PDF/N0156797.pdf?OpenElement :10.01.2003).

hardly escape the impression that every Guinean family had its refugee guests and that refugees were routinely provided lodging free of charge in Guinean homes. In fact, the refugee crises was locally concentrated, construction of refugee villages, camps and settlements rapidly went ahead, and refugees still lodging with locals usually paid rent, often in the form of food handouts.

An analysis of press articles, especially those published before the late 1990s, resulted in a picture quite consistent with the dominant Guinean perspective. The governmental newspaper Horoya, the only one available at the beginning of the 1990s, regularly reported sympathetically and in some cases passionately in favour of the refugees, recalling traditional norms of hospitality and pan-African solidarity. Both symbols are emotionally charged elements of Guinean identity. Since the referendum of 1958, Guineans consider themselves to "faire l'exception à la règle", and an important feature of that exceptionality is the feeling to be particularly African. The conviction of having reacted with exceptional and exemplary solidarity to the influx in part reflects that aspect of Guinean culture.[155] Notwithstanding, there was frequent stereotyping of refugees. Especially in the cities, Guineans perceived the clothing and behaviour of refugees as immoral.[156] As the private press developed, stereotypes of refugees' "légèreté des mœurs", "prostitution", "vente et consommation de stupéfiants", "dépravation vestimentaire", "consommation d'alcool, surtout par les filles qui, pour la plupart, fréquentent les boites de nuit et autres lieux mal famés" (Démocrate 03.07.2000b), "criminalité" (ibid. 2000a) became publicised.[157] The rise in

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[155] In some cases, inaction of the government and freedom for the refugees were confounded, and knowledge about the situation of the refugees was often sketchy. For example, an article clearly expressing the feeling of exceptionality stated that the freedom of movement, which refugees would not even need a passport for, was unique (Démocrate 03.07.2000b). In 1990 the Government decided that assistance should be limited to the Forest Region, which was the main method to control the place of residence of the refugees. Secondly, the non-provision of identity cards for refugees which would be accepted by the authorities was a constant point of discussion between UNHCR and the Government. The insecure status gave way to regular harassment of refugees and the extortion of money by the security forces, which were an informal way to restrict movement.

[156] Already in 1990, President Conté held a speech in N'zérékoré in which he urged his compatriots to be more tolerant of different customs. Interventions of the authorities helped a lot to reduce harassment and reassure refugees, and relations were remembered by refugees to have subsequently improved.

[157] Guinea has witnessed a sharp increase in crime since 1984 as the authoritarian system of control broke down. Crime is widely attributed to the refugees, despite some evidence to the contrary. The country's security forces are themselves a major, if not the major, perpetrator of hard crime (attacks on villas, a bank robbery etc.), routinely profit from their impunity on less spectacular occasions, and are widely assumed to co-operate with urban gangs. In Kissidougou, residents reported a sharp increase in crime after the refugee camp of Massakoundou hosting 30,000 inhabitants at a 4 kilometre distance had been closed – and after the *Volontaires*-militia had been stationed there. Given the generally high crime rate in Guinea, the refugee areas appeared comparatively calm, with non-violent crime like stealing from fields during night-time being one of the most frequent complaints. Guinean involvement in crime is generally acknowledged, and Guineans are aware that "nos sociétés ne sont pas étrangères à ces pratiques", but public opinion is "que ces pratiques, avec la présence étrangère, ce sont accrues" (Démocrate 03.07.2000a). There is a widespread feeling that negative changes did not arise from internal processes, but came from outside and infected the society, a belief deeply entrenched in popular and intellectual culture.

crime, the state's financial difficulties (Républicain 10.01.2000), deficits in the health system, degradation of roads and the environment (Indépendant 10.04.2000), and rising housing costs (ibid. 11.05.2000) were frequently attributed to the refugees, leading to some demands for a tighter refugee policy.[158] Refugees were often considered to be better off than locals, receiving supplies and having relatives in the US sending money (Démocrate 03.07.2000b). Generally, the perception that refugees were privileged because of the supplies they received was more widespread in rural areas.

Yet on the whole, a sympathetic attitude towards the refugees prevailed. Most newspapers condemned the abuses of refugees in 2000. Among the "civil society" organisations, it was particularly the *Organisation Guinéenne pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme* (OGDH) with close links to the Lynx and Lance newspapers which tried to impact positively on the public image of the refugees. The Catholic Church, too, was involved in providing assistance and lobbied for the refugees. Archbishop Robert Sarah was one of the most outspoken critics of attacks on refugees and condemned the government for its role in the incidences (Indépendant 14.12.2000).[159] As for the Muslim community, most authorities are represented in the state-controlled *Ligue Islamique*, and where Muslim authorities intervened, it was behind the scenes.[160]

The results of the trend line interviews showed fair to very good neighbourliness. With a few exceptions, relations were described as more or less continuously harmonious, and the invasion of 2000 was by far the most important event with a negative impact. Residents of Conakry tended to regard the relationship as least problematic with the trend line showing little to no variations prior to 2000, probably indicating that life was rather segregated, as daily interaction should have let to more frequent, minor problems. Trend lines established in the refugee areas showed comparatively more variations, with the beginning of the refugee influx, the repatriation of Liberian refugees around 1997, and the invasion of 2000 being instances of change, although the perception of an essentially harmonious relationship prevailed here as well. Interestingly, perceptions of refugees and locals seemed to be most contradictory at the beginning of the influx: while Guineans reported a slight decrease in the quality of the relationship, refugees tended to report an improvement during the first one or two years. Guineans estimated that first encounters were quite trouble-free;

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[158] As, for example, was expressed in the satirical Lynx. "[... N]os dirigeants tiennent un discours naïve: 'Ce sont nos parents. Ils doivent vivre avec nous et partager avec nous gîte et couvert!' Quelle stupidité! Partout ailleurs dans le monde, les réfugiés sont parqués dans des espaces bien précis. Et leur circulation est réglementée!" (Lynx 17.01.2000a).

[159] Sarah was called back to Rome under strong pressure from the Government, and the Catholic church has refused to name a new archbishop to Conakry since.

[160] My encounters with Muslim authorities suggested that these had intervened to protect individual refugees personally known to them, but generally Muslim authorities seemed to believe in the government's propaganda labelling refugees as "rebels", and did little to stop the abuses.

refugees were met with pity, and problems only developed over time as interaction increased and differences became apparent.

In contrast, while refugees overwhelmingly acknowledged the hospitality they had been met with, early interaction was not regarded as harmonious. Most refugees came from NPFL territory and were often met with considerable suspicion, resulting in attempts to control their movements. Unlike the Guineans who assumed they had well taken care of the refugees, the latter felt they largely had to provide for themselves, while access to natural resources had not been negotiated. This led to frequent minor incidents, for example theft or destruction of forest resources gathered by refugees without the consent of the locals. Not exclusively, but especially refugees without ethnic ties to the local community reported that there were frequent, but minor disputes about access to wells, lakes and forests.[161]

A right of access was usually established via a local patron, whose mediation was essential in order to give the refugees a voice in the host community. The one or two years after which the refugees deemed relations to the host community improved were the time they needed to establish the patron-client relationship. Traditionally, the most important function of this relationship is to protect strangers and give them access to the local court system (Richards 1996:79), i.e. it empowered the refugees vis-à-vis the locals, and once the former could claim some rights, minor disputes for the realisation of these rights followed. More integration lead to more conflicts, but as the setting provided for a resolution (e.g. through local courts or state authorities), these were only marginally relevant. Complaints by refugees centred on not being paid for field labour as concluded, being given rather infertile land (usually in exchange for labour on local peasant's soil), or being denied access to the forests. Although seeking redress through local institutions was often effective, many refugees felt that they were relegated to an inferior position. Guineans have a firm understanding of being in *their* ancestral homeland, and refugees have to consent to the place destined to newcomers or migrant strangers by traditional practices (cf. Skinner

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[161] The following statement made by a Liberian priest is certainly exaggerated and did not represent the opinion of the average Liberian refugee. Yet it summarises refugee complaints. It is most interesting to note that no Guinean I have met would have ever imagined that refugees had that kind of complaints. "Unlike in the Ivory Coast where Liberian refugees were at liberty to move freely, in Guinea, Liberian refugees were restricted to live either in the frontier towns and villages or in refugee camps. Anyone found out of bonds was arrested, beaten and even killed without due process of law. A few Liberians may have lived in the capital city, Conakry; this was an exception, not the norm. In many parts of Guinea where Liberians had to reside, the refugees were not allowed to fetch firewood or cut sticks from the forest, unless there was an agreement for some compensation to be given to the owner of the forest. Life in Guinea for the Liberian refugees was not 'a piece of cake', for they experienced extreme hardships. This was surprising because Guineans who lived and worked in Liberia prior to the war lived and worked without much hindrance" (Kulah 1999:100).

1963). The system does allow for integration, but the status accorded to refugees was a relative loss. Particularly Liberians tended to consider Guinea a backward country, and felt they should be granted a higher status.

One of the most important turning points in relations between Guineans and refugees was the repatriation of Liberian refugees in 1997. Immediately before leaving, some of the refugees destroyed their fields or those they had planted together with Guinean farmers. The incidences were confined to a few localities and presumably originated in individual quarrels of the sort described above between refugees and their patrons or other villagers. Once the interdependency between locals and refugees was broken up, individual refugees felt free to revenge. News of the burnings spread widely, effectively damaging the reputation of the refugees. Virtually none of the Guineans interviewed could imagine why a refugee should behave in such a way. The incidences were regarded signs of maliciousness and proof that refugees could not be trusted. Still, refugees were received again, albeit more reservedly, when fighting resumed in Liberia.

The hitherto fair relations between refugees and locals suffered a lasting blow in the context of the invasion into Guinea of September 2000. Already in August 2000 some cross-border raids on Guinean villages or LURD bases had taken place. These raids had either alarmed the government, or plans of the invasion had been disclosed to Conté. On 27 August 2000, a few days before fighting started, the President held a speech in which he deviated considerably from his earlier statements, mobilising against the refugees by identifying them as a security threat and the cause of the rise in crime.[162] The first major attack from Liberian territory took place on 1 September, and on 9 September the President delivered a televised speech in which he incited the population to action against the refugees.[163] Shortly afterwards widespread abuses against refugees and looting of their prop-

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[162] The essential sequence of the speech read : "[N]ous pensons que ce sont nos frères qu'il faut aider. Mais parmi ces frères, nous avons beaucoup de personnes qui sont là rien que pour faire du mal à la Guinée et aux Guinéens. [... F.G] S'il y a trop de vol à travers la Guinée aujourd'hui, [...] ce sont ces gens là qui sont parmi nous" (Indépendant 31.08.2000).

[163] The first part of the speech compared the Liberian/RUF invasion to the Portuguese-led invasion of 1970 and declared the current combat a matter of national independence. Subsequent parts of the speech, translated from Soussou into French, read: "Lorsque j'avais été a l'ONU, j'avais dit à Kofi Annan de ne rien nous donner, mais de nous débarrasser de ces punaises de réfugiés. Ces gens qui abusent de notre hospitalité pour contribuer à détruire notre pays. [... L'ordre a été donné, F.G.] de réunir tous les réfugiés en un seul lieu, pour les surveiller [...] En attendant de tout mettre en œuvre pour qu'ils rejoignent le bercail tous. [...] La Guinée s'en trouvera soulagée. [...] Aidez les enfants. Vos enfants qui sont dans des problèmes, qui sont en train de se battre! [...] Aidez les! N'acceptez pas que ceux qui sont entre nous ici bougent. Celui qui bouge, il faut l'écraser! Nous ne sommes plus à une époque où il faut blaguer" (Lynx 11.09.2000). "Après tous, on n'a jamais mieux entretenu des réfugiés à travers le monde que chez nous. A présent, il y a des rebelles parmi eux. Ils jouent les indices et repartent souvent chez eux pour livrer des renseignements. Comme ils n'aiment pas la liberté, ne les laissez plus monter ou descendre là où ils veulent. [...] Soyez partout vigilants, en ville comme dans les hameaux! Certains réfugiés ont des fusils, je vous dis! ... mais, voyons, écoutez ... s'ils ont des flingots, ces réfugiés sont nulle part ailleurs que dans

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erty commenced. In the capital, security forces and the ruling party's youth militia reportedly took a leading role. They were joined by urban gangs as well as ordinary civilians. In the Forest Region, camps were attacked by the invaders, security forces, and local villagers. The situation calmed down several days later in the cities, and after Conté gave a speech on 17 September in which he ordered that normalcy be restored, security seemed to be re-established. Violence against refugees was still widespread in the rural Forest Region, and flared up again in Guéckédou town after an attack on the city on 6 December.

The cause of the pogroms in the cities was rather trivial. The readiness of the Guinean population to identify refugees with social vices may have contributed to the outburst. As well, a cultural legacy of mistrust against foreigners inherited form the Sékou Touré era may have been a background factor (Mc Govern 2002). Essentially, it was the government's playing on emotions and opportunistic motives that were decisive. For many, including the security forces, the event constituted the opportunity to loot with impunity,[164] and even in normal times levels of crime are high in urban Guinea. Yet, the violence was not confined to the cities, but spread to the rural areas of the Forest Region, where refugees were considered to be more integrated and had for years lived in close contact with the local population. In order to explain the rural violence, I will examine the situation there in more detail later on.

3.4.2   The Impact of the Refugee Influx on the National Political Scene

Generally, Guinean opposition politicians estimated that the refugee influx had not strengthened the government. This largely explains that they did not try to profit from latent tensions by mobilising against the refugees.[165] Notwithstanding, in the run-up to the first presidential elections in 1993, the especially outspoken opposition politician Mamadou Bâh accused the government of conscripting refugees to vote for the incumbent regime. However, the issue subsequently subsided.[166] The opposition lamented some strengthening of the regime through the humanitarian system, e.g. the requisitioning of

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vos concessions, vous les Guinéens! Alors, fouillez-les! Ceux qui ont des fusils, ligotez-les et livrez-les aux autorités! N'épargnez personne! Nous, nous pensions qu'ils étaient nos frères, Noirs, comme nous! [...] Voila, qu'ils nous font la guéguerre! Eh bien, faisons en sorte qu'ils foutent le camp!" (Lynx 18.09.2000).

[164] It is perhaps indicative of widespread material opportunism that on the question whether Guineans objected to the violence and who had done so, most often house owners renting rooms to refugees where reported to have tried to prevent the security forces from throwing out the refugees.

[165] As well, opposition elites are influenced by the dominant ideology of Africanism and African hospitality, although the opposition strategy consisted primarily of a politicisation of ethnicity.

[166] According to a senior diplomatic source involved in election monitoring at the time, the government was fairly confident that it would win the election and did not organise fraud early on. It was only when the first results came in and the regime realised that it was far from winning a majority that rigging was improvised. Opposition elites no doubt were informed of the way in which the official results came about.

vehicles of humanitarian organisations to rally government supporters and corruption in humanitarian organisations to the benefit of government officials, but did not regard it as significant.[167] Nor did the opposition consider the government's alliance with the ULIMO/LURD important for the regime's survival. The opposition has so far pursued a remarkably peaceful strategy, and has tried to undermine the military's power by raising popular support. The presence of the ULIMO/LURD in the Forest Region raised concerns of the opposition only after the invasion. The leader of the *Union pour le progrès en Guinée* (UPG), Jean-Marie Doré, whose constituency are the Forest Minorities,[168] most vocally denounced the LURD presence (cf. Observateur 25.12.2000, 05.03.2001). The opposition tried to rally support by blaming Conté of having provoked the invasion by giving sanctuary to the LURD, thus exposing Guineans to insecurity. As for Doré, the accusations partly built on the latent Forestiers-Mandingo tensions and served to raise his profile as the defender of Forestiers' interests. On the whole, however, the issue did not significantly increase tensions between the Guinean political actors.

Although the refugee influx and the humanitarian system did not become an issue in political disputes, both in fact strengthened the government. The humanitarian system represented a vehicle for tremendous capital import,[169] part of which the government could use to strengthen its financial basis and by extension its patronage system. Part of the humanitarian budget accrued to the state through taxes. The UN enjoy large tax exemptions and imports of humanitarian supplies were not taxed, but associated activities such as the use of the port of Conakry, works carried out by Guinean subcontractors and NGO rents and salaries propped up the state budget. One of the few taxes to be paid by UN-organisations as well was the tax on internet satellite antennas, roughly 200,000 US-dollars a year per antenna.[170]

Secondly, the construction of infrastructures by UNHCR, primarily necessary to deliver aid to refugees, complemented governmental efforts in road construction aimed at enhancing its legitimacy among the population on the one hand and better exploitation of the Forest Region's resources on the other. When aid agencies started their work in 1990, large parts of the region were inaccessible, and almost all deliveries passed through Côte

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[167] As well, the opposition regards the international community as a key resource in the struggle for transparent elections. Mobilising against the refugees or humanitarian organisations could further damage its international reputation, which is already jeopardised by its ethnic strategy (cf. Docking 1999:30-37, cf. Groelsema 1998).

[168] Actually, the Forestiers are an ethnic group still in the making and are divided along linguistic and other lines.

[169] UNHCR Guinea's budget 1990-1999 totalled some 182.2 million US-dollars (EIU1996:31, 2001:37). In 1994 alone, the humanitarian sector channelled some 37.3 million US-dollars, or 8.8 percent of Official Development Assistance, into Guinea (EIU 1996:20)

[170] The tax was increased from some 20,000 US-dollars to ten times that amount in 2001.

d'Ivoire. UNHCR has greatly engaged in the rehabilitation and construction of rural roads and bridges to designated camps and distribution centres since. In the past, there had been virtually no road system in the region (Diallo 1992:23), and UNHCR's activities were crucial in opening it up (ibid., Grovogui 1996:35). Similarly, the development of water supply, educational facilities, and the health system in the region were greatly supported by humanitarian revenues (Diallo 1992, Grovogui 1996).[171] Nevertheless, public awareness of international engagement particularly in the health sector was low, and the extension of "Postes de santé" and hospital facilities was often attributed to government action.[172] As with basically all internationally financed development projects, the government tried to incorporate these into its patronage system, or at least create the impression on the part of the beneficiaries that the projects were carried out on the government's initiative. Generally, Guineans who had lived close to refugees in the border region felt that they had been largely ignored by the humanitarian organisations.

When the relocation of the refugees became necessary, the quest for new sites considerably increased the government's bargaining power vis-à-vis the humanitarian organisations. Authorities in the Albadariah region hosting Sierra Leonean refugees were comparatively more successful in imposing their objectives than their counterparts in the N'zérékoré region hosting Liberians. Most humanitarian activities in the cities served to appease the authorities and assure their cooperation with humanitarian agencies.[173] The projects consisted almost exclusively of the same activities that were carried out in the camps, e.g. field clearance, well-digging, micro-credit schemes, and the construction of latrines, wood-saving stoves, and school buildings. The construction work was generally done by the aid agencies or sub-contractors almost without any contributions from the locals, leading to little ownership identification and know-how transfer. It was likely that most of the projects will have no or considerably fewer long-term effects than the investment implied.

In the villages near the refugee camps, particularly in the Albadariah-region, the projects were nevertheless highly appreciated by the locals and directly attributed to the presence of

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[171] During the early months of the refugee influx, health was indeed a serious problem, as the–by West African standards–rudimentary health system became even more strained. Not only added refugees to the local patients, but the state of health of locals worsened due to rising food problems, an increased population density and the importation of infectious diseases (cf. Diallo 1992:25f). The situation gradually improved, and at the time of research, neither international health workers nor locals regarded the refugees as having significant negative effects on health care.

[172] Information gathered in several interviews.

[173] The projects were part of UNHCR's conflict prevention scheme, yet except for Kouankan town, the cities are far away from the camps, and contact between locals and refugees was minimal. Furthermore, the circle of beneficiaries was too small to have an impact on public opinion, and beneficiaries interviewed in Kissidougou had no idea of a connection between the refugee presence and the projects. In Kissidougou, individuals closely connected to the local prefect lead the programs and mediated between the aid agency and the beneficiaries.

the refugees. They thus effectively contributed to the acceptance of the refugees by the locals, who had initially been quite suspicious. Activities in the larger villages and small towns were highly vulnerable to integration into the regime's patronage system. This was mainly due to the necessary co-operation with the authorities to "sensitise" potential counterparts on the opportunities offered and to identify actual beneficiaries.[174] Occasionally, humanitarian resources found their way directly into the regime's patronage network; for instance, a humanitarian NGO supported the NGO of the second wife of the President, El Hadja Seth Kadiatou Conté.[175]

Another possibility for the regime to profit from humanitarian revenues was corruption. In the early 1990s, some assistance was channelled through Guinean ministries (Black/Sessay 1997:595), giving the regime the opportunity to appropriate some of the resources. Subsequently, NGOs replaced the state authorities. Since, there were basically two forms of corruption that have to be distinguished. One was official corruption, i.e. bribes paid by UNHCR and other organisations to government officials to be allowed or able to carry out their tasks. The need for a relocation of the refugees provided government officials with new leverage, and substantial sums of money and presents, e.g. at least one car, have been handed out to get the new sites allocated. The second form of corruption was collusion between individual employees of humanitarian organisations and state authorities, enabling the former to divert resources to the benefit of both while being protected by the authorities.[176]

3.4.3 The Economic Impact of the Refugee Influx: Winners and Losers

In reading this section, the interface between economy and politics has to be borne in mind. All nationally owned big business is held by elites close to the government, and gains made automatically strengthen the regime as well. Most importantly, Mamadou Sylla, President of the employers' organisation, is alleged to be a presidential proxy, serving as a guise for Conte's personal control of much of the economy.[177] Inter alia, he is an

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[174] It was concluded between UNHCR and the authorities that one fifth of the humanitarian budget should be spent on projects for Guineans in the refugee-populated areas. Although local authorities were not exclusively responsible for determining which projects would be carried out and who would benefit, they had an important intermediary role.

[175] Conté's NGO seemed to be genuinely interested in achieving its stated developmental goals, yet its political implications are obvious.

[176] For example, in what was a minor incident, a local NGO charged with the distribution of non-food items only distributed about 60 to 70 percent of the goods it received from UNHCR. After UNHCR protested, the local sous-préfet invited the monitoring team and threatened its members with arrest if the allegations were not dropped.

[177] Sylla was a subaltern government employee until 1998. In 2002, he was deemed to be the richest businessman of Guinea, and presided over the holding *Futurelec*. He has made "his" fortune mainly through

important provider of means of transport. All deliveries for roughly 60,000 refugees on the 600 kilometre road from Conakry to Kissidougou were carried out by Guinean sub-contractors. As well, the military was deeply involved in importing smuggled fuel, and the humanitarian system greatly increased demand. Generally, the humanitarian system considerably raised demand for construction, be it roads, wells, latrines, irrigation systems for rice fields, or camp facilities, while urban refugees increased demand for housing. Aid agencies have developed their own capacities for road construction and rehabilitation, but most other activities were carried out by Guinean enterprises. Given the scale on which projects were implemented in the Forest Region, humanitarian revenues were of great nationwide importance to the construction sector. While Guinean big business thus profited from the refugee influx, refugees stood little chance of competing with Guinean interests in that sector, as the Guinean political economy is characterised by heavy protectionism by informal means. Conflicts over its control could thus not develop.

While big business enterprises can be expected to have been aware of the opportunities offered by the refugee influx, there was a marked disparity between perceptions and reality on the level of the local population. As will subsequently be demonstrated, the refugees accelerated effects of long-term developments. Generally, negative effects of these changes were largely attributed to the refugees, while the opportunity provided by the refugee influx to adapt to a changing economy were frequently overlooked.

Guineans interviewed often considered the informal economy to have been dominated by refugees before late 2000, i.e. refugees were identified as rivals. The importance refugees had in the informal sector is likely to have been overestimated. During the research period, the situation resembled that in 1990 described by Lambert (1990), i.e. an ethnically structured informal economy controlled by Guineans. As the ethnic networks protected their interests, the situation was unlikely to have changed considerably in the meantime, although Guineans may have appropriated sectors dominated by refugees during the riots in 2000.[178] My queries regarding the sectors refugees were active in indicated that they occu-

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monopolising trade in several sectors, but was also a main beneficiary privatisation. Most notably, he took over the planes from the national carrier Air Guinée in late 2002, though not the company's excessive debts, and created Air Guinée Express.

[178] Refugees experiences were most likely analogous to those of other foreign entrepreneurs after the "liberalisation". When Conté took over, "la Guinée apparaît, dans toute la région, comme le pays où un capital commercial donné, fut il initialement petit, offre le rendement le plus considérable" (Morice 1987:112). The opening up of the system sparked a run on the opportunities offered, and many exiles and foreign merchants, mostly from Niger and Mali, tried to enter the market. In the beginning of the 1990s, the situation had cooled down, and it became clear who had won the race. A few foreign traders had been able to build alliances with Guinean businessmen and managed to engage in import trade, but their role ended at the port of Conakry. None of them succeeded to penetrate the interior market of Guinea, which became increasingly dominated by Peul commercial networks, while Upper Guinean Mandingo networks monopolised re-export to Mali and Côte d'Ivoire (Lambert 1991:501).

pied niches blocked for Guineans because of a lack of skills. Refugees seemed to have particularly engaged in the repair of consumer items which had simply not been available in Guinea until 1984, such as cars and petroleum lamps, and the recycling of consumer goods. Guineans progressively appropriated control of these sectors as well. The main sectors open to locals in which refugees were still significantly engaged in in 2002 was the trading of fruits acquired from neighbouring villagers and the market for house maids. Other sectors in which significant numbers of refugees where active in seemed to depend largely on a refugee clientele, i.e. restaurants, coffee bars and small-scale rice trade. Although Guineans may have considered these enterprises as competition, refugees were generally much more important to the Guinean economy as customers than as entrepreneurs. Commercial activities have greatly developed in the Forest Region, particularly because of an increased demand due to the refugees (Grovogui 1996:35). The relocation of markets from Liberia, in part stimulated by refugee traders, supported that trend. Most importantly, Guéckédou hosted one of the biggest (according to Guineans, the biggest) markets in the region until September 2000.[179] The town was an important junction for trade between Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. The market had been in Kolahun in "Greater Liberia" until traders fled the business methods of the NPFL. Generally, trade in the region underwent considerable growth, and the region around Guéckédou even witnessed an unprecedented boom.

Another area of competition was the housing market. Rents in urban Guinea, especially in the Forest Region and Conakry, sharply increased since 1989, according to locals by about 300 to 700 percent.[180] Somewhat inconsistently, locals in Kissidougou and N'zérékoré pointed out that rents had not fallen after the repatriation of Liberian refugees in 1997. However, claims that rents there had risen again as a result of the influx of humanitarian organisations are credible.[181] Urban Guineans tended to blame the housing problem on refugees and, as many were indeed able to pay the rents, regarded them as privileged. In the Forest Region, prices for essential items, most notably rice, rose as a consequence of increased demand due to refugees. The increase in demand refugees caused benefited im-

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[179] Guéckédou also hosted the bulk of humanitarian head offices. Increases in rents there are probably connected to the boom the town witnessed rather than to humanitarian personnel. The increase in demand caused by humanitarian personnel can hardly have led to price rises given the enormous turnover of the market.

[180] These are subjective estimates of Guinean locals, and most likely subjective price increase was higher than real increase. Inflation between 1990 and 2001 was about 300 percent (calculations by the author based on data from Hemstedt 1991-1998 and EIU sources). It is likely that the refugee influx indeed was a factor increasing rents, but inflation and accelerated urbanisation were important as well. It should as well be noted that many of the relatively few refugees who managed to establish themselves in the cities were lodged with relatives.

[181] Until 2000, most organisations operated from Guéckédou, which was severely hit during the fighting. Since then, most agencies have relocated their offices to Kissidougou and N'zérékoré.

porters, producers (particularly peasants), house owners, and constructors, while the associated inflationary tendencies were especially detrimental to the urban poor. Some resentment towards refugees in Conakry may be connected to competition for cheap housing. In the cities of the Forest Region, the increase in rice prices was countered by the availability of cheap humanitarian supplies on the local markets.[182] As one woman from a poor household in Kissidougou put it: "Quand les réfugiés étaient là, il n'y avait pas de famine. Maintenant, il y a la famine."[183]

Other benefits to locals (urban as well as rural) emanated from asset transfers (cf. Duffield 1994). Especially early arrivals had brought with them goods of value, such as cars, agricultural tools, household items etc. As the refugees' resources dwindled, they had to sell their property–at extremely low prices, as high pressure on the refugees to sell caused a supply far in excess of demand at reasonable prices. Almost all refugees interviewed had sold everything of value they owned within a one-year period, and the number of cars in the Forest Region is said to have tripled or quadrupled following the influx (Damme 1999:49).[184] On the whole, refugees have considerably increased opportunities for Guineans to acquire capital goods.

Notwithstanding, especially during the first months of the refugee crisis the rural population suffered adverse effects. Particularly villagers supported the refugees, i.e. accommodated them in their homes and shared food with them, putting additional stress on an already poor living standard. Near the border, population density tripled due to the refugee influx during the 1990s (Black/Sessay 1997:590).[185] The increase in population density obviously had implications on water, land and forest resources. The situation gradually improved as rural refugees started building their own houses, either in camps or as self-settlers, and humanitarian organisations became engaged. Although rural Guineans interviewed realised that effects of the refugee influx were not entirely negative, the perception that refugees had a largely negative impact on the living standard was widespread.

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[182] Most of the rice consumed in Guinea and particularly in Conakry is imported. Poor transport infrastructure means that imported rice is comparatively more expensive in the Forest Region, and locally produced rice is of greater importance there.

[183] The statement refers to the closure of the Massadou camp some three to four km away from Kissidougou in early 2001 (Interview 10.05.02).

[184] Almost all the public transport cars I used in the region were driven by Guineans, who, according to my queries, were most often employed by a relative owning the car.

[185] The figures are disputed, but Diallo 1992:14 and Grovogui 1996:9f cite similar numbers in their case studies. Refugees are estimated to make up half of the population of the Forest Region (Black/Sessay 1997:590), while in some districts the population even quadrupled during the 1990s. As a rule, most refugees were located within a 15 km distance from the border and in the cities, while most communities further inland had no or very selective contact (for example through direct family links or market transactions) with the refugees. However, Fairhead/Leach 1994:507 cite statistics which report population growth of 120 percent from 1932-1993, 40 percent of which was due to the refugees.

Access to drinking water was often mentioned by refugees–especially those without ethnic ties to the local community–as a critical point in early contacts with the local population, and access to the wells was frequently denied. Water quality and supply was indeed a problem. In the early 1990s, only the prefectures of Lola and N'zérékoré had some "puits améliorés",[186] and Macenta, Guéckédou and Kissidougou were only equipped with traditional wells. Most people still depended on surface water, the poor quality of which further deteriorated due to population growth (Diallo 1992:19). The humanitarian organisations had since greatly engaged in digging wells, and throughout the region supply with safe fresh water had markedly improved. During the research, villagers simply did not mention water as a source of tensions in the past, even where relations were quite strained, as in Kola.

Land-related issues were considered the most important source of tensions by government officials, humanitarian workers and ordinary Guineans alike, arguing that the population increase resulted in unbearable pressure on natural resources. However, population density in the Forest Region was just re-approaching its level prior to colonisation and the land can actually support a population increase (Fairhead/Leach 1994, 1996),[187] while cultural strategies for coping with increased demand on land still exist (Black/Sessay 1997:598f).[188] Refugees generally had no claim to land, so they had to negotiate access with the local villagers. A precondition for successful negotiations stressed by all the refugees interviewed was to establish friendly relations with one of the villagers. The traditional institution of finding a local patron is operated in the whole region and is well understood by the refugees (Black/Sessay 1997:602). According to the refugees interviewed, getting access to land was less a question of providing material benefits to locals than proving one's "good character". Speaking the same indigenous language considerably facilitated establishing personal relations. Refugees of different ethnicity than the locals usually entered the system through the mediation of refugees already incorporated.

There were clear incentives for the villagers to establish such a relationship. Firstly, it raised the prestige of the local patron, crucial to establishing some kind of authority at the village level. Village positions have become more important and more contested due to the decline of state control after the death of Sékou Touré (Black/Sessay 1997:603). Secondly, "proving one's good character" involved helping the patron doing field work, and, although villagers usually did not explicitly demand rent, refugees held that as a matter of custom and an expression of gratitude, 10 to 20 percent of the harvest would be given to

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[186] The term designates wells with cemented walls and cover in order to prevent pollution.

[187] The Forest Region was a major battlefield in inter-African and French-African wars during the colonisation period (see below), depopulating the area.

[188] Black/Sessay's case study was carried out in three localities in Yomou prefecture near the Liberian border, but as patterns which govern the access to land as well as politico-economic conditions in the region are quite similar, their findings are probably representative.

the land owner. Thirdly, the refugees provided an opportunity for local villagers to establish a claim to land on the one hand and to shift to more profitable production, particularly swamp rice farming and cash crop cultivation, on the other.[189] Generally, locals maintained control over land farmed by refugees, and access had to be renegotiated annually. Often, land was cleared by refugees and farmed for one season, after the end of which locals could convert it to cash crop cultivation, causing the rapid expansion of plantations. During my research, cash crop production was shifting from coffee to hybrid oil palms. For almost all of the rural refugees interviewed, doing work on villagers' fields or on the few commercial plantations was one important source of revenue.[190] Setting up irrigation systems for rice fields is labour intensive, and Liberians were considerably more experienced with the system than locals (Black/Sessay 1997:600). There are strong indications that we can generalise findings of Black/Sessay's analysis,[191] i.e. the refugee influx accelerated a long-term process of rural modernisation benefiting the local population, while at the same time furthering refugees' interests.

By 1995, three quarters of the refugee households covered in Black/Sessay's study (ibid:596) had access to land.[192] While locals generally maintained their fallow cycles of ten years on average, in 75 percent of the cases fallow cycles were shortened on refugees' land, basically meaning that refugees were offered land of inferior quality (ibid.). None of the refugee households covered in Black/Sessay (ibid:602) had been allocated land through the mediation of aid agencies. At the sites of my research, the relocated refugees' access was increasing rapidly, but humanitarian organisations there had a comparatively more substantial role in mediating. After the relocation of 2001, the principle of directing 20

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[189] Rights over bush land were not definitely established, and the first one to farm it himself or through refugee clients thus established a claim to it against other villagers and, more importantly, against other villages.

[190] Daily wages for refugees were at 300 to 500 FG, while for the locals they were at 750 to 1,000 FG in 1995 (Grovogui 1996:34) (1,000 FG = 1 US Dollar). In 2002, daily wages for fieldwork were at 1,000 to 1,500 for refugees and about 2,000 to 2,500 for local jouths (1,000 FG = 0.50 US dollar). Purchasing power loss from 1995-2002 was about 30 percent (author's own calculations, based on Hemstedt 1996-1998 and EIU sources), suggesting a real wage increase for refugees. Although locals often perceived the refugees as privileged, the difference in wages suggests that locals had far better access to means of subsistence. Yet refugees may have had better access to education, health services, and clean drinking water.

[191] Data from Grovogui's (1996) study which was conducted in the more northerly sous-préfecture of Fassankoni (Macenta prefecture) equally suggested that the refugees stimulated local demand for land. While refugees officially made up 70 percent of the population, the part of the population actually farming only increased by 36 percent (wage labour excluded). Yet the number of rice fields rocketed by 112.5 percent, from 200 in 1990 to 425 in 1995 (ibid:33), most likely stimulated by a price hike of 100 percent for rice (ibid:34) due to increased demand. Additionally, coffee plantations, which were exclusively held by locals, were rapidly expanding (ibid:17). Data used from Grovogui (1996): local population: 1,379 (p.9); refugees: 3,216 (p.10); local population active in agriculture: 93 % (p.13); peasant refugees: 73% of all refugees (p.19); peasant refugees having access to land: 20% (p.33).

[192] However, in Black/Sessay's area of research no primary forests were cleared except in one area, where rubber and oil palm plantations had considerably diminished the overall availability of land. At the new sites I visited, no primary forests were cleared.

percent of the humanitarian resources to locals had been firmly established.[193] Access to plains and hill slopes was still directly negotiated by refugees, but as one fifth of the seeds (and sometimes tools) would be given to the villager providing the land, humanitarian organisations increased incentives for the latter. The aid agencies concentrated their agricultural programs on irrigated swamp rice cultivation, which is roughly four times as productive as upland cultivation and twice as productive as natural swamp farming. Additionally swamps are usually not left fallow. Access to irrigated swamps at the new sites was achieved exclusively through aid agencies. Locals willing to improve their swamps were encouraged to contact the respective organisations, who would subcontract Guinean enterprises to carry out the necessary works. 20 percent of the land–usually the best part–were immediately used by the Guinean farmers, while the remaining 80 percent would be given to "vulnerable" refugees for a period of three years. Guinean farmers could thus expect to have considerably improved land at their disposal once the refugees had left or their land rights expired. Inhabitants of the Albadariah sub-prefecture were benefiting particularly from the relocation, and were quite aware of the benefits the refugees brought with them.[194] In sum, the refugee presence did not only increase the locals' capacities to engage in cash crop production, but also provided means to improve the productivity of agriculture. As locals developed an interest in the refugees' presence, they were unlikely to act against the refugees.

3.5   The Refugee Crisis and Identity Formation

The question to be dealt with in this section is that of the refugees' identity, important to understand between which groups conflicts could occur. To what extent did refugees maintain or develop a sectarian identity, and how did refugee identities relate to Guinean identities?

In the Forest Region, identity is complex and manifold. Before the Liberian war, "la grande partie des populations frontalières était tournée vers le Libéria et se sentait plus libérienne que guinéenne" (Grovogui 1996:32). A trans-border ethnic identity overlaps with Liberian and Guinean identity aspects. A regionally based Guinean "Forestier" identity further adds to the complexity. Self-identification is extremely variable and depends on

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[193] Before the relocation, a host of agencies was operating in the agricultural sector, and their practices reportedly varied considerably. According to Diallo (1992) and Grovogui (1996), aid agencies had included the local population in their programs early on, but it seems that more than 80% were destined for the refugees.

[194] In contrast to the Kola (which hosted a camp between 1993 and 1997) and Kouankan sites for Liberian refugees, the Albadariah region knew no refugee presence before the relocation. In Albadariah, the construction of roads and wells etc. of benefit to the locals had just commenced, while at the Liberian sites the provision of these infrastructures was somewhat taken for granted by the locals.

the situation. The wars weakened foreign-country identity aspects among Guineans, as the reputation of Guinea's southern neighbours suffered,[195] Guinean migrant labourers and traders had to return, and the government increased its military and administrative presence in the region. "L'assistance du Gouvernement aux populations frontalières prouva à ces dernières qu'elles font partie d'une entité nationale et jouissent de la sécurité de cette nation" (Grovogui 1996:32).[196]

When the wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone started, the refugees chose their place of refuge according to criteria of ethnicity (Grovogui 1996:20). Independently of the mode of settlement, refugees and locals kept–or developed–their separate identities (Damme 1999:37), the latter being the "citizens" ("citoyens") or "autochtones", the former simply being "refugees" (réfugiés). The trend line interviews revealed that despite considerable interaction and frequent friendly relations between Guineans and refugees, the distinction remained latent. However, it is likely that given the events of 2000/2001, refugees tended to overestimate the importance of that distinction in retrospective. Some of the symbols Guineans use to distinguish themselves from refugees have been mentioned in section 3.4.1. Generally, the imagined difference between Guineans and refugees largely followed the tradition-modernity dichotomy. Refugees were considered and frequently considered themselves to favour western fashion, be more entrepreneurial and materialist, be less deferent to elders, and have less rigid norms regulating sexual behaviour (cf. Andrews 2003). Liberia and Sierra Leone clearly were more modernised than Guinea before the wars, and the wars additionally accelerated processes of modernisation. Yet, it is quite likely that flight as well contributed to modernisation, as the theoretical framework suggests.

The qualification as "refugee" also applied to returnees having resided outside Guinea for considerable periods of time. In a Mandingo-village near Kouankan, old case-load "refugees" made up roughly 25 percent of the population. Virtually all of the "refugees" had chosen the village as place of settlement because of family links to the inhabitants, and considered themselves Guineans and "refugees" at the same time. They had, however, established their own parallel political institutions and had their own representative, who was to consult with the "citizens'" representatives. Different from other refugees, these "refugees" had been accorded an indefinite right to cultivate the village's land, and were better integrated politically as well as economically.[197] Generally, village and ethnic identities became subdivided into new entities, i.e. a refugee and a citizen identity. The overarching

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[195] Before the wars, Liberia and Sierra Leone symbolised a higher living standard, and both countries enjoyed a remarkably good reputation (cf. Andrews 2003). Nowadays, these countries are no more associated with anything desirable by Guineans.

[196] According to Jacobsen (2002) security problems associated with wars or refugees quite often compel the state to increase its presence, possibly having positive effects on state building.

[197] Interview in Kanela II (sous-préfecture de Kouankan), 28.05.2002

ethnic identity nevertheless remained important. After the events of 2000/2001 many refugees–Mandingo and "indigenous" Liberians alike–acquired Guinean identity cards.[198] This move was motivated by the security Guinean nationality conferred, rather than a change in self-identification. The way in which the identity documents were acquired nevertheless is indicative of the level of integration. Guineans befriended with refugees posed as their relatives, giving wrong testimony to the authorities as to the origin of the refugees.[199]

The private Guinean press, international humanitarian personnel and non-Mandingo refugees tended to regard the Mandingo as Guinean returnees and not as refugees. Although Mandingo emigration had already occurred in pre-colonial and colonial times, the bulk of migrants left Guinea during the 1960s and 1970s. In 2002, most of the Liberian refugee camp population was of Mandingo ethnicity. Given that most Mandingo refugees had arrived in mid-1990 (Damme 1999:39),[200] integration does not appear to have been as easy for them as their returnee-status suggests. The Mandingo interviewed in the camps did not consider themselves Guineans. Many have been born in Liberia and hardly speak any French. They legitimise their claim to Liberian nationality with reference to a historical Mandingo kingdom, a kingdom which "indigenous" Liberians tend to regard a mere hamlet where Mandingo were granted the right to settle down by an "indigenous" king. The Guinean government was equally reluctant to consider the Mandingo refugees Guineans. Both due to their involvement in Liberian politics, the ethnic factor in Guinean politics, and their predominantly urban background, they were regarded as potential troublemakers. The LURD forces represented a reliable ally of the Guinean regime for basically the same reason they previously represented an ally of Samuel Doe: they were a vulnerable, foreign minority. Not furthering their integration arguably reserved the option of expulsion for the Government,[201] and made humanitarian aid available which was needed to subsidise them.

In addition to other identities, refugees developed a distinct "refugee" identity uniting Liberians and Sierra Leoneans. Especially in the Parrot's Beak isthmus in the Guéckédou prefecture, there was considerable cohabitation of and interaction between Liberians and Sierra Leoneans. The refugee identity was mainly based on the use of a common language, and the common experiences of war, refuge, and exile. Pidgin English was the *lingua*

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[198] A substantial number of refugees, including those in the camp, held Guinean identity documents. One refugee estimated that some 20% of those speaking an indigenous Guinean language had acquired Guinean identity cards, though this account is likely to be exaggerated.

[199] Given the poor state of Guinea's records on its own population, the authorities often depend on testimony from relatives to issue documents.

[200] Most Liberian refugees repatriated around 1997, yet most of the Mandingo camp population in 2002 was made up of old case-load refugees who had refused to return given that they were still considered subversive in their home country.

[201] For instance, once President Conté stated that "[t]ous ceux qui sont de l'ULIMO ne sont pas des Guinéens, mais des libériens. Ils doivent retourner au Libéria" (Horoya 24-26-04.1999.

franca in the camps, and became much more widely spoken than had previously been the case in the refugees' home countries.[202] Refugees' trade relations were often limited to the refugee community, partly explaining the development of a common identity.[203] The dependence on a refugee clientele may have been the most important reason for which many of the Mandingo choose to settle down in the camps.

Inside the Kouankan and Kola refugee camps inhabited by Liberians, there was a discernible antagonism between Mandingo and "indigenous" Liberians. There was frequent stereotyping, but as well a substantial willingness to cooperate. "Indigenous" refugees overwhelmingly considered the LURD insurgency illegitimate. They almost universally regarded it as the selfish attempt of foreigners to monopolise power. There was a marked rejection of the Mandingo's claim to Liberian nationality and their right to have a say in the country's political affairs. In contrast, while there was little open support for the LURD from the Mandingo refugees, these stressed the need for a respect of Mandingo interests and tended to approve what they considered the rebels' motives. Despite some tensions due to these contradictory positions, there were also many conciliatory voices, especially from the upper strata of the refugee population such as camp authorities, religious authorities, and teachers, and cohabitation improved. UNHCR acted upon the camp administration in order to encourage cooperation.

In Kola, day-to-day relations were relatively unproblematic. Kola's respected chairman of the camp administration, an ethnic Krahn married to a Kpelle wife, actively promoted reconciliation. He denounced stereotypical prejudices, advocated a "forgive and forget" approach, mediated between the groups, and encouraged people to speak English and to reject "tribalism". Liberian origin and the common use of Pidgin English were strong symbols for the unity of the Liberian refugees, underlying such an attitude. In similar vein, it was frequently acknowledged that beliefs rooted in traditional African religions as well as the experiences of war and exile where features shared by the refugee community. Perhaps more significant than the symbols mentioned is that refugees, once asked, were quite prepared to find common ground between the groups.

In Kouankan, intra-camp relations were much more difficult than in Kola. The "indigenous" Christian representatives newly incorporated into the camp administration on an

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[202] In rural settings, indigenous languages had dominated before.

[203] The main reason for the limitation of trade relations seemed to be credit arrangements. Refugee merchants disposed of better mechanisms to enforce the repayment of debts from refugees, while they stood little chance to recover debts from Guineans, and the same was true for Guinean merchants. Day-to-day business was quite dependent on the willingness and capacity of traders to grant (and recover) credits. Customers often only buy from traders who are willing to provide them with credit in times of need. As the economic situation is precarious, consumers are regularly in need of credit to acquire items of basic necessity.

informal basis upon pressure of UNHCR reported that relations with the Mandingo representatives were essentially fair and improving,[204] but their view did not seem to be shared by those they were expected to represent. On the contrary: Several informants rather regarded the situation as becoming more difficult and not a few actually feared clashes. The difference between Kola and Kouankan demonstrates the impact the rebel presence had on intra-camp relations. Most of the non-Muslim refugees had fled the LURD and not government troops, and a climate of fear overshadowed relations between Mandingos and "indigenous" Liberians. In Kola, the impact of the few LURD combatants had a negligible impact on camp life. The Muslim community tended to regard Kouankan a Mandingo camp, and was hardly sensitive to the "indigenous" population's concerns.[205] Yet, there was little ethnic propaganda, as the LURD seemed interested in altering its image of an alien force and not in further dividing its Mandingo constituency from other Liberians (cf. ICG 2002). The LURD, in fact a coalition of different groups, had never openly advocated an ethnic agenda, although its Guinean wing clearly was a Mandingo force.

Subsequently, instances of refugee-related violence in Guinea will be analysed, taking into account the findings presented above on political, economic and symbolic contradictions.

3.5.1   Refugee-Related Violence in Guinea

As has been stated in chapter 1, land questions *per se* are unlikely to lead to armed conflict, as refugees usually have little resources to engage in confrontation, and would rather starve to death if not provided with aid or land. A closer examination of the relation between Guineans and refugees showed that the reciprocal nature of the system made confrontations unlikely. Furthermore, the danger of an overexploitation of the soil was not as apparent as the numbers of refugees suggest, as agricultural change towards more efficient production could be observed. Yet, in at least two cases, confrontations that were considered to be land-related took place. In order to understand the role land played in these incidences, we have to look at the wider politico-economic context in which agrarian change unfolded, and the way refugees impacted on these processes.

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[204] Kouankan received several waves of refugees. The first were almost exclusively Muslim/Mandingo, whereas later arrivals were mostly "indigenous" Liberians. These had not yet been formally incorporated into the camp administration, but elections were scheduled. "Indigenous" Liberians remained a minority in Kouankan.

[205] Remarkably, when I asked the Mandingo refugee chairman of Kouankan about features uniting the refugees, he first mentioned the Muslim religion, implying that refugees of other religions were not on his mind. The chairman was suspected of being a LURD member, but seemed to be committed to mediating between the rebels and other refugees. For instance, a former NPFL fighter interviewed in the camp had disclosed his identity to him in order to be protected against possible LURD harassment.

The Forest Region has witnessed substantial Mandingo immigration from the north since pre-colonial times (Fairhead/Leach 1994:495). Generally, immigrants came as traders and settled among the local population. Yet, war has played a crucial role in forming relations between locals and Mandingo. During the 19th century, several wars were fought for the control of regional trade routes, and between 1874 and 1909 the region was the site of continuous warfare. By the mid-nineteenth century the first Mandingo chiefdom of Buzié had been established, with Kouankan as its capital. Several of the "Forestiers" political entities became tributaries to Buzié, and later to the Muslim-Mandingo kingdom of Samory Touré.[206] Samory was expelled from the region in 1894 by the French, and Kouankan was taken and burned to the ground by Forestiers-forces in 1897 (ibid:495-497). These historic experiences provide a point of reference in the locals' interpretation of contemporary conflicts of interest.

Many immigrants became integrated into the agricultural economy, even though they most often had arrived as traders. Usually, immigrants negotiated a right to cultivate the land according to traditional practice. Even after considerable time had passed, Forestiers still tended to consider the right a temporary one. Currently, the temporary nature of the arrangement is often challenged, as the descendants of the immigrants now claim a customary right to the land. The region has witnessed several clashes between Konia and Forestier in the last decades (cf. Indépendant 01.03.2001). At the same time, as individual land ownership developed (Grovogui 1996:34) and the rural economy became commercialised, state intervention in questions of land ownership increased. The state began distributing ownership titles to those engaging in the *mise en valeur* of the land, i.e. in cash crop production and the set-up of irrigation systems, a move which has particularly benefited the Konia immigrants (Fairhead/Leach 1994:504). State intervention has become increasingly important to establish a claim to land. 44 percent of all swamp-farming Guinean nationals, or 13 percent of all Guinean peasants covered in Black/Sessay (1997:602), named the state as their source of access to land, compared to 41 percent who traditionally "owned" the swamps they farmed. These agricultural changes have to be kept in mind when analysing contemporary conflicts.

On 12 and 13 May 2002, about 70 youths from Kola village, inhabited by ethnic Kpelle Forestiers of Christian and Animist religion, invaded the camp site. They closed down offices and activity centres of humanitarian organisations and threatened their personnel into leaving. The community hall and the foundations of a mosque were torn down, and several private refugee huts were damaged. Although some refugees were hurt when the youths

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[206] Samory was a Mandingo, but he based his legitimacy on religion rather than ethnicity. Due to the current political situation in Guinea, the ethnic component has become more important in retrospective.

threw stones, the attackers met no physical resistance. Instead people fled in great numbers to the Muslim town of Gouécké four kilometres away. The conflict was prevented from escalating further by the Guinean military.

According to a local youth leader, the problem was one between the village and the aid agencies, rather than between the village and the refugees.[207] UNHCR was accused of having broken promises, and he demanded that villagers get the same treatment as refugees, i.e. they should receive food rations. Additional demands presented to UNHCR included building a youth activity centre, a maternity hospital, three new classrooms (in addition to the existing six in the village and twelve in the camp), filling up of a local water pool, drilling of pump-equipped wells, improvement of the local road, and payment of 10 million Guinean francs (approximately 5.000 Euros) to the village authorities. The youth leader pointed out that the village had to be compensated for the loss of fields and the "deforestation" at the camp site. The site, including the refugees' fields, measured some 43 hectares. The term "deforestation" usually means a loss of primary forests, yet the youth leader referred to the loss of coffee and fruit trees. Fruit trees on the site were not felled, for economic reasons as well as for protection against sun and wind. Compensation for the loss of fields and plantations had been paid to the affected farmers,[208] but not to the village authorities. Paradoxically the youth leader denied that a shortage of arable land or wood had indeed affected the village. Competition for these resources was thus unlikely to be a cause of conflict between refugees and locals, and the argument that the village had to be compensated for the losses brought about by refugees was unconvincing.

In order to understand the apparent contradiction, we have to explore the motives behind environmentalist rhetoric. International concern for the region's primary forests has become an important source of revenue, and the villagers are well aware that "presenting a degrading or threatened environment has become an imperative to gain access to donors' funds" (Fairhead/Leach 1996:116). Although villagers tried to create the impression that the dispute was between UNHCR and the villagers, it clearly was the construction of the mosque which sparked the invasion. Locals tried to profit from the tensions with the refugees by proposing a "solution" to UNHCR that would have brought them benefits but bore no relation to the cause of the hostilities.[209] When I expressed my doubts about land and "deforestation" being a cause of conflict, the villager's argumentation changed. They claimed to have always resisted the manifestation of Muslim belief on their ancestor's soil,

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[207] Interview in Kola Village, 25.05.02

[208] Accepting compensation for the coffee plantations was quite attractive to the farmers, as most plantations were not harvested anymore due to the slump in coffee prices on the world market in the late 1990s.

[209] This interpretation is supported by the locals' unwillingness to allow the construction of the mosque in exchange for humanitarian benefits.

and the refugees would not change that. Apparently the mosque was considered a symbol for land tenure claims. The denial of a construction permit therefore served to underline the villagers' claim to the land and to stress that the refugee's presence was merely temporary. Both villagers and the refugees considered their relationship strained, and negotiating access to land was universally described as difficult, while it was hardest for the Muslims.[210] Muslim refugees stood much better chances to establish friendly relations and negotiate land with the inhabitants of the Muslim town of Gouécké. However, by August 2002, 3,633 refugees (or 519 individuals, each of them statistically representing a household of seven) had negotiated access to land, mostly with Kola villagers.[211] The surprisingly high number indicates that the villagers realised benefits from temporarily ceding land–provided they maintained control. Given that most Kola camp refugees were Christians, that these refugees could build a church and that they could more easily negotiate access to land, the concerns which the Muslim refugees raised can only be understood in the context of intra-Guinean competition. The villagers' desire to increase production implied an extension of cultivated surfaces. This process had obvious implications on relations between Kola and neighbouring Gouécké.

These relations are crucial to understanding the problem between the (Muslim) refugees and the villagers. A representative of the Gouécké Muslim community considered relations with Kola as being and having been strained.[212] Land is one of several contentious issues. Gouécké is much larger than Kola, and the sheer size of the town suggests that it will encroach on land claimed by the "first-comers". The Muslim refugees became integrated into the Gouécké Muslim community. In local perspective, Gouécké was encroaching into Kola territory via the refugees. Gouécké supported the refugees, potentially jeopardising Kola's control over "its" territory. This potential threat almost materialised after the destruction of the mosque's foundations. The imam of Gouécké turned to the *Ligue Islamique* (LI) on behalf of the Muslim refugees.[213] The LI is quite influential but did not succeed to persuade the authorities to intervene so that the refugees could build a mosque. However, the impact the refugees might have on the balance of power between Gouécké and Kola was the primary concern of the Kola villagers–who then reached the conclusion that they had to prevent a precedent of Muslim/Mandingo manifestation on their soil. While in this case

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[210] Interview in Kola Camp, 29.08.02
[211] An additional 1,477 (or 211 individuals) refugees had been granted access to irrigated swamps through the mediation of an aid agency. All in all, 5,110 refugees thus had access to land, while the official camp population figure of 6,000 inhabitants was inflated.
[212] Interview in Gouécké, 29.08.02
[213] The Ligue Islamique is the organisation representing most of Guinea's imams and is–much more than the Christian churches–firmly incorporated into the national patronage network.

violence occurred between refugees and Guineans, in another incident refugees were considered to have sparked intra-Guinean violence.

In January 2000, fighting erupted between a Tomamania and a Toma village in the Macenta prefecture. At least 30 people were killed during the fighting (Lynx 17.01.2000). The Toma represent a Forest Minority, while the Tomamania are descendants of immigrant Mandingo. They continue to speak a Mandingo dialect, but have intermarried with local Toma and have assimilated in several respects. The Toma village had given the right to cultivate a piece of land to Mandingo who had newly arrived from Upper Guinea and had settled down with the Tomamania. The piece of land, which had been planted with coffee and cocoa in the meantime, was reclaimed by the Toma village in 1997, but the Tomamania refused to return the field. A governmental mission intervened in the dispute and ruled that the Toma owned the land, but the right to cultivate remained with the Tomamania. The Toma did not accept the decision (Lynx 17.01.2000). The press considered increasing land pressure caused by the refugees to be behind the dispute (ibid.). In the light of the dynamics described above, the background rather seemed to have been the competition for new sources of revenue arising in a process of modernisation. This process of modernisation was drastically reinforced by the influx. Nevertheless, the Tomamania are relatively well integrated into the forest societies and have more links with the "Forestiers" peoples than most other immigrant groups, circumstances which should prevent disputes from escalating. Additional factors able to break up these relations have therefore to be taken into account. These factors were provided by the ULIMO/LURD presence, their relation to the Forest Mandingo, and armed banditry. Arguably, Tomamania had provided shelter to the ULIMO, who were suspected of being behind the looting of Forestiers villages in 1997 (Républicain 18.01.2000).[214] Generally, as the Forest Region became more violent due to looting Liberian factions, relations between Guinean groups suffered.

In contrast to these cases where land was an issue, the attacks on refugees in late 2000 were essentially motivated by security interests. As has been said above, locals remained suspicious of the refugees. Occasional security breaches such as the one involving the Toma and Tomamania reinforced that attitude. When the invasion took place, the combination of a direct threat to the locals' security and government propaganda sparked the hostilities.

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[214] Whether the Tomamania village had indeed provided shelter to the rebels is doubtful. Yet Forestier villages seemed to have been selectively targeted, while the Tomamania had not come under attack. They were thus suspected of complicity with the bandits (Interview in Conakry, 13.04.02).

3.6   Conclusion: Refugees in Guinea and Political Violence

The ULIMO and the LURD had conventional as well as humanitarian sanctuaries in Guinea. The original motivation for the rebels to engage in hostilities was the loss of their former status during the war, yet the attitude of the host government was decisive for its ability to establish humanitarian sanctuaries in Guinea. The Guinean government supported the Liberian rebels for reasons of regime security and economic interests. This support can only be understood when personal politico-economic trans-border networks between rebels and the Guinean government are taken into account. The Liberian warlord and later President Charles Taylor was perceived a military and economic security threat. He symbolised neo-colonial interference in regime sovereignty and his appropriation of trade routes destroyed a source of revenue of the Guinean government. Guinea's alliance with the ULIMO thus represented an attempt to preserve its position in trans-border networks. Although humanitarian assistance partly supported the rebels' economy, the material support and rear bases provided by the Guinean government were of much greater importance. All in all, refugee assistance played a negligible role in the war economy, and foreign rebels would have maintained their bases in Guinea even if aid had not been provided or all *bona fide* refugees had been repatriated.

The impact the refugee influx had on the Guinean polity has been analysed as reinforcing or creating contradictions. The refugee influx strengthened the government, thus reinforcing the contradiction between the government and the opposition, but the refugees were in no way crucial to the regime's advantage over the domestic opposition. The opposition's interest in international support, a rational analysis of the sources of the government's power, and an ideology of African hospitality filtered the opposition's interpretation of the effects of the influx. As a consequence, it did not mobilise action against the refugees, and latent contradictions between refugees and Guineans did not lead to organised confrontation until September 2000. Then, the invasion from Liberia and Sierra Leone altered the government's perception of the refugees. They came to be considered a cover for enemy infiltration and the government instigated a pogrom aimed at forcing the refugees to leave or assembling them in spaces were they could be easily controlled. Rural Guineans adopted the government's perception of the refugees as a security threat and participated in hostilities against them, while in urban Guinea the chance to loot was a more important motivation for civilian participation in the riots. However, except for a few refugees acting as guides for the invaders, refugees did not seem to have been among those attacking Guinea.

The refugees caused few conflicts of interest in the urban informal economy. The informal market is protected by informal structures, and refugees overwhelmingly occupied economic niches in which Guineans had not yet become active. In rural Guinea, two contradictions between Guineans and refugees developed. The first is a traditional patron-

dictions between Guineans and refugees developed. The first is a traditional patron-client contradiction, while the second is a modern one between Guinean owners of means of subsistence and refugee labourers. Still, the relation was of relative benefit for both parties, and interdependence between the groups largely prevented hostilities. There is considerable evidence that the refugee influx did not lead to a declining living standard of locals. On the contrary, locals by and large seem to have economically benefited from the refugee presence. It was when interdependencies were broken up in the context of the repatriation of Liberian refugees that some Liberians engaged in what Guineans considered a hostile act, i.e. the destruction of planted crops. Generally, refugees had the greatest impact on Guinean stability where they intensified intra-Guinean tensions, primarily related to the modernisation of agriculture. Refugees accelerated that process.

Due to considerable interaction between the different refugee groups on the one hand and refugees and Guineans on the other, refugee identity was multiple and overlapping. These overlapping identities facilitated peace. Generally, sectarian identities were much less emphasised than could be expected given the ethnic aspect of the Liberian wars. Nevertheless, sectarian identity aspects remained and could still be mobilised when a political actor chose to do so. In the Liberian camps there was–often substantial–cooperation between the different groups. The camp administration, to which UNHCR gave incentives to encourage co-operation and equal representation, can be considered a political microcosm where co-operative attitudes were tested and learned.

Peace building studies identify three different layers of society on which conflicts can take place: the top level involving political and economic elites, the middle level involving community and "civil society" leaders, and the bottom level involving the grass roots. Adopting this terminology, the main antagonisms in the region's conflicts, be it in Liberia, Guinea or Sierra Leone, are situated at the "top" level. Liberians and Sierra Leoneans at the "middle" and "bottom" levels mostly desire peace and are prepared to make considerable concessions. Any potential for peace at the lower levels could only become significant once changes at the "top" level occurred in August 2003. Both Liberia and Sierra Leone have made considerable progress since this study was conducted, but it remains to be seen whether elites will permanently adopt more peaceful attitudes.

4 General Conclusion

This paper aimed at establishing refugees as a relevant social category in the analysis of causes of war. It explored the phenomenon of refugees engaging in armed conflict from the perspective that wars tend to become independent from the causes of their outbreak, and subsequently re-create causes explaining their persistence. The creation of refugees has been considered one of these causes, as refugees may constitute a specific social basis of warring parties. The dynamics explaining refugee involvement in wars have been presented by establishing an abstract societal order of refugees. Particular attention has been paid to refugees' exclusion from home country systems of reproduction, their (partial) integration into host societies, and conflicts arising in these processes. The concept of a societal order of refugee existence can serve as an analytical framework for exploring refugee involvement in wars and has proved to yield intelligible results when applied to the case of refugees in Guinea. A distinction contained in the "grammar of war", that between potentials for conflict and combat capacities, has been emphasized in the analysis. The "grammar"-model is usually employed to structure and put into logical hierarchy diverse information on war causes. The logical hierarchy is established using four major distinctions. In similar vein the "grammar" is now employed as a methodological tool to summarise the reasons for which refugees become armed actors. That is, the essential findings of this study are presented in the form of a "grammar of refugees in war".

During wars, contradictions are exacerbated to a point at which they take on a qualitatively new form, the contradiction between those included in and those excluded from a system of societal reproduction. Geographically manifested exclusion, i.e. the flight of one party, represents a definite solution to a conflict of interests for the excluding party. Nevertheless, flight exacerbates contradictions, and thereby represents a solution not overcoming but furthering causes of war. Displacement may also represent a temporary solution for elites of the excluded, as the sharpening of contradictions enables them to maintain their social basis and consequently an influential position in the excluded community. Centrifugal tendencies in a society may be instrumental to some, and these will consequently reject integration in the home and the host country alike, as the case of the PALIPEHUTU and the PLO demonstrates. Exclusion occurs in political, economic and symbolic dimensions of reproduction. Political exclusion means the definite denial of access to decision making, patronage and public goods, particularly security. Economically, exclusion becomes manifest as ejection from patronage networks and appropriation or destruction of the means of subsistence. Exclusion from symbolic reproduction is represented by ideologies defining the adversary as alien to the in-group, i.e. categorically rejecting a solution to a conflict

that respects interests of the other. Exclusion from home country societal reproduction is the basic root cause of refugee involvement in wars. In the long term, contradictions between refugees and nationals in the host country become more relevant as the background of immediate motivations for an armed return, but the condition necessary for these contradictions to become causal factors remains the refusal of the sending country to reintegrate the refugee population. Contradictions in the host country centre on the alien-national divide. As integration increases, conflicts of interest that can be analysed as contradictions will emerge in several areas of competition. The alien-national divide remains the basis for denying a solution to these conflicts that would respect the interests of the refugees. Refugees often remain aliens for generations, and the insecure standing this status implies explains the continuation of refugees' visions of a–probably armed–return to a place where they would be "at home".

The "crisis" stage of the "grammar of war" model assembles the paradigms through which actors interpret contradictions and on the basis of which they judge that resistance has to be mobilised. Flight and the circumstances under which it occurs alter refugees' perceptions of subsequent developments. The common experience of flight and exile as well as the social transformations accompanying it strengthen the cohesion of the refugee group. Flight and exile become symbols of a collective identity. Contradictions are interpreted through sectarian worldviews, e.g. an ethnic consciousness, expressing interests of the in-group and producing subjective motives to engage in armed struggle. The experience of actual exclusion often increases fear of a repetition of the experience when new conflicts arise. Flight then constitutes a precedent symbolising the perceived marginal standing of the refugee community and its consequences. Actors may come to the conclusion that only sufficient military power can guarantee the group's integrity. Nevertheless, refugees may also come to the conclusion that political violence was responsible for their plight, and that competition for opportunities should be non-violent. Whether this position becomes dominant among the refugee population is partly dependent on its leaders. As the case of Tanzania demonstrates (see 1.3), patterns of settlement determining the degree of influence these leaders exert and whether refugees subjectively recognise alternative, non-violent ways to fulfil their aspirations, are important variables. Furthermore, the host state has a prominent role in weakening or strengthening actors competing for influence over the refugee community.

On the "conflict" stage of the model, the genesis of organisational, economic and mental fighting capacities is analysed. The institution of the refugee camp furthers rebels' organisational capacities, as access to and communication with civilians is facilitated. Importantly, the home state is deprived of most of its capacities to destroy rebel organisations, while flight makes new economic and mental combat capacities accessible.

Refugee-related economic fighting capacities can accrue from humanitarian assistance, refugees' economic activities in the host country, trans-border trade and host state support. The relative importance of humanitarian aid differs from case to case. It may be of great importance in some cases, but an analysis of the economics of refugee involvement in violence cannot be restricted to that aspect. Generally, humanitarian aid to refugees only occasionally supports war economies, as the host state has capacities to prevent its abuse and often does use them. Mental fighting capacities specific to refugee situations are constituted via the experience of flight in the first place. The experience of a direct threat to physical integrity and material livelihood is most effective in legitimising "counter"-violence (even though the rebel group may in fact have started the fighting). Refugee camps then constitute an environment in which discourses producing mental fighting capabilities can effectively reach masses.

Yet refugees in camps and their movement can comparatively easily be controlled by host governments. Most often, the transformations of the societal order leading to war are blocked at the conflict stage. Contradictions between refugees and home country actors as well as between refugees and host country actors arise frequently, and they are often perceived as critical. The host country regime most often prevents that these subjectively recognised contradictions translate into organisational combat capabilities. Generally, refugees are weak actors in their host countries, and they need support from within these states to continuously engage in political violence. Refugees can establish the organisational capacities necessary to engage in political violence within the host state usually only when supported by actors of the host polity. The attitude of influential host country actors, particularly the regime, towards the refugee insurgents is thus decisive. They either allow foreign rebels to consolidate their organisation, or prevent them from establishing meaningful organisational capacities by repressing armed actors and monitoring their movement. Host country actors may consider the refugees an opportunity to enhance their political station. Rather than being a burden, refugees can open up opportunities for national elites. Ethnic, religious and ideological affiliations can strengthen or facilitate political trans-border alliances, yet the alliances are essentially strategic.

Host countries classically characterised as instable are most likely to tolerate refugee-warriors. Specifically, host states in which authority is largely exercised through informal networks, where manifest challenges to the regime's claim to power are present, and where the competition for political power is barely institutionalised are most vulnerable to an integration of foreign armed actors into the state's security apparatus or into oppositional military formations. A factor increasing the probability of integration into the state's security apparatus are hostile relations between the home and the host state. In case of hostile relations, refugee insurgents are frequently   employed by the host state to weaken the

home state or to guard the border area. Trans-national political networks and their relation to domestic politics can partly explain hostile relations between Third World states: Regimes consider each other a threat because their respective regional networks are economically or politically linked to dissidents in the neighbouring state. Likewise, neighbouring states can be perceived a threat because they undermine the symbolic basis of the regime's rule, thereby potentially strengthening domestic oppositional actors. When host country actors realise opportunities to strengthen their military capabilities by aligning with refugee armies, refugees become a trans-national as well as a domestic security problem. Generally, it is the host country regime rather than the opposition which profits from refugee-warriors, as it usually is the strongest actor and would expel the refugees if these strengthened oppositional forces.

The above stated transformations–contradictions caused by the war, the perception of these contradictions as causing a crisis, and a subsequent re-creation of fighting capacities–combine to alter the dynamics of war and what war is about. They can constitute a closed circle, leading to the permanent re-creation of war causes.

The preceding reflections largely confirm the hypotheses expressed in the introduction. Refugees, linked by common political, economic and symbolic features, indeed constitute a distinct social basis for warring parties created by war (or by massive violence akin to war). The social basis is related to the combatant organisation by providing personal, material and moral support to it. Root causes for refugee engagement in war can be attributed to dynamics in the home country, i.e. exclusive policies. Host country conditions marginalizing refugees add to and reinforce these root causes, and in the long run become more relevant for the refugees' motivations to engage in warfare, as particularly the case of the RPF demonstrates. Host country politics are decisive for allowing root causes to translate into actual fighting as these allow refugees to acquire the necessary organisational capacities. The reasons for which host country political forces tolerate cross-border activities–interests in power accumulation rather than logistical constraints–are not only an important cause of refugee involvement in that type of violence, but are equally important to explaining refugee engagement in fighting in the host country. Humanitarian assistance may further combat capabilities, but cannot be regarded decisive, as refugees not receiving assistance have similarly engaged in war.[215]

The hypothesis that flight constitutes a break with the order of war and refugees thus contribute to ending wars is equally valid under certain circumstances. The decisive variable however is the host country rather than humanitarian assistance, most important in that the

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[215] Pre-1967 Rwandan refugees, those invading Rwanda in 1990, Senegalese in Guinea-Bissau, and the Kuomintang-groups in Burma are examples mentioned in this paper.

host state can block developments situated on the conflict-stage of the grammar of war, i.e. it can take action against the formation or maintenance of organisational combat capabilities.

However, the circle of violence can be blocked at each of the stages of the "grammar of war", which is important for international refugee policies. Integrative politics in the home country allowing for a peaceful processing of societal contradictions provide one option. Rather than being compensated for, these politics can be complemented by reintegration in the host country. Long-term stability involves changes in the home country because refugees are a population segment likely to be discriminated against once competition in the host country becomes intense. When return is envisaged after a prolonged period of exile because of changes in the host polity, it is more likely to be armed in the absence of change in the home country. Yet integration in the receiving country can be an option reducing the costs of a political settlement in the home country and benefiting the host state. The present paper challenged the conventional wisdom that refugees are a burden to the host country. Refugees and the international humanitarian system often contribute to economic growth.[216] In some cases, refugees have deliberately been employed in national development strategies. Often, however, local economic growth stimulated by refugees presents few benefits to elites, while the perception that refugees impact negatively on social stability and the fear they might constitute a drain on state resources incite most governments–in the industrialised as well as in the developing world–to adopt a rather reserved policy on refugee integration.

Patterns of thought identified with the "crisis" stage of the model can also change in exile. The place of residence is outside the centre of conflict, and co-operative thinking may be more highly valued and rewarded there than in the home country. Host country conditions can contribute to changing the way in which situations are interpreted and promote non-violent reactions, as the case of urban refugees in Tanzania suggests. Most importantly, the host state can block fighting capacities, primarily on the organisational level of rebel groups. At the same time, its attitude has great importance for the security of humanitarian personnel and consequently the ability of rebel groups to divert humanitarian resources. Generally, refugee assistance may be the least problematic form of humanitarian aid, as it can allow people to remain civilians and not integrate into the order of war. Humanitarian organisations have few possibilities to act against the diversion of supplies when the host state does not provide adequate security backup, and can ultimately only threaten with withdrawal or withdraw when their resources are being abused.

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[216] In this paper the cases of Jordan, Tanzania and particularly of Guinea have been extensively discussed. Observations from Syria (Viorst 1989), Sudan (Harrell-Bond 1986), and Kenya (Crisp 2000) suggest that refugees regularly stimulate economic growth.

Nonetheless, security is a humanitarian affair in the sense that it is concerned with further-ing the well-being of people, and humanitarian organisations must assume their share of responsibility, i.e. integrate regional and home country security considerations into the humanitarian rationale. "[R]efugee policy must be measured against the yardstick that it does not directly contribute to the creation of future refugees by keeping alive the cycle of conflict" (Zolberg et al. 1989:278). For withdrawal to be an effective means of pressure that can be used as a threat, it must be a realistic option. However, in most cases, wars would continue in the absence of humanitarian assistance, and the international community will still have to not only think about interventions that prevent or end wars, but as well about interventions that make them less devastating to human welfare. Refugee assistance is fairly effective in preventing human suffering, most importantly by forestalling forced repatriations. There can be little doubt that many host states only accept refugees because the international community provides assistance and host country governments can profit from the humanitarian system. If it was not for humanitarian aid, incidents of forced repa-triation would drastically increase worldwide. This could lead to an ending of some con-flicts, but given the practices employed in many wars, it would mean an ending caused by deaths on a genocidal scale. A negative peace thus achieved not only is hardly a basis for future peaceful processing of conflicts but further strengthens the impression that the em-ployed counterinsurgency tactics are a viable means for guaranteeing stability. [217] In order to achieve long-term stability, however, countries need to establish mechanism that relia-bly allow for a peaceful processing of conflicts (cf. Senghaas 1997).

Legally and empirically, the host state is the most important actor preventing operations of irregulars from its territory. When a host state does not assume that function, it rarely is because of technical or logistical problems, i.e. insufficient repressive capacities and a lack of infrastructures, but because of political considerations. It is exactly because humanitar-ian refugee assistance is most problematic where the refugees get involved in host state politics that humanitarian organisations have to analyse the political implications of assis-tance, and cannot pretend that the "political" in refugee situations relates exclusively to the politics that cause refugee flows. The international community may decide to support flee-ing oppositional groups and use humanitarian assistance as a means. This is a political choice which humanitarian organisations should be aware of. In order not to discredit hu-manitarian assistance generally, this political decision should be made clear. Provided that the international community is interested in preventing the abuse of refugee assistance, its main option remains to hold the host state accountable for cross-border raids and support promising regional security initiatives. Humanitarian organisations tend to consider inter-

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[217] Negative peace is defined as the absence of war. In contrast, positive peace is defined as a social setting reliably allowing for the peaceful processing of conflicts (cf. Senghaas 1997).

national military interventions the key to prevent the abuse of assistance in extremely volatile situations. Yet for two reasons military interventions are an unlikely solution to the problem. Firstly, an international security structure imposing humanitarian interests in the use of assistance for civilian purposes only is anything but in sight. Secondly and more importantly, military interventions would usually involve the consent and support of the host state. Given the direct link between elite interest in the host country and the activities of refugee-warriors, host states are likely to obstruct international efforts. They are thereby very likely to worsen the cost-effectiveness ratio of interventions beyond levels acceptable to the international community. Interventions are thus most likely ineffective.

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Abbreviations

AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
AI	Amnesty International
ANP	Alliance Nationale du Progrès
DSP	Division Spéciale Présidentielle
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Cease-Fired Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FAR	Forces Armées Rwandaises
FRONASA	Front for National Salvation
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
INPFL	Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
LDF	Lofa Defence Forces
LI	Ligue Islamique
LPC	Liberian Peace Council
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MFDC	Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MSF	Médecins sans Frontières
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NRA	National Resistance Army
PUP	Parti de l'Unitè et du Progrès

PDG-RDA	Parti Démocratique de la Guinée-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain
RPA	Refugee Populated Area
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RPG	Rassemblement du Peuple de la Guinée
RSLMF	Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SPLA	Sudan's People Liberation Army
UFDG	Union des Forces Démocratiques de la Guinée
ULIMO (-K, -J)	United Liberation Movement (-Kromah, -Johnson)
UPG	Union pour le Progrès en Guinée
UPR	Union pour le Progrès et le Renouveau
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Program

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