Theories, Concepts and Research about Work and Welfare States

Organizer: Professor Dr. Birgit Pfau-Effinger, University of Hamburg
Guest: Professor Neil Gilbert, PhD, University of California, Berkeley, Visiting Professor at CGG

Wednesday, 7 December, 2016, 16:00 s.t. – 17:45, AP 1, Room 250

16:00 Short Introduction

Prof. Dr. Birgit Pfau-Effinger

16:10-16:40

Thordis Reimer

Measuring German Fathers' Involvement in Childcare

In fatherhood research there is an ongoing question of how to measure fathers’ engagement in childcare. Recent studies mainly use (1) the amount of time spent on childcare and/or (2) the use of paid parental leave as core indicators of paternal involvement. To examine how these two indicators of fathers’ engagement have to be understood differently, this study juxtaposes the determinants of these indicators, also differentiating between absolute and relative (i.e. compared to their partner) measures. Four negative binomial regression models are conducted with GSOEP data on 712 fathers with a child born between 2007 and 2013. The results indicate that there are distinct relationships behind the four different measures of fathers’ engagement. Fathers’ absolute and relative time for childcare is mostly explained by other time-use measures and a couples’ employment participation. With regard to fathers’ parental leave use, the absolute rather than the relative measures might be more suitable to explain fathers’ constraints to take-up parental leave that are aligned to their work situation.

Comments from Professor Neil Gilbert

16:40 – 17:10

Marina Chugunova, Andreas Nicklisch & Kai-Uwe Schnapp

Production Effects of Needs Based Redistribution

Redistribution is one of the core functions of many modern states. Although a wide body of literature confirms that redistribution may lead to inefficiencies (e.g. Harberger (1964), Feldstein (1999), Keane (2011)), there is no agreement on the elasticity of the labor supply and thus on the magnitude of the inefficiencies. Tax funds are redistributed for the goals, which are seen as socially desirable and therefore the effect of taxation may be less straightforward than outlined in the formal models. Labor supply elasticities may be affected by a number of factors: apart from income maximization, risk-aversion and social preferences are likely to affect the support for redistribution (Sinn (1996), Wallerstein et al. (2001), Andersen (2013), Durante et al. (2014)). In this article, we quantify the potential effect of social preferences and more precisely of need-based rationing for redistribution in comparison to a black box redistribution. For this purpose, we conduct an experiment, where
participants perform a real effort task yielding a taxable income. Income maximization motive is coupled with redistribution and thus the harder the subject works, the more income she gets herself and simultaneously the more is available for redistribution. This design allows to have an insight on the support for redistribution through the working effort provision and estimate how large the inefficiencies are. Our experimental results suggest that labor supply does not respond to the tax burden in this type of setting, and even increases when recipients need the transfer. Moreover, tax transfers lead to increased effort provision of needy subjects to earn the minimum income in comparison to needy subjects who do not get the transfers. Thus, there are no indirect costs, but direct benefits of redistribution for tax payers and transfer recipients in terms of their productivity.

Comments from Professor Neil Gilbert

17:10 – 17:40

Ralf Och

A weak civic society? Political participation of senior representatives in elderly care policies in East and West Germany

The paper asks how differences in the political participation of civil society organisations in local social policy making can be explained by looking after participatory rights and actual involvement. The database for the analysis are 37 qualitative interviews and documents of two Western and two Eastern middle sized cities. It turns out, that the Eastern senior representatives show a higher degree of political participation, because Western senior representatives are more focused on their own target group and less active and less politicised. Eastern senior representatives are political more active and cooperative towards the local state and provide implementation resources.

Comments from Professor Neil Gilbert

Final Remarks

End of the Workshop 17:45