Prof. Dr. Gerd Mühlheußer
Room: 2056
Phone: +49 40 42838 5575
Email: gerd.muehlheusser(at)wiso.uni-hamburg.de
Office Hour: Tuesday 16:30-17:30 (please contact Jolanda Porembski for appointments)
Research Interests
Applied Microeconomics: Contract Theory, Industrial Organization, Personnel and Organizational Economics, Law & Economics, Behavioral Economics, Economics of Sports, and Environmental Economics.
Short Biography
- since 2011: Full Professor of Economics (W3), University of Hamburg, Germany
- 2008-2011: Associate Professor (W2), University of Bielefeld, Germany
- 2003-2008: Assistant Professor, University of Bern, Switzerland
- 2005-2006: Visiting Scholar, Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Evanston, USA
- 2002-2003: Jean Monnet Fellow, European University Institute, Florence, Italy
- 1999-2002: European Doctoral Programme in Quantitative Economics, University of Bonn, Germany, and London School of Economics, UK
- 1998: Diploma in Economics, University of Frankfurt, Germany
Recent Publications
Sequential location games. RAND Journal of Economics, 42(4), 639–663, 2011 (with S. Loertscher).
Screening in courts: On the joint use of negligence and causation standards. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 27(2), 350–375, 2011 (with E. Feess and A. Wohlschlegel).
How often should you open the door? Optimal monitoring to screen heterogeneous agents. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 67, 820–831, 2008 (with A. Ichino).
Black sheep and walls of silence. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 65, 387–408, 2008 (with A. Roider).
Global and local players in a model of spatial competition. Economics Letters, 98(1),100–106, 2008 (with S. Loertscher).
Transfer fee regulations in European football. European Economic Review, 47(4), 645–668, 2003 (with E. Feess).
Working Papers
Repeated Selection with Heterogenous Individuals and Relative Age Effects (with H. Dawid).
Optimal incentive contracts under moral hazard when the agent is free to leave (with F. Englmaier and A. Roider). (Status: Revise and Resubmit at European Economic Review).
Contracts as rent seeking devices: Evidence from German soccer (with E. Feess and M.Gerfin). (Status: Revised Version Resubmitted at Economic Inquiry)
Work in Progress
Efficiency, Equality and Leadership (with E. Feess and A. Lange).
The relationship between performance and contract duration: Theory and evidence from German soccer (with E. Feess and M. Gerfin).